AL-ALBAB

CONTENTS

AL-ALBAB
Volume 11 Number 2 December 2022

AL - ALBAB

VOLUME 12 NUMBER 2 (DECEMBER 2023)

CONTENTS

THEATER OF TRIUMPH AND TRANSGRESSION: RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE ON HOSPITALITY/ HOSTILITY IN THE VIRAL COMMUNICATION DURING THE PANDEMIC

Leonard Chrysostomos Epafras
Sekolah Pascasarjana UGM, Yogyakarta, Indonesia
Email: leonard.e@ugm.ac.id

Hendrikus Paulus Kaunang
Sekolah Pascasarjana UGM, Yogyakarta, Indonesia
Email: erichkaunang@ugm.ac.id

Jekonia Tarigan
Sekolah Pascasarjana UGM, Yogyakarta, Indonesia
Email: jekonia.tarigan@mail.ugm.ac.id

David Akbar Hasyemi Rafsanjani
Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies, Yogyakarta, Indonesia
Email: david.akbar89@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

The present article is the outcome of the research project on religious discourse in social media (socmed) during the COVID-19 pandemic. The research focuses on the concept of hospitality and hostility, through which a welcoming, along with hostile and unfriendly attitude are displayed by netizens toward other people, to understand the nature of social relationships over digital platforms. The research employs Social Network Analysis (SNA) and Social Media Analysis to explore and visualize viral communication on Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. The framework is viral communication as condensed sequences of actions revolving around controversial topics. Several topics under scrutiny, among others, are klepon Islami, Hagia Sophia, and Pope Francis' controversies. Jacques Derrida mainly informs the discourse of hospitality/hostility. The result demonstrated the sporadic vulnerability of traditional understanding of hospitality. It appeared in the presence of information arbiters as communication actors, taking the middle position and mediating controversial topics. The employment of SNA in dealing with interpersonal virtues in social media is promising, as it demonstrates its mechanism and making in a specific communication context. It allows for a deeper understanding and exploration of the theory of mediatization.

Keywords: COVID-19 pandemic, hospitality, hostility, hostipitality, viral communication

INTRODUCTION

The present article is the outcome of a research project investigating religious discourse on hospitality and hostility in social media (socmed) during the COVID-19 pandemic. The subject of the investigation is the selected controversial topics as a manifestation of a viralized form of communication (Postill & Epafras, 2018). The research sought to understand the nature of social relationships within specific religious virtue over digital platforms in a social crisis, such as a pandemic.

The etymology of hospitality and hostility came from the interrelated Latin words hospes and hostis. Hospes means "stranger," while hostis is both "guest" and "enemy," thus embodying two contradictory conditions, both welcoming and hostile to the Others ("Hospes," 2012, pp. 885–888; Kearney, 2010, p. 38). Hence, the tandem of hospitality and hostility created tension and ushered a way of questioning the existence of conditional hospitality and the limit of both in socmed.

Socmed realizes a unique context for the discourse under scrutiny as the expression of hospitality/hostility, like any social, religious, or cultural virtues, is mediated and operated within the instrumentalized social platform and digital technology that conflates rationality and emotional impulse and championed actors' performance and eloquence over their intentionality. Socmed is a friendly place to create nanostories and nanopolitics for the "ordinary" actors dealing with religious issues, complicating traditional religious authorities' position (cf. Postill, 2014; Postill & Epafras, 2018, p. 107). Furthermore, subjectivity in this setting appears in behavioral attribution (nodes, socmed accounts, hashtags, mentions, associations, etc.) rather than observable activities, such as in an offline context. On the other hand, the social interaction within the dynamic of socmed is haunted by the presence of bots (internet robots), poly-identification, pseudonymized, and anonymized actors exist along with the real accounts, hence complicating the meaningful social relationship.

While the research context is the COVID-19 pandemic, the present investigation limits the discussion on the immediate effect of the pandemic on religion. It expands it to other religious-connected controversies, such as during the earlier period of the crises when there was uproar among religionists in relationship with a drastic transformation of their religious practice, such as the regular ritual pushed out from the worship houses. Among those controversies ensued was the inauguration of the Catholic Bishop of Manggarai and Jama'at Tabligh's transmission clustering. Nevertheless, the present research focuses more detail on the following controversies, i.e.,

"klepon Islami" (Islamic klepon), "Hagia Sophia repurpose," "Pope Francis and the civic rights of LGBT," and lastly, the conflict between Muhammad Rizieq Shihab (renowned as Habib Rizieq Shihab, from now on referred as HRS) and Nikita Mirzani (from now on referred as NM).

The investigation of viral communication is visualized through the employment of Social Network Analysis (SNA) and Social Media Analysis, focusing on Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram as the source of data collection and analysis. The discussion on hospitality/hostility was informed by Jacques Derrida (Derrida, 2000, 2002).

At the beginning of the research in the May-June 2020 period, fourteen scholarly works were recorded in the first three pages of Google Scholar, which explicitly discuss the religious concern of the pandemic. Among those fourteen, twelve were related to Islamic discourse, and two were Christian (e.g., Campbell, 2020; Kowalczyk et al., 2020; Wildman et al., 2020). But none specifically discuss religious discourse on hospitality/hostility, let alone in connection with social media performance. This condition bears, however, the present undertaking's potential to contribute insight into the larger religious discourse in the context of the pandemic.

Religious actors often utilize crises to enhance hope and strengthen social solidarity, but others exploit them for specific agendas. Concern such as COVID-19 is tangible to religion. Early on, the United Bible Society organized prayer rallies for Wuhan and China. At the same time, when China is still struggling to contain the spreading, a prominent Indonesian preacher, Abdul Somad Batubara, renowned as Ustad Somad, in one of his sermons, quoted to remark that Coronavirus is a God's army (tentara Allah) protects Uyghur Muslims from the Chinese "infidel" government. A pastor of an Indonesian mega-church in the capital city made a claim quoting from "a research" that speaks of the tongue (glossolalia), a manifestation of the work of the Holy Spirit might boost human immunity to stand against Coronavirus, hence ensuring his parishioners not to be afraid to join the Sunday service in his church. When the outbreak got out of control, major Indonesian religious organizations such as Indonesia's Ulama Council, Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, the Indonesian Communion of Churches, and the Indonesian Bishops Conference issued instructions to limit the people movement, closure of the public prayer house and refocusing the praying activities at home.

The above responses are examples of the spectrum of religious talks on COVID-19. Some made sense; others were too distinctive and could only be understood within the respected religious community. They might tell us more than just the rhetoric of eternity. In the Indonesian social landscape,

these actively influence the socio-political landscape. It is the dawn of the online religion age. The COVID-19 outbreak forced traditional and organized religion deep into the digital realm.

COMMUNICABLE DISEASES AND COMMUNICATING RELIGION

Communicable diseases, such as SARS, MERS, and COVID-19 (Coronavirus), are not only medical facts. Once classified as "infectious" by the authorities (WHO, government officials, religious leaders, and others), they transformed into a social topic, the narrative of danger, an outbreak narrative. Priscilla Wald (Wald, 2008, p. 2) further observed the communicable disease.

> "[I]s also a foundational concept in studying religion and society, with a long history of explaining how beliefs circulate in social interactions. The idea of contagion evolved throughout the twentieth century through the commingling of theories about microbes and attitudes about social change. Communicable disease compels attention — for scientists and the lay public alike — not only because of the devastation it can cause but also because the circulation of microbes materializes the transmission of ideas. The interactions that make us sick also constitute us as a community. Disease emergence dramatizes the dilemma that inspires the most basic human narratives: the necessity and danger of human contact."

There is no more risk and a "what-if" scenario as a general topic. It became the sublimation of the risk and resided within the social network. The disease evolved with the human projection of life (e.g., "we fear God alone, not the corona"), the dramatization of life (e.g., panic buying), human self-understanding (e.g., "besides COVID-19, we are facing the plague of foolishness"), political decision (e.g., debates on locking down a region), and other complexities.

Viral communication is understood in two ways: transmission producing a series of trivial nanostories and nanopolitics on particular agenda setting by the netizens employing socmed as viral media such as Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, and LINE (cf. Postill, 2014). Such viralized communication may drive collective action that changes the socio-political landscape, as manifested in Jakarta's gubernatorial election 2017. Secondly, religious discourse is "controversies, or social dramas, triggered by a perceived breach of the religious space's precarious moral order in Indonesia" (Postill & Epafras, 2018, p. 101). It is a space event that involves "condensed sequences of actions that transform a social space" (Postill & Epafras, 2018, p. 104).

The digital realm created and enforced the echo chamber environment in which a social media follower of an account tended to enliven the ideological, political, and religious leaning they are attaching to, often actively discrediting others beyond their social space. Privatized social spaces such as WhatsApp and Telegram groups are a haven for such engagement. While it produces productive and constructive information and discussion, the closed-minded religious group nurtures a restricted religious outlook and quickly raises and distributes hoaxes, misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation. Viral forms of communication are the consequence of such structure and logic. It is often loud and raucous. Such a condition might blur the sense of threshold in a digital frontier of interaction – no welcoming greet to the guest in the digital realm. Hence, the speech it produces is susceptible to the extreme perception of the Other.

Viral communication is temporary unless a plausible supporting condition is met to make a public "consensus," or in a popular term, it becomes "trending." It is ephemeral since it will always change and create a different arena of controversy. In many cases, such communication appeared in the appeal for collective action on, for instance, humanitarian concerns such as the victims of Lombok's earthquake or Palu's tsunami. However, testifying to the increasing conservatism in the religious landscape, the viral form of religious communication also came with a price. The line between civility and incivility often blanketed with religious jargon, is often blurred, in which rancorous messages and comments are exchanged unguarded.

The article argues that COVID-19 is part of the human narrative and tells about humanity's interdependence with others, including nature, microbes, and viruses. The virus is an enabler, an actant through which humanity is being on trial, interrogated, and demanded transformation. The "trial" is the virtue of hospitality, or, on the other hand, enhanced the demarcation of the self and hostile to the Other.

Derrida introduced a neologism, hostipitality, an embodiment of hospitality/hostility (Derrida, 2000, p. 45, 2002, pp. 358–420). Hospitality is considered an aporia, "a dead end," an interruption, and a terminal invited for rupture and transformation. Hospitality, in this sense, is a paradox, as it started by losing the sense of home (chez soi) while challenging the singularity and unconditional hospitality. The "homeless" may come to decide to welcome the Other, both as a stranger and an enemy. The dynamic, furthermore, is also upon the nature of welcoming that there is always a tension between hospitality as a "must" and without "must-ness," between "ready" and "not yet" (Derrida, 2002, p. 361), which is slippery and could easily fall into hostility.

The hostipitality might reflect in the aporia, which complicates the socialization process when the "I" becomes the center and encounters the Other, the guest, or the stranger. One possibility is that it may rebound the flow of the process back to "I" rather than to the Other, strengthening the individualization reflexively. The waging of dealing with the Other becomes "calculated" if not "transactional" as the communication is mediatized. It might limit the meaningful relationship. The corridor of comprehension is restricted by the premeditated outlook toward the Other rather than creating a new horizon of understanding. Hostility might be the effect of such a process. On the other hand, it could open an alternative path that might end with a more readiness to encounter the Other within the context of acceptance. The viral communication squeezed this flow as there is an attraction to join the battle and intensity of conversation that might succumb to the readiness to let the homeness of a digital self share with the Other's view and to overcome the aporia.

Put it together, those insights will allow the present undertaking to frame the notion of hospitality as embedded in human interaction, including within the digital platform and network. Hospitality/hostility is an aporia, an unfinished transformation process beyond the moralized unconditional hospitality. Both are seen as potency and possibilities. It will no longer turn to the normative understanding promoted by institutionalized religion. Hospitality is also understood as a philosophical, theological category, and public lingo. More than just a personal, social, and spiritual attitude toward Others and Strangers, it is also a phronesis, a practical virtue expressed, in this case, over the digital platform. Hostility in the context of social media and the internet might reflect the perceived "digital ills" such as cyber bullying, micro-aggression, and hate spin. Those are an effect of hoaxtivism, which implies misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation. Moreover, it is a dramatization of transgressive collective actions. The tension between the two will be framed within the religious talk and relate to public piety, spiritual enhancement, and political contestation discourse.

HOSPITALITY/HOSTILITY IN VIRALIZED COMMUNICATION

The main course of the research includes the visualization of digital interaction through the SNA of tweets on the Twitter platform. Social Media Analysis detailing the SNA and expanding it through the analysis of Facebook and Instagram. Microblogging service such as Twitter is associated with the global democratic movement for their powerful influence on changing the political landscape. At the same time, Facebook and its subsidiary, Instagram, are the

most popular SNSs (social networking sites) that visualize the digital self. Other data collection methods include the observation of the news in online media. The Big Data service providers, Astramaya and Drone Emprit provide all those activities.

Figure 1. Klepon Islami and Hagia Sophia controversy (generated by Astramaya SNA).

The Pandemic announcement by WHO in March immediately became a religious issue, notably on the restriction of public worship. These provide an initial interest in the present research proposal. Some cases stood prominently, i.e., the controversy over the Bishop of Manggarai's inauguration, the case of Jamaat Tabligh Corona's cluster in India, Malaysia, and Indonesia, the Korean church cluster, and the polemics among Indonesian Muslims and Christians on onsite and online worships, including the controversy among Christians on the effectivity of speak of the tongue (glossolalia) in increasing the body immunity against the Coronavirus. SNA might provide us with further insight into the discourse of hospitality.

In the case of the inauguration of the Bishop, one of the numerous screen captures of Facebook discussions allowed for a reflection on the meaning of hospitality/hostility, which, as argued below, provided space for the encroachment of the existing structure; this regards the regional Roman Catholics' structure. An excerpt of it was as follows, a Facebook account Mxxx Axxxxx:

"[C]onfronting with the super religious enthusiasts (orang yang mabok agama) is tough. There is a huge gap in the health standard between NTT (East Nusa Tenggara) and Jakarta and other countries. They are (Jakarta's and other countries) overwhelmed (in dealing with the pandemic), let alone NTT. (Here) is not only the theatre of stupidity, (it is) a strange demonstration to look at the bishop with a smile on his grandeur garment while, deep down, his adherents' hearts are seized by fear of Corona. God is not our servant; it is a waste if we are stupid and resist cooperating."

The study by Widyawati and Lon (2020) demonstrated the complexities of the inauguration event to resolve the internal crisis of Catholic leadership in the region, though at the price of violating the government stipulation on public gatherings for the health protocol.

Such statements and their counterstatements might give us an understanding of how hospitality is discounted in the politics of religiosity. It further provides a sense that social media has become a powerful tool to challenge the existing religious authority, which might need to be more comfortable in regular interaction. It is even more complicated when other controversial issues, such as the polemic between a prominent Protestant preacher, Rev. Stephen Tong, and Rev. Niko Njotorahardjo from a Charismatic church on the case of the effectivity of speak of the tongue (*glossolalia*) to immunize the Christians, was simply continued the pre-pandemic religious contestation and historical tension between Evangelical and Charismatic Christianity of Indonesia. The above debate among Indonesian Christians and Catholics was not specifically prominent on Twitter, making it difficult to visualize it through the SNA.

Klepon Islami and Hagia Sophia's controversy were examples of religious-nuanced conversation through SNA because those potentially helped us visualize the operation of viral communication. *Klepon* is a traditional Javanese and popular snack from coconut, rice, and palm sugar ingredients. The controversy most probably started with a Facebook post on July 20, 2020, that criticized a poster picture organized as an advertisement entitled "*Klepon* (cake) is Unislamic" (*Kue Klepon tidak Islami*), which followed by lines, "leave the Unislamic snacks and buy the Islamic one. Various dates are available in our Shar'i shop." While it was probably a fabricated message, it triggered a massive debate on the socmed and was picked up immediately by many online media. Drone Emprit has done the SNA (Fahmi, 2020a), while ours initiated the same by combining it with the Hagia Sophia's controversy to observe the conflation over simultaneous events.

The Hagia Sophia controversy revolves around Turkish President Recep

Tayyip Erdoğan's announcement on converting the Hagia Sophia museum in Istanbul into a mosque. Formerly, it was the largest Eastern Orthodox-Byzantine church and, converted to a mosque when Constantinople fell into the Turkish hands in 1453, repurposed into a museum by the first president of the Republic of Turkey, Kemal Attatürk in 1935. Erdoğan announced on May 29, 2021, marked as the 567th anniversary of the Fall of Constantinople, to convert it to "return it to its original state" as a mosque, partly as a response to the U.S. president Donald Trump's recognition of the East Jerusalem and Golan's Heights as belonged to Israel. Indeed, an angry international reaction ensued to the announcement (Soylu, 2020). However, our investigation focuses on the Indonesian public response to the controversy.

Both observations are based on the four keywords: *Islami*, *klepon*, *Hagia Sophia*, and *Aya Sofia* in five periods, as the SNA screenshots informed the brief of a viral issue (Figure 1). These keywords only came to the entire dynamic at the end of July but slowly dissipated in August. However, as the four screenshots demonstrated, the actors appeared and retired. Different bubbles were formed and transformed, but the polarization posture was relatively retained, i.e., between the anti-Jokowi and others camps, represented by hashtags such as #klepon and variations of #jokowi and "pro-Jokowi" hashtags such as #kadrunlaknat. *Klepon Islami* created more heated engagement as the SNA figure dominated by it rather than Hagia Sophia.

The narrative of triumphalism is strong in the discussion on Hagia Sophia. Elias Canetti (1981) observed that the crowd is an active, living, and conscious entity that is mysterious and unpredictable and could perform discrepancies and even senseless activities. The individuals sought "power" and the feeling of overcoming by tightening themselves into the crowd. This is the case of the controversy. The anti-Jokowi and the aspirants of the Islamic revived glory through the repurpose of Hagia Sophia into a mosque had tightened them into a single narrative all along. The initiative created new pride among the Muslims, as manifested in a Twitter account such as @demoxxx, which bluntly remarks, "*Kebangkitan Islam itu nyata tweeps ..!!*" ("the awakening of Islam is real, tweeps ...!!"). However, this encountered little resistance among the Indonesian Christians, except for official reaction from the international Christian organizations, probably because such an issue is too remote for average Christians.

The two main narratives prominently represented the "anti-Jokowi" forces against a combination of "pro-Jokowi," other "progressive" Muslims, and the rest—the former emphasis the conspiracy, allegedly volleyed by the "pro-Jokowi" camp behind the *klepon* incident. "Diversion" (*pengalihan isu*)

often becomes the keyword for such allegations. SNA, upon observing five periods (represented as four figures in Figure 1), demonstrated a relatively solid narrative among the "anti-Jokowis," regardless of different accounts of centrality. At the same time, the opponent remained scattered even though it started with a prominent account such as @TretanMuslim. The "anti-Jokowi" force, though holding a vast spectrum of political and religious positions, tends to be conservative in its religious outlook. It may be confirmed the latest finding of PPIM (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat, Centre for the Study of Islam and Society), State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah (2020, pp. iii–iv) that it found 67.2% of netizens (in Twitter and YouTube) are holding such a position. Singling out Jokowi as the epitome of an anti-Islam force ensured the consistency of the narrative making and sustainability across different topics, trending, and viral messages, such as below on the conflict between HRS and NM.

Social transformation only appears through socmed engagement. Still, on the contrary, it is part of amplifying the coming final battle of the 2024 presidential election, which would not surprise if religious discourse played a significant part once again. Postill, Epafras, and Fahmi have warned that such socmed engagement might reflect unfinished business in the religious-political landscape. "Current affairs are recurrent affairs" (Postill & Epafras, 2018, p. 118), and those are a "political sentiment residual" in the Fahmi identification (Fahmi, 2020b).

Figure 2a. *Pope Francis' controversy on LGBT's civic status* (generated by Astramaya SNA).

Figure 2b. Pope Francis' controversy on LGBT's civic status (Source: Instagram, 2020).

Pope Francis' controversy was initiated after a quotation from his biographical movie "Francesco" (2020) regarding his support of same-sex civil unions. However, it gave a different meaning of virality as Catholicism is among the minority groups in Indonesia. The SNA displayed a far less complicated interaction, and the volume is much smaller than other viral topics. Figure 2a shows the "islands" of conversations, disconnected from each other, with scattered accounts creating an outer ring nebula, suggesting the focus is more on the figure of the Pope and his "controversial" statement rather than the collectivity it may be triggered. It may indicate dispersed responses not belonging to the single coherence narrative.

The debate revolved around the presumably non-Catholic Christians who criticized the Pope's position. Some of them employed biblical verses to support their anti-LGBT standing. Nevertheless, a closer look through Instagram analytics gave a more complex religious talk. @xxxkatolik, a Catholic IG account, demonstrated the most significant volume (160 loves), which defended the Pope's position that the Pope never annulled the Catholic doctrine of marriage between man and woman. The post only got

one response that merely shared the emoticon   that could be translated as a concurrence to the explanation. Our observation throughout some Catholic and Christian WhatsApp groups never displayed an excessive discussion on the issue, and it dissipated immediately in the coming few days. A study by Sunstein demonstrated that "people's level of interest in the same news stories was greatly affected by the network label" (Sunstein, 2017, p. 65). An example of that, according to the research, American Republicans are more likely to be attracted by the reports of Fox Network than others such as CNN or NPR. At the same time, the Democrats are the other way around. Applying the same logic to the present analysis, socmed account, as a paradigmatic "TV network's label," might limit the netizens' type of responses. Hence, the account @xxxkatolik might assure the Catholic netizens to accept the clarification from the Indonesian Catholic church, thus suppressing further debate on the topic.

However, the public, indicated by @vivacoid opening conversation, as the most significant volume of discussion (1014 loves and 325 comments) with tumultuous debate put forward by cross-confessional voices, but predominantly Muslim, displayed criticism to the Pope's position and discussed within their respective religious doctrine of sexuality. Even more interesting is @dakwahxxx (501 loves and 62 comments), a da'wa Instagram account that concentrated on Islamic spiritual self-help, sometimes political, suddenly taking this issue into their lap. Unsurprisingly, the responses are almost unanimously negative, regardless of some minor voices that attempt to draw attention to the complex problems of LGBT (see Figure 2b). Interestingly, this position is shared by some non-Catholic Christian voices that support traditional Islamic places on LGBT.

Ultimately, the seemingly unpretentious posting of @dakwahxxx, which held 570K Instagram followers, became the site of interreligious polemic and apologetics. Furthermore, through the tagline of the account to "Like [the posting] if you think it is beneficial. Comment if you want to share it with your friends. Share it if you want to enhance your religious act/virtue" (Like jika postingan ini bermanfaat. Komen jika ingin berbagi dengan teman. Share jika ingin menambah amalnya), demonstrated the nature of the religion of the hybrid media space, i.e., the convenient mobilization of religious aspiration mediatized by the digital technology: a religiosity at your fingertips. It may indicate the more significant concern in which the religious minority group tends to limit the confrontational situation they could not entirely control. At the same time, for the dominant voice represented by @dakwahxxx, such controversial issues might boost their religious agenda and strengthen their conservative view.

Hostility is prominent in viral messages, as displayed by Twitter's SNA, through the formation of epistemic and homophilial bubbles. Still, we also testified to more balanced and hospitable messages that tried to moderate the polarity. It would be even more potent if those messages could gain the position of an information arbiter, i.e., the role of mediating between poles, which tended to be critical toward both sides but somewhat acceptable by all conflicting parties. The information arbiter could echo a social structure change if it could gain the highest betweenness centrality position, such as once enjoyed by the Twitter account Jack Separo Gendeng (@sudjiwotedjo) during the presidential campaign at the end of 2018 and early 2019. Such a situation does not so much appear in the religious conversation in the present observation, except in minor appearances such as indicated by Figure 2b.

Figure 3. Controversy HRS vs. NM (Source: Drone Emprit Publications).

The case of hostility between Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, renowned as Habib Rizieq (HRS), and Nikita Mirzani (NM) explained several things. First of all, the prominent context of the hybrid media space, where the offline rhetoric of HRS, posted on social media, responded by NM also in social media (Fig. 3). Secondly, NM, according to Fahmi Ismail, succeeded in "split the wave" of the revitalized pro-HRS grouping after his return from Saudi Arabia (Fahmi, 2020b). By splitting the wave, NM opened up a more extensive discussion of morality, law-abiding citizenship, and the possible regrouping of the anti-HRS discourse. But beyond that, we testified to the presence of the information arbiters in this controversy, enacted by several online media such as @

CNNIndonesia, @detikcom, and @VIVAcoid. This might help us think again about the return of credible journalism as the fourth pillar of democracy.

Nice words and calm posture do not necessarily reflect hospitality, though probably a "neutrality" at best. Hostility might be the religious or political terminology, while hospitality became a subversive force. In viral communication, it might be within the polarized interaction. An Islamic Twitter account @sxxxx posted a message as follows: "Fathimah [i.e., Fatima, the daughter of Prophet Muhammad], a direct descendant of Rasulullah [i.e., the Prophet Muhammad], did not enjoy an exception before the law. Anyone who claimed himself, Habib, should maintain himself and obey the law." The hospitable message is an allusion toward HRS for his disobedience to the police summons. This is only one example that epitomized the critique of much Islamic leadership toward the questionable attitude of HRS in his conflict with NM that was associated with his "Habib" religious title.

Derrida introduced the term hostipitality as an innate of hospitality. That is, hospitality is always on the verge of hostility in a contradictory and paradoxical manner. Welcoming the Other always opens the possibility of hostility as several interaction features are at work, such as temporality, the face of the Other, and so on. Contextualized this insight in dealing with instrumentalized communication, such a condition might be identified as "splitting the wave" of the surge of popularity of HRS after his return from Saudi Arabia. It is interestingly allowing for the establishment of new NM moral standing, e.g., netizens revealed the charity work of NM as a silent benefactor for the remote area's honorary teachers (guru honorer). We may testify the hostipitality at work through which: (1) hospitality toward NM appeared as the counterbalance of the MRS' new slogan of "morality revolution" (revolusi akhlaq); (2) hostility/hospitality appeared as a political language, transgression against the hegemonic power (by the pro-MRS in their critics toward the government); (3) Appeared as "recalcitrant" language that confrontational, blunt, and prone to the social polarization.

The core of the theory of hospitality is the wager thrown by an agency in an encounter with the Other, the guest, and the stranger. Because hospitality presumed the reflective realm of interaction in which the self and the Other engaged (or "social dancing") in well-set (stabilized) existential interaction that implicated the condition of wages and vulnerability. Hospitality and hostility are the effects of those conditions. Nevertheless, those insights seem to demand further elaboration as frameworks to understand such situations in the context of viral forms of communication. "Cultures are lived; the digital is programmed," remarks Wiggins (Wiggins, 2019, p. 22),

heightened the condition of instrumentalized human interaction in the digital realm. Hospitality as a scale-free abstraction is challenging to obtain (cf. Candea, 2012). Such a wager loses its power in highly mediatized digital communication. The interaction among agencies is entirely translated through representational entities (socmed account, anonymity), complicating the reality of the Other. Epafras (Epafras, 2020, pp. 19–23) introduced the notion of "organic hospitality" to frame the dynamic in the context of hybrid media space. Organic hospitality is a more action-based and pragmatic mode of hospitality that is "innate" in the social network.

CONCLUSION: BEYOND TRIUMPH AND TRANSGRESSION

Admittedly, the value of hospitality in the traditional sense understood by average Indonesians is mostly sporadic and vulnerable to viral communication. The prominent challenge is the instrumental condition of communication that bares us from the evaluative power of such virtue: haters and saints dwelling on the same platform. Besides the beneficial and digital dividend, this communication platform is also a social space allowing for the mobilization of confrontational collective action, it is a fertile soil for religious polemic and promotion of conservatism, civil transgression, and deep distrust of the government, which inadvertently push the democratic agenda to the periphery. This confirms the decline of ideal public space that became a severe hindrance to digital democracy envisioned by some scholars (Deibert et al., 2012; Morozov, 2011). The effects of this condition are unfolding the digital paranoia, conspiracy theory formation, and the prevailing emotion over facts, thus heightening the state of a "post-truth" society (D'Ancona, 2017, pp. 61–76; Tapsell, 2017b; but see the critique of Harari, 2018, pp. 338–356). In short, hostility is reigning the day.

The expression of hospitality appears through the presence of the "third voice" and "information arbiter." The clarity of the message transferred became the new "morality"; hence, hospitality appeared as the "truthful message" exchanged, channeled, and curated by the information arbiter. Often, the arbiters are online media. Regarding the controversy between MRS and NM, the arbiters are @CNNIndonesia, @detikcom, and @vivacoid. Though indeed, it does not mean they maintain "neutrality" at all costs, as behind it, there is regulation on mass media, and further, social, commercial, and political interest of such mass media accounts, a reflection of the condition of hybrid media space, which convergence of capital and news outlets conflated (Tapsell, 2017a).

The pandemic does not remove the "recurrence" of the former polarity. It is

the same "obsessive-compulsive," reflexive and monitorial posture fostered long before the pandemic, through which panoptical power, sometimes an obsession to respond to specific conditions related to one's social, political, and religious concern, even to the point of invading other group's or individual's space (Epafras et al., 2019, p. 222). Hospitable words might be critically assessed as genuine with the possibility of double talk, ambiguous, and part of weaponized information.

Socmed has been the tool and medium for humanitarian purposes, framed within religious and non-religious language. A virality produced hospitality in generic terms, "organic" hospitality over the story of suffering, victimhood, religious conversion, and romance. Those might be a social commentary and projection of economic inequality, interreligious tension, transactional human relationships, religious conservatism, and other social challenges.

Regrettably, the investigation demonstrated different levels of hostility over limited hospitality. Those contribute to creating a conflicting arena, through which the polarization of public talks gives an impression of the dispute between "conservative" religious positions against the "progressive" voices. Aporia, in Derrida's construction, which allows for the possibility of rupture to the more transformative relationship, turned out to be a process of rebound, moving back to the self, creating a hostile to the Other. Hospitality and hostility appeared in polarized manners, in which the possibility of hospitality mainly was in the form of the ephemeral position of an information arbiter. Such a reflexive attitude and the intensity of communication suggest the emergence of "network fundamentalism," religious and social virtue created within the network rather than in the scale-free abstraction. If the pattern persists, it may, in the end, erode the establishment of digital democracy (Paterson & Hanley, 2020).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Campbell, H. A. (Ed.). (2020). *Religion in Quarantine: The Future of Religion in a Post-Pandemic World*. Digital Religion Publications.

Candea, M. (2012). Derrida en Corse? Hospitality as scale-free abstraction. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, S34–S48.

Canetti, E. (1981). *Crowds and power* (C. Stewart, Trans.). Continuum.

D'Ancona, M. (2017). *Post-truth: The new war on truth and how to fight back*. Ebury Press.

Deibert, R. J., Palfrey, J., Rohozinski, R., & Zittrain, J. (Eds.). (2012). *Access contested: Security, identity, and resistance in Asian cyberspace information revolution and global politics*. MIT Press.

Derrida, J. (2000). *Of Hospitality* (A. Dufourmantelle, Ed.; R. Bowlby, Trans.). Stanford University Press.

Derrida, J. (2002). *Acts of Religion* (G. Anidjar, Ed.). Routledge.

Epafras, L. C. (2020). Pandemi tak kunjung Padam: Corona, Kon Ora dan Keramahan Organik. In L. C. Epafras (Ed.), *Corona vs Kon Ora: Refleksi Teologi Keramahan dalam Konteks Pandemi* (pp. 1–27). Alaf Media. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4270495

Epafras, L. C., Kaunang, H. P., & Asri, S. (2019). Religious Blasphemy and Monitory Society in Indonesian Digital Age. *Kawistara*, *9*(2), 220–230. https://doi.org/10.22146/kawistara.41169

Fahmi, I. (2020a, July 22). *Kue Klepon Tidak Islami*. Drone Emprit Publications. https://pers.droneemprit.id/kue-klepon-tidak-islami/

Fahmi, I. (2020b, November 16). *Percakapan Tentang HRS VS NM*. Drone Emprit Publications. https://pers.droneemprit.id/percakapan-tentang/

Harari, Y. N. (2018). *21 Lessons for the 21st Century*. Random House.

Hospes. (2012). In P. G. W. Glare (Ed.), *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (Second, pp. 885–886). Oxford University Press.

Kearney, R. (2010). *Anatheism: Returning to God after God*. Columbia University Press.

Kowalczyk, O., Roszkowski, K., Montane, X., Pawliszak, W., Tylkowski, B., & Bajek, A. (2020). Religion and Faith Perception in a Pandemic of COVID-19. *Journal of Religion and Health*, *59*(6), 2671–2677. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10943-020-01088-3

Morozov, E. (2011). *The net delusion: The dark side of Internet freedom*. PublicAffairs.

Postill, J. (2014). Freedom technologists and the new protest movements: A theory of protest formulas. *Convergence*, *20*(3). https://johnpostill.com/2014/05/02/freedom-technologists-and-the-new-protest-movements-a-theory-of-protest-formulas/

Postill, J., & Epafras, L. C. (2018). Indonesian Religion as a Hybrid Media Space: Social Dramas in a Contested Realm. *Asiascape: Digital Asia*, *5*(1), 100–123. https://doi.org/10.1163/22142312-12340086

PPIM UIN Jakarta. (2020). *Beragama di Dunia Maya: Media Sosial dan Pandangan Keagamaan di Indonesia* (1/1/2020). PPIM UIN Jakarta.

Soylu, R. (2020, May 29). *Turkey goes back to the future as Hagia Sophia set for Islamic prayers*. Middle East Eye. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/quran-recitation-conquest-hagia-sophia-istanbul

Sunstein, C. R. (2017). *#Republic: Divided democracy in the age of social media* (Kindle). Princeton University Press.

Tapsell, R. (2017a). *Media power in Indonesia: Oligarchs, citizens and the digital revolution*. Rowman & Littlefield International, Ltd.

Tapsell, R. (2017b, February 17). *Post-truth politics in Southeast Asia*. Inside Story. http://insidestory.org.au/post-truth-politics-in-southeast-asia

Wald, P. (2008). *Contagious: Cultures, Carriers, and the Outbreak Narrative*. Duke University Press.

Widyawati, F., & Lon, Y. S. (2020). The Catholic Church and the COVID-19 Pandemic: Case Study of Bishop Ordination in Ruteng, Flores, Indonesia. *Journal of Law, Religion and State*, 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1163/22124810-2020011

Wiggins, B. E. (2019). *The discursive power of memes in digital culture: Ideology, semiotics, and intertextuality*. Routledge.

Wildman, W. J., Bulbulia, J., Sosis, R., & Schjoedt, U. (2020). Religion and the COVID-19 pandemic. *Religion, Brain & Behavior*, *10*(2), 115–117. https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2020.1749339

A NETNOGRAPHY ANALYSIS OF THEMATIC HADITH MEMES DISTRIBUTION ON SOCIAL MEDIA

Ermawati Usman
Universitas Islam Negeri Datokarama Palu
Email: ermawati@uindatokarama.ac.id

Nurdin Nurdin
Universitas Islam Negeri Datokarama Palu
Email: nurdin@uindatokarama.ac.id

Ashir Ahmed
Swinburne University, Australia
Email: azamed@swin.edu.au

Miftachul Huda
Universiti Pendididikan Sultan Idris, Malaysia
Email: miftachul@fsk.upsi.edu.my

ABSTRACT

Instead, the use of hadith memes among Muslim communities is rampant, and the study of hadith memes is scarce. This study, therefore, aims to examine the use of hadith memes by millennial Ulama and the types and content of hadith memes disseminated and exchanged in the virtual world by millennial Ulama. This study built thematic hadith memes based on their contents and formats on social media platforms using Rajan's (2015) theory of religious memes. This study employed a netnography method, collecting data from the social media sites Facebook and WhatsApp of Islamic millennial Ulama. We used a thematic approach in analyzing the data. Our results show that hadith memes disseminated on social media sites fall into four themes. The first theme is prayer hadith memes that present the traditions of prayers in Islam. The second theme is hadith memes related to sacrifice, which depict messages of Muslims' willingness to practice gratitude and to sacrifice to do things according to Allah's will. The third theme of the hadith memes is that they present messages about the afterlife, which tells about the end of life, such as life in the grave, hell, and heaven. The last theme is hadith memes about tolerance, which tell about the importance of living in tolerance and respecting each other. We conclude that our study contributed to understanding the distribution of hadith meme themes in the virtual world to enhance the sharing and exchange of Islamic teachings.

Keywords*: Hadith Memes; Social Media; Online Hadith; Thematic Analysis; Netnography*

INTRODUCTION

The Internet has enabled the spread of various forms of digital information for communication purposes. This digital information can be in images, text, videos, memes, and more (Rogers, 2021). Currently, memes have attracted more attention and become a subject of many researchers across the globe. Memes have also become a new media to facilitate the distribution of messages among Internet users. Studies found that more and more internet users search for memes on Google for various purposes, such as marketing, information sharing, and propaganda (Beskow, Kumar, & Carley, 2020). Memes have been widely used to spread information through various social media platforms, either just for notification purposes or for campaign purposes on various social, political, and educational issues, and even the dissemination of religious-related information (Ratkiewicz et al., 2011).

Previous studies found that most of the young Muslim generation no longer rely on conventional teachers or educational institutions, such as Ulama, madrasah, or Islamic boarding schools, to learn Islam (C.-M. Hefner, 2016). A survey conducted by the State Islamic University of Jakarta, which involved 1214 young generations from 34 provinces in Indonesia, also found similar results in which Muslim millennials have intensive access to online resources to increase their knowledge of Islamic teachings (Halimatusaʾdiyah, 2021). The changing paradigm in learning Islam reflects the changing behavior of the young generation in utilizing new media. The young Muslim age uses digital media not only for fun but also for educational purposes. As such, the role of digital media in religious studies has also become pivotal for the acquisition and dissemination of religious knowledge (Hjarvard, 2008). This caused the emergence of various digital platforms and digital media that interfere with knowledge authorities.

As a result of the phenomenon of using the Internet for communication purposes through various platforms, Islamic da'wah activities are also increasingly prevalent in multiple digital formats through social media and the form of digital memes. More than ten years ago, using digital images to distribute online messages and content caused the emergence of memes as a new digital media to facilitate digital information and knowledge exchange among virtual communities (Wood, 2020). Likewise, the spread of religious texts that were previously shared and communicated through manual leaflets has been transformed into digital memes, such as the dissemination of hadiths and Quranic verses (Syahridawaty & Qudsy, 2019). Even the religious memes of the Internet are considered to represent the humanist and spiritual ideas of certain people, which is called Sufistic memes.

Currently, the young generation tends to distance themselves from conventional religious institutions, such as Mosques and churches, to obtain religious-related knowledge because they are busy or attached to new media. Thus, creating and circulating aesthetically pleasing short-form videos such as memes has become a new media of religious dissemination that is considered meaningful for conveying more touching religious messages (Haden Church & Feller, 2020). The rampant use of memes has triggered the dissemination of religious teaching in online spaces. The memes support the virilizing of information at a low cost and minimum effort. In addition, Internet users can see the memes repeatedly because they are funny and attractive, which causes them to keep them in mind for an extended period and circulate them across Internet platforms.

The memorable characteristics of memes have caused them to be a practical tool for delivering Islamic teaching to online communities. Individual Muslim scholars or organizations can utilize memes to deliver various religious messages to change Muslim communities' knowledge and behavior. Islamic education and religious messages can be designed and modified with exciting characteristics and disseminated with memes. For example, hadith related to Islamic praying, fiqh, sadaqah, zakat, etc., can be delivered with interesting digital memes through images, videos, and texts. The memes can also be distributed and exchanged using various social media sites that connect Muslims across regions and the globe.

Previous studies (e.g: Obadă & Dabija, 2022; Zulli & Zulli, 2022) argue that most online communication modes have used memes on the Internet to distribute information and to persuade virtual communities to adopt particular behavior and knowledge. As such, various memes are growing in online space to shape communities and opinions. The memes also deliver various messages based on the creators of the memes' mission (Latchem, 2014). For example, business actors might create memes for their product marketing. In contrast, religious actors, such as preachers and Ulama, might create and use memes to deliver religious teachings and messages to their followers. This helps Muslim communities access knowledge by distributing religious memes, such as hadith and Qur'an verses memes, faster and more conveniently.

Likewise, popular Ulama such as Abdul Somad, Adi Hidayat, Felix Siauw, and others have carried out da'wah communication activities through various platforms on the Internet. The use of short memes in text, images, and videos is also increasingly widespread by individuals and religious organizations. Experts such as Bellar et al. (2013) said that religion-related Internet memes can shed more light concepts on religious concepts about religious messages in society.

The distribution of religious memes, such as hadith memes, has been found to be able to instill divine experiences of internet users even while transcending the constraints of mobile media that circulates them (Haden Church & Feller, 2020). Similarly, the use and distribution of hadith memes across internet platforms are considered to increase the Muslim community's spiritual experience and knowledge of various Islamic teachings. However, studies on the distribution of hadith memes and their topics shared in online space are scarce. Meanwhile, such studies are critical to providing deep insight into the distribution of various types of hadith memes across online platforms to increase digital hadith meme distribution effectiveness among Muslim communities.

Therefore, this study aims to examine and discuss the distribution of the types of hadith memes spread on the Internet. This study also intends to classify or categorize what sorts of hadith memes are spread on the Internet. In doing this study, we used Rajan's theory (2015) of faith meme types to examine the types of hadith memes shared in the social media groups of millennial Ulama in Central Sulawesi, both on Facebook and WhatsApp groups. This research is expected to provide understanding to academics and practitioners regarding the spread of hadith meme types in increasing public Muslim knowledge and spirituality.

NETNOGRAPHY APPROACH TO RESEARCH

This research used a netnography methodology to study community and social interaction in a virtual world (Bowle, 2010). The term ethnography comes from ethnography which is a research method to study communities' social interaction within a conventional context, and when the community interactions are practiced in a virtual world, then the ethnography becomes ethnography (Morais, Santos & Gonçalves, 2020; O'Donohoe, 2010). In this study, we examined millennial ulama social interaction on the Internet and social media platforms when they disseminate and exchange information in a virtual world. Communication in this study was related to the spread of hadith memes on the social media platforms of millennial Ulama.

The observation and examination of millennial ulama interaction on social media sites such as WhatsApp groups and Facebook were conducted for three months. Such observation and reflection resemble the ethnography method where the researchers and online communities (millennial Ulama) engage with the millennial Ulama and other online communities as practiced by Jeacle (2021). Through the use of netnograpgy method, we were able to understand deeply the interaction of millenial Ulama as virtual communities in sharing and transferring hadith memes. Then, we collected types of hadith

memes shared among them and other Muslim communities.

Furthermore, the analysis of hadith memes on the Internet was carried out by identifying and classifying the types of memes spread by referring to the theory of faith memes by Rajan (2015), which includes prayer memes, sacrifice memes, and end-of-day memes. We used the concepts from the theory to observe and categorize the hadith memes shared by millennial Ulama in Central Sulawesi on their social media groups. However, in this study, we are also open to new themes of hadith memes. In other words, Rajan's theory did not preclude our analysis of new themes of hadith memes shared by millennial Ulama.

The data from social media content analysis related to the spread of hadith memes was analyzed using an online content analysis approach (Su et al., 2017). This allowed researchers to understand the cultural context of human action in the context of online communities related to the spread of hadith memes. The content analysis results were categorized through a coding process by following the categories and themes of the memes (Seiffert-Brockmann, Diehl, & Dobusch, 2018) communicated in the social media groups of the millennial Ulama.

UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF MEMES

The concept of 'meme' was first mentioned by Richard Dawkins. It refers to the transmission of small units of culture analogous to genes that spread from person to person as genes spread themselves from one pool to another by moving from one body to another. Dawkins gives instances of memes such as slogans, fashions, and musical songs. As such, the term Memes has been transformed into Internet Memes when they are used and transmitted across internet platforms in the forms of digital messages and images, and they are quickly designed and transformed into new tools for online communication (Mielczarek, 2018).

The term of Meme has been simplified from the word mimeme, which relates to the concept of memory with genes. Memes can be defined as cultural units that duplicate themselves in a process of copying and imitating. In a broad sense, the concept of Meme includes repeated lines, phrases, images, behaviors, ideas, or fragments of ideas that are perceived to quickly stick to the minds of users and also spread quickly (Susan Blackmore & Blackmore, 2000). Then, memes are widely used as a new metaphor to distribute digital content in online space. The memes are considered to fit new media in online communication, and they are also fitted with other digital media species. The

memes also support delivering various types of messages produced by different individuals and organizations to be disseminated across online environments (Zhang & Pinto, 2021).

Internet memes support the production and the creation of online content in a new format to be distributed online across communication environments by adjusting messages to give them subjectivity and generating new ways of communication (Wiggins & Bowers, 2015). Memes can be in the form of images, content, and videos while at the same time adding other language elements to them that are able to adapt to the internet media environment (Rajan, 2015). Memes present a participatory notion in the context of online communication that leads to the production and utilization of content that often takes the form of humor. Memes often take the form of digital photos or images that are humorous and ironic and sometimes aim to provoke humorous and critical ideas in society (Brantner, Lobinger, & Stehling, 2020).

Internet memes are also considered to be highly visual and emotive online communications media that use images of popular culture with short messages to communicate. Internet users use the word Meme to describe a medium of absorption and dissemination of certain ideas presented in the form of written text, images, language, or other cultural units (Truszkowski, Rouff, Akhavannik, & Tunstel, 2020). These characteristics of Internet Memes' rapid dissemination and modification characteristics have provided insights into how culture is produced and transmitted in the context of new media. This process describes the participatory culture involving internet users modifying memes to distribute their digital messages.

Scholars found that the successful engagement of communities in online media space should be supported by the communities' literacy on digital media. Social media literacy aims to address the negative effects of social media use (Schreurs & Vandenbosch, 2021). Within religious message distribution, media literacy can help Muslim communities participate actively and exchange meaningful content to deliver Islamic teachings. In other words, the Muslim community must have better technological proficiency in being involved in pop culture discourses to make and design digital media content to enable the spreading of Islamic messages virally. Such viral distribution of Islamic information can lead to Live Religion (Silvestri, 2015), in which the Islamic information and teachings are circulated and manifested by literate Muslim society. Thus, Muslim society's ability to understand Internet memes as a construction created in the form of images and texts with various themes, such as religious culture or religious traditions, can be combined with our ability to understand elements of popular culture.

MEMES IN RELIGIOUS CONTEXT

Previously, memes belonged to political and business institutions to promote their interest and business. In context, the memes were mainly adopted and used by religious believers. However, currently, the memetic culture is consumed by religious believers. Their religious institutions also utilize it by creating memes in particular formats, such as a short movie to be distributed online (Campbell & Sheldon, 2021). Such short films may consist of religious preaching that mimics the style and the form of a popular culture meme.

It often does not explicitly list the identity of the author of the religious memes. Some research shows that posting photos generates more likes, and people will post repeatedly, making it more effective in spreading the message (Campbell & Sheldon, 2021). Religious institutions use this to their benefit by posting meme-image-based religious messages in the hope that they will spread effectively. The distribution of religious memes is particularly important on more fully structured social media sites such as Instagram, Pinterest, Google+, and so on (Brubaker, Boyle, & Stephan, 2017). Such used memes are a way of being metonyms for themes preached by religious institutions and thus become more easily disseminated. By attaching images in the dissemination of religious beliefs, the attention of social media users can be attracted and religious materials can spread quickly digitally (Burroughs & Feller, 2015).

The messages of religious institutions online usually aim to instill divine experiences in their followers and must even transcend the boundaries of the mobile media that circulates them. In response to this urgency, religious institutions' messages can overcome communication barriers by using *synecdoche* or language that represents multiple meanings to create a more complete interaction with God (Haden Church & Feller, 2020). Internet religious memes can simplify the dissemination of religious beliefs in a more effective way. The use of Internet memes in spreading religion has made religious content more accessible and possibly more relevant in the lives of religious people on social media networks. Internet memes can also help promote religious allegiance, but they can also criticize religious beliefs (Burroughs & Feller, 2015).

Religious individuals and institutions can act as a creator of religious memes by continually producing and distributing religious memetics on their social sites. Religious memetics can be incorporated with various religious teachings and messages to increase believers' knowledge and spirituality. The religious memetic can also be used for worship to make the believers more attached to their religion in online space. For example, Muslim society often shares memes related to praying, hadith, and Al-Quran verses for worship. Even though

society does not attend conventional religious learning, such as in schools, mosques, or churches, they still can learn religious teaching and practice it in daily life. This reflects that religious practices have jumped from the pages of scripture into a virtual reality, which is called a new home by millennial individuals, both religious and non-religious. Related to memes in the context of religion, there are three types of memes, according to Rajan (Rajan, 2015), namely:

1. **Faith Memes or Prayer Memes** are the format of memes that are used to encourage societies to build a prayer habit by attracting and persuading the society to read the prayer meme texts or images. The prayer memes also encourage people to interact and communicate with God. The content of prayer memes is often based on values embedded in scripture, compassion, and forgiveness. The prayer memes can influence people to practice their praying even though they interact online. The prayer memes also want to depict that society does not need to spend longer time and get bored doing rituals, but the ritual can be made shorter, understandable, and still with a sincere conversation with God. The prayer memes can also facilitate the practice of prayer and popular religious culture among people who may need to be more religiously literate.

2. **Sacrifice Memes** evoke a sense of gratitude that obligates people to follow a particular way of life. These memes reaffirm beliefs through visualizations of sacrifices God encourages people to make. For example, images around us show a selfless lifestyle and encourage others to live the same way. The potency of such imagery creates respect in the minds of people who do not belong to a religious tradition. The messages of such memes are simple and, therefore, appeal to those outside the tradition who are accustomed to the value of sacrifice. The depiction of sacrifice aims to reaffirm the belief in the love of God.

3. **End of Days** memes are formats of memes that use narratives and images to communicate about the coming of doomsday and its signs. These memes also present images of the destruction of the world and stories of life in heaven and hell. End times memes are also used to evoke fear in the mind of the viewer. Fear not only works as a threat that affects individuals, but it also requires an understanding of the scriptures that provide references for the separation of good from evil in relation to the day of judgment or the afterlife. Allah frees those who do good deeds by admitting them to heaven and punishes those who do evil. These end-times memes, therefore, show the glory and holiness of God only to users who have knowledge of the apocalypse and thus will be motivated by the fear portrayed in the Meme.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF HADITH MEMES ON SOCIAL MEDIA

The utilization of hadith knowledge acquired online in daily activities shows a high significance level. The use of hadith in everyday life is related to answering fiqh questions asked by the people in the daily lives of millennial Ulama, such as issues of worship and muamalah. Our study found that millennial Ulama uses the hadith knowledge acquired from online sources by sharing them on social media for the public to read. Transmitting hadith online has been done using previously popular memes in other fields, such as business, politics, and social affairs. Millennial Ulama is using memes to spread hadith that can increase the knowledge of Islamic society.

We found that the use of hadith memes in distributing Islamic teachings among millennial Ulama is considered an effective way to create participative religious messages and living hadith understanding among Muslim communities, as said by a millennial ulama as follows:

> "I think the reason to use hadith memes in circulating Islamic teachings among Muslim communities is to increase the participation of Muslim communities in creating digital media to ease the distribution of Islamic teachings because such memes are easy to make and can be distributed quickly across regions. Besides, by using memes in sharing hadith, we can create a live religious experience because religious messages can be created and shared by someone self " (Partcipant ANW)

The participant statement above shows reasons for the use of hadith memes in the distribution of Islamic teachings among Muslim communities. The arguments are consistent with research conducted by Aguilar et al. (2017) and (Campbell, 2017), who found that the use of memes in religious message distribution can create lived religious experiences and digital culture, which become essential resources for presenting popular beliefs about religions.

The hadith memes shared include thematic hadiths such as hadith related to prayer, hadiths related to the Day of Judgment, and related to making sacrifices, and related to tolerance. Here are some examples of traditions based on these themes:

HADITH MEMES ABOUT PRAYER

The hadith memes shared by informants are related to prayers that are often used in everyday life. The prayer hadith memes shared by millennial Ulama are prayers that are commonly used by the community. For example, memes of hadith prayers easily accepted by Allah swt are shown in picture 1 below.

Source: *https://www.islamquote.com/2020/04/13/dua-supplication-for-protection-against-evil-diseases/*

The two Meme hadiths above show prayer for protection from lousy characters and from evils and black magic, commonly practiced by Muslim communities. The hadith memes reflect several prayers often shared among Muslims and used in their daily lives. Millennial Ulama even shares hadith prayer memes from their own organization, namely *MajelisUlama Indonesia*, and also takes hadith prayer memes from other social media, such as Mutiara Islam.net, which are then shared in their social media groups.

HADITH MEMES ABOUT SACRIFICE

The second type of hadith memes that millennial Ulama often share are those that narrate the theme of sacrifice. The sacrifice hadith memes depict the willingness to do good deeds, sacrifice on Hajj, and give alms. Some examples of hadith memes with the theme of sacrifice shared by millennial Ulama on social media include the hadith depicted in picture 2.

Source: *https://www.nubontang.or.id/2020/06/berqurban-1-unta-atau-sapi-untuk-7-orang.html*

The two examples of hadith memes with a sacrifice theme encourage Muslims to make charity related to kind words and sacrificial prayers to slaughter animals. Such hadith memes can encourage the Muslim community to be aware and make charity, such as zakah and infaq, which potentially contribute to the welfare of the Muslim community. The distribution of hadith memes about the charity can increase the Muslim community's willingness to make infaq, sadaqah, and waqaf. This could help the government and improve Muslim society's economic welfare (Ascarya, 2022). As such, the distribution of hadith memes about charity and sacrificial animals can play significant roles in Islamic economic development.

HADITH MEMES ABOUT DOOMSDAY

The third category of hadith memes shared online by millennial Ulama are end-of-life hadith memes in which a hadith tells about the end of the world, the end of life, and lives in heaven and hell. These hadith memes are mostly intended to raise Muslims' awareness about the future of life and to prepare themselves by doing good deeds. Examples of these hadith memes include those shown in picture 3 below:

Source: *https://kumparan.com/berita-terkini/dalil-tentang-hari-akhir-jan-gan-diabaikan-1v5tRi1aWQL*

Such hadith memes narrating the story of hell and doomsday can prevent people from doing evil deeds. Such stories about hell and doomdays can function as moral apocalyptic instruments (Cook, 1997) which can be used as a guidance that prevents them from doing evil things. Such hadith memes are commonly shared through millennial Ulama's social media site, Facebook. The content of the hadith memes narrated about living in the grave and hell can also be used as material for dakwah by other Muslims.

HADITH MEMES ABOUT TOLERANCE

The millennial ulama generation also shared several hadith memes related to tolerance on their social media. Some of these hadith memes discuss the need to live well with neighbors, namely by loving neighbors as part of a Muslim's faith. The neighbors referred to here are not only Muslim neighbors but also non-Muslim neighbors. An example of a hadith about the need to respect neighbors is shown in Picture 4 below.

Source: *https://brainly.co.id/tugas/14909020*

Tolerance has become an important issue among millennial Ulama since they were trained with religious moderation topics in their Ulama cadet program. The religious material given during their ulama cadet program training were implemented daily by distributing hadith memes about tolerance with a neighbor and different race, as depicted in figure 5 above. The roles of religious authorities in promoting tolerance among societies have been found to be significantly important, in particular in reducing inter-race and religious conflict in Pakistan (Kalin & Siddiqui, 2014).

Given tolerance is an important issue in Indonesia (R. W. Hefner, 2021; Widayati & Maulidiyah, 2018), millennial Ulama shows their concern regarding the problems by stressing the importance of tolerance behavior and the importance of treating non-Muslims in a good manner. The concerns were reflected in the meme hadith they shared on social media as depicted in picture 6 below.

Source: *https://www.fly-cards.com/en/cards/108*

The distribution of hadith memes about tolerance is expected to grow a sense of tolerance and respect in the Muslim community to the non-Muslim minority. The sense of tolerance has become a critical psychological variable in raising mutual respect and forming positive feelings towards other minority groups(Dangubić, Verkuyten, & Stark, 2021). In some memes, tolerance also contains an invitation to love and respect fellow human beings, both fellow Muslims and other humans of different religions. The Prophet's words, "I will complain (to God) on the day of judgment," reflect the essential of respecting non-Muslim minorities. Sharing memes and hadith could potentially provoke the Muslim community to love other religious believers.

Memes tolerance has been discussed in the previous study, but it is limited to social and political context (Tawadros, 2020) rather than religious context.

[183]

In this study, religious meme tolerance was found to be shared in the form of hadith memes, which is a new theme. The memes hadith about religious tolerance in this study is different from Rajan's (2015) theory, which focuses on three themes: prayer, sacrifice, and the day after memes. Therefore, memes about tolerance are the new finding of this study. The finding of hadith memes about tolerance contributes to the development of theory in the context of hadith memes study. The new finding as the result of our netnography method we used in this study allows us to explore online phenomenon of virtual communities (Caliandro, 2014; Kulavuz-Onal, 2015; Lizzo & Liechty, 2022) of ulama millenial interaction in creating and distributing of hadith memes.

CONCLUSION

The results of our study show that various hadith memes shared by millennial Ulama on their social media can be categorized into four themes. Three of the themes are following Rajan's (2015) theory. However, in this study, the themes of hadith memes have been adapted to the context of hadith memes so that they are in accordance with the Islamic context, namely hadith memes about prayers, hadith memes about the last days such as the grave, and the day of judgment, and hadith memes related to pleasing sacrifices such as selfless sacrifice and sacrifice by giving alms. In this study, we also found a new theme of hadith memes, namely hadith memes about tolerance, which is an important theme in the context of the Indonesian state, especially in the context of the department of religion as the spearhead of maintaining moderation among Muslims.

This research only focused on the themes of hadith shared by the millennial ulama generation through the social media Facebook and WhatsApp. This research has not studied whether the individuals who share them have an excellent or superficial understanding of hadith. In the future, there is a need for further research that also focuses on in-depth interviews with individuals who often share hadith on social media to find out their level of knowledge about hadith.

Although some researchers argue that people who learn hadith through Internet memes have a superficial understanding of the meaning of hadith, the spread of hadith in the form of various memes can increase people's knowledge of different types of hadith. For example, hadiths related to prayers can increase the piety of people's understanding of multiple prayers derived from hadith. Then, the hadiths about sacrifices, such as sacrificing for charity, can increase the willingness of Muslims to make charity.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aguilar, G. K., Campbell, H. A., Stanley, M., & Taylor, E. (2017). Communicating mixed messages about religion through internet memes. *Information, Communication & Society, 20*(10), 1498-1520. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2016.1229004

Ascarya, A. (2022). The role of Islamic social finance during Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia's economic recovery. *International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management, 15*(2), 386-405. doi:10.1108/IMEFM-07-2020-0351

Bellar, W., Campbell, H. A., Cho, K. J., Terry, A., Tsuria, R., Yadlin-Segal, A., & Ziemer, J. (2013). Reading Religion in Internet Memes. *Journal of Religion, Media and Digital Culture, 2*(2), 1-39. doi:https://doi.org/10.1163/21659214-90000031

Beskow, D. M., Kumar, S., & Carley, K. M. (2020). The evolution of political memes: Detecting and characterizing internet memes with multi-modal deep learning. *Information Processing & Management, 57*(2), 102170. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipm.2019.102170

Bowle, G. M. (2010). Netnography: A Method Specifically Designed to Study Cultures and Communities Online and Communities Online. *The Qualitative Report, 15*(5), 1270-1275.

Brantner, C., Lobinger, K., & Stehling, M. (2020). Memes against sexism? A multi-method analysis of the feminist protest hashtag #distractinglysexy and its resonance in the mainstream news media. *Convergence, 26*(3), 674-696. doi:10.1177/1354856519827804

Brubaker, P., Boyle, K., & Stephan, D. (2017). The Shared Cultural Experience: A Comparison of Religious Memes Created by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Religious Media, and Church Members. *Journal of Media and Religion, 16*(2), 67-79. doi:10.1080/15348423.2017.1311127

Burroughs, B., & Feller, G. (2015). Religious Memetics:Institutional Authority in Digital/Lived Religion. *Journal of Communication Inquiry, 39*(4), 357-377. doi:10.1177/0196859915603096

Caliandro, A. (2014). Ethnography in Digital Spaces: Ethnography of Virtual Worlds, Netnography, & Digital Ethnography In R. M. Denny & P. L. Sunderland (Eds.), *Handbook of Anthropology in Business* (pp. 22). London: Routledge.

Campbell, H. A. (2017). Religious communication and technology. *Annals of the International Communication Association, 41*(3-4), 228-234. doi:10.1080/23808985.2017.1374200

Campbell, H. A., & Sheldon, Z. (2021). Religious Responses to Social Distancing Revealed through Memes during the COVID-19 Pandemic. *Religions, 12*(9), 787.

Cook, D. (1997). Moral Apocalyptic in Islam. *Studia Islamica*(86), 37-69. doi:10.2307/1595805

Dangubić, M., Verkuyten, M., & Stark, T. H. (2021). Understanding (in)tolerance of Muslim minority practices: a latent profile analysis. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 47*(7), 1517-1538. doi:10.1080/1369183X.2020.1808450

Haden Church, S., & Feller, G. (2020). Synecdoche, Aesthetics, and the Sublime Online: Or, What's a Religious Internet Meme? *Journal of Media and Religion, 19*(1), 12-23. doi:10.1080/15348423.2020.1728188

Halimatusa'diyah, I. (2021). Launching Hasil Penelitian PPIM UIN Jakarta "Beragama ala Anak Muda: Ritual No, Konservatif Yes". Retrieved 10 Desember 2023, from PPIM UIN Jakarta https://ppim.uinjkt.ac.id/2021/12/09/launching-hasil-penelitian-ppim-uin-jakarta-beragama-ala-anak-muda-ritual-no-konservatif-yes/

Hefner, C.-M. (2016). Models of Achievement: Muslim Girls and Religious Authority in a Modernist Islamic Boarding School in Indonesia. *Asian Studies Review, 40*(4), 564-582. doi:10.1080/10357823.2016.1229266

Hefner, R. W. (2021). Islam and Institutional Religious Freedom in Indonesia. *Religions, 12*(6), 415.

Hjarvard, S. (2008). The mediatization of religion: A theory of the media as agents of religious change. *Northern Lights: Film & Media Studies Yearbook, 6*(1), 9-26. doi:https://doi.org/10.1386/nl.6.1.9_1

Jeacle, I. (2021). Navigating netnography: A guide for the accounting researcher. *Financial Accountability & Management, 37*(1), 88-101. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/faam.12237

Kalin, M., & Siddiqui, N. (2014). *Religious Authority and the Promotion of Sectarian Tolerance in Pakistan*. Retrieved from Washington:

Kulavuz-Onal, D. (2015). Using Netnography to Explore the Culture of Online Language Teaching Communities. *CALICO Journal, 32*(3), 426-448.

Latchem, C. (2014). Musing on the memes of open and distance education. *Distance Education, 35*(3), 400-409. doi:10.1080/01587919.2015.955266

Lizzo, R., & Liechty, T. (2022). The Hogwarts Running Club and Sense of Community: A Netnography of a Virtual Community. *Leisure Sciences, 44*(7), 959-976. doi:10.1080/01490400.2020.1755751

Mielczarek, N. (2018). The "Pepper-Spraying Cop" Icon and Its Internet Memes: Social Justice and Public Shaming Through Rhetorical Transformation in Digital Culture. *Visual Communication Quarterly, 25*(2), 67-81. doi:10.1080/15551393.2018.1456929

Morais, G. M., Santos, V. F., & Gonçalves, C. A. (2020). Netnography: Origins, Foundations, Evolution and Axiological and Methodological Developments and TrendsMethodological Developments and Tre. *The Qualitative Report, 25*(2), 441-455.

O'Donohoe, S. (2010). Netnography: Doing Ethnographic Research Online. *International Journal of Advertising, 29*(2), 328-330. doi:10.2501/S026504871020118X

Obadă, D.-R., & Dabija, D.-C. (2022). "In Flow"! Why Do Users Share Fake News about Environmentally Friendly Brands on Social Media? *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 19*(8), 4861.

Rajan, B. (2015). Faith Memes: An Analysis of Authority as Reflected in the Social Media of Churches in New Delhi. *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion, 11*, 1-23.

Ratkiewicz, J., Conover, M., Meiss, M., Gonçalves, B., Patil, S., Flammini, A., & Menczer, F. (2011). *Detecting and Tracking the Spread of Astroturf Memes in Microblog Streams.* Paper presented at the Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 20th international conference companion on World wide web, Hyderabad, Hyderabad.

Rogers, R. (2021). Visual media analysis for Instagram and other online platforms. *Big Data & Society, 8*(1), 20539517211022370. doi:10.1177/20539517211022370

Schreurs, L., & Vandenbosch, L. (2021). Introducing the Social Media Literacy (SMILE) model with the case of the positivity bias on social media. *Journal of Children and Media, 15*(3), 320-337. doi:10.1080/17482798.2020.1809481

Seiffert-Brockmann, J., Diehl, T., & Dobusch, L. (2018). Memes as games: The evolution of a digital discourse online. *New Media & Society, 20*(8), 2862-2879. doi:10.1177/1461444817735334

Silvestri, L. E. (2015). *Friended at the Front*

Social Media in the American War Zone: University Press of Kansas.

Su, L. Y.-F., Cacciatore, M. A., Liang, X., Brossard, D., Scheufele, D. A., & Xenos, M. A. (2017). Analyzing public sentiments online: combining human- and computer-based content analysis. *Information, Communication & Society, 20*(3), 406-427. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2016.1182197

Susan Blackmore, & Blackmore, S. J. (2000). *The Meme Machine*. London: Oxford University Press.

Syahridawaty, S., & Qudsy, S. Z. (2019). The Contestation of Hadith Memes on the Prohibition of Music *Journal of Hadith Studies, 2*(1), 23-36.

Tawadros, A. S. N. (2020). A Network Analysis Approach to the Diffusion of Tolerance Memes. *Nile Valley Journal for Humanitarian, Social and Educational Studies and Research.* 24-1, (26).26

Truszkowski, W., Rouff, C., Akhavannik, M., & Tunstel, E. (2020). *Memes, Culture, the Internet, and Intelligence.* London: Springer.

Widayati, S., & Maulidiyah, E. C. (2018). *Religious Tolerance In Indonesia.* Paper presented at the 2nd International Conference on Education Innovation (ICEI 2018).

Wiggins, B. E., & Bowers, G. B. (2015). Memes as genre: A structurational analysis of the memescape. *New Media & Society, 17*(11), 1886-1906. doi:10.1177/1461444814535194

Wood, M. A. (2020). Policing's 'meme strategy': understanding the rise of police social media engagement work. *Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 32*(1), 40-58. doi:10.1080/10345329.2019.1658695

Zhang, B., & Pinto, J. (2021). Changing the World One Meme at a Time: The Effects of Climate Change Memes on Civic Engagement Intentions. *Environmental Communication, 15*(6), 749-764. doi:10.1080/17524032.2021.1894197

Zulli, D., & Zulli, D. J. (2022). Extending the Internet meme: Conceptualizing technological mimesis and imitation publics on the TikTok platform. *New Media & Society, 24*(8), 1872-1890. doi:10.1177/1461444820983603

APOCALYPTIC PROPAGANDA:
HOW THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MANUFACTURED CONSENT ON THE WAR ON TERROR

Carin Blom
Independent researcher
Email: cmblom68@gmail.com

Tomas Lindgren
Umeå University, Sweden
Email: tomas.lindgren@umu.se

ABSTRACT

War and propaganda have been linked together for a long time because of a natural human inhibition against killing other humans. To get citizens to give their consent to go to war and kill, the leader(s) need to influence them. The aim of this study is to analyse the content and functions of the U.S. governments post 9/11 propaganda to find out how this where done. Coyne and Hall argue that propagandists need the publics enlighted consent to be able to influence them. This work will prove that the U.S. government used propagandistic tools, like the fear of our own and our civilizations annihilation through an apocalyptic language, to circumvent our rational thinking and talk unbridled to our emotions and thereby inhibit our higher cognitive functions. As method we use bricolage. Bricolage interpretations adapt different technical discourses to each other and move freely between different techniques and concepts. In this work it had an advancement over other methods because our field of investigation stretched over different fields of research and we were free to use the method that best suited our collected data. We demonstrate that the U.S. government functioned as fearmongers on their home audience to stir up emotions so the citizens would choose the path that best suited the leader(s), but that it was far from being enlighted.

Keywords: Propaganda; Totalism; Apocalypse; War on Terror

INTRODUCTION

Since the foundation of the United States of America in 1776, war and propaganda have been linked to shape the opinions of domestic audiences (Coyne & Hall 2021). In line with this statement Noam Chomsky claims "Usually the population is pacifist, just like they were during the First World War. The Public sees no reason to get involved in foreign adventures, killing, and torture. So you have to whip them up" (Chomsky 2002b: 30). This is

exactly what happened after the 9/11 attacks (2001).

In this article, we focus on the content of the (religiously and apocalyptically inspired) post-9/11 propaganda in George W. Bush and his governments speeches, how it was used by the government to manufacture consent for the war on terror, and its implications. The aim is to increase our understanding of how war propaganda can circumvent our rational thinking by talking exclusively to our emotions and thus make ordinary people vulnerable to governments choice of action.

Drawing on public statements, secondary literature, and theories of propaganda (Herman and Chomsky 1998/2002; Coyne and Hall 2021; Stanley 2016) and totalism (Lifton 2003), we argue that the post-9/11 propaganda was deliberately used by the U.S. government to circumvent their own citizens´ higher cognitive functions. By talking directly to our emotions by exaggerating the threats from outside through apocalyptic language, the President George W. Bush made the people of USA dependent on him and his government for survival.

As method of analysis, we use bricolage. With bricolage interpretation we adapt different technical discourses to each other and move freely between different techniques and concepts; this ad hoc approach allows us to find connections and structures that do not seem to belong together and notice patterns and themes, see plausibility, and juxtapose to see "what went with what" (Kvale & Brinkmann 2014:282). Bricolage has an advantage over other methods in that our research stretched over many theories and we were free to use the method of analysis that best suited the collected data.

PROPAGANDA

Chomsky (2011) argue that propaganda is to a democracy what violence is to a dictatorship. Propaganda is a means of framing and transmitting information from the government to the population according to Coyne & Hall (2021). The ability to frame issues and to define how political controversies are presented to the public is the most useful tool political elites have at their disposal. This tool is invaluable in times of war. Propaganda is also used as a coordination tool. Thus, propaganda is a means to generate general knowledge. The key characteristic of public knowledge is that it is public–that is, widely distributed and known by the population. This creates an experience of shared expectations because everyone is convinced that everyone else has the same information. The final use of propaganda is to instil, or reinforce, collective fear in the home audience. It could be fear of terrorism, panic regarding crime

or concern about moral decay. Citizens' fear of external threats and their demands on governments to protect them, creates room for state actors to expand their power.

To influence the population in the chosen direction, Coyne and Hall writes, the government of the United States used four common means of influence. First, appeal to authority - propaganda usually includes markings of government authority. The technology is intended to give the government credibility by reinforcing the message that the government is the one who can solve the threat. Second: the appeal to patriotism - propaganda tries to stir up widespread and powerful support for the government, which in turn represents the "Nation". This technique aims to link support for an activity for the "common good" and "the country". Support for the activity is associated with the advancement of "national interests" while, directly or indirectly, non-visible support of these interests suggests a lack of interest in the public good which equates to be unpatriotic or, worse, being a fifth columnist. The above means of influence are looking to rally national support for the nation's military and create a link for widespread acceptance of the relation between the government, the nation, and a war effort. Third: appeal to differences between "Us" and "Them" - the goal of propaganda at this stage is to create well-defined, black-and-white distinctions between "ingroups", the nation and their allies, and "outgroups", enemies, and their allies. The goal of the propagandist is to give the target audience a clear, distinct, and simple choice between two sides, without nuances or intricate details. This propaganda technique reinforces feelings of patriotism because the ingroup is the "nation" and the outgroup is "the others" who threaten the way of life and even life itself within the ingroup. Finally, is the appeal to simple slogans and images - the language of propaganda usually consists of simple images and slogans so that they are easily remembered and speaking unbridled to the emotions of the target group. By simplifying complex foreign affairs, patriotic themes and "us versus them", feelings are reinforced and amplified. Furthermore, the oversimplified slogans and imagery of the propaganda prevent any meaningful nuance in the complex issues they represent. The goal of propaganda in this case is to limit the debate about information and ideas in favour of the government's point of view, which gives them power over the citizens information gathering.

Jason Stanley (2015) put forward in *How propaganda works*, that it is inequality that results in anti-democratic flawed ideologies. In this article we use the inequality about knowledge between the elites (the U.S. government and military complex) who have the means – through fundings from big lobby groups like the weapon industry, media conglomerates (and Christian Zionist

groups, see Lampman 2004), to form the information reaching those without means. He also argues that the audience would not believe a liar, so the reason propaganda seems sincere to the audience is because the propagandists themselves believe in a flawed ideology and therefore could speak out of belief, therefore he continues, propaganda will always be invariably political.

TOTALISM

Drawing on intensive studies of POW´s, Robert J. Lifton distinguishes between eight steps of indoctrination in *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism* (2014). Later he added this knowledge to the shaping of U.S. response to Iraq after 9/11 through an apocalyptic propaganda in *Superpower Syndrome – America´s apocalyptic confrontation with the world* (2003). We use Lifton's eight steps theory and his thesis of the superpower syndrome to explain the psychological results of propaganda.

Milieu control. The foundation of all totalitarian milieus, according to Lifton, is the control over human communication, both external and internal. Those who practise milieu control experience a sovereign surge of power and are convinced that the perception of the reality they embrace is the right one - they "own reality".

Mysterious manipulation and planned spontaneity. The next step towards totalism is a comprehensive manipulation of the individual. This step is controlled and planned by the leader(s) to create behaviours and emotions that should seem to appear spontaneously in the environment. In this atmosphere, the image arises of having a higher purpose after an idea of a higher order in society and that it is they, the leaders, who are the vanguard of this change (Lifton 2003, see also: Klemperer 1975/2020 Chomsky 2002, Coyne & Hall 2021).

In this article we interpret the "sense of mystery", to the need for secrecy and a sense of a "noble deception" within the U.S. government, the latter is necessary because the public do not know what is best for them (Coyne & Hall 2021: 16, Stanley 2015). In opposition to Lifton claiming the leaders do not solely do this for the sake of power, Coyne and Hall (2021), and Stanley (2015) argue that the members of the security state have a strong incentive to protect their monopoly over information because of the power it gives them to control the policy and the benefits that come with that power. We agree with this interpretation.

The demand for purity. In milieus where thought control is involved, the world is divided into pure and impure, the inherent good and the inherent evil. The

good are the ideas, feelings and actions that are in line with the ideology and its policy; everything else is banished to that which is unclean and thus evil. By manipulating the definitions of what is "pure" and introducing full-scale war against all "unclean", the government creates a very narrow corridor of guilt and shame among its citizens where the individual constantly needs to try to adapt to the group norm (Are you with us or with the terrorists?).

Here we start to deviate from Coyne and Halls belief that the government needs the recipient's consent to be able to influence and, if they do not receive this consent nor could influence it – rather it is at this step governments tighten their grip around that consent based on misleading propaganda and fear that impede our rational thinking in favour of emotions.

Confessions. In close relation to the requirement of purity above, is an obsession with personal confession. Confessions in this phase are, according to Lifton (2014) beyond the religious, legal, or therapeutic confessions we are used to and become in themselves a cult phenomenon.

This article originates in Lifton's theory, but here we take a slightly different perspective, namely that instead of confessing sins, the individual must confess his/her fidelity to American ideals and symbolism; for example, the flag, the constitution, the American exceptionalism and the "War on Terror" - all of which can be found under the word "patriotism".

Holy knowledge. The government maintains an aura of "holiness" about its dogma by pointing to the moral vision for the survival of human existence. That it is sacred is evident from the fact that it is forbidden, though not explicitly stated, to question the assumptions about reality that are made, as well as by those who represent it. The inner demand for clear answers and the avoidance of ambiguity will prevent the individual from gaining the insights necessary for individuality and creativity (Lifton, 2014). And if it prevents individuality and creativity, it also prevents enlightened consent, in line with our theory.

Loading the language. The language in a totalitarian environment is characterised by thought-terminating clichés. Complex problems shrink down to short, sharply reduced, definitive and easy-to-spread messages. In the American version of thought reforms after 9/11, the phrase "war on terrorism" was used to dismiss problematic questions about the terrorists as individuals, as well as a general search for perspective and balance in what happened. In addition to the fact that the thought-terminating clichés function as shortcuts, they also become, according to Richard Weavers (Lifton 2014:429), "absolute conditions" - either "God's" conditions, which represent the ultimate good, or "the Devil's" conditions representing the ultimate evil. The totalitarian

language is thus centred around an all-encompassing jargon that is simplified, categorised, and judgemental. Lionel Trilling (Lifton 2014:429) calls it "the language of non-thinking".

Doctrine over person. The sterility of language is reflected in another characteristic of ideological totalism, the subordination of the human experience under the ideology. The consequence of this mindset is that previous historical events are changed, rewritten, or ignored for them to be in line with the inner logic of the ideology. If I doubt, the leader(s) addresses this doubt by throwing it back at me, and accuses me of inner weaknesses, such as not being patriotic enough and producing thought-terminating clichés such as: "You are either with us, or with the terrorists."

Dispensing of existence. Totalist ideologues believe that they have the divine power to decide who has the right to exist and who does not. Those who have lost that right have also been degraded to "subhuman" and are thus relegated to the bottom of society and, in its most extreme form - death.

Once here, the individual in the totalitarian milieu experiences polarised emotional conflicts that are about the ultimate existence (Lifton, 2014). The totalitarian environment has evoked a fear of one's own annihilation that cannot be alleviated by other individuals, only from the source of all justification - the totalitarian organisation itself.

With the term *Superpower Syndrome* Lifton describes a national mindset which is strongly put forward by a tight-knit leadership group who takes on a sense of omnipotence, of a unique standing in the world, that grants them the right to hold sway over all other nations (Lifton 2003:3, see also *the indispensable Nation Syndrome* Stranne & Parsi 2023: 92 ff, Bacevich 2021). He also describes the apocalypse and the human nature psychologically as a need for us to understand how our death fits into the cosmic order. Individual death, Lifton says (2003:19), when associated with the death and rebirth of the world, can take on special significance and high nobility. He continues to explain that participation in an apocalyptic project offers expression for two primal human aspirations, the urge toward spiritual or ethical improvement. After 9/11, in the U.S., this was visualised through an embrace of what was perceived as radical good and the urge to become part of something larger than oneself but also sacred and eternal. If we set aside the apocalyptic theme in the propaganda, the theme of purifying resurrection of those who win fulfilled the needs of the audiences to be part of something larger than life.

PROPAGANDA AND TOTALISATION IN THE WAR ON TERROR

The U.S-citizen has inherited their Christian worldview from their approximately fifty million European descendants who emigrated to the United States between 1820-1930. Most of them where puritans fleeing from the Catholic church purgatory of Europe of protestants, with them came a black and white worldview. Through Christian Zionism they also gained a receptivity to a medieval view of villains, and a cosmology based on fear of death where the devil is an eternal adversary: "To kill the foreign devil-enemy is to reaffirm the nation's special virtue as a chosen people destined to overcome malevolence so that civilization may prevail" (Ivie & Giner 2007: 581; Lampman 2004). Lasswell argued about propaganda that the enemy should be described as demoralised and arrogant and the enemy nation should be described as contemptuous, scornful, and cruel (Mral 2004). In today's propaganda we do not look down upon a nation´s people, but their leaders are described in Satanic terms.

Further, the U.S. citizen has, from Thomas Jefferson and forward, been spoon fed with the notion of being an "Empire of Liberty", "Last Best Hope of Earth" (A. Lincoln), a "Shining Capitol on a Hill" (USA compared to a new Jerusalem by Ronald Reagan), an "Indispensable Nation" (Albright on the Tonight Show) and a "Beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world" (G. W. Bush). Through those lenses, the citizens of the U.S. look upon themselves as an enlightened and pacifically inclined nation, chosen by God, to be a beacon of justice and democracy in a dark diabolic landscape, not as an imperial beast praying on the world, because "We are on the side of Light, they on the side of Darkness" (Ivie & Giner 2007: 585).

President George W. Bush government fostered another part of this exceptionalism through the role they saw for the U.S. in a post-cold-war world. Dick Cheney, defence secretary from Bush senior's presidency, later G. W. Bush junior's adviser, secretary of State Collin Powell, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice and the new Defence secretary David Rumsfeld where the staff closest to the president. Rumsfeld took as his deputy Paul Wolfowitz who worked under Cheney earlier. In 1992 Wolfowitz and Zalmay Khalilzad (of the NSC staff) completed a task initiated by Cheney a couple of years earlier. The task was to create America´s political and military mission in the post-cold-war world – the Defence Planning Guidance (DPG). The policy in the DPG asserted that America´s mission was to ensure that no rival superpower rose to challenge the power of the United States of America (Wolfowitz DGP, Armstrong, 2002). These were the flawed ideologies that imbued the group closest to President G. W. Bush. It is in line with Lifton's definition of the close-

knit group with superpower syndrome on his first and second step to totalism, milieu control and mysterious manipulation and planned spontaneity, where the leaders indulge the feeling of a higher purpose and therefore need to keep their monopoly of the narrative just because it gave them power.

Bush's religious beliefs have been associated with a dogmatic approach with a tendency towards both personal and political fundamentalism, and he characterised himself as a person who wants reality to be clear and unambiguous - without nuances and without legal figurative language. Bush's leadership style bordered on the rushed; he wanted "action" and quick solutions. He says about himself: "I know it is hard for you to believe, but I have not doubted what we are doing… There is no doubt in my mind we're doing the right thing. No doubt." (Lifton 2003: 67, Woodward 2002: 256). If he did not doubt what he was doing, there were no reflection over right or wrong because the ends justify the means. This is particularly true when you believe your actions are supported by a divine power.

Lifton believes that the personality traits above can be part of a larger picture, an overall religious one, within which he polarised issues of right and wrong, truth and falsehood, good and evil (See also Teehan 2010). Bob Woodward, journalist at the *Washington Post*, wrote that Bush wanted to convey to the American people that "this is what my presidency is all about" and to capture his newly awakened insight into his mission, he used phrases such as: "I'm in the Lord Hands" and "there is a reason why I'm here". If he considered himself having a divine mission, everything he did was part of a greater truth and this, in turn, was part of an overall struggle between good and evil, with him as Saint George against the terrorist Dragon.

Being the supreme leader of United States and its military complex Bush confirmed his mission from God in an Israeli-Palestinian summit in 2003 four months after the US-led invasion of Iraq:

> 'I am driven with a mission from God'. God would tell me, 'George go and fight these terrorists in Afghanistan'. And I did. And then God would tell me 'George, go and end the tyranny in Iraq'. And I did. " (McAskill, Oct 2005, the Guardian)

For G. W. Bush and his staff to be able to "own the reality" (with Lifton's words) after 9/11, they needed cooperation from the media (see also Froula et al 2010). DoD´s involvement with military assistance in the movie industry made possible by President Wilson´s Executive Order (EO) 2594 in 1917. The Order established the Committee on Public Information with the goal of shaping

the public opinion in support of WWI (Coyne & Hall 2021). William Bradley, head of the National Association of the Motion Picture Industry, stated that: "The motion picture can be the most wonderful system for spreading national propaganda at little or no cost."

The cooperation between DOD and Hollywood continued. In June 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed EO 9182 authorizing the creation of the Office of War Information (OWI). The order´s mission was to gain support for the government's wartime activities through media, including film. OWI in turn created the GIMMPI, Government Information Manual for the Motion Picture Industry that stated that participating in government war programs is "American" and patriotic (Coyne & Hall 2021: 146). It also states that questioning the programs or the nature of the threat from abroad is un-American and aligns the dissenter with the enemy – a point of view that President G. W. Bush emphasized in his thought stopping cliché: "You are either with us, or with the terrorists." After 9/11 the emphasis for DOD was to picture the Iraqi war as a just and righteous war, and the message was that "The position of the U.S. government is good, noble, and serves the broader public interest, and supporting these ends requires supporting the government´s policies." (Coyne & Hall 2021: 154; see also Jackson et al 2011/2019; Steuter & Wills 2008). As icing on the cake, the DoD´s propaganda activities were out of congressional reach and not under the laws of U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act (Public Law 80-402), which prohibits the domestic influence of propaganda. Cut from the leash of congressional restraints, the propagandists in the government were free to work their magic on the domestic audience.

We also need to anchor our knowledge in Herman and Chomsky and Coyne and Halls Propaganda theories to understand the inequalities in information gathering between those who own the media and those who consume it. The twenty-four top tier media companies in the U.S. after WWII, among them CBS, NBC (through its parent firm the General Electric, GE), *New York Times* and *Washington Post* were all profit seeking corporations owned by wealthy people most of whom had assets exceeding $1 billion, three-quarters of these media firms earned a median of $183 million after tax (Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002). These media families had an obvious reason to have a good relation to the political elite to keep the status quo, and they exercised their power by establishing the aims of the company.

It is understandable that members of the media faced a strong incentive to avoid being overly critical of the national security state afraid of losing key access to policymakers (Herman & Chomsky 1988/2002; Coyne & Hall 2021

and 2018). Dan Rather, news anchor at CBS, confirmed to a British journalist the pressure to adapt to the propaganda and not ask the tough questions:

> […] but you know there was a time in South Africa that people would put flaming tyres around people's necks if they dissented. And in some ways the fear is that you will be necklaced here, you will have a flaming tyre of lack of patriotism put around your neck" he said. (bbc.co.uk 2002)

Here Coyne and Halls theory of propaganda as a coordination tool fits when the U.S. government used media as a foundation to form general knowledge in the public of the government's narrative of choice. It also fits well with Lifton's first and second step toward totalism, milieu control and mysterious manipulation.

It is easy to imagine the feelings of shock and disbelief in U.S. citizens when the planes hit the Twin Towers on Manhattan and Pentagon in the morning on the 11:th September 2001. Rumsfeld and his staff on the other hand almost immediately started to work at the president's speech and when Rumsfeld entered his office he said, "This is the defining moment […] What does the President need to address?" (Woodward 2002: 25). Already in the first paragraph Bush used the term evil about the terrorists: "… ended by evil, despicable acts of terror." Just days later, on the 16:th of September Bush elaborated the evil theme: "We've been warned there are evil people in this world. We've been warned so vividly and we'll be alert. Your government is alert." And a month later at a press conference: "I think it's essential that all moms and dads and citizens tell their children we love them and there is love in the world, but also remind them there are evil people." (Mral 2004: 22). There was also the dichotomy of good "America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world" versus evil "Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature" and so was the concept of "War on Terror" and the apocalyptic theme "our way of life, our very freedom came under attack".

The feeling of un-just treatment is understandable if we are led to believe that all we do and stand for is good and we will not only seek justice for this maltreatment, but we also want revenge. To instill fear and get allies and those who doubted the chosen path in the pen, the hardly disguised threat from an overwhelming superpower "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour (*sic*) them" and "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists", did the trick. By emphasising all he, G. W. Bush, already done to secure that the state would

function, and the military was ready to defend its country Coyne and Hall´s means, plea for authority was in place.

Underlying G. W. Bush foreign policy was his belief of United States manifest destiny as sanctioned by God: "there is a *value system that cannot be compromised*, and that is the values that *we praise*. And if the values are good enough for our people, they ought to be good enough for others, not in a way to impose because these are *God-given* values." (Woodward, Washington Post 19 Nov. 2002, our italics).

Initially the government had the possibility of self-reflection over the past decade's politics in the Middle east; it was not inevitable that it would be interpreted as an act of war, or that those who conducted the attack would be called terrorists (Sontag 2002, Lifton 2003; Mral 2004; Chomsky 2016, Stranne & Parsi 2023), but already in the early afternoon on 9/11 Usama bin Laden and al Qaeda was on the agenda. And at a NSC meeting in 4 P.M. the day after, Iraq and Saddam Hussein were brought up as a target by Rumsfeld (Woodward 2002: 49). By displacing aggression instead of turning the gaze inwards, the U.S. government had created a common enemy. It fits nicely in with Lifton's third step, the demand for purity by not questioning the narrative. G. W. Bush inner circle nurtured, through their flawed ideology of American exceptionalism and their mission of an U.S.-led post-cold war world, a "Hawkish" hard-line authoritarianism with organisations like DoD and radical Christian Zionist movements supporting their cause.

Making the "war on terrorism" a morally just war, is to manufacture it as black and white without nuances, which we saw was already in place in G. W. Bush speech on the evening of 9/11 above. In the government led propaganda it was contrasting all the good of the "American way of life" to the destructive way "of the terrorist", where all "we" did was inherently good, and the way of the "others" inherently evil, "we" were civilised, but "they" were barbarians and ultimately it was about God versus Satan (see also Silberstein 2004, Stanley 2018, Zimbardo 2007; Ivie & Giner 2007).

When Bush, the born-again evangelical Christian president of the United States, a country where over 75% were Christians, spoke to the most powerful constituency - the American Christian right, it was not enough that the war against Iraq was for a noble cause, it also needed to be sanctioned by God (Jackson 2005, Cartledge et al 2015, Rogers 2005). By initially calling the war against terror a "Crusade," ending his first speech with a Bible verse, Psalm 23: "Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for You are with me." and calling Usama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein for demons, and the reverend pastor Jerry Vines juxtaposing Islam and its

founder for "a demon-possessed paedophile" on a Baptist Convention and claiming that only the Christian God is: "not going to turn you in to a terrorist that′ll try to bomb people" (Steuter & Wills 2008: 192) – the war against terrorist after 9/11 became a religious war. David Frum, one of Bush's speech writers defined the religious theme in the presidents' speeches like this: "In a country where almost two thirds of the population believes in the existence of the devil, Bush was identifying Osama bin Laden and his gang as literally satanic." (Mral 2004). With the apocalyptic cleansing of the world from all evil a new beginning for the victors with a Christian U.S. led world would rise, and thus the war became morally right (see also Smith 2007 and Haidt 2016).

Media soon followed suite, the *New York Times* had the following headlines: "Yes, this is about Islam", "This is a religious war", "Diffusing the holy bomb", "Barbarians at the gate" (Esch, 2010: 381). Other major media outlets repeatedly had the headline: "Why do they hate us?" and answered the questions themselves in terms of values and culture instead of politics and economics. This pair with Lifton′s step four, five and six: confession, holy knowledge and loading the language. When you think your life and your way of living is at stake, your thinking is severely damaged, and you act on instinct (Haidt 2016, Smith 2021). In line with our theory.

By solidification of the categorical thinking by endless repetitions of an us versus them theme based on good versus evil and a Christian apocalyptic language, the U.S. government functioned as fearmongers to their own citizens. A categorical us-versus-them thinking are hallmarks for terrorist organisations, writes Moghaddam (2005) and confirm that this is one trait of American Right-Wing authoritarianism.

By amplifying the threats posed by al Qaida and add the apocalyptic weapon of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of "the satanic" Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein – the U.S. government with President G. W. Bush used the fear of annihilation in the American citizens to mobilize them to support a new Iraq war. The threat of WMD in the hands of a demon makes people extremely sensitive and increases their fear, insecurity, resentment, and xenophobia and, because we humans are extremely sensitive to the emotions of others - especially those who signal danger, these feelings are strengthened and magnified as they are passed on. The effect of using these words is that the more fear people experience, the more willingly they sacrifice civil rights for order and security (Jackson et al 2019, Stellmacher & Petzel 2005).

By now the governments propaganda had essentialised all Muslims as terrorists, which could be seen in this report from July 24, 2003:

The new nationwide survey of 2,002 adults, conducted June 24-July 8 by the Pew Research Center and the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, shows that there has been an important shift in public perceptions of Islam. Fully 44% now believe that Islam is more likely than other religions "to encourage violence among its believers." As recently as March 2002, just 25% expressed this view. (www.pewresearch.org)

By exaggerating differences and using pejorative words such as barbarians, evil-doers, spiders, demons and so forth they dehumanised everyone that did not share their point of view and the thought stopping cliché; "You are either with us, or with the terrorists", prevented opposition and reflective thinking. By now Lifton's step seven and eight: doctrine over person and dispensing of existence were in place and the war against Iraq could begin.

CONCLUSION

USA is market red today, as a land moving in an authoritarian direction according to V-Dem institute (2021), the world's leading democracy research foundation. And it all started with believing in a flawed ideology about American exceptionalism and continued with the refusal from the leader(s) to take a good look in the mirror about past political and economic shortcomings in the middle east. Because of this the U.S. citizens, the close-knit group surrounding President G. W. Bush, and even the president himself, became victimized on 9/11. A victimized superpower brings on both the sense of humiliation but also an angry determination to restore or extend their borders, says Lifton (2003). An angry superpower is a dangerous superpower – because when angered and humiliated, the ability to access our whole cognitive capacity is badly severed, a sad thing in an ordinary citizen, devastating in a leadership. When that leadership are the only ones with access to the truth, it also gives them the opportunity to choose what truth to share to keep the power. The media in turn is owned by a small elite eager to stay in favour of them in power, so they will not scrutinize them afraid of losing access. The narrative shared with the people is therefore the chosen narrative of the political elite, they "own reality" with Lifton's words. The reality they owned (among other interpretations) was a Christian apocalyptic one and by using the media as a coordination tool to create a common enemy, the U.S. government saw to it that everyone had the same information; that the United States of America was a beacon of enlightenment and democracy, unjust attacked by the evil forces of Muslim terror who´s mission was to annihilate everything "we" stand for. People who did not agree with this narrative was either silenced with a thought stopping cliché like: "You are ether with us, or with the terrorist,"

or made suspicious as a fifth columnist. By using an apocalyptic language of us versus them, enlightenment versus barbarism, exaggerating differences (we are noble and righteous, they are pure evil) and putting (unconfirmed until this day) weapons of mass destruction in the hands of the "Iraqi Satan" Saddam Hussein, the U.S. government functioned as fearmongers on their own citizens. They did this deliberately because fear make us dependent on strong leaders and the more fear we experience, the more power to those who lead and restrictions in our own freedom we tolerate to feel safe. And as we stated in the beginning of this article, fear circumvent our rational thinking, and if we lose our rational thinking, we cannot give our enlightened consent.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Appiah, K. (2019). *The Lies That Bind: Rethinking Identity.* Profile Books Ltd.

Armstrong, A. (2002). "Dick Cheney´s song of America – drafting a plan for global dominance". *Harper's Magazine.* October 76-83. https://harpers.org/archive/2002/10/dick-cheneys-song-of-america/

Bacevich, A. (2021). "We Are Not an Indispensable Nation". *The Nation.* August 6. https://www.thenation.com/article/world/united-states-hegemony/

Cartledge, S., Bowman-Grieve, L., & Palasinski, M. (2015). "The mechanisms of moral disengagement in George W. Bush´s "War on terror" rhetoric". November 2015. *The Qualitative Report* 20(11):1905-192. DOI:10.46743/2160-3715/2015.2401. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287224136_The_Mechanisms_of_Moral_Disengagement_in_George_W_Bush%27s_War_on_Terror_Rhetoric

Chomsky, N. (2002). *Understanding Power – the indispensable Chomsky*. Vintage books. (ed Peter R. Mitchell & John Schoeffel).

_____(2011). *Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda*. (ed. Seven Stories Press).

_____(2017). *Who rules the world?* Penguin Books.

Coyne, C., & Hall, A. (2018). *Tyranny comes home – the domestic fate of U.S. militarism*. Stanford University Press.

_____(2021). *Manufacturing militarism – U.S. propaganda in the war on terror*. Stanford University Press.

Esch, J. (2010). Legitimizing the "War on Terror": Political myth in official-level rhetoric. *Political Psychology*. 31(3). 357–391. https://doi.

org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00762.x. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227805658_Legitimizing_the_War_on_Terror_Political_Myth_in_Official-Level_Rhetoric

Froula, A., (eds). Birkenstein, J., (eds) & Randell, K. (2010). *Reframing 9/11 – Film, popular culture and the "war on terror"*. Continuum Publishing Corporation.

Gross, O., & Ni, Aolain. F. The Rhetoric of War: Words, Conflict and Categorization Post-9/11. (November 25, 2014). *Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy*. Vol. 24. No. 2. 2014. Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-47. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2530789

Haidt, J. (2016). *Righteous Mind - Why Good People Are Divided by Religion and Politics*. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.

Herman, E., & Chomsky, N. (1988/2002). *Manufacturing consent – the political economy of the mass media*. Pantheon Books NY.

Ivie, R., & Giner, O. (2007). Hunting the Devil: Democracy's Rhetorical Impulse to War. *Presidential Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 37. No. 4. Shadows of Democracy in Presidential Rhetoric. p. 580-598. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552279

Jackson, R. (2005). Security, Democracy, and the Rhetoric of Counterterrorism. July 2005. *Democracy and Security* 1(2):147-171 DOI:10.1080/17419160500322517. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/240954547_Security_Democracy_and_the_Rhetoric_of_CounterTerrorism

Jackson, R., Jarvis, L., Gunning, J., & Breen-Smyth, M. (2019). *Terrorism a critical introduction*. Red Globe Press.

Klemperer, V. (1975/2020). *LTI Lingua Tertii Imperii, tredje rikets språk*. Glänta Produktion .

Kvale, S., & Brinkmann, S. (2014). *Den kvalitativa forskningsintervjun*. Studentlitteratur.

Lampman, J. (2004). "Mixing Prophecy and Politics," *Christian Science Monitor*. July 8. 2004. http://www.world-crisis.com/analysis_comments/461_0_15_36_C40/

Lifton, R. (2003). *Superpower syndrome – America's apocalyptic confrontation with the world*. Thunder´s Mouth Press/Nation Books NY.

_____(2003). In the Lord´s hand: America´s Apocalyptic mindset.

World Policy Journal (2003) 20 (3): 59–69. DOI: 10.1215/07402775-2003-4002, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40209876

_____(2014). *Thought reform and the psychology of totalism – a study of "brainwashing" in China.* Martino Publishing.

_____(2019). *Losing reality – on cults, cultism, and the mindset of political and religious zealotry.* The New Press.

_____(2020). Owning reality: reflections on cultism and zealotry. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association.* Volume. 68. Issue 3 DOI: 10.1177/0003065120937. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0003065120937064

Mral, M. (2004). "*We're a peaceful nation*" *war rhetoric after September 11.* Swedish Emergency Management Agency. Special feature 2004:5. https://rib.msb.se/filer/pdf/27495.pdf

Moghaddam, F. (2005). The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration. *American Psychologist.* 60 (2). 161–169. DOI: 10.1037/0003-066X.60.2.161. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/7994368_The_Staircase_to_Terrorism_A_Psychological_Exploration

Rogers, P. (2005). *Christian Zionists and neocons: a heavenly marriage.* https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/article_2329jsp/

Smith, D. (2007). *The most dangerous animal – human nature and the origins of war.* St. Martin's Griffin.

Smith, D. (2021). *Making monsters – the uncanny power of dehumanization.* Harvard University Press.

Stanley, J. (2016). *How propaganda works.* Princeton University Press.

_____(2020). *How Fascism Works: The Politics of Us and Them.* Random House Trade Paperbacks.

Stellmacher, J., & Petzel, T. (2005). Authoritarianism as a Group Phenomenon. *Political Psychology.* 26(2). 245–274. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792614

Steuter, E., & Wills, D. (2008). *At war with metaphor: media, propaganda, and racism in the war on terror.* Lexington Books.

Stranne, F., & Parsi, T. (2023). *Illusionen om den amerikanska freden.* Ordfront.

Teehan, J. (2010). *In the name of God – the evolutionary origins of religious ethics and violence.* Wiley-Blackwell.

Woodward, B. (2002). *Bush at war.* Simon & Schuster paperbacks.

Zimbardo, P. (2007). *The Lucifer effect: understanding how good people turn evil*. Random House Trade Paperbacks NY.

Electronic sources

Bush, G. W. citations from: https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/september11/archive.html

McA, Ewen. *skill the Guardian*. Fri 7 Oct 2005 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/oct/07/iraq.usa (2023-08-13, 09.26)

Rev. Vines Called Mohammed a Demon-possessed Pedophile https://www.haaretz.com/2002-07-17/ty-article/rev-vines-called-mohammed-a-demon-possessed-pedophile/0000017f-e4d9-d804-ad7f-f5fba8590000 (2023-02-19 07.16)

Susan, S. The New York Times. Sept. 10. 2002 https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/10/opinion/real-battles-and-empty-metaphors.html (2023-08-13, 09.51)

Wolfowitz, P. Defense Planning Guidance FY 19941999. https://archive.org/details/DefensePlanningGuidanceFY1994-1999 (2023-08-13. 1031)

Woodward. *Washington Post*. 19 November 2002 https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/11/19/a-course-of-confident-action/83de9fc2-cd2c-494e-98d9-a8cbc2c156cb/ (2023-08-11, 12.00)

Pew Research Center

https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2003/07/24/religion-and-politics-contention-and-consensus/ (2023-10-17, 12.44)

V-Dem institute. https://v-dem.net/media/publications/dr_2022.pdf (2023-08-30, 13.23)

STATE FAILURE AND THE SUNNI-SHIA CONFLICT IN SAMPANG MADURA

Akhmad Siddiq
Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Ampel Surabaya
Email: a.siddiq@uinsby.ac.id

Lely Shofa Imama
Institut Agama Islam Negeri Madura
Email: lelyshofa@iainmadura.ac.id

Muhammad Febriansyah
School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia
Email: febrian@usm.my

Muhamad Ali Hisyam
Universitas Turnojoyo Madura
Email: hisyamhisyam@trunojoyo.ac.id

ABSTRACT

This paper attempts to explain the process of conflict reconciliation within the Sunni-Shia conflict in Sampang, Madura. The research tries to analyze the process and progress of the Sunni-Shia conflict through the discourse of state failure. It will not only figure out the discourse through political or security perspective, but also tries to view the failure and the weakness of the state from the conflict-transformation and social perspective. This research aims to look at how religious identity has been played within the process of conflict reconciliation and how the state failed to solve the Shia-Sunni conflict in Sampang. In doing so, the paper explains the history of Shia in Sampang Madura, the chronology of the conflict and its escalation, and the absence of the state within the long process of reconciliation.

Keywords: State Failure; Conflict Reconciliation; Religious Identity; Sunni; Shia

INTRODUCTION

After more than 10 years of awaiting moments at the refugee camp in Sidoarjo, in May 2023, around 265 Shia refugees were finally returned to their homeland in Sampang.[1] This is the second stage of the return of Shia refugees which is considered as the successful achievement of the local-government in

---

[1] https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20230504193301-20-945418/265-orang-eks-syiah-kembali-ke-sampang-setelah-10-tahun-mengungsi

resolving Shia-Sunni conflict. The conflict has ever become an international appeal because to some extent it was identified as the conflict between two Muslim-majority-group representations in the world. The role of the state in managing and resolving the conflict has always been criticized and questioned in term of peace-building and conflict reconciliation, until the local regent of Sampang finally succeeded to make a religiously and culturally putative solution to return most of the refugees except for a few remaining people.

Besides the successful return of the refugees to their homeland, through the discourse of state failure and weakness this paper attempts to analyze the process and progress of the Sunni-Shia conflict reconciliation in Sampang. It attempts to explain (1) the history of the Shia community in Sampang, (2) the socio-religious conflict of Sunni-Shia in Sampang and its escalation, (3) the process of conflict reconciliation, and (4) the absence or weakness of the state-government during the conflict. This research aims to describe the process of conflict reconciliation of Sunni-Shia in Sampang through in-depth interview, observation, and literature or document research. The interviews documented in this paper include the past and current interviews in order to capture gradual progress concerning the conflict. In addition, the research also refers to the past and current news of the conflict published in the newspapers or investigation reports. This research is meant to follow what Geertz stated as a "thick description" method which involves a researcher to understand particular descriptions of social life through which broader cultural interpretation can be made (Geertz, 1973).

This paper refers to the discourse of "fragile state" and "weak state" that elucidate the government fail in organizing, controlling, and providing security among the citizen. It is known that peacemakers, activists, and intellectuals have been discussing and criticizing the absence of state in the process of conflict reconciliation for long time. In hand with civil society organization engaged in peacebuilding, development and human rights, peacemakers tried to improve governance structure, poverty reduction program, development, democratization and peacebuilding strategies (Fischer & Schmelzle, 2009).

The government, according to Ghani, has to accomplish several features of statehood to overcome weakness and fragility, such as (1) a legitimate monopoly on the means of violence, (2) administrative control, (3) sound management of public finances, (4) investment in human capital, (5) the creation of citizenship rights and duties, (6) provision of infrastructure, (7) market formation, (8) management of the assets of the state, (9) effective public borrowing, (10) maintenance of rule of law (Ghani et al., 2005).

Questions on whether a state has accomplished those principles or not remain

a challenging topic for evaluating and reckoning legitimate power. The case of Ahmadiyya and Shia group in Indonesia to some extent denotes the absence and failure of the government. Setara Institute stated that these two cases have become a real test for the Indonesian government relating to state presence, citizenship, and human-rights enforcement (Satriani et al., 2019). For more than a decade, the Shia refugees have been excluded from their homeland in Sampang and placed in a shelter in Sidoarjo. They were expelled from their homes and families in Madura, because of religious differences. This phenomenon is kind of social reflection on looking at religion-based violence that still occurs in Indonesia today. The government has gradually maintained several chains of approach to solve the conflict, but in the end, it needs a very long time to return the Shia refugees back to their homes.

THE SHIA COMMUNITY IN SAMPANG

When Kiai Makmun, the founder of Shia community in Karang Gayam and Blu'uran Sampang, introduced the teaching of Shia for his family in Sampang, he reminded them to make the Shia teaching as an "exclusive" and "closed" ideology among them. He asserted not to teach and spread out the teaching to other people, especially the Madurese Sunni community, outside his family. He remarked the teaching of Shia as *hubb li ahl al-bayt* (loving the family and lineage of the Prophet Muhammad).[2] He considered not to use the term of Shia demonstratively because it could drive deep resistance and controversy among the Sunni muslim majority in Madura.

Kiai Makmun has been interested in the teaching of Shia based on his admire to the religious leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatullah Khomeini. In 1980, when the Islamic Republic of Iran competed the Islamic revolution, Kiai Makmun read and studied several books and papers relating to the revolution and Khomeini's movement.[3] From this attention and curiosity, Kiai Makmun

---

[2] KH Ali Karrar, *interview*, 15/2/2013; Tajul Muluk, *interview*, 2/4/2019.

[3] Muhammad Haji wrote, "It has been suggested that many Shias in Indonesia were heavily influenced by the Iranian revolution in 1979, which is said to have contributed to their rise in population. There remains no consensus on the number of Shia Muslims in Indonesia. According to Muhammad Jawad Mughniyya, a Lebanese Shia scholar, the number of Shi-as in the country in 1979 numbered approximately one million. Andi Muhammad Assegaf, head of the Fatimah Foundation in Jakarta, cited the same number in 2003, whilst Dimitri Mahayana, former chairman of the national Shia organization, Ikatan Jamaah Ahlubait In-donesia (IJABI), estimated there were three million Shia Muslims in Indonesia. Regardless of the exact figure, it is certain that Shias constitute a very small proportion of Indonesia's total Muslim population. One of the main organizations that represent Shia Muslims in the coun-try is IJABI, which is a national organization that was given legal status in 2000. IJABI has 14 provincials, 48 district and 25 sub-district branches, including offices in South Sumatra, West Java, and South Sulawesi. The organization has organized several short-term programs that are focused on religious education, career development, and youth empowerment, whilst

sent three of his children (Tajul Muluk, Roisul Hukama and Ummu Hani) to the Shia-affiliated Islamic Boarding School, Yayasan Pesantren Islam YAPI (YAPI),[4] Bangil, East Java.

Graduated from Pesantren YAPI, Tajul Muluk, one of Makmun's sons, continued his study to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1993 and resided under the fellowship of Sayyid Muhammad Alawi al-Maliki. During his study in Saudi Arabia, Tajul Muluk dealt with and read many books of Shia. He was indeed fascinated with Shia ideologies and doctrines.

In 1999, Tajul returned back to Sampang. Two years before his father's death, supported by people around him, Tajul Muluk built an Islamic Boarding School (Pondok Pesantren) and named it "Misbahul Huda". Along with his brother and sister—which are also the alumni from YAPI, he managed and developed this pesantren. Unlike his father, Tajul Muluk called the people around him to learn and practice the teaching of Shia. Tajul Muluk was known as low profile and humble leader. He succeeded to persuade and influence people around him into learning and practicing Shia. The followers of Tajul Muluk have been gradually increasing.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE CONFLICT

There was no crucial tension between Sunni community—as majority—and Shia community in Karang Gayam and Blu'uran Sampang, at least during Kiai Makmun's life. The Madurese ulama and kiai (the local Muslim leader) respected Kiai Makmun and avoided to challenge or argue against him. The first tension between them happened in 2006, when Tajul Muluk and his followers initiated to conduct an Islamic festival of *Maulid Nabi* (birthday of the Prophet Muhammad). He supposed to invite Shia community from the outside city. This festival has also been performed to remember the 40th day of his father's death (Ahnaf et al., 2015). The Sunny community in Karang Gayam and other districts objected, resisted and threatened this festival. Along with the police and the local government of Sampang, Sunni community asked Tajul Muluk to cancel the festival and not to invite Shia community from

---

establishing autonomous institutions such as the Association of Indonesian Ahl al-Bayt Students, the Board for Advocacy and Development of Law and Human Rights and Ahl–al-Bayt Women." Read Muhammad Haji, *The Shia Muslims of Indonesia* (The Center for the Academic Shia Studies), 9.

    [4] Located in Bangil, East Java, YAPI was established in June 21, 1976. Ustad Husein bin Abu Bakar al-Habsyi is the founder of this *pesantren*. He offered two cluster of Islamic boarding school: for male and female. Today, this pesantren formally has secondary and high school both for male and female, *Madrasah Diniyah* (Islamic School) in three classes: *mutawassit, tsanawi and tamhidi*, and *Hauzah*. https://yapibangil.org/yayasan/ (accessed November 21, 2021).

outside village.

In Sunni Muslim view, Tajul has been trying to teach and spread a heretical teaching of Shia for Sunni people around him.[5] He and his followers were not only practicing Shia among themselves but also aiming at attracting and calling Sunni muslim to pursue. Tajul's approach, according to the Sunni muslim, has attacked Sunni feeling and its essential doctrine. Several Islamic organizations, such as *Badan Silaturahmi Ulama Madura* (BASSRA: the Association of the Madurese Ulama), MUI (the Council of Indonesian Ulama), and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) ulama, attempted to mediate the tension occurred between Shia community and Sunni people. Under supervision of the local police, Sunni ulama and Tajul Muluk discussed several points of ideological differences between Shia and Sunni. They aimed to have such agreement to solve the tension.

On the one hand, the Sunni Ulama wrote at least 22 indictments to prove crucial mistakes of Tajul Muluk,[6] on the other hand Tajul Muluk responded these indictments by reading several references of *kitab kuning* to explain and answer those prejudices. As a solution, Ulama of Sampang asked Tajul Muluk to sign in an agreement not to publicly teach and spread Shia teaching again.

In 2009, Tajul Muluk tried to conduct the same festival of *Maulid Nabi* which eventually created the same tension as well as in 2006. Tajul Muluk, according to the Madurese ulama, tended to disregard the agreement: he had been teaching Shia publicly. For a second time, the Madurese ulama (represented by the Council of Indonesian Ulama, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and the Ministry of Religious Affairs) invited Tajul Muluk to a forum and asked him to sign an agreement. At least there are five points signed in that forum. First, Tajul Muluk should stop preaching, calling, and provocating others to learn and practice the Shia teaching. What he did, the Madurese ulama said, produced unfriendly condition among Sunni people. Second, Tajul Muluk has to stop planning to perform Shia ritual and festival in Sampang. Third, if the second agreement was disappointed, the ulama will register the case as a religious and civil circumstance. Forth, MUI, NU, the local division of the Ministry of Religious Affairs will observe and scrutinize Tajul's activities and his followers. Fifth, MUI, NU, and the Sunni ulama will manage and help the local government to build harmonious and peaceful condition in the grass root level.[7]

---

[5] KH Ali Karrar, *interview*, 15/2/2013

[6] Adian Husaini, (2012), "Kisah Tujul Muluk dari Sampang", Catatan Akhir Pekan, Radio Dakta 107, http://www.hidayatullah.com/kolom/catatan-akhir-pekan/read/2012/09/01/3822/kisah-tajul-muluk-dari-sampang.html (accessed November 21, 2021).

[7] Ibid.

In 2011, tension between Shia community and Sunni majority happened in its physical appearance. Several houses of Shia community were burned and numbers of Shia members had been injured. The Sunni ulama insisted to separate Tajul Muluk with his followers and he was finally displaced to Malang. The ulama hindered to call Tajul followers back to the teaching of Sunni Islam. The pick of this tension happened in August, 2012. Tens of Shia houses were destroyed and burned by Sunni people. One of Shia followers was dead and many others were injured. The police that came lately to the area of conflict could not stop people anger. In the end, the local government evacuated the Shia community to Sport Centre in the city of Sampang.

ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT

Conflict between Sunni and Shia community in Sampang heightened steadily. The Sunni ulama and the people in Madura perceived that the present of Shia in Sampang could offend the purity of Sunni teaching. On the one hand, for Sunni people, Tajul Muluk has been assumed to intensionally call the people of Karang Gayam and Bluuran Sampang to learn and practice Shia ritual. On the other hand, Tajul and his followers insisted that the way they practiced Shia is a part of Islamic teaching. Furthermore, it was, according to them, supported by the principles of religious freedom. In June 2012, Tajul Muluk was jailed on charges of religious blasphemy.[8] Previously, he has been sentenced to two years in jail, but laterly after his appealing it was increased to four years.[9] In September 2012, the whole refugee of Shia community living in Sport Centre in Sampang were relocated into Rusunawa Jemundo, Sidoarjo, East Java. The vice governor of East Java at the time stated that "it is temporary action and they will be brought back soon to their homeland, when the situation is getting normal."[10] In fact, until today the Shia refugees are still living at Rusunawa Jemundo.

The case of Tajul Muluk and his followers has increasingly become a very interesting topic relating to religious violence discourse. Media, intellectuals, and NGOs have been giving their support: psychologically and financially. Many NGOs gave their hand to accompany and manage their daily needs. Just to mention few of them were ABI (Indonesian Ahlul Bait), IJABI (the Association of Ahlul Bait Indonesia), Kontras, and CMARs. However, Sunni people has also influenced media, intellectuals, and NGOs to exclude and reject the existence of Tajul Muluk and his followers in Sampang.

---

[8] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/12/indonesia-jails-shia-cleric-blasphemy (accessed November 21, 2021).

[9] http://www.amnesty.org.au/news/comments/34816/ (accessed November 21, 2021).

[10] Read http://daerah.sindonews.com/read/670816/23/pengungsi-sampang-akan-di-relokasi-sementara-ke-rusunawa-1346996624, (accessed November 21, 2021).

In this conflict, Sunni and Shia community seemed to use Islamic teaching as a cover of their standing position and "ideology". Since for Marx ideology is "always something false, a distortion of the truth for the sake of social interest, a symbolic framework of the mind that legitimates the power and privileges of the dominant groups and sanctions the social evils inflicted on the people without access to power,"(Baum, 2001). It is logic that both Sunni and Shia community have been insisting that what they have done is an Islam-based practice and religiously true. In the idea of Pierre Bourdieu, Sunni and Shia people had been playing with their practical reason of action during the conflict (Pierre, 1998). It is a critique of suspicion which remind that there is always a distance between *practical reality* and *theoretical thought*. In other words, it is needed to examine the practical truth behind the reality of Sunni-Shia conflict. Bourdieu discerned that there are two kinds of truth which should be undoubtedly classified: the *lived truth of practice* and the *objective truth*.

Inside the boundary of cultural or social capital, religious capital occurs as a dominant domain whereby the agents occupy to achieve a benefit in the social fields. Religious tasks are occasionally deemed as a medium of exploitation masked in the name of God, in the name of religion. Religious symbols are permanently treated as one of *euphemism's* instruments to gain benefits for the agents (Pierre, 1998). Euphemism denotes a tactful action that veils the main interest behind the "exterior" reality.

Sunni and Shia community have been standing on their own needs and interests, without considering what the others need. Arguing that religious freedom (including for conducting Shia festival in Sampang) and equality of being Indonesian citizen, Shia community tend to push the government to make a significant decision to bring them back to their homeland. In doing so, some NGOs have been supporting this effort and urged the government to encourage Shia community as a victim of violence. While Sunni community in Sampang argued that the existence of Shia is heretic and avoidable. According to BASSRA, there are at least ten points of Shia (Tajul Muluk) deviations: (1) reducing the five pillars of Islam and the six pillar of Iman; (2) believing in heretical doctrine outside *ahl al-sunnah wa al-jamaah*; (3) believing in the revelation after the Quran; (4) distrusting the authenticity of the Quran; (5) interpreting the Qur'an based on non-authoritative basis; (6) unbelieving the Prophet Muhammad sayings (*hadith*); (7) harassing some of the prophets; (8) denying the position of the Prophet Muhammad as the last prophet; (9) reducing and adding basic rituals on Islam; and (10) accusing other Moslem as infidel without any reason.[11]

---

[11] *As-Sunnah Magazine*, sixth edition, Edisi 06/Tahun X/1427H/2006 (Surakarta: Yayasan Lajnah Istiqomah).

To empower Sunni movement for avoiding Shia community in Sampang (and East Java in general), in September 2013 BASSRA called Madurese ulama to declare a Sunni-affiliated body called FAAS (Front Anti Aliran Sesat/The Anti Deviant-School Front).[12] The main goal of this organization is to clean up and sterilize East Java from religiously heretical and deviant sects.

The Sunni and Shia community in Sampang have been sthrengthening their religious position by taking Islam as a legitimating idea and doctrine. They realized that such social acts and movements require religious legitimation where Muslim leader or Islamic constitution can provide it (Hasenclever & Rittberger, 2000). In this context, religious identity has been played as a *blocking factor* to solve the conflict.

Appleby described relational logic between religion and violence in three level of understanding: *strong religion, weak religion, and pathological religion*. Strong religion means that there is a close and inseparable relation which binds the notion of violence with religious conviction. It is appealing that Appleby start his point of view by naming religion. It shows that he concerns with religious value and implicitly considers violence as an outside influence or effect of understanding religion. In this point, people believe that religious teaching is socially constructed and imaginatively created without any direct relation to the reality (Appleby, 2012). Referring to Mircea Eliade, people suppose religion as "the sacred" which orders and regulates some circumstances, including violence. Religion has been fundamentally placed as a basis of cruelty and violence (Eliade, 1078).

The *weak religion* assumes that religion is likely seen as subordinate reason compared with other factors: politics, economy, culture, prestige, etc. This perspective excludes religion as main source in some explanations of conflict. Different from the first, people in this level perceive religion as a "weak" because it could be simply and easily illuminated from the arena of violence. The objective measure on analyzing causes of violence in this point is not constantly religion. However, religion cannot be totally excluded from violence consideration because it clearly is a piece of human experiences (Appleby, 2012). And the third is ambiguous relationship between religion and violence. Appleby entitles this level of understanding as "pathological religion".

To solve this fundamental perspective, it is necessary to recognize Hans Kung's idea that violence and peace begin in the mind of men. Accordingly, we should basically construct and build the idea of peace instead of cultivating the idea of war in violence (Kung, 1991). However, to solve the conflict and increase

---

[12] http://www.koranmadura.com/2013/09/30/deklarasi-syiah-menyimpang/ (accessed November 21, 2021).

the idea of peace building require a long process of conflict reconciliation and social network.

CONFLICT RECONCILIATION AND STATE FAILURE

In 2012, being part of the National Reconciliation Team of Sunni-Shia conflict in Sampang, UIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya announced a center to support data collection, research, and observation. At the time, the central government—alongside with local bodies—has made some strategic plans to solve the conflict. What the center has been doing is to continue, evaluate, and strengthen the plans. The center eventually invited Sunni community for sharing and discussing the basic needs and their standing points of the conflict. They also invited Shia community to share and discuss the same thing: what they feel, experience, and expect relating to the conflict reconciliation. In the end, the center invited both of Sunni and Shia people in one forum to discuss and solve of the conflict. The Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Social Affairs have also engaged in the forum.[13]

There was no significant agreement acknowledged by these two groups at that forum. Both insisted to stand with their basic need and interest, and their position of how to solve the problem. They insisted to argue and maintain their ideological position and keep their political, economic, and cultural aims. There were too many considerations that affect the process of conflict reconciliation. Moreover, the conflict has been seen as a part of trans-national issues between the global Shia (especially of the Islamic Republic of Iran) and the Sunni-Wahabi (represented by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia).[14]

According to Sunni ulama in Madura, the relocation of Shia refugee at Rusunawa Jemundo has been perceived as the best solution. Shia community would not welcome come back to their homeland, unless they re-embrace Sunni teachings.[15] While for the Shia community they have their it is their right to come back because they deserve to return back to their home without any considerations, including ideological shifting.[16]

The conflict between Sunni and Shia community in Sampang is multifaceted. It emerged not only because of theological differences but also because of socio-cultural, political, economic, and personal issues. The family crisis between Tajul Muluk and his brother, Rois, was revealed as a trigger of this conflict. At the beginning, Rois is a skillful assistant of Tajul that is always supports the

---

[13] These activities were conducted during the end of 2013 until the midst of 2014.

[14] KH. Lailurrahman, *interview*, 7/5/2015.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Iklil, interview, 20/10/2014.

teachings and practices of Shia. Personal tension between these two brothers drove Rois to break out from Shia community (Afdillah, 2013). Eventually, Rois transformed himself from the believer of Shia (Tajul Muluk's follower) to the hater of Tajul.

The center for Peacebuilding of UIN Sunan Ampel proposed some recommendations to the Ministry of Religious Affairs (as a leading sector) for intensifying and solving the conflict. The center insisted that returning back the Shia refugee back home is the only solution. However, the center suggested at least four stages that must be accomplished. First, building a deeply understanding among two groups especially on how to deal with cultural and religious differences. Second, if the first step was completed, the government has to rebuild destroyed houses of the Shia community and replace them back in the homeland. This process could be implemented gradually. Third, relocating and scaling the conflict. The government must prevent other groups (the third parties) not to involve into the conflict. Forth, conducting the process of trauma healing for the victim and empowering their life skill (CPB, 2013).

Besides the long process of the conflict reconciliation, until today the Shia refugees has been still wedged and immovable at the Rusunawa, Sidoarjo. The hopes of returning back home remains unfeasible. Tajul Muluk said that relocation to another land such as Sumatera or Kalimantan will not solve the conflict. He insisted that the only resolution is returning the Shia community back home.[17] Papers, researches, and recommendations concerning the Sunni-Shia conflict in Sampang have been published and discussed within last five years[18] but the process of reconciliation and returning back the refugees to the home-land seem to be "going nowhere".

In 2014, when Joko Widodo was inaugurated as a new promising president of Indonesia, hopes, expectations, and conflict resolutions emerged. Many individuals and organizations expected that the conflict of Sunni-Syiah Sampang, that has been going on for years, can be presently solved. In fact,

---

[17] Tajul Muluk, interview, 2/4/2019.

[18] Just to mention a few of them: Syukron Mahbub, "Konflik dan Kekerasan Sunni-Syiah Sampang Prespektif Kultur Kekerasan dan Hak Asasi Manusia (Conflicts and Violence Of Sunni-Syiah Sampang Prespective Of Violence Cultures and Human Rights)," Voice Justisia: Jurnal Hukum dan Keadilan, Volume 2, Nomor 1, Maret (2018): 92-101; Cahyo Pamungkas, "Mencari Bentuk Rekonsiliasi Intra-Agama: Analisis terhadap Pengungsi Syiah Sampang dan Ahmadiyah Mataram (Looking for Intra-Religious Forms of Reconciliation: An Analysis on Shia and Ahmadiyya Refugees in Sampang and Mataram)," Epsiteme: Jurnal Pengembangan Ilmu Keislaman, Vol 13, No 1 (2018): 113-147. https://doi.org/10.21274/epis.2018.13.1.113-147; Nasrullah Ainul Yaqin, "Menagih Hak Beragama Muslim Ahmadiyah dan Syiah Sampang dalam Perspektif Nalar Maqâṣidî," Religi: Jurnal Studi Agama-agama, Vol 16, No 2 (2020): 208-227, DOI: https://doi.org/10.14421/rejusta.2020.1602-05.

the conflict has still prevailed throughout Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to Joko Widodo's era. More than 260 persons of Shia community are still living in the refugee camp at Rusunawa Sidoarjo, approximately 150 km from their homeland. They are separated from their houses, their land, their family, and their past. Religious conflict disconnected them away from their families and brothers, the Sunni communities. Political, economic, and cultural interest has also taken part of in this conflict.

There are many obstacles which surface on dealing with the conflict reconciliation process. Among them is the power relation contested by two different religious identities, Sunni and Shia, in Karang Gayam and Blu'uran Sampang. Religious identity becomes a *euphimical* term that conceals a really-contested interest within the two groups. In addition, the absence of the government for mediation and conflict reconciliation has continuously happened.[19] Siti Hanifah stated that the way how conflict resolution within Sunni-Shia conflict has been performed shows the weak of the government role in protecting freedom of religion and belief in Indonesia.[20]

Referring to Call's classification of three different gaps on describing "failed state", the Sunni-Shia conflict articulates at least two different gaps: security gap and legitimacy gap. The first gap elucidates the weakness of the state to establish a minimal level of national security within its territory and to solve the social conflict which happens between different religious, ethnic, or racial groups. The second, the legitimacy gap, denotes a significant rejection of society toward an established authority. This kind of social denunciation could create social opponent of the government which eventually undermine the legitimacy of the governing body (Call, 2011). The third gap is the capacity gap that represents the lack of the state capacity to provide minimal public needs and services (Call, 2011).

Inaccessibility of aid and lack of job drive the Shia refugees in Rusunawa Sidoarjo to look further for their future. It is not easy for them to survive through difficult life in the refugee camps. Khoiri and Chamankhah described that there are at least three approaches performed by the Shia refugees to survive. First is reducing their daily expenses, second is having an alternative subsystem of working as coconut shelling labor, farming the surrounding land, and raising goats and chickens, third is getting financial support from the government or persons or certain organization (Khoiri & Chamankhah, 2021).

---

[19] KH Nurut Tamam, *interview*, 26/5/2015.

[20] Raja Eben Lumbanrau, "Ratusan Pengungsi Syiah Sampang Dibaiat Menjadi Suni di Tengah Keinginan Pulang Kampung: Pemerintah Dituding Mengalahkan Minoritas Demi Keinginan Mayoritas," https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-54550918 (accessed 11/12/2021).

In November 5, 2020, more than 270 Shia refugees pledged allegiance to re-embracing Sunni teaching. They read the pledge in Kota Sampang in front of the Madurese Ulama, witnessed by the local leader and the local government.[21] Tajul Muluk, the Shia refugee leader, expressed his hope for having all Shia refugees back to their homeland in Sampang. Even though, he realized that the process will be challenging because it involves the local ulama, the local government, and the national bodies.[22] Slamet Mulyono, director of Center for Peacebuilding UIN Sunan Ampel, expressed his doubts on political attention behind the process of conflict reconciliation. According to him, the government seems to be captured by a political concern in making a certain policy.[23]

The efforts of returning Shia refugee back to their home require stronger political-will from the (local and central) government. Although Miichi argued that in Jokowi's era the government has made a gradual change compared to Yudhoyono's period through "empowering refugees by providing assistance for the institutionalisation of their rights," but the fact shows that the state body failed to guarantee Shia refugee's right to return back to their homeland (Mijchi & Kayane, 2019).

In his article, "The Politics of Religious Pluralism in Indonesia: The Shi'a Response to the Sampang Incidents of 2011–12", Miichi criticized President Yudhoyono for doing nothing with regard to Sunni-Shia conflict in Sampang. He stated that many of reconciliation plans initiated by the Reconciliation Tema (lead by Abd A'la) and the housing project (promised by the Ministry of Public Housing) were poorly executed. It differs from Jokowi's approach to the conflict which provided assistance to facilitate infrastructure and institutional arrangement for Shia refugee's rights. According to Miichi, this political act was made because of advocating activism directed by pluralist activists that possibly influenced the Jokowi's administration (Mijchi & Kayane, 2019).

In fact, what Miichi said as "gradual change" in Jokowi's era has not reached a final goal of the conflict reconciliation intended by the Shia refugees. Their hope of being returned bac home could not been easily achieved yet. Although Jokowi's government has a longer time (from 2014 to 2024) to solve the conflict compared to Yudhoyono which only obtained two years of reigns (from its appearance in 2012 to 2014), it does not successfully build effective and productive connection with the local Sunni ulama in Sampang. In addition, the absence of the government during this conflict has become a point of criticism. Faiq, from *Solidaritas untuk Anti Kekerasan* (Solidarity for Anti-

---

[21] https://news.detik.com/bbc-world/d-5242909/pengungsi-syiah-sampang-dibaiat-ja-di-suni-di-tengah-keinginan-pulang-kampung (accessed 11/12/2021).

[22] https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-54550918 (accessed November 19, 2021)

[23] Slamet Mulyono, *Interview*, November 20, 2021.

Voelence), stated "We strongly demand the head of the Indonesian National Police to conduct an internal evaluation of the failure of the Sampang Police to ensure a sense of security for Shia congregations. We ask the National Police Chief to instruct the Sampang Police Chief to handle this incident quickly and professionally."[24] In line with this critics, KontraS Surabaya concluded that "the Sampang Regional Government, including the police, do not have the perspective that every citizen has the right to have a belief, religion and worship according to their religion and belief, and the government is obliged to carry out legal and political protection of this right as regulated in the 1945 Constitution, Law no. 12 2005 concerning the ratification of the ICCPR, and Law Number 39 of 2009 about human rights. The right to believe is a right that cannot be reduced or eliminated under any circumstances."[25]

Another example of having state security as a source of insecurity could be more precisely taken from the case of Papua. Anderson wrote that in Papua "as the rest of Indonesia, security forces are often more concern with income generation than security" (Anderson, 2015). However, he argued that the state failure in regard with Papua is not an intentional result of the government policy but a result of "morass of policy failures over time, aggravated by limitations to state capacity and competence."[26] The case of Sunni-Shia in Sampang has comparatively the same problem concerning the absence of the government, where the state is not fully present to solve the problem. The conflict requires more "personal connections" and "cultural approaches" to bridge the local government, the local ulama, and other socio-political bodies in the region (Mijchi & Kayane, 2019).

In 2002, years after the economic crisis attacked several countries in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Wanandi questioned whether Indonesia a failed or not in his article, "Indonesia: A Failed State?" He wrote that Indonesia is not a failed state but it becomes weak. One of the measurements he used to look at is regional conflicts. According to him, "regional conflicts are the most visible sign of the breakdown of the central government's authority, and no clear strategy to overcome these problems seems to exist" (Wanandi, 2002). By looking at religious conflicts happening among the Indonesian people, someone could remark on how the presence or absence of the state reflected within society.

In this regard, it is not easy to deal with the conflict and make a peaceful

---

[24] https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/serangan-atas-kelompok-syiah-di-sampang-tuai-kecaman/1496881.html. (accessed November 19, 2021)

[25] KontraS, "Laporan Investigasi dan Pemantauan Kasus Syi'ah Sampang," Surabaya, 2012.

[26] Ibid., 2.

agreement between Sunni and Shia refugees. This research acknowledges at least two attentions that should be considered as a state-failure condition. First, not all the Shia refugees have been returned back home, although most of them are re-embraced the Sunni teachings in 2020. Second, as a minority group in Indonesia, Shia community has still been placed in a fragile pot which could be broken up when the social or political tension emerge. Third, it should be noted that the successful return of the Shia refugees to their hometowns in Sampang was not the result of structured government work, but rather due to the personal initiative of the local head and the intensives of the local government. The long-lasting efforts of the central government as the representation of the state, for approximately 10 years, did not have much impact on solving the Sunni-Shia problem in Sampang.

Referring to Goldstone, we should look at two general qualities that remain stability of the state: effectiveness and legitimacy. The first reflects how the state function its authority to provide security, promote economic growth, and deliver social services. The second reflects whether state action is perceived by elite and lay people as "just" and "reasonable" in term of prevailing social norms (Goldstone, 2008). The state's delay to resolve the Sunni-Shiite conflict in Sampang can be examined from these two perspectives. On the one hand, the state did not make effective efforts to resolve the problem, on the other hand, the government's efforts are considered unjust and unreasonable in developing a conflict solution to the Sunni-Shiite conflict in Sampang.

The initiative to take preventive measures in resolving Sunni-Shiite conflicts should be politically taken by the state. Krasner asserts that conflict prevention must become a routine element of policymaking. He wrote that "anticipating, averting, and responding to conflict require a greater, more comprehensive level of planning and organization" (Krasner & Pascual, 2005).

Alissa Wahid, national director of Gusdurian, said, "favoritism and majoritarianism are getting stronger in Indonesia. The government is not doing enough to enforce the constitution, and more and more conflicts are being solved by local agreements, which often represent the interests of the majority."[27] The Wahid's statement is kind of general criticism for the central government that has no serious attention to solve the conflict. The initiative to solve the problem arose from the Sampang regent, the local government, who is dealing the conflict through religious and cultural approaches. This local strategy flourished the agreement between Sunni and Shia in Sampang to build a better relation in the future.

---

[27] Office of International Religious Freedom, "2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Indonesia," May 12, 2021. https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-report-on-international-religious-freedom/indonesia/ (accessed Novermber 19, 2021).

CONCLUSION

Conflict reconciliation between Sunni and Shia in Sampang has stunned several phases from its emergence in 2012 to our present life. This reconciliation touched convincing attentions from governmental (such as the Ministry of Religious Affair, the Ministry of Public Housing, and the Ministry of Social Affairs) and non-governmental organizations (such as ABI, IJABI, BASSRA, CMARs, and KontraS) as well as grasped broadly social networks in its processes. Recommendations were produced to solve and end the conflict which to some extent reduced the escalation of conflict gradually. However, the lack of returning back Shia refugees to their home signified the difficult process of that reconciliation.

This research found that the absence of the state in this conflict has become one of the most socially criticized-elements which hinder the process of reconciliation. Peace activists and NGOs look into the absence of the state involvement within the process of reconciliation. Questions of political tenace of the government during the process of arose as a public discourse conversed among the parties involved in the conflict. It means that the government has not succeeded yet in resolving the conflict profoundly. In the case of Sunni-Shia Sampang, the keywords of the conflict reconciliation depend on local agreements or individual networks between Sunni, Shia, and the local power. However, the local government of Sampang have finally succeeded to commence an agreement between Sunni and the Shia refugees: the later signed an ideological agreement, a theological pact, to revert to their old belief as Sunni Muslims.

This study limits itself to discuss the escalation of the conflict, the resolution process, and the failure of the state on addressing the root causes of the Sunni-Shiite conflict in Sampang. However, this research has limitations in revealing the network of non-governmental organizations that are also engaged in the context of resolving the Sunni-Shiite conflict in Sampang. This topic could be another interesting research, at least to clarify the process of conflict resolution and non-governmental parties intensively involved in resolving the conflict.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Afdillah, M. (2013). *Dari Masjid ke Panggung Politik*. Yogyakarta: Thesis. Gadjah Mada University.

Ahnaf, M. I., et al. (2015). *Politik Lokal dan Konflik Keagamaan*. Yogyakarta: Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies.

Anderson, B. (2015). *Papua's Insecurity: State Failure in the Indonesian Periphery*. Hawaii: East-West Center.

Appleby, R. S. (2012). Religious Violence: The Strong, the Weak, and the Pathological. *Practical Manners*. Spring. Issue 5: 1-25.

Baum, G. (2001). *Religion and Alienation: A Theological Reading on Sociology*. Toronto: Paulist Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1998). *Practical Reason on the Theory of Action*. California: Stanford University Press.

Call, C. T. (2011). Beyond the 'Failed State': Toward Conceptual Alternatives. *European Journal of International Relations*. Vol. 17. No. 2: 303-326.

Eliade, M. (1987). *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion*. Florida: Harcourt Inc.

Fischer, M. & Schmelzle, B.(ed.). (2009). *Building Peace in the Absence of State: Challenging the Discourse of State Failure*. Berlin: Berghof Research Center.

Geertz, C. 1973. *The Interpretation of Culture*. New York: Basic Books.

Ghani, A. et al. (2005). *Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State-Building*. London: Overseas Development Institute.

Goldstone, J. A. (2008). Pathways to State Failure. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25. No. 4: 285–96. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26275148.

Haji, M. *The Shia Muslims of Indonesia*. The Center for the Academic Shia Studies.

Hasenclever, A., & Rittberger, V. (2000). Does Religion Make a Diference? Theoretical Approach to the Impact of Faith on Political Conflict. *Millenium Journal of International Studies*. Vol 29. No 3: 641-674. https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298000290031401.

Khoiri, M. A., & Chamankhah, L. (2021). *Survival Mechanism of The Shia Community Post-Shia–Sunni Sampang Conflict in 2012. Al-Mada: Jurnal Agama Sosisal dan Budaya*. Vol. 4 No 2: 240-251. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31538/almada.v4i2.1248.

KontraS. (2012). *Laporan Investigasi dan Pemantauan Kasus Syi'ah Sampang*. Surabaya: Laporan Penelitian.

Krasner, S. D., & Pascual, C. (2005). Addressing State Failure. *Foreign Affairs* 84. No. 4: 153–63. https://doi.org/10.2307/20034427.

Kung, H. (1991). *Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic.* New York: Crossroad.

Mahbub, S. (2018). Konflik dan Kekerasan Sunni-Syiah Sampang Prespektif Kultur Kekerasan dan Hak Asasi Manusia. *Voice Justisia: Jurnal Hukum dan Keadilan.* Volume 2. Nomor 1. Maret: 92-101.

Miichi, K., & Kayane, Y. (2019). The Politics of Religious Pluralism in Indonesia: The Shi'a Response to the Sampang Incidents of 2011–12. *TRaNS: Trans-Regional and-National Studies of Southeast Asia*: 1–14. doi:10.1017/trn.2019.12.

Pamungkas, C. (2018). Mencari Bentuk Rekonsiliasi Intra-Agama: Analisis terhadap Pengungsi Syiah Sampang dan Ahmadiyah Mataram. *Episteme: Jurnal Pengembangan Ilmu Keislaman*, Vol 13, No 1: 113-147. https://doi.org/10.21274/epis.2018.13.1.113-147.

Satriani, S., et al. (2019). Policy Brief: Memulihkan Hak Pengungsi Ahmadiyah dan Syiah. *Setara Institute for Democracy and Peace.*

Wanandi, J. (2002). Indonesia: A Failed State? *The Washington Quarterly,* 25:3: 135-146. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/01636600260046299

Yaqin, N. A. (2020). Menagih Hak Beragama Muslim Ahmadiyah dan Syiah Sampang dalam Perspektif Nalar Maqâ idî. *Religi: Jurnal Studi Agama-agama.* Vol. 16. No. 2: 208-227. https://doi.org/10.14421/rejusta.2020.1602-05.

INTERNET SOURCES

http://daerah.sindonews.com/read/670816/23/pengungsi-sampang-akan-di-relokasi-sementara-ke-rusunawa-1346996624 (accessed November 21, 2021).

http://www.amnesty.org.au/news/comments/34816/ (accessed November 21, 2021).

http://www.hidayatullah.com/kolom/catatan-akhir-pekan/read/2012/09/01/3822/kisah-tajul-muluk-dari-sampang.html (accessed November 21, 2021).

http://www.koranmadura.com/2013/09/30/deklarasi-syiah-menyimpang/ (accessed November 21, 2021).

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/12/indonesia-jails-shia-cleric-blasphemy (accessed November 21, 2021).

https://news.detik.com/bbc-world/d-5242909/pengungsi-syiah-sampang-dibaiat-jadi-suni-di-tengah-keinginan-pulang-kampung (accessed November 21, 2021).

https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-54550918 (accessed November 21, 2021).

https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/serangan-atas-kelompok-syiah-di-sampang-tuai-kecaman/1496881.html. (accessed November 19, 2021).

https://news.detik.com/bbc-world/d-5242909/pengungsi-syiah-sampang-dibaiat-jadi-suni-di-tengah-keinginan-pulang-kampung (accessed November 11, 2021).

https://yapibangil.org/yayasan/ (accessed November 21, 2021).

https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-report-on-international-religious-freedom/indonesia/ (accessed November 19, 2021).

RELIGIOUS CONSTRUCTION IN DECISION MAKING OF INDONESIAN CUSTOMERS FOR FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS ON SYARIAH BANKS

Mustaqim Pabbajah
Universitas Teknologi Yogyakarta
Email: mustaqim_pabbajah@uty.ac.id

Ratri Nurina Widyanti
Universitas Teknologi Yogyakarta
Email: ratri.nurina@uty.ac.id

Dato' Sudin Harun
Kuala Lumpur Business School, Malaysia
Email: datodrsudin@gmail.com

Muh. Darwis
Institut Agama Islam Negeri Palopo
Email: darwis@iainpalopo.ac.id

Widi Fajar Widyatmoko
Universitas Teknologi Yogyakarta
Email: widifajarpsi@uty.ac.id

ABSTRACT

This study aims to explain how Islamic concepts, symbols and values have implications for people. Especially when they must make decisions to make financial transactions in Islamic banking. Likewise, the religious trend accompanied by the spirit of city has resulted in the enthusiasm of the community to transact with institutions labelled religion in practice. Data collection used in this study was carried out by observation and distributing questionnaires to respondents (customers). Documentation studies are also conducted to find literature related to this study. There are three findings described in this study. First, the conception and symbol of religion is an essential element in the existence of Islamic banking in Indonesia. Second, the understanding of the religious community has been constructed in the decision to make economic transactions in Islamic banks. Third, the religious trend accompanied by religious zeal makes sharia banks in Indonesia have bright prospects to attract the interest of the public to transact. The enermous potential of Islamic banks in Indonesia will experience an increase if the religious values and symbols are implemented correctly and adequately. Religious construction of economic behaviour has resulted in a shift in the pattern of community transactions in the name of religion. This shift certainly provides not only positive expectations in the religious society, but also

provides broad opportunities for the banking business world.

Keywords: Construction; Religious; Economic Transactions; Indonesian Workers; Syariah Banks

INTRODUCTION

The current economic system tends to be forced to adapt to capitalist financial goals, in contrast the capitalist financial system according to Weber is a financial system aimed at market interests to reap higher profits (Holton & Turner, 2010). Therefore, a balance is needed so that the economy is not only to generate profits, but also to pay attention to social interest. One of which is through an ethical approach. In this case, the religion which is only believed to be a set of rituals and spiritual matters, but also needs to be seen to become an essential reason for someone to behave commercial (Coleman, 2012; Shwed, 2019; Swedberg, 2018). Even, belief is considered capable of becoming a solution to the ongoing economic crisis (Hien, 2019; Itçaina, 2015; Rothholz, 2020). One form that is shown by the community in religious considerations in economic transactions is people's trust in the service of economic transactions as practised in Islamic banking in Indonesia, especially in Yogyakarta. Indonesia is one of the countries with the most Islamic banks in the world. According to data released by the Financial Services Authority (OJK) in Sharia Banking Statistics (SPS) as of July 2019 the number of sharia banks in Indonesia currently amounts to around 198 sharia banks (OJK, 2019). The existence of Islamic banks in Indonesia has now entered the 3rd decade. Since it was first pioneered in 1992 by *Bank Muamalat Indonesia (*BMI), other Islamic banks have also emerged. This is inseparable from the bright prospects in the Indonesian sharia financial sector. Therefore, the study of Islamic banks, especially in Indonesia, needs to be studied as economic development supported by a high religious attitude.

So far, the study of religious construction of economic practices has received much attention from researchers and observers of the relationship between religion and economics. There are at least three existing study trends related to the study; first, religion and economic behaviour (Teak, 2018; Sohrah, 2014; Schneider et al., 2015; Shwed, 2019), second, religion as a spirit in analyzing social welfare (Jawad, 2018; Macarov, 2014; Rommelspacher, 2017), as well as religion considered able to overcome the problems of the economic crisis (Rama, 2015; Azwar, 2016; Arruñada & Krapf, 2019) and practised in religious communities (Pabbajah, 2017), and third, the concept of religion in Islamic banking (Finance, 2018; Lely Shofa Imama, 2014; Rokhlinasari, 2016), and people's perceptions and comparisons of Islamic banks and conventional

banks (Choliq, 2016; Kamayanti & Wardhani, 2008). Of the three trends are the basis in seeing how religion is an essential consideration for customers who are safer and more comfortable with financial transactions at Islamic banks.

This survey is a response to the existing studies by completing a study of religious construction on the customer's decision to make economic operations in Islamic banking, especially in Yogyakarta. Accordingly, three questions can be formulated. First, how is the conception of religion used in Islamic banking services? Second, how is the perception of the customer's religion effectively in the selection of financial transactions in Islamic banking. Third, how the construction of religious understanding can attract customer interest in transactions in Islamic banking, these three questions discussed in this study.

This paper is built on three assumptions that underlie customers choosing to do economic transactions in Islamic banking. First, Islamic banks have great potential in Indonesia because of the use of religious concessions in services, also supported by the Muslim community in Indonesia as the majority with the highest Muslim population in the world. Second, the correlation between religion and economic behaviour are inseparable. Therefore, religiosity has a vital role in influencing the customer's decision to transact economically in sharia banking. This is the same as the conceptions and symbols of religion practised in the business services of Islamic banks. Third, the existence of the Shari'ah Bank has a system and financial management with a religious label so that it can maintain the trust of the community, especially Muslims in Indonesia as a potential market. This is the most significant capital for a financial institution accompanied by high religious trends and enthusiasm. Religion and economic behaviour they are considered complimentary and complementary. This study tries to look back at the correlation between the two by choosing a survey of the practice of sharia banking able to become an attraction for adherents of religion, especially Muslims in Indonesia. This study is a qualitative descriptive study by taking a sample of Syariah bank customers in the Yogyakarta region.

RELIGIOUS CONSTRUCTION

The construction theory approach has seized the attention of academics in seeing social, political and economic change. However, construction theory will be vulnerable to accusations of self-satisfaction if not accompanied by noble goals (2014: 2). Then, Front Matter (2012) explains that the critical path for conceptual innovation in social becomes a theoretical construction on empirical data. Construction theory can be structured through research that

is not just gathering data to imply contributions in the explanation of causal relationships (Walby et al., 2017). Correspondingly, construction theory can be widespread in science with the practice of intellectual dissemination to all who play an essential role in empirical discovery (Haig, 2013). Improper theoretical construction can cause school districts and other government institutions to spend resources (Brian et al., 2015). Hill (2012) suggests that vague theories or inability to decompose formulations be improved by systematic validation efforts, especially related to critical assumptions, concepts, and propositions. In this objective fact, Berger and Luckman see and highlight the community in social construction, as a physical entity, formed by the reality of the surrounding environment (Forssell, 2019). Society, also seen as an "artefact" in which the concept of society itself, is constructed by humans and developed into human products (Forssell, 2019). Then, the reality that conceived was explained by Berger and Luckman, which could form subjectivity and materiality that socially constructed with legitimacy and objectification (Bosančić, 2019).

The social construction that was initiated by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, is a comprehensive theory based on a subjective understanding of the world through daily interactions, and understanding and interpretation of the world becomes a fact that builds the way things operate in society (Berger & Luckmann, 2016). Roibin explained the subject of construction religion is the two compromising forces between God related to the representation of revelation and man as a representation of the results of its interpretation (2010: 87). In line with that, Yani et all. (2018: 175) divides religious construction into two categories, namely inclusive or moderate and exclusive, where the difference between them caused by variations in the book used as a reference and with whom one learns. A general religious construction can provide peace and peace for all beings, which in Islamic terminology often referred to as "rahmatanlil 'alamin" (Yani et al., 2018: 175). In contrast to this, praticular religion is more intolerant and radical in terms of religious visions related to and rejects the reality of the plurality of society (Yani et al., 2018: 175). On another occasion, some Muslims took up exclusive and inclusive construction positions in turn (Jubba et al., 2020). According to Santosa (2011), the construction of certain religions cannot be changed or modified — in contrast to cultural identities that are very likely to be revised or redefined in social interactions. In Christianity, a cathedral is a symbol of the religious construction of a closed Christian order, but it has a more positive connotation than a prison (Toraiwa, 2013: 63). According to Çakır et al. (2017: 2), semi-religious construction can be related to semi-mythical development where the unconscious can be stimulated by images that used intensely.

THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION IN ISLAMIC BANKING

An Islamic bank is a banking system whose implementation based on Islamic law (sharia). The formation of this system is based on the prohibition in Islam to lend or collect loans by charging interest (*riba*), as well as the prohibition to invest in businesses that categorized as forbidden (*haram*) (ER, 2018). The difference between Islamic banks and conventional banks is as follows. Islamic banks: 1) only make halal investments according to Islamic law 2) use the principle of profit-sharing, buying and selling, 3) have profit and *Falah* oriented (world happiness and *akhirat* according to Islamic teachings) 4) have relationships with customers in the form of partnerships 5) apply the collection and distribution of funds following the DPS fatwa, whereas Conventional Banks: 1) invest in both halal and haram according to Islamic law 2) use interest rate instruments 3) have profit-oriented 4) have relationships with customers in the form of creditors and debtors 5) Apply the collection and distribution of funds which are not regulated by similar boards (Budisantoso & Sigit, 2011).

The concept of Islamic banking is banking activities based on Islamic sharia, whose characteristics are rejecting the interest system because it is considered usury. However, Islamic banking uses a profit-sharing system or commonly called al-Mudharabah. Mudharabah is a type of financing in Islamic banking whose principle is the distribution of profits from a business based on agreement (Saputro, 2015). Among the Fundamental principles of Sharia Banks is not to conduct stealing, *gharar*, *maisir*, and illicit product transactions. Sharia banks in the collection of demand deposits and savings funds use the principle of *wadi'ah* and deposits using *mudharabah* agreements (Najib, 2017). Wadi'ah is an item that someone entrusts to another party to be looked after properly (Hayati & Sri Sudiarti, 2022). This concept is based on the Islamic principle of trust and ethical conduct in financial transactions. Wadi'ah is often used for safekeeping purposes, allowing individuals or entities to store their money in a secure manner without engaging in interest-bearing transactions, which are prohibited in Islamic finance. On one side of sharia banking makes *mudharabah* as the main icon of sharia banking, at the practical level the mudharabah model is still a debate among scientists, so *mudharabah* in sharia banking seems to be even burdensome and the same as conventional banking (Jalaluddin & Pangiuk, 2016).

One of the sharia banking products that are in high demand by the public and mutually beneficial between the customer and the bank is financing with a *musyarakah* contract. *Musyarakah* contracts nowadays tend to be often done by entrepreneurs where they want to develop their business. Because the

musyarakah contract is a loss carried by each party, capital is jointly borne, and the manager can be one party or both parties. It depends on the initial agreement. The profit is divided following with the initial deal (Susanto, 2016). Likewise, the concept and application of the *Murabahah* contract in Islamic Banking in Indonesia. *Murabahah*, which constitutes all types of sales of amânat in Islamic law, is the leading contract scheme used in Sharia banking practices in Indonesia. However, in preparation, *murabaha* has undergone many changes compared to the basic concepts of classical *muamalat fiqh*. Ulama do not reject adjusment that do not conflict with the basic principles of Islamic law. However, many models for modification have sparked debate, because they are done exclusively to meet the requirements of formal justice, to review the effectiveness and efficiency of banking administration (Lathif, 2013). The existence and development of the Sharia banking industry, the concept of *Murabaha* was adopted as one of the contracts for Islamic bank financing products (Lely Shofa Imama, 2014). With the religious ideas utilised in the service of Islamic banks, so that the Islamic banking industry can develop rapidly, which is followed by the high potential of the religious community.

ISLAMIC THOUGHT AND FINANCIAL TRANSACTION

Economy is the central pillar in every development of a region or country. A developed nation is characterized by a stable economy with the state of middle- and upper-class people. The economic pace is also accompanied by high commercial transactions, including public confidence in the services of financial institutions (Widyanti, 2019), such as banking. The excellent services offered by banks will have an impact on the trust and interest of the public in dealing, including paying attention to the religious conditions of the community. Therefore, in dealing with the economy, it is not only focused on service, security and comfort, but banks consider the condition of customer religiosity (Widyanti et al., 2022). There are three trends of reasons for customers in choosing economic transactions through Islamic banking.

First, an excellent religious understanding leads people to choose to transact according to the teachings of the religion they believe. This is indicated by the high perception of customers in selecting economic transactions in Islamic banking. Sharia economic activity is currently increasing, both in terms of quality and quantity. The indication is the growth of Islamic banking which has provided the stimulus to the public about alternative financing that is more equitable and distributive (Rofiani, 2009). Second, increasingly open interpretations of understanding of religious teachings influence customers in transacting in financial institutions with Islamic or sharia labels (Sudrajat

& Sodiq, 2016). The principle of sharia compliance can be implemented based on a detailed and comprehensive understanding of sharia principles. Third, high public trust in industries with religious labels, for example in Islam there is a halal and sharia label however the emergence of sectors with a halal name, according to Ali & Al-Aali (2015), needs to be continually studied practices and processes that take place in the community.

From the existence of religious labels, Barro and McCleary assess the influence of religious participation and beliefs on the level of economic progress of a country. The presence of stronger religious beliefs can stimulate economic growth because it helps maintain individual behaviour by increasing productivity (Campante, 2013) Hence, religion influencing economic development activities as explained by Jerotijević & Hagovská (2019) that corporate meetings in religious rituals can have a positive impact on individual welfare. Noland (2005) added, religious activities can affect economic performance at the level of individuals, groups, or countries, where religion can affect economic outcomes such as economic growth. However, religion can also set rules of behaviour, or practice that restrict followers. Therefore, religious exercises become informal institutions that impose constraints by arranging economic, political and social interactions, in which religious practices impose direct exchanges in the production process that affect productivity (Darwis et al., 2023)"mendeley":{"formattedCitation":"(Darwis et al., 2023. The practices also form beliefs and values that determine economic decisions. However, since religious behaviour tends to be endogenous and influenced by economic growth itself, Campante (2013) believes that there is a causal effect that drives these relations challenging to understand.

RELIGIOUS CONCEPTION IN ECONOMIC PRACTICES IN ISLAMIC BANKING

At present, the growth of sharia banking in Indonesia is entirely developing. As stated in the 2019 Financial Services Authority report, in Indonesia there are 198 sharia banks consisting of 14 Sharia Commercial Banks (BUS), 20 Sharia Business Units (UUS), and 164 Islamic People's Financing Bank (BPRS). Even, Indonesia is one of the countries that have the most Islamic banks (OJK, 2019). This shows that Islamic banking is a potential institution that grows and develops well in religious communities in Indonesia. The existing Islamic banking spread in several regions in Indonesia, one of which has the potential to be the Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY).

Yogyakarta Special Region Province (DIY) is a special region that has a good and positive development of sharia economy. Chairman of the Regional

Leadership Council (DPW) of the Indonesian Sharia Bank Association (Asbisindo) of the Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY) Sukma Dwie Priardi said that in 2019 "overall the DIY Islamic banking industry experienced a positive trend and succeeded in having higher growth compared to the average national banking industry growth. He further said that the overall growth in assets of the national sharia banking reached 10.97%. In terms of financing it also grew by around 7.5% and in terms of third-party funds (DPK) also rose 9.5%. "DIY Islamic banking assets grew around 11.36 per cent, with the portion of financing, experiencing a significant growth, which amounted to 19.5 per cent. Meanwhile, DPK grew around 11.93 per cent" (Jogja Daily, January 2019).

The existence and growth of Islamic banking in Yogyakarta is inseparable from the acceptance of heterogeneous society with a high level of religiosity. Most people of Yogyakarta are Muslim. The growth of the banking business based on Islamic teachings is proliferating. Even, today many conventional banks are interested in expanding the business wing that is considered potential in Islamic banking. This condition will undoubtedly be an open rivalry in the banking world, which will then encourage each bank to innovate to see the cultural-religious potential of the region to maintain the maximum quantity and quality of service. Thus, the bargaining power of Islamic banks will become a potential market which will undoubtedly have an impact on the growth of Islamic banking. variables of religiosity, service quality, satisfaction, and trust on Islamic bank customer loyalty through a study on Islamic the Special Capital Region (DKI) of Jakarta (Wahyoedi et al., 2021). The customer's decision to transact at a sharia bank cannot be separated from the context of Indonesian society, which is predominantly Muslim (Nugroho et al., 2017). This also happens in a number of countries with a Muslim majority, such as Malaysia (Haron & Nursofiza Wan Azmi, 2008; Haron & Wan Azmi, 2005).

This proper development is inseparable from the enthusiasm and trust of the public to conduct financial transactions in Islamic banks. In line with that, Weber in his thesis, explained the relationship of religion and work ethic initiated by Max Weber in his study entitled Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism (Pabbajah, 2017). In the Weberian perspective, religion plays an important role in developing work ethics. Rationalism, asceticism, and "calling" encourage humans to work hard in the world to obtain economic needs and materialist benefits (Teak, 2013). The work ethic in the name of religion can also be done through community empowerment or community groups to answer the challenges of the global economy (Pabbajah et al, 2019). Thus, business institutions with religious labels can be an alternative in the

ongoing development of the worldwide economy.

This potential is due to the concept and approach of religion used in Islamic banking services. Religious communities have a high enough interest to transact business or economy with ethical guarantees that accompany it. In this case, Islamic banking has an excellent opportunity to see the potential that exists in the community. Based on the results of a questionnaire conducted in this study of 52 customers in several Islamic banks in Yogyakarta, religious perceptions and conceptions have an essential influence on the transaction decisions in Islamic banks.

From the results of the questionnaire conducted to 52 customers, and it shows that the most influencing factor in financial transaction decisions is the conception of religion applied in Islamic banks. It shows that 47 customers see the concept of religion in Islamic banks. Then it is followed by a religious understanding of the customer, it also becomes a reason for customers to make transactions in Islamic banks with the result that 46 customers have spiritual perceptions and understanding. Meanwhile, customer service and trust are the comparison variable under the conception and understanding of the effects of 41 customers, while 31 customers see the physical Islamic bank as a reason. Therefore, this study shows that the majority of customers decide that financial transactions cannot separated from the concept of religion attached to Islamic banks.

IMPLICATIONS OF CUSTOMER'S RELIGIOUS PERCEPTION IN TRANSACTIONS IN ISLAMIC BANKING

Islamic banking has varied customer characteristics both in terms of gender, age and profession. This shows the existence of public confidence in financial transactions in Islamic banking. The data collected, although it is still a small scale, can already be used as a representation of customers. Before describing the religious perceptions of customers having significant significance in conducting transactions in Islamic banks, the following data presented about the identity of material objects to provide a description of respondents as shown in the following table:

Table 1
Respondents Characteristics

No.	Respondents Characteristics	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	Gender		
	Male	24	48
	Female	28	52
	Total	52	100
2.	Age		
	20-30 y.o	4	4
	31-40 y.o	18	35
	41-50 y.o	21	47
	>50 y.o	9	14
	Total	52	100
3.	Occupation		
	Civil Servants	8	11
	Private Sectors	17	29
	Entrepreneur	22	52
	Retired	5	8
	Total	52	100

Source: *Compiled by researchers, 2022.*

The description shows that the number of female Islamic bank customers in Yogyakarta is more significant than male. The number of female is 28 respondents (52%), while the number of men is 24 respondents. Likewise, the age of most customers is between 41-50 years, with 21 respondents (47%). The types of occupations most respondents are entrepreneurs as many as 22 respondents (52%). The description of the results shows that the number of customers who choose to make financial transactions in Islamic banking tends to be more than those of entrepreneurs with an age that is still productive. Therefore, the government through the Financial Services Authority focuses on increasing financial literacy, especially in the productive age population, so that the influence of financial literacy, risk tolerance and overconfidence can be measured in investment decision making (Dewi & Krisnawati, 2020).

The perception of religion for some people is something that needs to be used as a reference in socio-economic practices. Worship and socio-economic activities are two things that complement and supervise one another. In Islam for example, there is a lot of literature that discusses the relationship between Islam and economics commonly referred to as Islamic economics (Toth & Toth, 2013; Visser, 2019) or Islamic finance (Al-Jarhi, 2017; Marketplace, 2015). The ongoing development of the Islamic economy is identical to the development of Islamic financial institutions. One of the fundamental philosophies of Islamic teachings in economic and business activities is the

prohibition of cheating and wrongdoing. All transactions carried out by a Muslim must be based on the principle of being willing on both parties, and no party may be wrong, or in the opposite may be wronged. This basic principle has vast implications in the economic and business fields, including in banking practices (Rasulong, 2011). With these principles, a Muslim tends to prioritize religious considerations in social and economic practices, including in the division of transactions in Islamic banking. It shown in the description in the following table:

Table 2
Descriptive Results

Descriptive Statistics	Respon-dent	Agree/ person	Disagree/ person	%
Religion Conception in Sharia Bank	52	47	5	96
Service and Trust	52	41	13	91
Perception and Understanding of Religion	52	46	6	94
Quality of Service	52	23	29	47
Valid N (listwise)	52			

Source: *Compiled by researchers, 2022.*

RELIGIOUS (ISLAMIC) CONSTRUCTION OF ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS

Religion is a device that regulates all activities for adherents. With faith, a person will interact socially by showing an adaptive phenomenon and tends to vary, depending on where located a person. Correspondingly, Durkheim argues that religion is a social phenomenon which in its process has a correlation that is continuously interacting interactively with other social aspects (Douglas et al., 1996; Sutcliffe, 2011). The phenomenon of religion has always been an interesting issue to study in seeing the continuity of a changing social life. Various forms of changes caused by religious construction can be witnessed in almost all aspects of community life, among others, cultural, political and economic issues. This study looks at one of the elements that exist with the construction approach of ethical (Islam) in commercial practice.

There are three trends in the construction of faith (Islam) over a Muslim's decision to make economic transactions in an Islamic financial institution, as discussed in the previous section. First, the conception of religion used by financial institutions with the name of religion has an appeal in attracting the interests of the Muslim community in Indonesia. In the view of religious communities, the label of religion considered as a reference in transactions. The relationship of faith and economy has long been a concern of the western world,

where the study of the relationship between religion and economics referred to as economic of religion (Schneider et al., 2015; Shwed, 2019). This study views faith as a variable that has a causal relationship with various variables, and one of which is an economic variable. In this case, religion can be studied and measured through individual and group religious behaviour (Rama, 2015). The study models is correlative, according to Rehman and Askari has two patterns, namely religion is placed as the dependent variable (which influenced) and as an independent variable (which influences) (Rehman & Askari, 2010). Under these conditions, religion is easily constructed and constructed following with the term underlying it, so can religion be constructed with economic interests.

Second, the paradigm in religion that usually sourced from one's religious understanding results in economic practices. In Islam, there is knowledge about understanding called fiqh, as a source of law for Muslims in their daily practice. Islam based on sharia law, which based on the Qur'an and hadith. The ethical system in Islam derived from this Shariah law. Whereas, trade and business are the main subjects in the Islamic moral tradition because the Arabs historically have these traditions, and after becoming Muslims, they continue the tradition (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2017). In the concept of Islamic economics is called *muamalah fiqh* as a fundamental paradigm in the practice of Islamic economics (Azwar Iskandar & KhaerulAqbar, 2019). In connection with this study which shows a person's understanding factor can make decisions in economic transactions. In other words, the construction of religious understanding causes one to choose to transact in Islamic banking institutions. The paradigm of Islamic economics is not solely related to perceptions of thoughts, ideas and final products, but instead includes underlying assumptions about human nature, motivation, and effort, which form the economic and institutional basis on which economic activity is practised (Yusuf, 2014). In practice, one's understanding of religion has been constructed into economic behavior that shows financial transactions in institutions with religious (Islamic) labels.

Third, the religious community trend in Indonesia is currently experiencing a relatively high increase. This is inseparable from the religious enthusiasm of the community which has recently shown a positive direction. The opening of space for religious expression has led to an increasing number of media that provide religious studies, both offline and online, so that religion can be consumed by the public openly. The new media has changed the tendency of religious education by opening public participation in the production of religious knowledge. In other words, the centre of power shifts from the religious elite to the media that are present within the framework of political

economy interests (Abdullah, 2017). The formation of religious behaviuor determined by the overall experience that is realized by each person. Personally, awareness is the action, meaning that what is thought and felt by the individual determines what will be taught (Supriyanto, 2018). Thus, economic transactions on the consideration of religiosity constructed by the ongoing religious tendency.

CONCLUSIONS

The correlation between religion and economy has stimulated the birth of various studies with social, cultural, political and economic approaches that are taking place in the community. That is also an essential reason in seeing the construction of religion (Islam) in the customer's decision to make an economic transaction with an Islamic bank. Significant findings of this study show the high public interest in financial transactions in Islamic banking, specifically in Indonesia. Based on the results, there are three forms of religious construction so that customers prefer financial transactions in Islamic banks. First, the concept of religion that used in Islamic banking makes priority the reason for a customer's economic transactions. The religious symbols in implemented in Islamic banks have a relatively strong influence. Second, the construction of theological understanding that is believed by the customer has implications in deciding economic transactions, in other words, the spiritual attitude of the customer has a correlation in economic behavior of choosing an institution with a religious label (Wdyatmoko et al, 2020). Third, the religious trend that is increasing at this time is accompanied by a communal religious zeal. Likewise, other supporting factors, namely easy access to religious learning through various media, further strengthen religious trends in the community.

From the three constructions, this study provides two important notes for financial institution managers, especially those with religious labels. First, the enormous potential of the banking world cannot separated from the socioreligious conditions of the community, so a business approach is needed that is not only looking for profit, but also how to empower the community. Second, the concepts and religious symbols used in banking practices certainly have positive values to support the existence of Islamic banks which are expected to be alternatives in global financial competition. However, stakeholder attention is needed not to misuse religion in the banking system, so that it can damage the image of faith and the bank itself in the rising religious attitude of the people.

This study is only a complementary study of existing studies, so it is still very possible to do further studies by looking at religious and economic correlations

comprehensively. Likewise, this study certainly still has limitations and weaknesses in analyzing the construction of religion, especially Islam over economic transactions. One limitation of this study is that the object used as a sample is still small scale, so a more comprehensive follow-up study with broader scale data coverage with sharper analysis is needed. Therefore, it is recommended to develop the variables studied and the presentation of specific data. Thus, the world of banking and financial institutions, especially those that have religious labels can take strategic policies to respond to the challenges of the global economy that continues to move simultaneously.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdullah, I. (2017). Di Bawah Bayang-Bayang Media : Kodifikasi, Divergensi, dan Kooptasi Agama di Era Internet. *Sabda : Jurnal Kajian Kebudayaan*. https://doi.org/10.14710/mkmi.

Ali, A.J. & Al-Aali, A. (2015). Marketing and Ethics: What Islamic Ethics Have Contributed and the Challenges Ahead. *Journal of Business Ethics, 129*(4), 833-845

Al-Jarhi, M. A. (2017). An economic theory of Islamic finance. *ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance*, *9*(2), 117–132. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJIF-07-2017-0007

Arruñada, B., & Krapf, M. (2019). Religion and the European Union. In *Advances in the Economics of Religion* (pp. 295–308). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98848-1_18

Azwar, M. (2016). Zakat dan Kesejahteraan Sosial. *Jurnal Islaminomic, V. No, 2*, 59–74.

Azwar Iskandar, & Khaerul Aqbar. (2019). Kedudukan Ilmu Ekonomi Islam di Antara Ilmu Ekonomi dan Fikih Muamalah : Analisis Problematika Epistemologis. *NUKHBATUL 'ULUM : Jurnal Bidang Kajian Islam*, *5*(2), 88–105. https://doi.org/10.36701/nukhbah.v5i2.77

Baehr, P. (2014). Introduction. The American Sociologist, 45(1), 2-7. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/43956312.

Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (2016). The social construction of reality. In *Social Theory Re-Wired: New Connections to Classical and Contemporary Perspectives: Second Edition* (pp. 110–122). https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315775357.

Bosančić, S. (2019). Relations, Discourses and Subjectivities: The Social Construction of Reality and beyond. ГласникЕтнографскогинститута САНУ, *67*(1), 91-104.

Brian R. Belland, Andrew E. Walker, Megan Whitney Olsen, & Heather Leary. (2015). A Pilot Meta-Analysis of Computer-Based Scaffolding in STEM Education. Journal of Educational Technology & Society, 18(1), 183-197. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/jeductechsoci.18.1.183.

Budisantoso, Totok &SigitTriandaru.(2011).*Bank danLembagaKeuangan Lain,*Edisi 3, Jakarta, SalembaEmpat.

Çakır, F., &Günday, R. (2017). KırmızıPazartesi" nin Büyülü Gerçekçilik Temelli Psikanalitik Eleştirisi. Uşak Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 10(1), 1-18.

Coleman, S. (2012). Economy and religion. In *A Handbook of Economic Anthropology, Second Edition* (pp. 361–376). https://doi.org/10.4337/9781849809290.00031

Darwis, M., Pabbajah, M., Harun, D. S., Adliyah, N., Fitriani, F., & Yogyakarta, U. T. (2023). *Religious : Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama dan Lintas Budaya The Inequality of Zakat Distribution to the Indonesia ' s Impoverished Muslim. 7249.*

Dewi, N. P. P. K., & Krisnawati, A. (2020). Pengaruh Financial Literacy, Risk Tolerance Dan Overconfidence Terhadap Pengambilan Keputusan Investasi Pada Usia Produktif Di Kota Bandung. *Jurnal Mitra Manajemen*, *2*(4), 236–250.

Douglas, M., Durkheim, E., & Fields, K. (1996). The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. *Contemporary Sociology*, *25*(4), 467. https://doi.org/10.2307/2077075Front Matter. (2012). Sociological Theory, 30(3). Retrieved fro www.jstor.org/stable/41725509

ER, N. E. (2018). Analisa Perkembangan Jumlah Outlet Kantor Cabang dan Kebutuhan Frontliners di Era Digital Banking (Studi kasus di Bank Syariah Anak Perusahaan dan UUS Bank BUMN di Yogyakarta). *IQTISAD*, *5*(2), 1. https://doi.org/10.31942/iq.v5i2.2547Forssell, T. (2019)." I made you, but you made me first": The Social Construction of Evil, in part through the Architecture and Urban Landscape in Tim Burton's Batman (1989) and Christopher Nolan's The Dark Knight (2008).

Haig, B. (2013). Detecting Psychological Phenomena: Taking Bottom-Up Research Seriously. The American Journal of Psychology, 126(2), 135-

153. doi:10.5406/amerjpsyc.126.2.0135Choliq, M. (2016). Bank Syariah dan Bank Konvensional. *Jurnal Keuangan Dan Perbankan*, *20*(1), 1.

Haron, S., & Nursofiza Wan Azmi, W. (2008). Determinants of Islamic and conventional deposits in the Malaysian banking system. *Managerial Finance*. https://doi.org/10.1108/03074350810890976

Haron, S., & Wan Azmi, W. N. (2005). Marketing Strategy of Islamic Banks: A Lesson from Malaysia. *Seminar on Enhancing Competitive Advantage on Islamic Financial Institutions*.

Hayati, F., & Sri Sudiarti. (2022). Penerapan Rahn, Wadi'ah dan Ijarah. *Mumtaz : Jurnal Ekonomi Dan Bisnis Islam*. https://doi.org/10.55537/mumtaz.v1i2.181

Hien, J. (2019). A new thirty years war?: Protestant ordoliberalism and the reemergence of the north–south conflict. In *Ordoliberalism and European Economic Policy: Between Realpolitik and Economic Utopia* (pp. 58–73). https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429202032-4

Holton, R. J., & Turner, B. S. (2010). Max Weber on economy and society. In *Max Weber on Economy and Society*. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203831632

Itçaina, X. (2015). The crisis as a constrained opportunity? Catholic organisations and territorial welfare in the Basque Country and Emilia-Romagna. *Religion, State and Society*, *43*(2), 118–132. https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2015.1059656

Iqbal, Z. & Mirakhor, A. (2017). Business Ethics in Islam. Dalam *Ethical Dimensions of Islamic Finance* (pp. 81-102). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Jalaluddin, J., & Pangiuk, A. (2016). Bagi Hasil (Studi Tentang Implikasi Konsep Maqasid Al-Syariah Al-Syatiby). *Indonesian Journal of Islamic Economics and Business*, *1*(1), 133–144.

Jati, W. R. (2013). Agama Dan Spirit Ekonomi. *ALQALAM*, *30*(2), 265. https://doi.org/10.32678/alqalam.v30i2.1066.

Jawad, R. (2018). Social welfare and religion in the Middle East. In *Social welfare and religion in the Middle East*. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt9qgnrx

Jerotijević, D., & Hagovská, M. (2019). The role of group experience in alternative spiritual gatherings. *Human Affairs*, *29*(1), 48–62. https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2019-0005

Jubba, H., Abdullah, I., Pabbajah, M., Iribaram, S., Prasojo, Z. H., & Qodir, Z. (2020). The display of religious symbols in public space: The contesta-

tion of muslim and christian identities in jayapura, Papua. *Humanities and Social Sciences Reviews*, *8*(1), 642–650. https://doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2020.8177

Kamayanti, A., & Wardhani, P. S. (2008). Persepsi Nasabah dalam Memilih Bank Syariah atau Bank Konvensional. *Jurnal Media Mahardhika*, *6*(3).

Keuangan, O. J. (2018). *Prinsip dan Konsep Dasar Perbankan Syariah*. Otoritas Jasa Keuangan.

Lathif, A. A. (2013). Konsep dan Aplikasi Akad Murâbahah pada Perbankan Syariah di Indonesia. *AHKAM : Jurnal Ilmu Syariah*, *12*(2). https://doi.org/10.15408/ajis.v12i2.967

Lely Shofa Imama. (2014). Konsep Dan Implementasi Murabahah Pada Produk Pembiayaan Bank Syariah. *IQTISHADIA: Jurnal Ekonomi & Perbankan Syariah*, *1*(2).

Macarov, D. (2014). Religion as a Motivator of Social Welfare. In *Social Welfare: Structure and Practice* (pp. 85–106). https://doi.org/10.4135/9781483345345.n6

Marketplace, W. I. F. (2015). Islamic Finance and Economic Growth. *IMF World Economic Outlook*, *January*.

Najib, M. A. (2017). Penguatan Prinsip Syariah Pada Produk Bank Syari-aH. *Jurnal Jurisprudence*. https://doi.org/10.23917/jurisprudence.v7i1.4351

Nugroho, A. P., Hidayat, A., & Kusuma, H. (2017). The influence of religiosity and self-efficacy on the saving behavior of the slamic banks. *Banks and Bank Systems*. https://doi.org/10.21511/bbs.12(3).2017.03

OJK. (2019). Statistik Perbankan Syariah September 2019. *Otoritas Jasa Keuangan*, *53*(9), 1689–1699. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004

Pabbajah, M. (2017). Praktik Ekonomi Islam pada Komunitas Keagamaan di Sulawesi Selatan. *Al-Ulum*, *17*(1). https://doi.org/10.30603/au.v17i1.107

Pabbajah, M., Abdullah, I., Juhansar, & Jubba, H. 2019. Contested Socioreligious Reality: An-Nadzir, a Non-mainstream Islamic Movement in Indonesia. *The International Journal of Religion and Spirituality in Society*. https://doi.org/10.18848/2154-8633/cgp/v09i02/71-78

Rama, A. (2015). Agama dan Aktivitas Ekonomi. *Opini KOMPAS*, *January*, 6. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.1743.7203

Rasulong, I. (2011). Pemahaman Nasabah Tentang Konsep Mudharabah (Studi Pada BMT Ditha Anugerah Makassar). *Jurnal Ekonomi Balance*, *7*(1), 44–59.

Rehman, S. S., & Askari, H. (2010). An Economic Islamicity Index. *Global Economy Journal*, *10*(3), 1–37.

Rofiani, N. (2009). PErilaku Nasabah Dalam Memilih Produk Pembiayaan Pegadaian Pada Pt. Bank Syari'ah Mandiri TBK. *Al-Iqtishad: Jurnal Ilmu Ekonomi Syariah*, *1*(2). https://doi.org/10.15408/aiq.v1i2.2467

Rokhlinasari, S. (2016). Perbankan Syariah Dan Manajemen Laba. *Al-Amwal : Jurnal Ekonomi Dan Perbankan Syari'ah*, *6*(1), 80–94. https://doi.org/10.24235/AMWAL.V6I1.250.G220

Roibin, R. (2010). Agama danmitos: Dari imajinasikreatifmenujurealitas yang dinamis. el-Harakah, 12(2), 85-97.

Rommelspacher, B. (2017). Religion and welfare. *European Journal of Social Work*, *20*(6), 795–800. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691457.2017.1318262

Rothholz, W. (2020). The Political/Civil Role of Religion: What Narrative is Appropiate for the EU? *Review of Ecumenical Studies Sibiu*, *10*(2), 266–281. https://doi.org/10.2478/ress-2018-0020

Santosa, N. E. T. I. (2010). Strengthening Cultures of Peace. UniversitasMuhammadiyahSidoarjo.

Saputro, A. (2015). Sistem Perhitungan Bagi Hasil Pembiayaan Mudharabah Pada Pt. Bank Syariah Mandiri Cabang Malang. *Jurnal Administrasi Bisnis S1 Universitas Brawijaya*, *21*(2), 85837.

Schneider, F., Linsbauer, K., & Heinemann, F. (2015). Religion and the shadow economy. *Kyklos*. https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12075

Shwed, Z. (2019). Theoretical Approaches to the Study of the Economy of Religion. *Future Human Image*, *11*, 83–90. https://doi.org/10.29202/fhi/11/9

Sohrah, S. (2014). Prinsip Ekonomi dalam Islam. *Jurnal Al-Qadau*, *Vol 1*, *No*, 9.

Sudrajat, A., & Sodiq, A. (2016). Analisis Penilaian Kinerja Bank Syariah Berdasarkan Indeks Maqasid ShaRI'AH (Studi Kasus pada 9 Bank Umum Syariah di Indonesia Tahun 2015). *BISNIS : Jurnal Bisnis Dan Manajemen Islam*, *4*(1), 178. https://doi.org/10.21043/bisnis.v4i1.1688

Sugiyono. (2016). Metodologi Penelitian Kuantitatif, Kualitatif, dan R&D. In *CV Alfabeta*. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000238666

Supriyanto, S. (2018). Trend Busana Muslimah Dan Perilaku Keagamaan Di Kalangan Karyawati. *YinyanG: Jurnal Studi Islam, Gender Dan Anak*, *13*(2), 327–347. https://doi.org/10.24090/yinyang.v13i2.2018.pp327-347

Susanto, H. H. (2016). Konsep Syirkah Pada Perbankan Syariah. *Justicia Islamica*, *13*(2), 283. https://doi.org/10.21154/justicia.v13i2.612

Sutcliffe, S. J. (2011). New age, world religions and elementary forms. In *New Age Spirituality: Rethinking Religion* (pp. 17–34).

Swedberg, R. (2018). The Economy and Religion. In *Max Weber and the Idea of Economic Sociology* (pp. 108–145). https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv346nqx.10

Toraiwa, N. (2013). Portals between Here and There: Sinéad Morrissey's Uses of Visual Imagery. Journal of Irish Studies, 28, 56-67.

Toth, J., & Toth, J. (2013). The Islamic Economy. In *Sayyid Qutb* (pp. 179–191). https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199790883.003.0009

Visser, H. (2019). The Islamic economy. In *Islamic Finance* (pp. 27–69). https://doi.org/10.4337/9781786433503.00011.

V.Wiratna& Poly E. (2012) *StatistikUntukPenelitian*. PenerbitGrahaIlmu: Yogyakarta

Wahyoedi, S., Sudiro, A., Sunaryo, S., & Sudjatno, S. (2021). The effect of religiosity and service quality on customer loyalty of Islamic banks mediated by customer trust and satisfaction. *Management Science Letters*. https://doi.org/10.5267/j.msl.2020.8.016

Walby, S., Towers, J., Balderston, S., Corradi, C., Francis, B., Heiskanen, M., Strid, S. (2017). Coordination. In The concept and measurement of violence (pp. 145-158). Bristol, UK; Chicago, IL, USA: Bristol University Press. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv47w5j0.11

Widyanti, Ratri Nurina. (2019). Student perception of the quality of service in the Master of Management Study Program of Universitas Teknologi Yogyakarta. *Jurnal Manajemen Bisnis,* 10 (2) https://doi.org/10.18196/mb.10179.

Widyanti, R. N., Pabbajah, M., & Darwis, M. (2022). Online Marketing sebagai Strategi Kualitas Layanan pada Perbankan Syariah. *Al-Buhuts*, *18*, 658–672. https://journal.iaingorontalo.ac.id/index.php/ab/article/

view/3115%0Ahttps://journal.iaingorontalo.ac.id/index.php/ab/article/download/3115/1616

Widyatmoko, W. F., Pabbajah, M., & Widyanti, R. N. (2020). The Character of Leadership in Human Resources Development: A Critical Review. *International Journal of Management, Innovation & Entrepreneurial Research*, *6*(2), 01-09. https://doi.org/10.18510/ijmier.2020.621

Yani, M. T., Haidar, M. A., Warsono, W., &Sadewo, F. S. (2018). The Religious Construction of Kiai on Pluralism and Multiculturalism. El Harakah, 20(2), 175.

Yusuf, A. (2014). Paradigma Kontemporer Ekonomi Islam. *Studi Islamika*, *11*(2), 215–244.

RELIGION-STATE RELATION WITHIN THE SURYALAYA QADIRIYAH NAQSYABANDIYAH TARIQA

Asep Salahudin
IAILM Suryalaya Tasikmalaya
Email: asepsalahudin@gmail.com

Try Riduwan Santoso
IAILM Suryalaya Tasikmalaya
Email: tryriduwan165@gmail.com

Norhayati binti Hj Abd Karim
Fakulti Bahasa Arab, Universiti Islam Sultan Sharif Ali
Email: Norhayati.abdkarim@unissa.edu.bn

Akhmad Robittul Hilmi
IAILM Suryalaya Tasikmalaya
Email: arhilmi@iailm.ac.id

ABSTRACT

The assumption that a tariqa group opposes worldly attainment and power is incorrect; their engagement in practical politics stems from a moral duty to uphold the state's unity and integrity. This article delves into the political communication established by a Sufi figure, Abah Anom, aiming to reinforce the teachings of the tariqa and its relevance to religion and the state. Employing a descriptive qualitative approach through literature review, this research obtained data from various documents such as lecture texts, announcements, and photographs. The findings reveal two strategies employed by Abah Anom to reinforce the relations between religion and the state. First, a focus on spiritual growth, emphasizing practice and religious knowledge as guiding principles. Second, the maintenance of relations with state leaders, fostering legitimacy as responsible citizens. This study concludes that the relations between religion and the state that constitute part of the teachings of the Qodiriyah Naqsabandiyah tariqa (TQN)serve as a means to advocate and position itself within Muslim communities and government, aligning with both religion and state objectives. Furthermore, it suggests that the roles of the kyai extend beyond a broker of culture; the kyai also plays the role of a broker of politics to preserve harmony among religious groups and uphold the state's unity and integrity.

INTRODUCTION

Islamic boarding schools based on the *tariqa* [a school or order of Sufism] serve not only as centers for Islamic spiritual education but also as hubs for fostering the cultural, economic, social, and political aspects of society (Rahman Nurul Amin & Panorama, 2021). These Pesantren institutions manifest as political spaces, exemplified by the dynamic relationships between ulemas [religious scholars] and the government. An example of this was witnessed at the Islamic boarding school founded by Habib Luthfi bin Yahya in Pekalongan, Central Java, during a significant event from July 27th to 29th, 2016. Here, an international ulama conference was convened. Organized by Jam'iyah Ahlith Tariqah al-Mutabarah an-Nahdiyah in collaboration with the Indonesian Ministry of Defense, this gathering involved representatives from 37 countries and centered on the theme, "Defending the Nation: Concept and Urgency in Islam." The conference underscored the crucial role of the Tariqa ulemas in upholding the security and stability of global religious communities. This illustrates that tariqas should convey not only spiritual teachings but also political messages, positioning themselves as political entities engaging in dialogues with the government.

To date, numerous studies have explored the political movements within the tariqa, often emphasizing how *kyais* engage with the government (Abdurahman, 2019). Several studies also delve into *kyai's* resistance against colonial rule in the pursuit of independence. *Kyais*, recognized as cultural brokers, wield influence over social norms and behavior in daily life (Salahudin, 2016). Gertz (1989, 2003) categorizes Javanese society into three distinct social groups: *Abangan, priyayi,* and *santri*. The santri's identity is intricately linked to the kyai, who has great influence over the social order (Sairin, 2012). The significant role of the kyai lies in shaping national character through religious and patriotic teachings, instilling the belief that love for one's country is integral to faith (Siraj, 2016). The kyai's instructional methods not only emphasize spiritual devotion but also conveys a love for the homeland within their teachings (Samrudi & Abd. Hadi Faishol, 2022). Consequently, the kyai leadership has made significant contributions to Indonesia's mental and moral development, striving towards a fair, prosperous, and harmonious society.

The tariqa kyai group, contrary to being synonymous with passive escapism amid changing times (Hakim, 2021), tends to adopt an activist stance, actively engaging in social and political movements (Thohir, 2014). While the foundational purpose of tariqa institutions is to cultivate societal ethics centered around religious spirituality and esoteric power, these objectives inevitably intersect with the realm of practical politics. On the other hand,

there are also individuals within this group who opt for a more confined approach, making choices within the domain of value politics. (Mulyati & Nihayah, 2020). Sayyed Hossen Nasr (1979: 132) argues that a *Sufi is an active participant in a spiritual path and is intellectual in the real meaning in this word. Contemplation in Sufism, the higest form of activity and in fact sufis have always integrated the active and contemplative lives.* Hence, the role of Sufis is not solely confined to being agents of the spiritual path but extends to being agents of change, particularly in strenngthening social and political movements within the *ummah*. (Rosi, 2020).

This article seeks to analyze the Sufistic da'wah movement embodied by KH Ahmad Shohibul Wafa Tajul Arifin, exploring how it synergizes the teachings of the Tarekat Qadiriyah Naqsyabandiyah [hereafter referred to as the TQN] with religious and state affairs. In addition to being the spiritual teacher of the TQN Suryalaya, Abah Anom was also actively involved in practical politics, particularly in presidential elections during the New Order era (Sadono, 2021). The involvement of kyais in the tariqa, exemplified by Abah Anom, is not arbitrary; it is rooted in moral encouragement and signifies a commitment to religious principles and civic duties. The harmonious synergy of the TQN teachings with religious and state aspects reflects an earnest endeavor to uphold unity among citizens. Consequently, Abah Anom's political communication serves as a form of da'wah and political negotiation, contributing to the evolution and propagation of TQN teachings.

Until now, numerous studies have examined the engagement of tariqa *kyais* in practical politics during the era of struggle against colonialism. However, this study focuses on the nuances of political communication among tariqa *kyais* during the eras of independence and the New Order regime, specifically delving into the strategies employed by figures like Abah Anom (Ridho et al., 2021). Political communication stands as a crucial agenda for negotiating with legitimate authorities, aimed at fostering unity within the ummah and cultivating harmonious relationships between ulemas and the ummah. Moreover, it serves as a crucial element of da'wah, positioning tariqa kyai as allies of the government in harmonizing religious practices within both religious and state domains, rather than adopting an anti-worldly attainment stance. Consequently, the political communication developed by Abah Anom represents a means of establishing the TQN's legitimacy within Indonesia's religious and state affairs. (Rohimat, 2021).

This qualitative descriptive study aims to analyze the dynamics of Abah Anom's political relations, focusing on socio-political aspects. The research delves into Abah Anom's narrative and behavior in promoting the TQN by integrating

religious and state teachings. Data were obtained from various documents, including photographs, speech texts, lectures, and the TQN teaching guidebooks. The study used a literature-based approach, gathering documents from the Suryalaya Islamic Boarding School to explore its development during the Abah Anom era and his relations with the New Order government. The data analysis employed a critical approach, considering historical, social, and political dimensions and establishing connections between the text and the context of the period under study.

RELIGIO-SOCIAL, RELIGIO-POLITICAL

The tariqa finds itself within the pendulum of the religio-social and religio-political systems. Religio-political manifests as a form of social interaction within the political sphere of a specific society or community, characterized by a religious ideology. This interaction embodies key features: (1) integralism; (2) the presence of a religious control mechanism within the community; and (3) the influence of the main actor or *murshid* (Ajid Thohir, 2014: 85). The tariqa's movements exhibit a continual synergy, adapting to evolving social conditions. These movements are intrinsically linked to the active participation of tariqa groups in social and political transformations within society. Tariqa members consistently uphold harmony by adhering to both religious and state directives. (van Bruinessen, 1992; Zainurofieq, 2021)dari Syair Perang Menteng, menceritakan perlawanan orang Palembang terhadap pasukan Belanda yang dikirim untuk menaklukkan kota mereka pada tahun 1819. Perang ini dikenal dengan nama komandan pasukan Belanda, Muntinghe, yang dimelayukan menjadi Menteng. Sang penyair Melayu menggambarkan bagaimana kaum putihan (\"haji\".

In the political landscape of "Nusantara" [the Indonesian Archipelago], the oppressive rule of the Dutch East Indies posed a significant challenge for the Qadiriyah Naqsabandiyah Tariqa across Java, including regions like Banten, Kediri, Blitar, Gedangan, and Sidoarjo. In response, the Tariqa not only closed ranks internally but also forged unity with the people to carry out *jihad fisabilillah* [fight in the path of Allah} against the invaders. This collective effort highlighted a resistance against colonialism, which is viewed as contrary to both religious and humanitarian principles. According to Clifford Geertz, the period between 1820-1880 witnessed a substantial rebellion among the *santri* in Indonesia. This rebellion encompassed several significant events; first, the Padri rebellion in Sumatra; second, the Diponegoro rebellion in Java; third, the Banten rebellion spurred by Dutch forced labor, and the rebellion in Aceh led, among others, by Teuku Umar. (Geertz, 1992: 27).

The synergy of *kyais*, with their charismatic religiosity, and the mystical-psychological inclination of the Javanese people, who held a belief in the anticipated arrival of a righteous queen, created a social momentum that played a crucial role in this conflict. Kartodirjo noted that nearly all radical movements in the interior of Java, opposing Dutch colonialism, were consistently intertwined with collective notions centered around the emergence of the fair queen, nativism (a yearning for an independent past) and millenarianism (aspiration for a liberated state without oppression). The messianic anticipation of the righteous queen found its cultural-theological orientation in the figures of the tariqa leaders who staunchly supported these movements. This alignment with the tariqa's teachings, focused on three pillars: (1) setting an example; (2) spiritual elevation; and (3) the pursuit of ideal conditions. Benda provided further explanation.

> "The rise of colonialism led to ulama and kyai assuming the roles of educators and promoters of Islam, gradually becoming pivotal figures in rural communities. This significance extended beyond mere numerical increase, impacting people both psychologically and ideologically. Particularly for farmers, weighed down by mandatory crop contributions, forced labor, and taxes, the propagation of the religion of Allah became a refuge and a source of solace, offering a means of escape from their burdens."

TQN SURYALAYA IN THE DYNAMICS OF NATIONSHOOD

Following Indonesia's sovereignty, the Suryalaya Islamic Boarding School significantly engaged in national affairs. Previously, it influenced Wiranatakusumah V to abandon his plan of forming the Pasundan state due to his discontent with the central authorities. The school's role in preserving Indonesia's unity embodies a commitment to upholding the TQN doctrine, emphasizing adherence to religious principles and loyalty to the sovereign state.

The DI/TII ideological Islamic movement had a substantial presence across Ciamis, Tasikmalaya, and Garut. Abah Anom, along with his brothers and soldiers, formed a fortification that aimed to promote peaceful Islam. This initiative stressed the importance of aligning obedience to the state with obedience to religious principles, evident in the regular recitation of the tariqa's manifesto, called tanbih, during religious ceremonies. There was also concerted effort to heighten political-religious awareness, particularly among individuals previously associated with the PKI's left movement. Consequently, using spiritual-based rehabilitation methods, like inabah, facilitated efforts to raise awareness about important issues such as NAPZA addiction within these communities. (Nurhamzah CS et al., 2021).

During the early days of the New Order, Indonesian society held a negative perception of the tariqa. The emergence of the DI/TII movement in West Java further marginalized Islamic mass organizations. Abah Anom, however, played a significant role in bridging this gap, actively engaging with the New Order government. Besides being associated with Golongan Karya, he also held a position in the MPR representing this group. Notably, the New Order era depicted the tariqa as supportive of the state, marking a shift in perception. The concepts of religion and state, under this regime, allowed greater freedom in promoting the teachings of the tariqa to broader Muslim communities. This approach fostered a more harmonious relationship between religion and the state, moving away from confrontation to collaboration. (Abbas & Danial, 2022).

SUNDANESE IDENTITY, INDONESIAN IDENTITY

Abah Anom, as a Murshid teacher, displays a genuine appreciation for the local Sundanese culture. The tariqa's teachings, while carrying a universal message, are intricately woven into the fabric of Sundanese traditions. Consequently, the tariqa bears a distinct and strong local cultural identity. Abah Anom has not only incorporated Sundanese thought as the foundation for constructing the tariqa paradigm but has also rooted his approach to Indonesian politics in Sundanese cultural awareness. This integration is evident in the "Tanbih" manifesto, which vividly captures the nuances of Sundanese life through its use of metaphors, all while underscoring its commitment to Indonesian politics.

Tritangtu:
Tarekat, Kesundaan, Keindonesiaan

The illustration above describes the profound interconnection between Sundaneseism, Islam (tariqa), and Indonesianness, portraying them as cross-cultural expressions. It embodies a dialectic of complementary thoughts, emphasizing that cultural greatness does not derive from a monolithic perspective but rather from an open, cosmopolitan, and inclusive approach. The ethos presented encourages the accommodation of all possibilities for development, fostering a spirit of receiving and giving without the need to assert recognition.

As articulated by KH Baban Ahmad Jihad, "In the past, Pangersa Abah Sepuh (K.H. Abdullah Mubarok ibn Nur Muhammad, RA) and Pangersa Abah Anom (K.H. A. Sohibul Wafa Tajul Arifin, RA) conveyed the teachings of the Qadiriyah Naqsyabandiyah Tariqa predominantly in the Sundanese language. This is evident in various works such as the Collection of Early Morning Lectures, Tanbih, and ancient Sundanese poetry, for example, *Layar Putri, Kunosari, Panambih Lembur Singkur, Gelenyu, Téjamantri, Salaka Domas, Panambih Saropangan, Mangu-Mangu, Goyong, Panambih Sukanagara, Dangdanggula, Rumangsang Degung, Rakitan Degung, Tepiswiring, Bayubud, Budaya, Malihwarni, Kapaksi, Gaya, Mangari, Kentar Ajun, Kentar Miring, Pancaniti, Pager Ageung, Pagunungan, Kentar Cisaat, Pangesahan, Kulu-Kulu Setra, Adu Manis, Katalimbeng, Ditilar, Pangrungrum, Lumengis, Bogoh Teu Sapikir, Sumambat, Sungkawa, Kinanti Kaum, Sumolondo* and *Langendria*." KH Baban further said that "Religion does not have to clash with culture; on the contrary, religion and culture reinforce each other. Religion becomes inseparable from its cultural roots, and culture finds its divine vision."

Identity is shaped through interactions with 'lian' [the others] presenting a reformulated look that is more contextual. This process involves preserving aspects of the old culture deemed relevant, while revising or discarding elements of tradition that have become obsolete. This paradigm is the cornerstone of the development undertaken by the TQN Suryalaya.

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION OF TQN IN STATE AFFAIRS

Gabriel Almond (1960) argued that a political system invariably involves political communication conducted by formal (structural) entities as well as non-formal practitioners within society (cultural). "*All of the functions performed in the political system, political socialization and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation, rule making, rule application, and rule adjudication, are performed by means of communication.*" Rusadi Kartaprawira highlights that political communication serves as a means of expressing political thoughts within both society and the government sector.

It acts as a channel, facilitating dialogue and deliberation to convey and negotiate political aspirations. Miriam Budiardjo further emphasizes that political communication is instrumental in channeling diverse opinions and community aspirations, organizing them through a combination of interest aggregation and interest articulation which are subsequently advocated as public policy objectives.

Denton and Woodward, as cited by Pawito (2009), define political communication as "public discussion regarding the allocation of public resources," specifically pertaining to the distribution of public income, official authority, regulations, and official sanctions imposed by the state. This definition assumes an interactive relationship between the state and the people or public.

In practice, political communication channels can take various forms, including mass communication, face-to-face interactions, interpersonal exchanges, and organizational processes. The scope of political communication encompasses communicators (activists, politicians, professionals), messages, persuasion techniques, media, audiences, and the resulting consequences.

In the context of the New Order state, Abah Anom emerged as a significant figure in the political landscape. He garnered considerable support from high-ranking officials and Golkar, an affiliation he maintained since the organization's foundation. The widespread influence of his leadership extended across various regions, including Java, Singapore, East Sumatra, West Kalimantan, and Lombok (Bruinessen, 1992).

A noteworthy political ijtihad (individual interpretation) consistently upheld by Abah Anom throughout his life was his strategic alignment with the New Order regime. This alignment was interpreted as an internal form of da'wah communication, an endeavor described by someone close to him as an attempt to transform "Golkar" into "Golkir" (dhikr group). The TQN Suryalaya developed a close relationship with the ruling power, specifically with the Cendana [Soeharto's residence]. Abah Anom's closeness to the center of political power was not driven by a pursuit of personal power; rather, it was a deliberate effort to foster a coexistence between religion and the state without mutual suspicion. One of his sons, K.H. Baban Ahmad Jihad (Rido, 2011: 16), affirmed this approach, stating:

> "The closeness between the Qadiriyah Naqsyabandiyah Suryalaya and the Cendana [Soeharto's residence], established by Abah Anom, indeed holds remarkable significance. This connection prompted a strong desire to extend support, particularly in material assistance, to the Islamic

boarding school. However, our approach aligns closely with Abah's counsel to exercise caution and vigilance, fostering closeness without any attached expectations. He emphasized the importance of continual giving without seeking in return—a principle we have persistently upheld, even in his absence. I must address a recent policy shift regarding the madrasah that we oversee, which now receives government assistance. It is crucial for everyone to understand that this aid is rightfully allocated by the government, similar to the support provided to other educational institutions. This clarification is essential, considering past speculations and busy discussions implying a departure from the practices during Abah Anom's era. The truth is, the aid program is part of the government initiatives, and our role is to accept the program without any further involvement. Nonetheless, our commitment to Abah's principle of 'giving instead of asking' remains unwavering."

The data highlights that Abah Anom's closeness within the New Order's political sphere was not solely driven by personal aspirations or those of Suryalaya Islamic Boarding School. It was primarily about fostering a strong relationship between the ulema (religious scholars) and the *umara* (government authorities) to synergize Indonesian human development. Abah Anom's intentions went beyond seeking personal power or positions; rather, they were inclined toward balancing and fortifying religious values within the state's policy framework. Additionally, he consistently prayed for the physical and mental well-being of the country's leaders, emphasizing the importance of their health in preserving the unity and continuity of the Indonesian state.

COMMUNICATION OF VALUE POLITICS

Abah Anom's political messaging, within Liddle's framework of political thought, leans towards substantivism rather than scripturalism, exhibiting accommodative political behavior. This approach underscores the significance of Islam as a value rather than a rigid ideology, with Islamic values being presented in a manner adaptable to the New Order government (Liddle, 1997: 100-127).

Charismatic leaders often encounter a dilemma when navigating the dynamics of power. Situated as elites of the people, charismatic leaders require legitimacy from their constituents. However, as representatives of the people, they must navigate interactions with bureaucracy and government authority. Confronted by an expanding bureaucratic elite exercising control through a corporative logic, charismatic leaders face the challenge of either embracing the government's logic, risking co-optation and potential loss of

legitimacy from the people, or adopting a critical stance that entails certain political risks. Alternatively, there's the prospect of a charismatic tariqa leader successfully gaining legitimacy from the people while concurrently engaging with government corporatism. (Mahmud Sujuthi, 2011: xx).

Sociologically, Abah Anom serves as a point of reference for the ummah and the nation, with his political references grounded in morality. This implies maintaining proximity to power, such as with Golkar, while still retaining legitimacy from the people. This delicate balance was evident in various public events, such as *manakiban, ngaras, khataman* ceremonies, and *natura* parades, attended by individuals from diverse backgrounds. These gatherings provided not only moral guidance but also insights into the murshid's political vision, often articulated in the form of "edicts," especially during the later period of Abah Anom. Consequently, every activity carried a moral message embedded with positive values and local wisdom. (Rahman et al., 2022).

This political stance, particularly during the New Order era, sparked controversy among certain groups. However, for his fellows, this political choice is adhered to with unwavering fidelity, in keeping with the traditions of the tariqa. The disciples emulate the Murshid not only in matters of worship but also in all aspects of life, including his political choices. Moreover, the TQN Suryalaya firmly holds the view that the state is as crucial as religion, as evident in the *tanbih*. Obedience to the state is considered to be equal to obedience to religion, establishing a parallel position between the two.

> *Jeungna sim kuring nu jadi pananyaan Thariqah Qadiriyah Naqsabandiyah, ngahaturkeun kagegelan wasiat ka sadaya murid-murid poma sing hade-hade dina sagala laku lampah, ulah aya carekeun Agama jeung Nagara. Eta dua-duanana kawulaan sapantesna samistina, kudu kitu manusa anu tetep cicing dina kaimanan, tegesna tiasa ngawujudkeun karumasaan terhadep agama jeung nagara ta'at ka hadirat Ilahi nu ngabuktikeun parentah dina agama jeung nagara* [1]

We also serve as a platform where individuals inquire about the Qadiriyah Naqsabandiyah Tariqa, imparting a sincere advice to all students: exercise caution in all matters, refrain from actions that contradict religious or state regulations. Adhere to both appropriately, reflecting the demeanor of individuals who maintain faith. Such an attitude not only demonstrates compliance with religious and state directives but also fosters a genuine willingness to embrace the Divine Presence of God, affirming the principles

---

[1] This text is an excerpt of the "Tanbih" which is always recited at the *manakiban* event and other Suryalaya's formal events.

upheld in both religion and the state.

Essentially, the politics of the TQN Suryalaya are predominantly oriented toward moral values and ethics. Abah Anom stands as a moral figure, serving as a role model, an exemplar, and a cultural landmark. He consistently reminds leaders of their responsibilities while emphasizing his ethical role in safeguarding the interests of the people in their daily lives.

According to Hiroko Horikoshi (1987: 78), Abah Anom's political approach resembles that of a volunteer and an agent capable of selecting and guiding cultural values to empower society. This political volunteer function extends to reinforcing vulnerable points in the local system's framework, connecting it with the broader system. Often, Abah Anom acts as a buffer or mediator between conflicting groups, maintaining the necessary driving forces of community dynamics. The kyai, leader of the ummah, wields political influence, particularly within their ummah.

MODERATELY-ACCOMMODATIVE APPROACH

In terms of relations between power and the state, the TQN Suryalaya has adopted a more accommodative and moderate stance. This choice aligns with the tariqa's principles, emphasizing ethics over ideology and presenting "religion" as a moral force. The political-religious communication fostered by the TQN Suryalaya extends not only between schools of thought but also across religions and diverse beliefs. In a scientific oration on the 105th anniversary of the Suryalaya Islamic Boarding School, one of the TQN Suryalaya fellows, Nazarudin Umar, highlighted that the tariqa's communication aims not only to build a harmonious relationship between humans and God but also fosters harmony among people regardless of differences in beliefs, tribes, and countries. Additionally, it promotes harmonious relationships between humans and nature and animals. The tariqa's teachings are so inclusive that people from various backgrounds, including officials and ordinary individuals, naturally come together.

Contrary to the notion that modernity diminishes the roles of charismatic leaders, charismatic leadership in politics is asserted to be even stronger than leadership based on procedural and rational authority (Coser, in Gordon, 1991: 488). Recognizing the significant influence charismatic tariqa leaders wield in shaping people's behavior, it becomes apparent why traditional leaders of this nature generally appeal to both bureaucracy and politicians (Jackson, 1990: 307). Blessings represent expressions that surpass mere actions and verbal communication.

The close association with power during the New Order era was a murshid ijtihad, aimed at bringing Islam closer to power when, in reality, power at that time was highly hegemonic, and few were interested in carrying out da'wah from within. Abah Anom opted to be within the vortex of power politics without getting entangled in it, as evidenced in "Ranggeuyan Mutiara" (String of Pearls) at the end of the "Tanbih."

> *Ulah ngewa ka ulama sajaman*
> *Ulah nyalahkeun kana pangajaran batur*
> *Ulah mariksa murid batur*
> *Ulah medal sila upama kapanah*

> Avoid harboring resentment towards modern scholars.
> Refrain from criticizing the teachings of others.
> Abstain from scrutinizing the students of other teachers.
> Maintain your demeanor even when faced with adversity.
> (Source: Book "Tanbih Abah Sepuh 1956")

These words in "Ranggeuyan Mutiara" emphasize the importance of adopting a humble attitude and nurturing a hospitable character. Abah Anom promotes an Islamic message that engages in a dialogue with national politics, establishing a strong connection between religious values and everyday politics. In Abah Anom's teachings, religion is seamlessly integrated with statehood, viewing the tariqa as a means to experience pluralism.

Nasaruddin Umar (2014) asserts that this inclusive attitude applies the universality and cosmopolitan aspects of Islam, making Islam a source of blessing for the entire universe. He further highlights the significance of Suryalaya in fostering diversity, contributing to the mitigation of social tensions and conflicts prevalent in society. The Suryalaya Islamic Boarding School, according to Umar, places a strong emphasis on upholding humanity, respecting all individuals irrespective of their religion, nationality, or social class.[2] Additionally, Abah Anom imparts values such as sincerity, humility, and the prioritization of the brotherhood of faith to his followers.

The analysis by Kompas Research and Development (October 14, 1996) underscores that Abah Anom's political decision to support the Golkar Secretariat since its foundation in 1963 was not made without a deep understanding of the dynamics of political life. This decision, and the subsequent establishment of a personal "closeness" between Abah Anom and President Soeharto, is considered a political *ijtihad*. The enduring relationship

---

[2] Delivered by Nasaruddin Umar on 5 September 2010

between Abah Anom and President Soeharto is compared to the political stance taken by KH Ahmad Siddiq, the former Rais Aam of PBNU, during the opening of the NU Congress in Krapyak Yogyakarta (1989). In that event, Siddiq firmly stated NU's acceptance of Pancasila as the principle of the nation and state, providing a thorough foundation for the decision and inspiring the development of "harmonious" relations between the government and Islam. This has contributed to a gradual reduction in suspicion towards Islam as a social group.

The political alliance between the government and religious leaders is exemplified by the amicable relationship with Islamic boarding schools (Witro, 2020)this does not make Indonesia as an Islamic country. The relationship between religion and state in Islam is fairly interpretive and it nowadays still becomes a debate. The government system applied in this country is democratic. Besides, there has to freedom for the ulama in preaching without being limited by space and time. A number of ulama are currently being persecuted and intimidated that impacts to the lecture to be either stopped, postponed, or even canceled. At this part, the role of the umara (government. This symbolizes the strengthening of ties between the ulema and the umara. On September 5, 2004, coinciding with the 99th anniversary of the Suryalaya Islamic Boarding School, Megawati Soekarnoputri, accompanied by Golkar Party figures Akbar Tandjung, Pramono Anung, and several functionaries from the Golkar Party and PDIP, visited Abah Anom. Megawati, then serving as the president, and her entourage traveled from the Halim Perdanakusuma Air Force Base using an F-100 aircraft owned by Merpati Nusantara. Upon arrival at Husein Sastranegara Airport in Bandung, the President and her entourage proceeded to Suryalaya. In her address, Megawati mentioned her longstanding awareness of Pondok Suryalaya, stating, "There is no other purpose than to stay connected." Additionally, the President sought prayers for Abah Anom, wishing him ease in guiding the nation through the current crisis. Pramono Anung clarified, "The visit was, without a doubt, a friendly one. They prayed for each other." Megawati also expressed concern for Abah Anom regarding his efforts to address the drug issues.

In the 2009 presidential election, specifically on Friday, June 26, 2009, Jusuf Kalla visited Abah Anom. Similarly, President KH Abdurrahman Wahid also paid a visit. Even long before that, during the era of the New Order regime, Gus Dur, a known representative of civil society, made multiple visits to Abah Anom. He urged Abah Anom to mend relations with President Soeharto, recognizing that Abah Anom, as a kyai, not only held a "special route" to the palace but also commanded great respect from the then-powerful President.

According to Martin van Bruinessen (1992), Abah Anom was a kyai with a personal closeness to Suharto. Abah Anom played a role in "Islamizing" Soeharto, shifting the emphasis from what was perceived as a more dominant "Kejawen" appreciation. Suharto regularly sought Abah Anom's advice on religious teachings and dynamics, even in the final stages of his power. Abah Anom, a spiritual teacher, was unwavering in his commitment to *ngumawula ka wayahna* (serving without limits), serving as a pillar for every complaint (*jadi gunung pananggehan*), and never ceasing to serve *(homo tuna sumujud)*. He remained a reliable listener for all the problems faced by the people.

Moertono (1995) defines an ongoing tug-of-war between kyai and rulers. Despite the authorities wielding substantial, integrated, diffuse, technocratic, bureaucratic, and at times, repressive power, it cannot be overlooked that kyai have played a crucial political role from the pre-independence era to the present, navigating various dynamics. [3] Endang Turmudi (2004) emphasizes a strong interdependence between the community and kyais, encompassing various aspects of life, including politics. Kyais are perceived to hold superior cultural and structural positions. Ali Maschan Moesa (1999) highlights their knowledge superiority and the precedence of actions that impel kyai to attain self-perfection and endeavor to perfect others (*al-kamâl wa al-takmîl*). Max Weber (1968) categorizes this as charismatic leadership rooted in personal authority. In this context, ulemas act as patrons to their followers (clients) in a paternalistic relationship. Berger (1991) argues that religion serves as the sacred canopy, an instrument to fortify politics in all human actions. Kyais not only serve as leaders of Islamic boarding schools but also wield power within and hold prestige in society (Geertz, 1981).

Initially rooted in cultural spheres, kyais have adapted to the fast-paced socio-political dynamics, extending their influence into politics. This transformation occurs through mutual symbiosis, where kyai receive government support. Simultaneously, the political elite gains religious moral legitimacy from kyais, a legitimacy crucial for expanding their authority.

---

[3] Further studies on aspects of the *kyai* leadership both for himself and in the context of relations with the state can be read in Zamaksyari Dofier, *Tradisi Pesantren* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982); Clifford Geertz, *"The Javanese Kiai, The Changing Role of Cultural Broker"* in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 2; Hiroko Harikoshi, *Kiai and Social Change*, (Jakarta: P3M, 1987); Endang Turmudi, *Perselingkuhan Kiai dan Kekuasaan* (Yogyakarta: LP3ES, 2003); Bisri Effendi, *an-Nuqayyah: Corak Transformasi Sosial di Madura* (Jakarta: P3M, 1990) and Arifin Mansur Noor, *Islam in an Indonesian World: Ulama of Madura* (Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada Press, 1990)

PAPAYUNG (TENT) TARIQA

It appears that the TQN's religious and state political communication centers around efforts to make religion a *papayung* for society right from the onset of crises such as drought, chaos (*bancang pakewuh*), anxiety (*harengreng*), and full of worry (*loba karingrang kahariwang*). This religio-politics is not only involved but engages deeply with the life of society. It represents a religion that ascends to the heavens of transcendence and simultaneously delves into the roots of humanization, similar to "word of purity" (*kalimah thayyibah*), which is consistently expressed either loudly (jahar) or subtly (khafi).

This form of religious politics avoids being trapped in doctrinal fanaticism, as evidenced in the *tanbih*:

> *"Ari sebagi agama, saagamana-saagamana, nurutkeun surat Alkafirun ayat 6: "agama anjeun keur anjeun, agama kuring keur kuring", surahna ulah jadi papaseaan "kudu akur jeung batur-batur tapi ulah campur baur". Geuning dawuhan sepuh baheula " Sina logor dina liang jarum, ulah sereg di buana". Lamun urangna henteu kitu tangtu hanjakal diakhirna. Karana anu matak tugeunah terhadep badan urang masing-masing eta teh tapak amal perbuatanana.Dina surat Annahli ayat 112 diuynggelkeun anu kieu :"Gusti Allah geus maparing conto pirang-pirang tempat, boh kampungna atawa desana atawa nagarana, anu dina eta tempat nuju aman sentosa, gemah ripah loh jinawi, aki-kari pendudukna (nu nyicinganana) teu narima kana ni'mat ti Pangeran, maka tuluy bae dina eta tempat kalaparan, loba kasusah, loba karisi jeung sajabana, kitu teh samata-mata pagawean maranehanana".*

Regarding religious matters, it is left to each individual's belief, bearing in mind Surah Al-Kafirun verse 6: "Your religion is for you, my religion is for me." This verse emphasizes the importance of avoiding disputes, promoting harmony and peace, and respecting each other without interference. Let us reflect on the wisdom passed down by our ancestors: "We should conduct ourselves wisely, in an orderly manner, and peacefully; failing to do so will lead to regrets—first in terms of income, then personal remorse, and ultimately, it will be futile." The suffering one experiences is often a consequence of one's own actions. Surah An-Nahl verse 112 provides a meaningful example: "Allah has given the analogy of a town or village that was once safe, peaceful, and prosperous. Yet, its residents rejected the blessings of Allah, leading to famine, suffering, and fear due to their own attitudes and deeds."

The inclusiveness of religion-state politics stems from an acknowledgment of the inevitability of diversity as a social reality, requiring tolerant attitudes.

Differences are not seen as sources of conflict but rather as opportunities to enhance spiritual experiences. Abah Anom's teachings emphasize this appreciation for spirituality, extending beyond the spiritual realm and manifesting in real-life situations. This philosophy is not confined to metaphysical considerations but is transformed into a political practice, embodying both "politics" and "the politically-related aspects."

CONCLUSION

The political communication of the tariqa group, exemplified by Abah Anom, goes beyond the scope of da'wah and political negotiations for the tariqa's teachings. It aims to legitimize the TQN and establish its position in state affairs. The relationship Abah Anom cultivated with state leaders reflects a collaboration between the *ulema* and the *umara*, working together to foster religious harmony and uphold the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia. This effort aligns with the tariqa's doctrine, emphasizing the importance of maintaining a balance between religious teachings and obedience to the state. Abah Anom's political communication carries implications for the government's perception of the TQN teachings, which might be seen as anti-development and anti-worldly attainment. Therefore, Abah Anom's approach serves as a form of da'wah to integrate the TQN teachings into both religious and state affairs in Indonesia.

Following Abah Anom's passing, political dynamics continued to evolve, requiring prompt, adequate, and visionary responses from the Suryalaya Islamic Boarding School and the broader TQN fellows. The teachings of Abah Anom need to be interpreted progressively and contextually to ensure the continued relevance of the TQN in an ever-changing political landscape. The political arena, characterized by power struggles and various means, stands in contrast to the world of the kyai. The crucial role played by kyais within the state requires an independent stance, ensuring that their existence contributes significantly and long-term to the nation's development and the welfare of its ummah.

This study serves as a reflective critique, challenging the perception of tariqa groups as exclusive and detached from worldly affairs, even being perceived as anti-government. It recognizes the significant transformation of the tariqa movement, acknowledging its direct involvement in practical politics. The participation of kyais and tariqa communities in political activities is not a contradiction to the teachings of the tariqa but is seen as a beneficial collaboration between kyais and the government for the country's development.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbas, R., & Danial, M. (2022). Relasi Agama dan Negara (Studi Komparasi Pemikiran Nurcholis Madjid dan Abdurrahman Wahid). *Constitution Journal*. https://doi.org/10.35719/constitution.v1i1.5

Arberry, A.J. (1989). *Sufism; An Account of the Mystics of Islam*. Diterjemahkan dengan judul. Pasang Surut Aliran Tasawuf,. terj. Bambang Herawan. Bandung: Mizan.

Arifin, S. W. T. (1983). *Azas dan Tujuan TQN*. Tasikmalaya : Yayasan Serba Bakti Pondok Pesantren Suryalaya.

_____, (1985). *Ibadah Sebagai Metoda Pembinaan Korban Penyalahgunaan Narkotika dan Kenakalan Remaja*, Tasikmalaya: Yayasan Serba Bakti.

_____, (1970). *Miftahus Shudur Kunci Pembuka Dada*. Tasikmalaya : Yayasan Serba Bakti Pondok Pesantren Suryalaya.

_____, (1975). *Uqudul Jumaan*. Tasikmalaya: PT. Mudawamah Warohmah.

_____, 1988. *Tanbih, Tawassul, Manaqib Bahasa Indonesia*. Bandung: Wahana Karya Grafika.

_____, (1983). *Akhlakul Karimah Akhlakul Mahmudah*. Tasikmalaya: Yayasan Serba Bakti.

Bellah, N. R. (1972). *Civil Religion in Amerika*. Ohio: Charles E. Merril.

Berger, L. P. (1978). *Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective. Hormonsworth*. Middlesex: Penguin Books.

Berger, L. P., & Thomas, L. (1967). *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in The Sociology of Knowledge*. New York: Anchor Book.

_____. (1967). *Sacred Canopy*. New York: Doubelday.

Black, J. A., & Champion, D. J. (1999). *Metode dan Masalah Penelitian Sosial.* Bandung: Rafika Aditama.

Bormann, E. G. (1985). Symbolic Convergence Theory: A Communication Formulation, *Journal of Communication*.

Bouyer, L. (1980). *Mysticism: An Essay On The History of The World,* dalam Richard Wood (ed.), Understanding Mysticism. London: Athlon Press.

Bruinessen, M. V. (1999). *Kitab Kuning Pesantren dan Tarekat: Tradisi-tradisi Islam di Indonesia*. Bandung: Mizan.

_____. (1992). *Tarekat Naqsyabandiyah di Indonesia: Survei Historis, Geografis, dan Sosiologis*. Bandung: Mizan.

Dudung. (2009). Gerakan Sosial-Politik Kaum Tarekat di Priangan Abad XX, *Desertasi.* UIN Yogyakarta.

Geertz, C. (2003). P*engetahuan Lokal: Esai-Esai Lanjutan Antropologi Interpretative.* Yogyakarta: Merapi

_____. (1964). The Religion of Javanese. London: The Free Press of Glencoe

_____. (1973). *The Interpretation of Culture.* Global Paradox. Jakarta: Bina Aksara.

Griffin, E. M. (2003). *A First Look At Communication Theory. Fifth edition.* New York: Mc Graw Hill.

Haryatmoko. (2007). *Etika Komunikasi.* Jakarta: Kanisius.

Howard, R. J. (1982) *Three Faces of Hermeneutics, Berkley and Los Angele*s: University of California Press. Ltd.

Madkur, I. (1968). a*l-Falsafah al-Islamiyah wa Manhaj wa Tathbiquh.* Kairo: Dar al-Ma'arif.

Howell, J. " Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival" , *The Journal of Asian Studies.* Vol. 60 No 3. Agustus 2011

_____. (2010) Sufism in the Modern World" *Journal International Oxford islamic studies.*

Joseph, D.V. A. (1997). *Komunikasi Antar Manusia.* Jakarta : Profesional Book

Kahmad, D. (1999). Islam dan Modernisasi: Perilaku Keagamaan Pengikut TQN di Masyarakat Perkotaan, *Desertasi* UNPAD.

Kuper, A. & Kuper, J. (2001). *The Social Science Encyclopedia.* USA: Routledge

Lasswell, H. (1960). *The Structure and Function of Communication in Society*, dalam Communications, a Book of Readings Selected and Edited by the Directo of the Institute for Communication Research at Stanford University, Editor: Wilbur Schramm, University of Illinois Press, Urbana.

Littlejohn, S. W. (2005). *Theories of Human Communication*. California: Wadsworth

Madjid, N. (1999). *Beberapa Renungan Kehidupan Keagamaan Untuk generasi Mendatang*, dalam Eddy A. Effendy (ed.): Dekonstruksi Islam Mazhab Ciputat. Bandung: Zaman wacana Mulia.

Masrpah, E. (2003). Sosialisasi Agama Islam pada Pondok Pesantren Tradisional dan Pesantren Modern. *Tesis*. Unpad. Bandung.

McQuail, D., & Sven, W. (1993). *Communication Models : For the Study of Mass Communication*. Second Edition, London: Longman.

Miller, K. (2002). *Communication Theories: Perspectives, Processes, and Contexts*. New York: McGrawHill.

Moleong, L. J. (2001). *Metologi Penelitian Kualitatif*. Bandung: Remaja Rosydakarya

_____. (2000). *Metodologi Penelitian Kualitatif*. Bandung: Remaja Rosda Karya.

Mulyana, D. (2007). *Metode Penelitian Komunikasi: Contoh-Contoh Penelitian Kualitatif dengan Pendekatan Praktis*. Bandung: Rosdakarya.

_____. (2003). *Metodologi Penelitian Kualitatif*: Paradigma Baru Ilmu Komunikasi dan Ilmu Sosial Lainnya. Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya

_____. (2005). *Ilmu Komunikasi: Suatu Pengantar*. Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya.

Mulyati, S. (2004). *Tarekat Qodiriyah wa Naqsyabandiyah: Tarekat Temuan Tokoh Indonesia Asli*, dalam Sri Mulyati (ed.) Tarekat-tarekat Muktabarah di Indonesia. Jakarta: Prenada Media.

_____ (2005). Perkembangan Tasawuf dan Tarekat di Dunia Islam. *Makalah disampaikan dalam Seminar Tasawuf di Pesantren Suryalaya, Tasikmalaya.*

_____. (2002). The Educational Role of The Tariqa Qodiriyya Naqsyabandiyya With Special Reference to Suryalaya. *Disertasi*. Mc Gill University. Montreal Canada.

Nasr, S. H. (ed.). (2003). *Ensiklopedi Tematis Spiritualitas Islam*. Bandung: Mizan.

Nasution, H. (ed.). (1991). *Tarekat Qodiriyah wa Naqsyabandiyah: Sejarah Asal-Usul dan Perkembangannya*. IAILM. Tasikmalaya.

Nisbet, R.A. (1966). *The Sociological Tradition*. New York: Basic Book.

Muhadjir, N. (2000). *Metodologi Penelitian Kualitatif*. Edisi IV. Yogyakarta: Rake

Nurudin. (2004). *Sistem Komunikasi Indoensia*. Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada

O'dea, T. F. (1990). *Sosiologi Agama: Suatu Pengenalan Awal*. Jakarta: Rajawali Press.

Pellat, C. M. (2007) *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Vol.VIII. Koninklijke Brill NV. Leiden. Netherlans.

Peursen, C.A. V. (1985). *Susunan Ilmu Pengetahuan, Sebuah Pengantar Filsafat Ilmu*. Terjemahan. J. Drost. Jakarta: Gramedia.

Pradja, J. S. (1991). "*Tarekat Qodiriyah Naqsyabandiyah Pondok Pesantren Suryalaya dan Perkembangannya Pada Masa Abah Anom (1950-1990)*" dalam Harun Nasution (ed), Tarekat Qodiriyah wa Naqsyabandiyah: Sejarah Asal-usul dan Perkembangannya. Tasikmalaya: IAILM.

Rakhmat, J. (1994). *Psikologi Komunikasi*. Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya.

Rahman, N. A. A., & Panorama, M. (2021). Pesantren Sebagai Solusi Pemberdayaan Ekonomi Kerakyatan. *Jurnal Syntax Transformation*. https://doi.org/10.46799/jst.v2i7.321

Ricouer, P. (1982). *Hermeneutics and The Human Sciences*. Melbourne. Sydney: Cambridge University Press.

Ritzer, G., & Douglas, J. G. (2005). *Teori Sosiologi Modern*. Edisi keenam. Penerjemah Alimandan, Jakarta: Prenada Media.

Robertson, R. (ed.). (1993). *Agama dalam Analisa dan Interpretasi Sosiologis*. Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada.

Ruben, B. D. (2004). *Communication and Behaviour*. Prentice Hall: New Jersey.

Samavor, L. A., Richard, E. P., & Edwin, A. M. D. (2010) *Komunikasi Lintas Budaya. Communication Between Cultures*. Jakarta: Salemba Humanika.

Sajaroh, W. S. (2004). *Tarekat Naqsyabandiyah: Menjalin Hubungan Harmonis dengan Kalangan Penguasa*, dalam Sri Mulyati (ed.), Mengenal dan Memahami Tarekat-tarekat Muktabarah di Indonesia. Jakarta: Prenada Media.

Salahudin, A. (2001). *Ziarah Sufistik: Wacana Spiritualitas Kaum Santri*. Bandung: Rosdakarya

Salamah, U. (1998). Tradisi Tarekat dan Dampak Konsistensi Aktualisasinya Terhadap Perilaku Penganut Tarekat. *Disertasi*. Bandung: Program Pasca Sarjana Unpad.

Sanusi, A. (1991). "*Abah Sepuh dan Pembentukan TQN Pondok Pesantren Suryalaya,*" dalam Harun Nasution (ed), Tarekat Qodiriyah wa Naqsyabandiyah: Sejarah Asal-usul dan Perkembangannya. Tasikmalaya: IAILM.

Schimmel, A. (1986). *Dimensi Mistik dalam Islam*. Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus.

Mulyati, S. (2002). The Educational Role of The Tariqa Qodiriyya Naqsyabandiyya With Special reference to Suryalaya. *Disertasi*. Institute of Islamic Studies. Mc Gill University Montreal Canada

Sumaryono, E. (1999). *Hermeneutik (Sebuah metode Filsafat)*. Yogyakarta: Kanisius

Suriasumantri, J. S. (1984). *Filsafat Ilmu, Sebuah Pengantar Populer*. Jakarta: Sinar Harapan.

Syarif (ed.) (1987). *History of Muslim Philosophy*. Waisbaden: Otto Harrasowitz.

Sobur, A. (2006). *Semiotika Komunikasi*. Bandung: PT Remaja Rosda Karya.

Underhill, E. (1980). *The Essential of Mysticism*. dalam Richard Wood (ed.). Understanding Mysticism. London: Athlon Press.

Van Bruinessen, M. (1992). *Tarekat dan Politik: Amalan untuk Dunia dan Akherat?* Pesantren

Van Baal. J. (1971). *Symbols for Communication; an Introduction to The Anthropological Stuy of Religion (Studies of Developing Countries 11,* Asen: Van Gorcum

Wallace, A. FC. (1966). *Religion: An Antropological View*. New York: Random House.

Webber, M. (1985). *The Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalisme*. New York: Macmillan.

West, R. & Lynn, H. T. (2008). *Pengantar Teori Komunikasi: Analisi dan Aplikasi*. Jakarta: Salemba Humanika.

WT Jones. (1969). *A History of Western Philospohy: The Medieval Mind*. New York: Harcaourt, Brace & World Inc.

Zainurofieq, Z. (2021). Gerakan Politik Kaum Tarekat dalam Sejarah *Indonesia. Jurnal Iman Dan Spiritualitas*. https://doi.org/10.15575/jis.v1i4.15027

INTERNET SOURCES

Anonim. *Keterbukaan Suryalaya Menjadi Contoh*. Kompas. Senin. 11 Oktober 2010.

Anonim. *Pendiri Pesantren Inabah Suryalaya K.H. Ahmad Shohibulwafa Tajul Arifin (Abah Anom) Meninggal*. Pikiran Rakyat. 05 September 2011.

Anonim. Ulama Besar Abah Anom Wafat. *Jurnal Nasional*. 6 September 2011.

Anonim. *Abah Anom Pelopor Ekonomi Rakyat Tasikmalaya*. Republika. 05 September 2011.

Anonim. *Abah Anom Wafat Bertepatan dengan Milad Pesantren Suryalaya ke-106.* Republika. 05 September 2011.

Anonim. *Matahari Berjalan di Godebag*. Majalah Tempo. 19 September 2005.

Interview. Mahfud MD. *Abah Anom Giat Sembuhkan Pecandu Narkoba*. Republika. 05 September 2011.

Interview. Said Aqil Siradj. *Kepergian Abah Anom Tanda Kiamat*. Republika. 05 September 2011.

Interview. Din Syamsuddin. *Abah Anom Rehabilitasi Pencandu Narkoba dengan Spiritual Islam.* Republika. 05 September 2011.

Interview. Azyumardi Azra. *Abah Anom Sosok Sufi yang Peka Persoalan Sosial.* Republika. 05 September 2011.

CULTURAL EDUCATION FOR SUSTAINING NUSANTARA RELIGION WITHIN BOTI INDIGENOUS COMMUNITY

Octalyna Puspa Wardany
Inter-Religious Studies Program of UGM – INSIST
Email: opuspad@gmail.com

Al Makin
Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga
Email: almakin3@gmail.com

Samsul Maarif
*Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies Graduates School,
Gadjah Mada University*
Email: samsul.maarif75@ugm.ac.id

ABSTRACT

Boti indigenous community which is in Timor Tengah Selatan district, Nusa Tenggara Timur preserves and nurtures their Nusantara religion, named Uis Neno ma Uis Pah. Boti is able to live through different eras, before West influences, the colonization era, modern, and contemporary. How can the Boti indigenous community be sustained with their religion as part of custom? Is there any certain methodology which they have implemented for the regeneration so their descendants keep preserving and nurturing their Nusantara religion?. This research article is focused to answer those two questions. The research is already implemented using ethnography method, so the researcher lived in the Boti indigenous community for 13 months from October 2, 2021 until November 1, 2022. This research used decolonization as the perspective method in order to understand Boti's Nusantara religion as well as their customs in detail and holistic including the concept and the core, so enable to do the comprehensive analyzing using proper theories of education; education and culture theories from Ki Hajar Dewantara, the Indonesia National Education Notable; Tukan and Hasfaria's theory about Adat (Indonesia: custom); Roem Topatimasang's theory about school; and Mori's theory about learning method. Boti implements the cultural education as the methodology to do the regeneration so the next generation know and preserve their Nusantara religion and customs. It teaches the understanding of the transformation in life that enables them to be open and flexible for the new influences. By the implementation of division on education; modern and cultural education; Boti indigenous community is able to sustain and nurture their Nusantara religion.

INTRODUCTION

Considering historical facts, the Boti indigenous community is able to be sustained through various eras and nurture their tradition including their Nusantara Religion. Boti's Nusantara religion is taught by their ancestors and continued to their adherents. There is a certain method and mechanism applied by the Boti indigenous community so the Boti children still know, moreover implement their tradition and believe in Boti's Nusantara religion.

The interesting thing is they apply their tradition and religion not merely as the form, but have philosophical understanding so they may modify, revise, and change the formal things to adapt with the contemporary era. This understanding raises unique wisdom and enables them to be resilient. How can the Boti indigenous community be sustained with their religion as part of custom and become their culture? Is there any certain methodology which they have implemented for the regeneration so their descendants keep preserving and nurturing their Nusantara religion? This research article focuses in order to explain those questions.

Understanding Boti indigenous community's methodology presents the knowledge to support the indigenous community sustainability in their ways, using their wisdom. This understanding is also able to explain how important Boti's Nusantara religion was, as the soft construction of Boti indigenous community and the foundation of their way of life. Otherwise, it will paint a unique color in modern knowledge on sustainability methodology of the root community, especially indigenous communities.

This research implemented an ethnography method for the field research. The researcher was living in the Boti indigenous community for 13 months; October 2, 2021 to November 1, 2022. There are many rites and thoughts of indigenous community which cannot be accessed by outsiders. It needs trust which might be developed by closed and routine interaction. Besides, there is much value in knowledge which is frequently not formulated, but internalized through daily activities, habits, and routine work. Ethnography enables researcher to live blending with them and joining their daily activity, so the researcher is able to catch up and understand the unformulated and unspoken knowledge as their wisdom of life.

To strengthen the mindset of researcher to get comprehensive data, this research used   decolonization methodology as the perspective. In doing the research, there are some possibilities that will be happened: (1) the scholar will face difficulties in catching and understanding the subject and object matter of the research, (2) the scholar's way of thought (West constructed) will influence the indigenous community which is then change the community, (3) there

will be the efforts to transliterate the indigenous concept into academic term in order to disseminate the understanding of the research results.

All of those possibilities are able to make reductions, augmentations, or distractions to the indigenous community's authentic concept, meanings, and values. Otherwise, it is also the possibility for indigenous community to get influences from the researcher which is then affirmed and adopted to be unified with new indigenous community concepts and values. In order to limit those possibilities, this research needs to implement decolonizing methodology as the perspective. It will urge the researcher to do critic and auto critic during the field research until writing the research results.

Smith in the *Decolonizing Methodologies, Research and Indigenous Peoples* propounds Graham Smith's four models of research works as part of her decolonizing methodology (2008: 177). These are the poins (1) the *tiaki* or mentoring model in which authoritative Maori people guide and sponsor the research, (2) the *whangai* or adoption model in which researchers are incorporated into the daily life of Maori people, and sustain a life-long relationship which extends far beyond the realms of research, (3) a 'power sharing model' where researchers 'seek the assistance of the community to meaningfully support the development of a research enterprise', (4) 'empowering outcomes model', which addresses the sorts of questions Maori people want to know and which has beneficial outcomes.

These Graham Smith's four models can be implemented in this research as the manifestation of decolonizing methodology. There are also some critical considerations that need to be placed as the mind frame in doing this research which are abstracted from Smith. Those are (2008: 177-191): First, the move towards research is more ethical, and concerned with outcomes as well as processes. Second, epistemological tradition which frames the way we see the world, the way we organize ourselves in it, the questions we ask and the solutions which we seek. Third, it is a way of abstracting that knowledge, reflecting on it, engaging with it, taking it for granted sometimes, making assumptions based upon it, and at times critically engaging in the way it has been and is being constructed. Fouth, developing more culturally sensitive research and employing the indigenous comunity approaches. Fifth, the research approach also has to address seriously the cultural ground rules of respect, of working with communities, of sharing processes and knowledge. Sixth, researchers have to share their 'control' of research and seek to maximize the participation and the interest of indigenous community.

From this perspective, the researcher does not position themselves as an outsider with an abundance of knowledge, but rather as someone who studies

and learns from the Boti indigenous community. This approach posts the Boti indigenous community as the resource of the knowledge for this research. It is common practice to make comparisons when acquiring new information in order to enhance understanding. For instance, the Boti farewell ritual which is held 3-4 years after the burial can be compared to the Javanese tradition of a similar ritual held 1000 days after burial, also occurring 3 years after burial. If the researcher applies this comparison and presents it to the Boti indigenous community without considering their own knowledge, it undermines their role as the primary source of knowledge. Additionally, injecting other traditions into the Boti culture would perpetuate the colonization of knowledge, impeding the implementation of decolonization.

It will have a different meaning if the Boti indigenous community shares about other facts from the different location or from researcher's location which have similarity. By adopting other facts, the Boti indigenous community endeavors to convey their knowledge to the researcher as the outsider in order to facilitate understanding. As elucidated by Smith's critical analysis, the researcher sometimes has to take for granted all the knowledge including the information and data which are given by the indigenous community. By this way, the Boti indigenous community is posted as a valuable resource of knowledge.

The decolonization methodology becomes the guide of awareness for the researcher in absorbing the knowledge, doing the conversation and discussion with the people, observing and even act in their daily lives. Still about the Boti's farewell ritual, refraining from making comparisons allowed the researcher to comprehend that there is a collective work and resources sharing. Each group of family comes to the party bringing the rice, goat or cow, and other food items to give to the host to be cooked and eat together. This practice implements in all Boti's rituals. Through this system, the cost for the ritual is kept affordable and each adherent able to hold the ritual because they will be supported by the society.

By employing decolonization as a guiding principle of awareness, the researcher also discovers that *Ama Usif* (Dawan, The King Father), as the leader of the Boti's Nusantara religion, does not always lead the ritual. Instead, there are other spiritual leaders known as *Amaf*[1] and *Atoin Amaf*[2] who have the ability

---

[1] *Amaf* are the persons who assist all affairs and are in charge to take care of various duties given by *Usif* for all areas of life; the religious sector, the government as kingdom, social, economy, politic, and custom.

[2] *Atoin Amaf* is the foster parent from mother's family who accompany the persons since teenage in order to guide and educate them. *Atoin amaf* is appointed by customary elders. *Atoin amaf* led religious rituals based on family custom.

to take charge of the rituals, such as the farewell ritual.

Discussing topics on sustainability and regeneration are closely linked to the education process practiced by the Boti indigenous community. This research article explores the education and culture theories in an attempt to analyze the Boti's methodology.

BOTI INDIGENOUS COMMUNITY

Boti is a village in Timor Tengah Selatan (TTS) district of East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) province of Indonesia. It is located on the expansive Timor island. This village was established and nurtured by the local people who are recognized as members of the Dawan tribe, one of NTT tribes inhabiting Timor island. Boti was one kingdom, part of Amanuban Kingdom with its capital located in Niki-niki city.

It is an indigenous village surrounded by mountains and hills. The village area is 16.500 M^2 at 519 MASL. The majority of the village is encompassed by hills with slopes ranging 45° - 90°. It's not easy to get to Boti. The road from Soe[3] to Niki-niki[4] is fully paved with asphalt and it takes about 1-2 hours to travel by car or motorcycle. Then, a quarter of the way from Niki-niki to Boti remains asphalt, but beyond that point, the road is a dirt road surrounded by bushes and trees. It takes 1-2 hours to travel from Niki-niki to Boti by car or motorcycle. Some parts of the dirt road will be very muddy and challenging to navigate during and after the rainfall, so it needs a skillful driver and off-road type of car.

---

[3] Soe is the capital city of TTS district.
[4] The nearest city of Boti which used to be the center of Amanuban Kingdom where Boti is part of it.

Figure 1: *The muddy road to Boti after the hard rain*
Photo by: Octalyna Puspa Wardany at Sonaf Boti on November 1, 2022 using Redmi 9

Fortune by its geographical location, Boti has remained untouched by any colonizers; Portuguese, Dutch and Japan who colonized Niki-niki. Boti has been accessed by foreigners since 1985. Boti always welcomes and opens to all guess, regardless of their origin, purpose, or background. Based on the history of Amanuban Kingdom and Boti Kingdom, the Boti indigenous community has existed since before the 14th century. This fact is substantiated by Vlekke (2018: 24-25) as explained in the *Nusantara: Sejarah Indonesia* that many kingdoms in Indonesia have existed since the 2nd century.

In 2019, the population of Boti village was 2.236 persons[5]. Nowadays, there are approximately 631 HH[6] or approximately 3,000 people. The population growth is caused by marriage. Most of the Boti people, circa 85% are Protestant, comprising 536 HH[7]. The fewest are Catholic amounts 14 HH. The remaining, about 76 HH, equivalent to 319 individuals[8] are the adherents of Nusantara Religion. It is considered an "… "unstructured religion" embraced

---

[5] Data of Boti Village Potency year 2019.

[6] Interview with The Head of Boti Village Government, Balsasar O. I. Benu on October 11, 2021.

[7] Interview with Mike Nuryati Tatfui, S. Th., The Preach of GMIT (*Gereja Masehi Injili di Timor* or Evangelical Protestant Church in Timor) Boti on January 30, 2022.

[8] Interview with *Ama Usif* Namah Benu, Boti King & the leader of Nusantara Religion of Uis Neno ma Uis Pah on September 6, 2022.

by "subordinated groups" and different from institutionalized, established, or recognized religions whose theology and dogma have been codified" (Makin, 2016) in the context of Indonesia. Within Indonesia's legal system, the Nusantara religion is categorized as Belief in One God, distinguishing it from *agama* or religion (Maarif, 2019).

The term "Nusantara" symbolizes the interconnection between indigenous religions and Indonesia as geographical, geopolitical with all its nature, and culture that is historically constructed. There exists a mutual influence between indigenous religions within the specific context of Indonesia, leading to the development of a unique character so differ it to other indigenous religions in different contexts. This distinctive character encompasses particular concept within the content of Nusantara religion, holding intellectual, instrumental, and emotional significance as a result of the adaptation process of human beings and their habitat. The "Nusantara" term serves as a symbol that represent this unique character, defining the specific indigenous religions in Indonesia.

In the easternmost part of Indonesia, there existed a Nusantara religion known as *Wiyon* or *Wofle*[9] in the South West Papua province which was practiced by Maybrat, Imian, and Sawiat tribes. These three among 257 tribes of 7 ethnic groups live in the Maybrat regency and Sorong regency[10]. *Wiyon* or *Wofle* believed in supernatural powers residing in *Sawro Mron* (heaven) situated in *Ayoh* (sky) headed by the supreme and eternal power called *Oron Yabi or Wiyon U* (God)[11].

Moving to the center part, there are the adherents of Nusantara religion named Jingitiu in Sabu island that explicitly concerns faith in Deo (God) and involves many aspects; the physical world, human life, and the unseen world. Jingitiu views everything as a gift from God Almighty called '*Deo Mone Ae'* (Widjaja, 2022).

From the western part, there is Orang Rimba, a group of tribes who live in the forest of Sumatra, that is also called Suku Anak Dalam (SAD), Kubu, Komunitas Adat Terpencil (KAT) who spread at Bukit Duabelas National Park or Taman Nasional Bukit Duabelas (TNBD) of Jambi province[12]. As a semi nomadic tribe who follows local wisdom and customary law of their ancestors, forests are their homes and sources of life where traditional and

---

[9] Sagrim (2013: 29); *Wiyon* is the name of Nusantara religion for Maybrat tribe and *Wofle* is for Imian and Sawiat tribes.

[10] Sagrim (2013: 30).

[11] Sagrim (2013: 30).

[12] Tuhri, 2020: 236.

religious ceremonies are held[13], also the sacred land where a spirit live[14]. They also consider the rivers as a primary avenue for the interconnection of forests and villages on earth and the heaven, for the flow of ideas, contact and relations with the outside world, as well as the means through which the gods of sickness travel from heaven to earth[15].

Nusantara refers to Indonesia geographically and geopolitically, and it is admitted internationally. It is nowadays often used interchangeably with the name Indonesia. The utterance of Nusantara as Indonesia geographically and geopolitically actually interconnected and interrelated to culture too. It is called Nusantara for Indonesia territory with area 7,81 km^2 which consist of 3,25 million km^2 water area, 2,55 million km^2 ZEE and 2,01 million km^2 land area. Within this vast territory, there are abundant natural resources, a diverse population, and various ethnic groups including the culture. All born within this territory can be considered a part of Nusantara. Those all can be absorbed and adapted to the syncretic with others from outside Nusantara. This intermingling extends to the realm of religion as well.

Specifically, the Nusantara Religion term refers to the existence of various religions amounting to more than 600 (Makin, 2017) in Indonesia   which already lived before the entrance of World Religions (Christian and Islam), even before the entrance of Buddha and Hindu as the history of Indonesia people is already existed since second century which was signed by a number of unrecognizable Indonesian kingdoms (Vlekke, 2018).

Nusantara Religion is an authentic concept of religion in Indonesia. It represents Indonesia's thought and understanding in living as part of this world inhabitant. It presents the understanding of the long history of the struggle of authentic religion in Indonesia. It represents the religion which is understood by Nusantara people as the unification of God with infinite power and nature which is also as the place of the spirits including the spirits of the ancestors. This religious teaches to maintain the way of life which is synergized with nature to worship the superhuman power.

The title of Boti's Nusantara religion is *Uis Neno ma Uis Pah* from the Dawan language. *Uis* stands for God. *Neno* represents for the sky. *Ma* means and. *Pah* signifies nature. Using the straight translation, *Uis Neno ma Uis Pah* means "the god of sky above and the god of nature, the natural environment as the human habitat". This translation might imply that Boti's Nusantara religion believes in two gods. This interpretation is commonly understood by those

---

[13] Ibid.: 237.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.

outside the religion.

The adherents of Boti's Nusantara religion employ a metaphor to describe the constellation between human and *Uis Neno ma Uis Pah*. The metaphor equates *Uis Neno* to the father and *Uis Pah* to the mother, while human as the children. According to this understanding, they always ask nature first to fulfill their needs, such as food and favorable weather. They will ask the father for things that cannot be provided by the mother, such as protection for their lives, blessings for the spirit of their ancestors and the deceased, as explained by *Ama Usif* "*Kalau anak mau minta, pertama minta di Mama dulu. Kalau Mama tidak bisa kasih, baru minta Bapa*" (If the child wants something, first asks to the mother. If the mother cannot provide, then asks the father).

Nature plays a crucial role in life. To have a secure and good life, humans should conserve and nurture the nature. Then, nature will take care of humans too because all things that are done to nature will be returned to the humans. All things done will give effects and impacts to the humans. By mentioning nature in the title of their religion, the Boti people are consistently reminded of nature's superior power over humanity. They do not conquer the nature, but live in synergy with it. While the sky for *Uis Neno* is the symbol of the infinity power, reigning over all aspects of life. When there is something that cannot be solved by nature, they pray and surrender to God.

Uis Neno ma Uis Pah are not two distinct gods worshipped by the Boti people. In their religious rituals, *Uis Neno ma Uis Pah* is always mentioned as a unification without any separation. Balsasar O.I. Benu explained, "*… dua sebutan itu menjadi satu dalam penyembahan*"[16]. *Uis Neno ma Uis Pah* are two rules in one God. They don't have any term to explain One God. *Uis Neno ma Uis Pah* represents the consciousness of the infinite power of God and nature which surpasses human capabilities in this life and as the manifestation of God power. God almighty has two manifestations. God rules the sky to explain the infinity power and God rules nature.

Boti's Nusantara religion is also the root of all customs which then construct the way of Boti people's life. The cornerstone of their ethics lies in being a virtuous individual. In order to achieve this, they adhere to the ancestral teachings passed down through generations, which are embodied and practiced by the followers of *Uis Neno ma Uis Pah*. These ancestral teachings encompass various aspects, including religious rituals, the way of thinking and acts in facing the new things and solving the problems, preserving nature, fostering the harmonization of social life based on the consideration that Boti

---

[16] Interviewed on October 11, 2021 "… those two names always become one unify in the worship".

people are one family, and not doing the bads. By upholding these principles, individuals strive to become good people.

The cores of the thought are being good people, independent, and life synergize with nature. To be a good person, they cannot hurt other people and implement monogamy. To be independent means they can fulfill their needs from their own works, so they do not want to be lazy and accept any aids. Life synergizes with nature by forbidding them to exploit and waste nature. Otherwise, they should think about a better life and future for Boti people and the environment.

The Boti indigenous people keep the core of their ancestors' thought but not rigidly applying various customary rules. The cores of the thought enable them to be flexible in receiving the new influences and adjust themselves with various changes then transform their lives. It can be seen from their openness to modern education and building the school.

MODERN SCHOOL AS THE SPACE FOR NEGOTIATION

The national school in Boti started in 1957. As Heka Benu told[17], firstly, the late *Usif* Nune Benu already gave permission for Boti people to study in modern ways, unfortunately there was no education facility yet. He instructed 5 persons to go to NTT capital city, Kupang, in order to ask the modern education facility in Boti. One of those 5 persons is Christopher Benu. Since Boti is very far from Kupang, the provincial government recommended them to ask their neighboring villages.

Before the school operated, the Boti people took their education at Oenaek and Opus, the neighboring villages. Following the provincial government's suggestion and after asking Bele, another neighboring village, the school was finally built using a weeds roof and named *Sekolah Rakyat* (Indonesian, public school). The first teacher was Mr. Biredoko from Rote who was called by Boti people and students as Mr. Meniloko. In 1960, it was changed to *Sekolah Dasar* (Indonesian, Elementary School) until now.

The school days are Monday to Saturday from 7.00 am to 12.15 pm. But, in the hot season, it ends at 11.00 pm or 11.30 pm considering the students have to walk back home, which is very far about 1 hour to 4 hours on foot, in the very hot season. The school did not operate during the Gestapu incident; 1965 until July 1966. During the corona pandemic in 2020, the school was also not operated and activated for half day school in July 2021 until June 2022. Starting

---

[17] Heka Benu (80 years) who is the little brother of late *Usif* Nune Benu is interviewed on May 8, 2022.

from July 2022, the school is fully operated. Nowadays, there are junior high school and senior high school too, so Boti children are able to study in their own village. While for undergraduate education, Boti has cooperated with Indonesia Open University in Soe. Thus, the Boti students are able to continue their study without leaving their village as the Boti people's dream.

The religion subject is taught in every class, spanning 6 levels of elementary school, 3 levels of junior high school, and 3 levels of senior high school. Protestantism is primary taught reflecting the majority of the Boti people. However, the elementary school provides Catholic teachers so the Catholic students get their own religion subject. While the *Uis Neno ma Uis Pah* adherents could join Protestantism for religion subject.

Because religion is not included as part of the evaluated subjects at National level and no guidelines for the evaluation aspects, the valuation and evaluation system are determined by the school itself. The students of *Uis Neno ma Uis Pah* adherents do the evaluation of Protestant religion subject in Boti elementary school[18], but they are not obligated to answer all questions correctly and achieve a certain grade score. Beside the result of the evaluation, the scores for their religion subject also consider their attitude and ethics in daily life at school.

In the intercommunication with other students who are Protestant and Catholic, there is no discrimination either in learning activities in class or social interactions between students outside of study hours. The students of *Uis Neno ma Uis Pah* can have good relations with other students. They can play, study, go to school, and walk back home together. Indeed, there are some special attitudes of the students who adhere to *Uis Neno ma Uis Pah*. They are very polite and respectful. When they receive admonition, they listen well and obey it[19]. Based on the information from the teachers, the students of *Uis Neno ma Uis Pah* adherents have different acts and attitudes in their ethic, their perspective about study[20] and teachers, also how they use the knowledge in their life. They post those as the important matters and act in a good way. These different acts are related to the way their families – especially their parents – educate them.

––––––––––––

[18] Interview with Yakob Benu, the Headmaster of Boti Elementary School, on November 25, 2021.

[19] Interview with Antonius Nesi, the teacher in class 5 of Boti Elementary School, on November 25, 2021.

[20] Their perspective about study leads them to understand that everything which is given in the school is part or the knowledge. This makes them have no obligation in learning another religion in class which is mostly Protestant. For them, that subject is part of knowledge and won't make them change their religion. From this perspective, it is not very rare if a student of *Uis Neno ma Uis Pah* adherent achieved good points in religion.

CULTURAL EDUCATION: THE STRATEGY FOR RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL SUSTAINABILITY

The Boti indigenous community understands very well that in order to preserve and nurture their culture, including their Nusantara religion; they should do regeneration. Education is an important methodology for the regeneration process. The Boti indigenous community name their education as cultural education.

A. EDUCATIONAL DIVISIONS

For the adherents of *Uis Neno ma Uis Pah*, they implement the rule of the Children Education Division. If they have two children, one can study modern knowledge and the other should study about culture. If they have three children, two can study modern knowledge and another should study about culture. The acquisition of modern knowledge can be pursued through national or modern schools. While, to study culture or cultural education is facilitated by parents as the teacher and integrating daily tasks and work as learning methods.

In practice, the rule of educational division is not implemented strictly. There is always a space of tolerance in every Boti's customary rule including education. It is allowable for those whose four children, that three children study at modern school while only one child studies cultural. In deciding which child will study at modern school or do cultural education, they observe their children's habits and ask their willingness. If a child is able to obey their parents' commands and has good intellectual competence, that child will study at the modern school. If a child prefers to work in the fields and disinterest to study modern knowledge; that child will do cultural education. It is not impossible a child states their desire to not go to the modern school and prefer do cultural education as the case of one girl named Koko Banuet,

> "*Ya, beta tidak mau sekolah (modern). Mau bantu Mama di rumah. Mau masak, tenun di rumah*"[21].
> "Indeed, I don't want to go to (modern) school. I'd like to help Mama at home. I'd like to cook and weave at home".

A different experience from a boy named Heka Neolaka who do not go to the modern school due to his parents' rule,

---

[21] Interview with Koko Banuet, 18 years, on August 23, 2022.

"Itu dari dulu. Sudah ditentukan memang"[22].
"It has already been decided since a long time ago".

B. EDUCATIONAL CONCEPT

The Boti indigenous people embrace a paradigm that the first and primary education takes place within their families, with parents as the teacher. Ki Hajar Dewantara, the Indonesia National Education Notable, agreed with this concept that family serves as an educational institution for children. He even wrote three statements about this in *Pemikiran Konsepsi, Keteladanan, Sikap Merdeka* of book 1 which specifically discusses education:

"***Alam keluarga*** *adalah "pusat-pendidikan" yang **pertama** dan yang **terpenting***, *oleh karena sejak timbulnya adab-kemanusiaan hingga kini, hidup-keluarga itu selalu mempengaruhi bertumbuhnya budi pekerti dari tiap-tiap manusia"*[23].
("*Family environment* is "the center of education" which is *the first* and the most important because since the emergence of humanity until now, family life always influences the maturity of character of each human").

"*… keluarga itulah tempat-pendidikan yang lebih sempurna sifat dan ujudnya daripada pusat lain-lainnya, untuk melangsungkan Pendidikan ke arah **kecerdasan budi pekerti** (pembentukan watak individual) dan sebagai **persediaan hidup kemasyarakatan**"*[24].
("… family itself is the education place which is more perfect in quality and shape than other centers, to perpetuate the education toward *the intelligence character* (the individual character building) and as *the source of social life*").

"***Alam keluarga*** *itu buat tiap-tiap orang adalah alam Pendidikan yang permulaan. Pendidikan di situ **pertama kalinya** bersifat Pendidikan dari **orang-tua***, *yang berkedudukan sebagai **guru** (penuntun), sebagai **pengajar** dan sebagai **pemimpin pekerjaan** (pemberi contoh)"*[25].
("*Family environment* for each person is the beginning of an educational environment. The education there for *the first time* has the character of education from *the parents*, who are as *teachers* (guide), as *instructor*s and as *work leader*s (giving the examples)").

---

[22] Interview with Heka Neolaka, 19 years, on August 23, 2022.
[23] Ki Hajar Dewantara (2013) *Pemikiran, Konsepsi, Keteladanan, Sikap Merdeka: Pendidikan* pp. 71. The bold words are written italicized in the book.
[24] Ibid. pp. 374. The bold words are written italicized in the book.
[25] Ibid. pp. 375. The bold words are written italicized in the book.

Those three statements clearly explain that family has the most important role in education. The children's acts and attitudes in their daily friendship, their involvement in various places and institutions such as schools, moreover their perspectives and mindset regarding life are significantly dependent on how their parents educate them.

Regarding education itself, Ki Hajar Dewantara emphasized it as an effort which is not merely focused on improving the intellectual competence, moreover about the soul values in order to enable human being to live together with others in the community as stated below:

> "***Pendidikan*** *adalah salah satu usaha untuk* ***memberikan segala nilai-nilai kebatinan****, yang ada dalam hidup rakyat yang berkebudayaan,* ***kepada tiap-tiap turunan baru*** *(penyerahan kultur), tidak hanya berupa "pemeliharaan", akan tetapi juga dengan "memajukan" serta "memperkembangkan" kebudayaan,* ***menuju ke arah keluhuran hidup kemanusiaan***"[26].
> ("**Education** is one of the efforts **to give all the values of philosophy**, which exist in the life of a cultured people, **to each new generation** (handing over culture), not only in the form of "maintaining", but also by "advancing" and "developing" culture, **towards the nobility of human life**").

> "*Soal Pendidikan itu bukan hanya bersifat pengetahuan atau "wetenschap" dari kaum ahli belaka, akan tetapi suatu soal yang mengenai tiap-tiap orang yang hidup Bersama di dalam masyarakat …*"[27].
> ("Education is not only knowledge or "*wetenschap*" from experts, but a matter that concerns every person who lives together in society...")

So, education is not merely at school. Education can be held anywhere considering the type of knowledge which would like to be learned.

C. EDUCATIONAL CONTENT

What they study in cultural education actually are the thoughts passed down from their ancestors about life. As farmers, they study agricultural for the dried land with no irrigation and depend on rainwater to nourish the crops. They apply the indulgent cattle system which accommodates their habitat. Both girls and boys study cooking and cleaning their living space; house, field, S*onaf* (Dawan, palace). In cooking, the Boti people have a unique method of

---

[26] Ibid. pp. 344. The bold ones are as written in the book.
[27] Ibid. pp. 433-434.

animal slaughter. They do not cut the throat, but instead pierce specific part of the neck. This method makes the slaughtered animal die quickly and there is no blood spilled from the animal's neck. Afterward, the animal is burned to remove the feathers. After completely cleaned, the animal is cut into pieces and the meat, head, legs and entrails are separated. They learn to build their various houses; *ume kebubu* (Dawan, round house), *Lopo* (Dawan, gathering house), and square house. In cleaning their living space, they clean regularly so there are no mosquitos, but only one or two found.

They study cultivation in their fields and do farming since they are circa 6 or 7 years old, so when they get 17 years old, they usually are capable of managing their own field. Likewise, Heka Neolaka, 19 years old, already has the field and various livestock; 1 cow, 2 goats, 10 pigs, and countless chickens. Almost every child raises chickens since they are 6 or 7 years old. Kolo, who is 6 years old, already raised his own chicken, though only one.

Figure 1: *Cleaning the cotton as the process of weaving*
Photo by: Octalyna Puspa Wardany at Sonaf Boti on December 6, 2021 using Canon 60D

They study about managing finances too. Koko Banuet who's 18 years old already had livestock; chickens and 2 pigs. She bought her first pig in 2017, when she was 13 years old, from her savings of selling woven blanket, sarong, and shawl. She started to study weaving from the first step; taking the cotton plant from its tree and processing it to be the thread by cleaning the cotton plant and spinning it. Then, she studied coloring the thread. Finally, doing the manual weave. For the first time, she can weave a shawl in three months. After

successfully doing one shawl, she studied to weave the blanket and sarong which can be accomplished in 3 years.

Figure 2: *Spinning yarn as the process of weaving*
Photo by: Octalyna Puspa Wardany at Sonaf Boti on December 6, 2021 using Canon 60D

Figure 3: *Rolling the dyed yarn to be ready to be woven*
Photo by: Octalyna Puspa Wardany at Sonaf Boti on December 6, 2021 using Canon 60D

Culture takes an important role in Boti education. Since childhood, all *Uis Neno ma Uis Pah* adherents get usual to gather in *Sonaf* routinely for *Neon Tokos*, the ninth day in Boti week period[28], welcoming the guesses, to be documented in certain film or television program production, and becoming resource persons for research interviews. The welcoming guesses events or involving in film production are the chances to study their traditional arts, such as *Pukul Gong* as the name of dancing and playing the dance music consist of gong and trommel, playing *juk*[29], and sing their traditional songs. They study visual arts, such as painting and sculpt, as part of their architecture to decorate the house. They make wood sculptures too, but very rarely.

Indeed, their understanding about culture is not limited to the arts. They do understand that all human products are cultural (Dewantara, 2013: 342-343). According to Ki Hajar Dewantara (2013: 83), culture is described as "the result of human struggle, that is, its struggle against all the "natural" forces that surround it, and all the influences of the "age", or its society, which both - nature and the age - cause constantly changing all the "forms" and "contents" of culture in the life of every nation".

Part of the culture is *Adat*, or custom, or tradition. *Adat* becomes the key role in their education. It becomes the source and reference for everything in their lives, particularly in education (Dewantara, 2013: 491). *Adat* also becomes the guiding principles for the Boti people in conducting ceremonies and in their conception for preserving nature. Indeed, *adat* is not merely about tradition with their instruments, such as tools, rules, procedures, traditional speech, clothes, etc. *Adat* represents conformity and harmonization, relating to the interconnectedness of acts, situations, or matters (Dewantara, 2013: pp18). Tukan and Hasfaria further elucidate *adat* as the explanation on the being of human in all their essential dimensions which contains of elements, values, norms and rites and applied universally in their society so becomes the knowledge loaded of wisdoms and internalized in their society hereditary, rooted and binding (Tukan, 2018: 9).

And Boti indigenous community denominate their non-modern school as the cultural education. It is the school too. The school is beyond the buildings, certain equipment, uniform[30], textbooks, curriculum, class of study, test

---

[28] Boti implements 9 days in a week. The last day, 9th day, is called Neon Tokos as the rest day for gathering at Sonaf or taking a rest at home. The complete explanation is in Chapter 5.

[29] *Juk* is a small guitar made of certain fruit which is dried and given strings.

[30] In Indonesia, commonly, the students should wear uniforms which are indicated their level of study; playgroup, elementary, junior high school, senior high school; certain purpose such as scout uniform; or indicated their school and even religion identity for the school based on religion such as Muhammadiyah and Pondok Pesantren.

scores, graduation, etc. as said by Roem Topatimasang (2018: 21) in *Sekolah Itu Candu* that "in the end, school is just a word, a term, a designation, a name, for a purpose and a true meaning which cannot be marked at all in the way it is formed, in the container in which it was born". School can encompass a certain school of thought (Topatimasang, 2018: 15). Therefore, what the Boti indigenous community called their cultural education as school is actually correct.

Indeed, the daily life of the Boti community is knowledge as explained by Dewantara that education is not only knowledge from experts, but a matter that concerns every person who lives together in society (2013: 433-434). Moreover, the daily life of Boti which contains certain customs heredity that is proven able to sustain for centuries should be studied. It is not merely about survival methods. It is the knowledge related to managing nature with specific conditions as their habitat. It then becomes their local wisdom and knowledge which is constructed as cultural. Kyouzon-no-Mori Network (2016: 1) explained this in *Kikigaki* that "Humans' daily life and their cultural roots are very closely related to the natural resources around where they live. They utilize natural resources such as paddy fields, fields, forests, and the sea in their surroundings for their daily livelihood and work. During the process of utilizing natural resources, it is also accompanied by the growth and development of local wisdom or knowledge and perspectives and thoughts that are passed down from generation to generation". It is a precious asset, it is important for the younger generation to study and learn from the elders to develop their village and at once participate in developing Indonesia future (Kyouzon-no-Mori Network, 2016: 4).

Figure 4: *Boti children who join the modern school and get cultural education*
Photo by: Octalyna Puspa Wardany at Sonaf Boti on August 8, 2022 using Canon 60D

Boti local wisdom in the division of children's education presents the cooperation between those attending modern schools and those receiving cultural education. Each type of school has its own strengths and weaknesses which can be combined in order to strengthen their village. Every child can respect each other regardless of their education background because all of them have important roles in their village. Finally, it can achieve the main purpose of education as the Boti indigenous people principle that is to be the independent individuals who are self-reliant and capable to fulfill their needs through their own efforts.

CONCLUSION

Religion is related to education particularly to maintain, preserve, and nurture the religion itself. The Boti indigenous community understands this very well. Without refusing the modernity or even contemporality, the Boti indigenous community maintain a methodology to sustain and regenerate their Nusantara religion through cultural education. Furthermore, their wisdom on the division of education for their children is the methodology to sustain and regenerate their custom in the different eras with different ways of life.

The Boti indigenous community understands education is not merely at modern school. School can be held by doing their daily activities in real life. They recognize that education is to educate their next generation to be able to live while preserving their custom and nurturing their religion. Religion is not exclusive from daily activities but involves all aspects of life. Cultural education is the appropriate methodology to sustain and regenerate Boti's Nusantara religion and their customs.

Cultural education enables the kids have critical understanding about their live in the correlation with the environment and still follow their Nusantara Religion. Cultural education fosters the Boti children to be the independent human as well as adaptive to the changes and the developments over time. Cultural education presents the Boti children who do not lose their identity as the Boti indigenous community. Cultural education is an education methodology which is blending with daily live in all aspects of life.

This research is one case study of the indigenous community related to their Nusantara Religion. It will be enriched the study of indigenous community and the study of Nusantara Religion to do more research in other indigenous communities in the different location with different ecosystem.

ENDNOTES

Author Contribution: Octalyna Puspa Wardany, S.E., M.Sn., Ph.D. cand. as the field researcher and writing the research result. Prof. Dr.Phil. Al Makin, S.Ag., M.A. and Dr. Samsul Maarif as senior researchers who were supervising and giving consultation for the implementation of this research and reviewing the research result writing.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Andung, P. A. (2010). Komunikasi Ritual Natoni Masyarakat Adat Boti Dalam di Nusa Tenggara Timur. *Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi*. Vol. 8. No. 1. Jan-Apr 2010. pp. 36-44.

Arnold, P. P. (2003). What Are Indigenous Religions? Lessons from Onondaga. *Journal for the Study of Religion*. Vol. 16. No. 2. Special Issues: Religion and the Imagination of Matter (2003). pp. 33-49.

Asad, T. (1993). *Genealogies of Religion, Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*. USA: The John Hopkins University Press.

Bagir, Z. A. (2015). The "Relation" Between Science and Religion in the Pluralistic Landscape of Today's World. *Zygon*. Vol. 50. No. 2 (June 2015). pp. 403-417.

Banchoff, T. (ed.) (2008). *Religious Pluralism, Globalization, and World Politics*. USA: Oxford University Press. Inc., New York.

Benu, A. N., dkk. (2013). *Tumbuhan Desa Boti dan Kegunaannya dalam Tradisi Boti Timor Barat, Indonesia*. United Kingdom: The Bebali Foundation (YPBB). Bali. Indonesia and Royal Botanic Gardens. Kew. Surrey.

Benu, B. O. I. (2020). *Filosofi dan Tata Cara Kehidupan Warga Suku Boti*. paper for Kongres Kebudayaan Desa on July 13. 2020. Indonesia.

Bogen, D., & Goldstein, L. F. (2009). Culture, Religion, and Indigenous People. *Maryland Law Review*. Vol. 69. Issue 1. Article 7. pp. 48-65.

Borofsky, R. & De Lauri, A. (2019). Public Anthropology in Changing Times. from *Public Anthropologist I*. pp. 3-19. download from Brill.com on Feb 2nd. 2019.

Bruchac, M. (2014). Indigenous Knowledge and Traditional Knowledge, In Smith, C. (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Global Archeology*. pp. 3814-3824. Springer. New York. USA.

Dewantara, K. H. (2013). *Pemikiran, Konsepsi, Keteladanan, Sikap Merdeka: Pendidikan*. Indonesia: Universitas Sarjanawiyata Tamansiswa Press dan Majelis Luhur Persatuan Tamansiswa

Fakih, Dr. M. (2008). *Analisis Gender dan Transformasi Sosial*. Yogyakarta: INSISTPress.

Fatmawati. (2011). Perlindungan Hak atas Kebebasan Beragama dan Beribadah dalam Negara Hukum Indonesia. *Jurnal Konstitusi* Vol. 8 No. 4 August 2011. pp. 489-520.

Febionesta. (2019). *Miskonsepsi Pengakuan Agama di Indonesia*, download from https://ylbhi.or.id/publikasi/artikel/miskonsepsi-pengakuan-agama-di-indonesia/ on 21st February 2021.

Geertz, C. (1973). *The Interpretation of Cultures*. USA: Basic Books. Inc.

Hulst, M. V., Martijn, K. and Jeroen, V. (2015). *Ethnographic Research*. Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy Third Edition. DOI: 10.1081/E-EPAP3-120051222, pp. 1-5.

Junianto, M. R. Persepsi Kenyamanan Termal Suku Boti. *Temu Ilmiah Ikatan Peneliti Lingkungan Binaan Indonesia (IPLBI)* 7. H 010-014. https://doi.org/10.32315/ti.7.h010

Kaka, S.M., & Dominggus, D. C. (2007). *TTS ku Firdausku*. East Nusa Tenggara: Tourism Arts and Cultural Service of South Timor Tengah District.

Khaswara, F., Fikra, H., Vera, S., & Firdaus, M. Y. (2021). Pengakuan Agama Lokal sebagai Bentuk Pemenuhan Hak Warga Negara. *Jurnal Riset Agama*. Vol. 1 No. 3 December 202. pp. 199-211, https://journal.uinsgd.ac.id/index.php/jra

King, R. (2001). *Orientalism and Religion, Postcolonial theory, India and 'the mystic East'*. London: the Taylor & Francis Group imprint of Routledge.

Koentjaraningrat. (1987). *Sejarah Teori Antropologi I*. Jakarta: Penerbit Universitas Indonesia.

Kyouzon-no-Mori, N. (2016). *Kikigaki: Mendengar & Menulis – Menjembatani*

Manusia, Alam, dan Budaya Antar Generasi. Japan: Kyouzon-no-Mori Network.

Lichterman, P., & Isaac, A. R. (2015). Theory and Contrastive Explanation in Ethnography. *Sociological Methods and Research.* Vol 44(4). pp. 585-635.

Maarif, S. (2017). *Pasang Surut Rekognisi Agama Leluhur dalam Politik Agama di Indonesia.* Yogyakarta: CRCS.

_____(2019), *Indigenous Religion Paradigm: Re-interpreting Religious Practices of Indigenous People*, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332511113, download on 17th November 2020.

Mailani, N. M. (2021). *Kearifan Lokal Masyarakat Boti.* Jawa Tengah: CV Amerta Media.

Makin, A. (2016). Unearthing Nusantara's Concept of Religious Pluralism, Harmonization and Syncretism in Hindu-Buddhist and Islamic Classical Texts. *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies.* Vol. 54. No. 1 (2016). pp. 1-30.

_____(2017), *'Not a Religious State', Indonesia and the Malay World*, downloaded from http://www.tandfonline.com on 11th October 2017.

_____(2017), *Plurality, Religiosity, and Patriotism: Critical Insights into Indonesia and Islam.* Yogyakarta: SUKA-Press.

Mullick, P. D., Paramita, S., Kaustav, D., and Koel, M. (2013). The Basics of Ethnography: An Overview of Designing an Ethnographic Research in Anthropology and Beyond. *Journal of the Anthropological Survey of India.* (62 (2). pp. 893-902.

Mutaqin, Z. Z. (2014). *Indonesia and the Malay World: Penghayat, Orthodoxy and the Legal Politics of the State.* UK: Routledge Informa Ltd.

Naidoo, L. (2012). *Ethnography: An Introduction to Definition and Method*, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/221927953 download in July 2020.

Otto, B. B., Susanne, R., and Jörg, R. (2015). *History and Religion.* German: CPI books GmbH. Leck.

Pals, D. L. (1996). Seven Theories of Religion. Ali Noer Zaman (Penerjemah, 2001), *Seven Theories of Religion: Dari Animisme E. B. Tylor, Materialisme Karl Marx hingga Antropologi Budaya C. Geertz.* Yogyakarta: Penerbit Qalam.

Picard, M. (2011). Introduction:'Agama','adat', and Pancasila. In *The politics of*

religion in Indonesia (pp. 1-20). Routledge.

Rosmiati, N. I. L., & Masrul, A. (2016). Cultural of Pregnancy and Childbirth in Baduy Tribe: An Ethnography Study.

Sagrim, H. (2013). Indigenous Belief and Trans-Faith in Indonesia: The Case of the Maybrat, Imian and Sawiat Tribes in West Papua, *RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN A GLOBALISED SOCIETY: Challenges and Responses in Africa and Asia With a Comparative View from Europe 55 Years after the Bandung Asian-African Conference 1955*, CSSCS (Centre for South-South Cooperation Studies), Indonesia

Sailana, D. (2020). *Ada dari Boti di antara Himpitan Pandemic Covid-19*. Paper for Kongres Kebudayaan Desa on July 13. 2020. Indonesia.

Sangasubana, N. (2011). How to Conduct Ethnographic Research. *The Qualitative Report* 16(2). pp. S67-S73.

Saukko, P. (2003). *Doing Research in Cultural Studies*. Great Britain: Athenaeum Press.

Scoones, I. (2020). *Penghidupan Berkelanjutan dan Pembangunan Pedesaan* (terj.), *Sustainable Livelihoods and Rural Development*. Yogyakarta: INSISTPress.

Simpson, J. H. (1990). The Stark-Bainbridge Theory of Religion. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*. Sep. 1990. Vol. 29. No. 3 (Sept., 1990). pp. 367-371.

Smith, C. (2017). *Religion: What It is, How It Works, and Why It Matters*. UK: Princeton University Press.

Smith, L. T. (2021). *Decolonizing methodologies: Research and indigenous peoples*. Bloomsbury Publishing.

Sinaga, M. (t.t). *Perencanaan Pengelolaan Kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan YME dan Tradisi pada Direktorat Kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan YME dan Tradisi*, paper, download on March 20, 2023.

Strenski, I. (2015). *Understanding Theories of Religion*. UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Surtikanti, H. K., Syulasmi, A., & Ramdhani, N. (2017, September). Traditional knowledge of local wisdom of Ammatoa kajang tribe (South Sulawesi) about environmental conservation. In *Journal of Physics: Conference Series* (Vol. 895, No. 1, p. 012122). IOP Publishing.

Suryani, A. J. (2021). *From Respected Hermits to Ordinary Citizens, The Conversion of the Baduy, Ethnicity, and Politics of Religion in Indonesia (1977*

– 2019). The Netherlands and LPDP Indonesia: Universiteit Leiden.

Sutoto (2017), The Transformation of Baduy Learning Culture in Banten. *Jurnal Pendidikan dan Pengajaran*. 50 (2). July 2017. pp. 86-97.

Topatimasang, R. (2018). *Sekolah Itu Candu*. Yogyakarta: INSISTPress.

Topatimasang, R., Rahardjo, T., & Fakih, M. (Eds.). (2010). *Pendidikan popular: Membangun kesadaran kritis*. INSISTPress.

Tuhri, M. (2020). Religion and Land Rights in Indonesian Indigenous – State Relations: Case Study of Orang Rimba in Jambi. *Religio: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama*. 10(2). 229–248. https://doi.org/10.15642/religio.v10i2.1386

Tukan, SVD., Simon,S. S., & Hasfaria, M. (2018). *Membangun Kesadaran: Kisah-Kisah Gerakan Tolak Tambang di Manggarai Raya dengan Memanfaatkan Pengetahuan Lokal*. Yogyakarta: INSISTPress.

Turner, B. S. (2008). The crisis of religious authority: Education, information and technology. In *Islamic legitimacy in a plural Asia* (pp. 65-82). Routledge..

Vlekke, B. H. M. (2008). *Nusantara: Sejarah Indonesia*. Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia.

Wade, G. (2009). An Early Age of Commerce in Southeast Asia, 900-1300 CE. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*. 40(2) (June 2009). pp. 221-265.

Wardany, O. P. (2019). The Cultural Strategy for Boti to Survive in the Reformation Era of Indonesia. *Final Paper for Theory of Religion and Society class, Inter-Religious Studies Program UGM*.

Widjaja, F.I. (2022), *Realities and challenges for mission transformation in Sabu people*. HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 78(1). a7137. https://doi. org/10.4102/hts.v78i1.7137

Wilson, W. J., and Anmol, C. (2010). The Role of Theory in Ethnographic Research. *Ethnography* 10(4), pp. 549-564.

Zakaria, R. Y. (2016). Strategi Pengakuan dan Perlindungan Hak-hak Masyarakat (Hukum) Adat: Sebuah Pendekatan Sosio-Antropologis. *Jurnal Agraria dan Pertanahan Bumi* Vol. 2 No. 2 November 2016, pp. 133-150.

Constitution 1945 (*Undang-Undang Dasar Negara RI 1945*) original and revision.

PP RI No. 1/PNPS year 1965 about *Pencegahan Penyalagunaan dan/atau Pe-*

nodaan Agama or Precaution on Religions Abuse and/or Desecration.

PP RI No. 55 year 2007 about *Pendidikan Agama dan Pendidikan Keagamaan* (Education of Religion and Education of Religious)

Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi RI No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016 (Resolution of Indonesian Republic Constitution Court).

TAP MPR No. XVII/MPR/1998 about Human Rights

UU No. 12 year 2005 about Ratification of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

UU No. 39 year 1999 about Human Rights

RELIGION OF PANDEMIC: DELEGITIMIZATION OF AUTHORITY DURING THE COVID-19 ERA

Irwan Abdullah
Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta
Email: Irwan.fib@ugm.ac.id

Mulan Tang
Institute of Asian Studies, Guizhou University, China
E-mail: 709652129@qq.com

Putri Rahmah Nurhakim
Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta
E-mail: putrirahmah282@gmail.com

Bibi Suprianto
IA Scholar Foundation, Yogyakarta
E-mail:bibiSuprianto78@gmail.com

Henky Fernando
Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta
Email: fhenky92@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

The study delves into the delegitimization of religion during the COVID-19 pandemic, addressing not only the social aspects of religious life but also the social significance of religion itself. It explores how this delegitimization, particularly in Islam, has altered the sacredness of religious life. This qualitative research, utilizing literature review and media analysis, aims to uncover the forms of religious delegitimization that have transformed the face and substance of religion during the pandemic. It investigates 1) how this process has changed the legitimacy of religion, 2) the patterns of belief and worship, and 3) the context and factors underlying this delegitimization. The findings reveal that religious delegitimization during the pandemic is a part of the process of objectifying religion in a health disruption, highlighting changes due to COVID-19 regulations, understanding of religious sacredness, and the authority of religious figures in the context of religion and COVID-19 controversies.

Keywords: Religion of Pandemic; Delegitimization of Authority, COVID-19 Era

INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic has fundamentally impacted social life, leading to the delegitimization of religion. This process stemmed from health-based regulations by governmental bodies conflicting with established religious beliefs and practices. Religion, once an absolute influence, has been reinterpreted through diverse social forces, particularly within health and security paradigms. This trend decreases religion's credibility as a social guide, coinciding with health protocols in worship matters. At the height of the pandemic, the lessened influence of religious leaders and the dislocation of worship places and practices were evident. First, the validity of religious doctrines was questioned, and their truth was doubted by various groups. For example, congregational Friday prayers in mosques were replaced with Dhuhr (midday) prayers at home (Syamsuddin, 2020). Secondly, the gradual abandonment of valued practices, such as direct religious learning with religious figures, shifted towards social media (Regus, 2022). This overview reveals a fundamental shift post-pandemic, transforming the sacred into the mundane.

The issue of religious delegitimization has been underanalyzed from a macro perspective concerning the context of disruptions like the pandemic. Existing studies tend to focus on micro aspects, overlooking major forces structuring religious life, such as great disruptions (Ikenberry & Fukuyama, 1999) or technological disruptions affecting religious life (Rashid, 2019). Consequently, three trends emerge in the discussion of religious delegitimization during the COVID-19 pandemic. First, delegitimization is linked with changing religious commitments within religious communities (Miski & Hamdan, 2019). Second, it relates to religious authority where the sanctity of religion is questioned (Abraham & Stewart, 2019; Hayati, 2020). Third, it examines health policy impacts eroding sacred or absolute religious values (Khairunnisa, 2020). The macro context underpinning changes in religious life remains underexplored. The pandemic actually justifies the ongoing changes in religious life.

This paper positions religious analysis within a macro context, foundational for changes in religious life. The delegitimization of religion during the COVID-19 pandemic is inseparable from social and historical changes, presenting religious social facts as objective realities. Specifically, this paper addresses how religious delegitimization unfolds in social life and its effects on religiosity during and post-pandemic. The analysis provides a deep understanding of the factors causing delegitimization and comprehensive knowledge to formulate more targeted religious policies.

Religious delegitimization may occur due to shifts in religious ideology

and authority during the COVID-19 pandemic. Religion, once considered foundational, is now questioned or debated for its truthfulness. In other words, the loss of truth occurs as religion no longer possesses a single truth, due to open truth production. Three arguments are presented. First, the weakening of religious doctrines and the deauthorizing of religious figures coincide with the strengthening of governmental or power center authority for health and security reasons. Second, delegitimization is found in the loss of religious purity and practices due to increasingly dominant and coercive government policies. Third, delegitimization is a manifestation of the dysfunction of worship places due to the privatization of religious practices. Thus, the process of delegitimization occurs with the power shift of religion in relation to government policies.

The data for this paper is based on qualitative research from online sources discussing cases like replacing Friday prayers with Dhuhr prayers at home, mosque closures, home congregational prayers, defiance against religious figures, and insults towards scholars. This research involved systematic documentation and analysis of online news with the main keyword "COVID-19 pandemic," focusing on news discussing religious delegitimization in social life during the pandemic leading to religious shifts. The data was interpreted to understand the format, process, and reasoning behind religious delegitimization in social life.

DELEGITIMIZATION OF RELIGION

Delegitimization refers to the loss of belief or power from something established as a result of challenges due to an organization's failure to reproduce previously legitimized actions. This occurs due to social, political, cultural, or intellectual factors (Regany et al., 2021). Shevsky describes delegitimization as a change in self-description within the system and territorial disintegration (Shevsky, 2020). In line with this, delegitimization is also connected to the process where a structure experiences a loss of collective coercive power (Berger et al., 1998; Ridgeway et al., 1998). Delegitimization is divided into two levels, ideological and systemic. Ideologically, religion is understood as a driving idea capable of creating consensus to mobilize mass and public opinion in competition with other ideological forces (Acanfora, 2010). Systemically, delegitimization strategy relates to antifascism in public life, on one hand, a parliamentary system that has a great framework in establishing the limits of democratic legitimacy (Chiarini, 2017, 2019). With this strategy, delegitimization has two levels that can influence the existing democratic systems in the world.

Knowledge derived from social interactions and processes provides individuals

with a nuanced understanding of societal dynamics, integrating both personal and collective aspects (Siti Rahma Harahap, 2020). Within this social fabric, religion plays a pivotal role, profoundly influenced by its dual nature as both an ideological belief system and a practical framework (Dani & Mediantara, 2020). It significantly shapes personality development and social interactions, particularly through the medium of religious institutions (Shofaussamawati, 2018; Kardis & Kardis, 2019). Religion, as a universal aspect of human societies, establishes cognitive and behavioral patterns that are inherently religious in nature (Ridla, 2014).

Religion commonly sets forth ethical and moral guidelines, establishing norms and criteria for discerning ethical behavior (Zainur, 2020). It also emerges as a fundamental aspect of life, addressing strong social needs in humans (Nizar, 2018). As a universal need, religion critically organizes and governs social life (Rakodi, 2021; Roh et al., 2015; Salamah Eka Susanti, 2019). Its primary social function is to foster a sense of community through socialization, serving as a form of social control over individuals and groups (Barker, 2021). In this context, religion serves as a moral compass, promoting virtuous conduct and discouraging malfeasance (Baker et al., 2020; Berggren & Bjørnskov, 2011), thus underscoring its indispensable role in societal well-being.

The COVID-19 pandemic significantly disrupted not only public health but also the economic sphere (Haryaningsih & Elyta, 2022). It reconfigured everyday activities, ranging from work and social engagements to religious practices (Febriyani et al., 2021; Diez-Sampedro et al., 2020). The pandemic's influence extended to altering human behavior and religious observances (Ivan Muhammad Agung, 2020). During the crisis, religion evolved into a crucial source of social and spiritual capital, providing moral support and fostering solidarity in facing collective challenges (Luqman & Ilhamdi, 2023). Concurrently, religious practices adapted, aligning with the shift toward virtual platforms necessitated by pandemic containment measures.

This pandemic-induced transition converted traditional face-to-face social and religious interactions into online experiences. Restrictions limited the number of participants in physical worship gatherings, leading to the cancellation of many in-person religious activities (Yanuarita & Haryati, 2021). Consequently, numerous religious institutions embraced technology to facilitate virtual worship (Febriyani et al., 2021; Diez-Sampedro et al., 2020). Services became accessible via online platforms, live streaming, or video conferencing. These changes particularly impacted Muslim communities, where customary congregational worships shifted to individual practice at home, with Friday prayers being replaced by Dhuhr prayers and Eid prayers

conducted domestically. This transformation signifies a profound alteration in religious traditions and practices, reflecting the pandemic's pervasive impact on religious life.

DELEGITIMIZATION OF RELIGIOUS DOCTRINES AND WORSHIP PRACTICES

Religion traditionally calls its followers to live according to taught values, influencing both personal and social lives. Religion encompasses more than just doctrinal teachings; it also shapes individuals and communities. The pandemic era, and the period following it, has been marked by a growing suspicion that religious teachings could hinder efforts to combat COVID-19. This has led to a loss of the absolute nature of religion, where its truths were once accepted without question. Now, there are increasing inquiries regarding the validity of religion. Evidence shows instances of delegitimization of religious teachings as reported in the media (see Table 1).

Table 1. Cases of Delegitimization of Religious Doctrines during COVID-19 Pandemic

No.	Cases of religious delegitimization	Narrative	Source
1	Use of vaccines containing elements forbidden by Islamic doctrine	The government allows the use of such vaccines in emergency situations.	https://metro.tempo.co/read/1478882/fat-wa-mui-pedoman-penguru-san-jenazah-covid-19-me-mandikan-hingga-mengu-burkan
2	Burial process in accordance with COVID-19 health protocols	The deceased who succumbed to COVID-19 are no longer washed, prayed for, and buried as customary for deceased Muslims.	https://metro.tempo.co/read/1478882/fat-wa-mui-pedoman-penguru-san-jenazah-covid-19-me-mandikan-hingga-mengu-burkan
3	Postponement of departure for Hajj pilgrimage	The Hajj pilgrimage was postponed to reduce the spread of COVID-19 for the safety of pilgrims.	https://m.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/27142/dis-informasi-pembatalan-ke-berangkatan-haji-kare-na-dananya-sudah-habis/0/laporan_isu_hoaks

No.	Cases of religious delegitimization	Narrative	Source
4	Restrictions on social gatherings or visits	Prohibition of face-to-face social visits during social distancing, even though in Islam, maintaining ties of kinship (*silaturahmi*) is considered obligatory.	https://islam.nu.or.id/ta-sawuf-akhlak/cara-silatura-him-jarak-jauh-di-masa-pan-demi-ypqth
5	Changing Friday con-gregational prayers to Dhuhr prayers for Muslim men	During the pandemic, there was a recommendation to replace Friday congrega-tional prayers with Dhuhr prayers, which is actually contrary to Islamic law.	https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4944622/sholat-ju-mat-diganti-dzuhur-kare-na-virus-corona-bagaima-na-hukumnya
6	Distancing between individuals in rows during prayers	Spacing between individu-als in rows during prayers due to the pandemic con-flict with Islamic teachings that recommend forming tight rows.	https://www.republika.co.id/berita/q7f6rm366/shaf-sho-lat-berjarak-antisipasi-coro-na-bagaimana-hukumnya
7	Replacing congre-gational prayers in mosque with praying at home	The replacement of congregational prayers in mosques with praying at home during the pandemic is examined from a Sharia perspective, highlighting the virtues of organizing congregational prayers in mosques.	https://kalam.sindonews.com/read/162598/69/salat-berjamaah-di-rumah-saat-pandemi-samakah-fadhilahnya-dengan-di-mas-jid-1599919785
8	Wearing masks during prayers	Wearing masks during prayers during the pan-demic contradicts Islamic teachings that prohibit men from covering their mouths during prayer.	https://dalamislam.com/shalat/hukum-shalat-pa-kai-masker

Table 1 demonstrates the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the perception of certain Islamic doctrines. Initially, some factions considered the use of vaccines to be forbidden (*haram*) in Islam, citing their supposed inclusion of prohibited substances. However, as COVID-19 cases surged, the Indonesian Ulema Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia or MUI) sanctioned the use of vaccines, citing the urgency of the situation. The Islamic funeral process, which typically adheres to specific rites, had to conform to health protocols mandated by the government for pandemic management. In response, MUI issued a fatwa, declaring that the burial of COVID-19 victims should comply with both Islamic Sharia and health guidelines. The suspension of the Hajj pilgrimage serves as a further indication of how traditional religious doctrines

have been reevaluated in light of the pandemic.

Social activities traditionally involving direct interactions, such as returning to one's hometown during Eid, faced restrictions to uphold social distancing measures during the pandemic. As a result, these interactions transitioned to remote forms of communication, including exchanging news via text messages, phone calls, or through various digital platforms. The pandemic also led to the suspension of the obligatory Friday prayers for adult Muslim men, a preventive measure to curtail the spread of the coronavirus. This necessitated a reevaluation of the teachings related to congregational religious practices and their execution in public spaces, especially for worship purposes. Consequently, many mosques and prayer halls were closed for congregational prayers.

In response, Muslims adapted by conducting prayers at home. However, numerous scholars pointed out that, as per authentic hadiths from Bukhari and Muslim, congregational prayers in mosques hold greater virtue than prayers performed individually at home. The mandated use of face masks presented a conflict with Islamic practices, as Prophet Muhammad discouraged men from covering their mouths during prayers. This restriction was believed to interfere with the clarity of prayer recitations and the direct contact of the nose with the ground during prostrations, potentially diminishing the prayer's completeness. Figure 1 depicts a range of responses to the implementation of these health protocols, highlighting the ensuing controversies.

**Figure 1. Discourse on Implementation of Health Protocols
in Religious Practices during COVID-19 Pandemic**

No.	Discourse	Visual Description	Source
1	Vaccines containing forbidden animal ingredients		https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/369790/15/mui-astrazeneca-haram-tapi-boleh-digunakan-selengkapnya-di-inews-sore-jumat-pukul-1600-wib-1616141032

No.	Discourse	Visual Description	Source
2	Burial of COVID-19 victims under health protocol provisions		https://www.liputan6.com/cek-fakta/read/4394568/pelibatan-tokoh-agama-penting-hindari-konflik-cara-pemakaman-jenazah-covid-19
3	Deserted atmosphere of the Kaaba due to travel restrictions amid pandemic		https://bkpp.demakkab.go.id/2020/06/penundaan-keberangkatan-ibadah-haji.html
4	Practice of the distancing of individuals in prayer rows (*shaf*) during the pandemic stirred controversy		https://republika.co.id/berita/r8ixht399/masjid-al-akbar-surabaya-belum-akan-rapatkan-shaf-shalat-jumat
5	Congregational prayer with the use of masks due to COVID-19 pandemic		https://syariah.iainkediri.ac.id/shalat-menggunakan-masker/
6	Eid prayers conducted virtually due to COVID-19 pandemic		https://poskota.co.id/2021/07/20/timbulkan-pro-kontra-bagaimana-hukum-salat-idul-adha-berjemaah-secara-virtual-berikut-penjelasannya

The visuals depicted above highlight that the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in profound alterations to the beliefs and worship practices within religious communities, especially among Muslims. Practices that were conventionally performed in congregational settings, characterized by collective participation, had to be reconfigured into individual practices, distancing worshippers from communal gatherings. This emergent pattern of worship, necessitated by the pandemic, established a new norm in religious observance. Consequently, Muslims have progressively adapted to these modified patterns of worship, embracing new routines in their religious practices without the resistance or dissent that was more prevalent before the pandemic.

DELEGITIMIZATION OF RELIGIOUS FIGURES

During the pandemic, a notable process of delegitimization affected religious figures, characterized by their decreasing authorization. This led to a weakening of their traditional authority and a reduction in their influence on social organization. This shift occurred as the state and its agents assumed a more dominant role in the regulation of religious affairs, justified by concerns for public health and national security. Table 2 provides a detailed account of various instances where religious figures experienced delegitimization throughout the COVID-19 pandemic.

Tabel 2.
Delegitimization of Religious Figures during COVID-19 Pandemic

No.	Delegitimization of religious figures	Narrative	Source
1.	Defiance against religious figures (disregarding religious decrees).	People's resistance against fatwas issued by religious scholars regarding COVID-19 regulations	https://ibtimes.id/peran-ulama-kegelisahan-masyarakat-dan-mitigasi-covid-19/
2.	Refusal to study religion with religious figures	People preferred instant, non-personalized religious learning	https://jabar.nu.or.id/taushiyah/bahaya-belajar-agama-secara-instan-iKYwv
3.	Disparaging ulema or ignoring their existence	Disparagement of religious scholars who made decisions not in line with public opinion. Internet users assigned derogatory labels such as "*kiai sumbu pendek*" (short-fused clerics) or "*kiai kagetan*" (reactionary clerics)	https://sidogirimedia.com/delegitimasi-ulama-oleh-dunia-maya/

No.	Delegitimization of religious figures	Narrative	Source
4.	Controversy surrounding a sermon by a religious teacher who claimed that the coronavirus is an Illuminati weapon.	Statements by Ustad Zulkifli about the rampant coronavirus, claiming that COVID-19 is a creation of the Illuminati, sparked considerable controversy among internet users.	https://monitor.co.id/2020/03/17/kontroversi-ceramah-ustadz-zulkifli-sebut-virus-corona-senjata-illuminati/
5.	Controversy surrounding a video in which an Islamic scholar suggested that the coronavirus only affects hypocritical individuals	In a post, an internet user stated: "If he ever contracts COVID-19, we'll call him ... a hypocrite". Other internet users expressed wishes for the scholar to contract COVID-19.	https://www.suara.com/news/2020/04/17/073000/dikecam-ustaz-yahya-waloni-sebut-virus-corona-hanya-serang-orang-munafik

Table 2 suggests that the public frequently disregarded the fatwas issued by the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), such as those concerning the suspension of congregational Friday prayers during the COVID-19 pandemic. These fatwas often sparked controversy, given the religious norms emphasizing the obligatory nature of Friday prayers. It is widely held that religion is best understood through the insights of knowledgeable religious scholars, who possess a deep comprehension of religious teachings and their practical application in the real world. Instantaneous learning methods, such as reading religious texts or accessing lectures via television or the internet, akin to a 'Google search' approach to religious education, carry the risk of misinterpretation, misunderstanding, and the propagation of incorrect beliefs, especially among younger audiences.

Disrespect towards religious scholars has become increasingly common, often manifesting in derogatory remarks about their viewpoints or actions. For example, when scholars confront various deviations, they are frequently met with cynical labels like "*kiai sumbu pendek*" or "*kiai kagetan*" (terms implying reactionary or short-fused clerics). Similarly, those who adopt a more persuasive approach to address deviations are quickly labeled as "*kiai liberal*" (liberal clerics). With public opinions spreading rapidly through social media, there is a noticeable shift in the power dynamics, with the public exerting influence through both traditional and digital media to create religious knowledge and contest the views of religious scholars. The pandemic period has notably opened up a space of contestation, reshaping the community's relationship with religious figures. The changes wrought by this pandemic are seen as enduring and an inevitable part of the evolution of the times.

DISLOCATION OF WORSHIP

The implementation of social and physical distancing policies has been identified as a significant issue in relation to the restrictions on conducting religious worship and mass religious activities. Religious practices were forced by regulations to shift to homes. Similarly, various religious preaching activities that previously involved large public gatherings were suspended during the pandemic. Table 3 presents various instances with diverse responses, demonstrating the disruption of places of worship throughout the pandemic.

Table 3. Cases of Delegitimization of Places of Worship during COVID-19 Pandemic

No	Cases	Narrative	Source
1.	Pros and cons of Mosque closures during the pandemic sparked debates within the community	The recommendation for the closure of mosques among the Muslim community triggered diverse opinions. Some argued that mosque closures constitute a form of discrimination and even oppression against the Muslim community.	https://www.republika.co.id/berita/qvrq98318/penutupan-masjid-masa-ppkm-darurat-dan-diksi-zalimi-umat
2.	Restriction of worship activities in mosques	The government recommended the implementation of various restrictions on places of worship during the pandemic.	https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20210803111609-20-675675/aturan-salat-di-masjid-daerah-ppkm-level-4-3-dan-2
3.	Dissemination of religious teachings (*da'wah*) no longer takes place in mosques; instead, it has shifted to digital platforms.	In reality, *da'wah* is no longer confined to mosques, assemblies, or traditional face-to-face communities.	https://www.kompasiana.com/tiarade/5ee-8974ad541df2e593ef0f2/kebangkitan-dakwah-digital-di-masa-pandemi
4.	Cessation of study sessions in mosques	During the pandemic, conducting face-to-face study sessions was considered to pose health issues for the public.	https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/men ag-harap-tokoh-agama-lebih-arif-menyikapi-pandemi-covid-19.html
5.	Virtual Friday prayers	MUI stated that virtual Friday prayers are considered invalid.	https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/salat-jumat-virtu-al-berjamaah-tanpa-berkeru-mun/5925156.html

No	Cases	Narrative	Source
6.	Virtual Eid prayers	Eid prayers were conducted utilizing computers, such as via Zoom	https://www.kompas.id/baca/opini/2021/08/07/ibadah-virtual
7.	Virtual *umrah* (lesser hajj)	The implementation of virtual *umrah* during the pandemic is considered by some scholars as a deception of the public	https://www.suara.com/news/2021/04/27/120207/fakta-umroh-virtual-harganya-murah-tapi-pembodohan?page=all

Table 3 reveals that the COVID-19 pandemic not only modified worship practices but also evidences the reduced functionality of places of worship. Activities traditionally performed in these spaces, once considered normal and habitual, experienced a process of delegitimization throughout the pandemic. COVID-19 Task Force strongly stated: "The government emphasizes that places of worship are not permitted to conduct collective worship activities. Community members who wish to worship are advised to do so at home." Diverse reactions elicited by this regulation, including a comment from the Minister of Religious Affairs: "Places of worship are open only in a restricted capacity for administrators. While mosque or musala administrators may still call the adhan to denote prayer times, actual worship activities should be conducted individually at home." The pandemic has transformed the traditional pattern of preaching, which typically involved face-to-face and congregational interactions. Preaching has expanded beyond mosques, assemblies, or traditional community gatherings. COVID-19 has necessitated a rapid transition for preachers into the digital era, utilizing communication and information technologies to their full potential.

The recommendation to restrict activities in places of worship (including mosques, churches, Hindu and Buddhist temples, etc.) catalyzed the adoption of virtual and digital spaces for religious practices. For example, the virtual celebration of Eid prayer during Eid al-Adha 2021 saw a Zoom attendance of 1,000 people. The online worship was conducted live, with participants scattered across various locations in Indonesia. In addition to Eid prayers, other religious practices such as *tahlilan* (a form of remembrance) and *takziah*, dedicated to praying for deceased friends and family members during the pandemic, also transitioned to being performed online. Since the onset of the pandemic, various innovations in virtual religious activities have emerged, including virtual *umrah*, which has been a subject of controversy. Numerous reports have underscored the widespread challenges related to the disruption of traditional places of worship (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Virtual Worship Practices

No.	Online religious practice	Visual	Source
1	Eid prayer conducted virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic		https://poskota.co.id/2021/07/20/timbulkan-pro-kontra-bagaimana-hukum-salat-idul-adha-berjemaah-secara-virtual-berikut-penjelasannya
2	Procedure for online Friday prayers: the preacher, *muezzin* (caller to prayer), and congregation are separated		https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/tata-cara-jumatan-online-khatib-muazin-dan-jemaah-terpisah-1uwEPwAf5jQ
3	Policy of mosque closures during the COVID-19 pandemic		https://www.republika.co.id/berita/qw1y79366/tito-tempat-ibadah-tak-ditutup-tetapi-tak-boleh-berjamaah
4	Invitation to spread religious teachings through social media		https://kampusdosenjualan.com/syiar-islam-lewat-sosial-media/

No.	Online religious practice	Visual	Source
5	Poster design for virtual *umrah*		https://makassar.terkini.id/poster-umrah-virtual-kembali-viral-netizen-tawafnya-mengelilingi-tv-kalau-doa-gak-sampai-berarti-sinyal-bermasalah/
6	Religious preaching through podcast		https://www.liputan6.com/lifestyle/read/4533528/kembangkan-dakwah-digital-umma-rilis-fitur-podcast-hingga-kompetisi-syiar

The images presented above demonstrate how the delegitimization of traditional places of worship has redirected attention away from physical locales previously central to religious activities and practices. With the advent of online platforms, conventional places of worship have experienced a decline in perceived legitimacy. In contrast, virtual or digital media spaces have emerged as the new epicenters of religious life, progressively evolving into preferred spaces for religious engagement.

RELIGION IN TIMES OF CRISIS

The findings of this research have revealed that religious doctrines underwent delegitimization during the COVID-19 pandemic. Policies implemented to handle the pandemic, in fact, diminished the role of religious doctrines, leading to a reinterpretation of the initial understanding of values and norms in religious teachings. This reevaluation of religious teachings, adapted to the emergency situation of the pandemic, served not only as a coping strategy but also had the potential to generate misunderstandings within society. Religious doctrines were no longer considered absolute; their truth became subject to questioning and debate, rendering them relative. Simultaneously, these

doctrines could induce social changes in communities, creating situations where individuals altered their ingrained behavioral patterns (Berezovska-Chmil, 2020). Doctrines in general consistently dominate and influence the ability to attract followers (Hanson & Xiang, 2013). During the pandemic, religious doctrines significantly transformed the lives of religious communities.

The loss of perceived absolute truth in religious teachings became increasingly palpable among nearly all Muslims due to health protocol regulations. This phenomenon arose from a series of changes that transformed the original meanings into a new system, facilitated by the opening of media space, causing a redefinition of religious doctrines. The forms of delegitimization of religious doctrines illustrate that government regulations tended to contradict earlier religious decrees, such as on the use of vaccines, which were considered to contain forbidden elements. On the other hand, vaccination represented almost the sole opportunity to address the emergency situation of the spread of COVID-19. Religion, in this shift, experienced desacralization, transforming the law from forbidden (*haram*) to an allowed solution in emergency situations. The pandemic turned the absolute laws of Islam into a contested space with open meanings.

The delegitimization of religious figures during the pandemic brought about a significant shift in meaning for the religious community. On one hand, society lost its guidance or role models in the form of religious leaders, aligned with the weakening authority of religious figures caused by the growth of individualism or a shift in communal values (Sajjadi, 2008). Religious figures underwent a transformation in their role in conveying religious teachings, in line with the open space for truth that allows anyone who subscribe to a particular religion to make their own interpretations. Resistance to religious leaders' fatwas often gave rise to both support and opposition. The diminishing authority of religion resulting from controversies surrounding religious figures eroded religious influence, potentially sparking disputes between those who believe in COVID-19 and those who see it merely as a global conspiracy. Controversies in expressing views and values on religion in addressing the pandemic led to a shift in public trust in religion and religious figures.

The implementation of regulations mandating the closure of mosques, limiting worship activities within them, and promoting the virtualization of preaching and prayers, has contributed to the delegitimization of traditional religious practices, leading to profound shifts in the dynamics among religious communities. These regulations ignited considerable debate within the Islamic community, particularly in 2020, when religious practices experienced a loss of empowerment and disruption in rituals and preaching (Hamdi, 2022). The

necessity for physical distancing due to COVID-19 markedly encouraged the adoption of virtual methods for disseminating religious teachings, significantly influencing the landscape of religious practice (Jogezai et al., 2021). Religious activities have increasingly adapted to the confines imposed by worship rules in sacred spaces. Within the Islamic framework of needs, especially in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, applying the principle of *if̣ al-nafs* (preserving life) in mosques has been prioritized as a primary need (*darūriyyāt*). This principle underscores the importance of protecting life while maintaining the spiritual continuity of collective worship. This adaptation unites the community within a paradigm that values health and sanctifies life during these challenging times (Dahlan et al., 2021). Therefore, the process of delegitimizing religion in social life, particularly in places of worship, signifies an evolution in the patterns and structures of the religious social experiences within the Muslim community.

CONCLUSION

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the phenomenon of religious delegitimization in social life transcended mere alterations in Islamic religious regulations; it also entailed significant changes in religious doctrines, thereby affecting the established legitimacy of long-standing beliefs. This widespread perception of delegitimization within Indonesia's Muslim population was, in part, attributed to a lack of comprehensive understanding. The process led to various instances of delegitimization of religious doctrines and the diminished authority of religious figures, culminating in prevalent misunderstandings. This occurrence of religious delegitimization has projected implications for the future of social religious life, suggesting a transition away from conventional Islamic practices and spirituality. In this context, religious doctrines have broadened their reach, disseminating through various social media platforms, with religious figures frequently igniting social controversies in their portrayal of religion during the pandemic. Consequently, the delegitimization of religion in social life throughout the COVID-19 pandemic poses emerging challenges for future religious practice and interpretation.

This study offers insights into the delegitimization of religion in social life, examining not only the social impact but also the ramifications of regulatory changes and alterations in religious practices as a significant social issue within Indonesian Islam. The different manifestations of religious delegitimization observed during the pandemic have indicated that this period has reshaped patterns and the authority of religious practices. It is posited that religion has experienced a shift in its social significance during the COVID-19 pandemic.

This observation underscores that the delegitimization of religion in social life can be discerned through various expressions of doctrinal teachings, the implementation of values, and the behavioral patterns of believers during the pandemic.

The manuscript, however, acknowledges limitations in its data sources, primarily derived from social media research. Such a foundation is not sufficiently robust to support broad claims of extensive religious delegitimization in social life. To develop a comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon, extensive surveys on religious delegitimization in social life are necessary, taking into account spirituality and religious concerns. These surveys, encompassing a broader scope and including experiences from various religious backgrounds, are vital for informed understanding and effective policymaking in managing community life in the aftermath of the pandemic.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abraham, I. B., & Stewart, F. (2019). Desacralizing Salvation in Straight Edge Christianity and Holistic Spirituality. *International Journal for the Study of New Religions, 5*(1), 77‑102. https://doi.org/10.1558/ijsnr.v5i1.77

Acanfora, P. (2010). The Italian Christian democratic party within the international christian democratic organizations: Nationalism, Europeanism, and religious identity (1947-1954). *Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 15*(2), 200‑231. https://doi.org/10.1080/13545711003606602

Agung, I. M. (2020). Memahami Pandemi Covid-19 dalam Perspektif Psikologi Sosial. *Psikobuletin:Buletin Ilmiah Psikologi, 1*(2), 68‑84. http://dx.doi.org/10.24014/pib.v1i2.9616

Baker, J. O., Martí, G., Braunstein, R., Whitehead, A. L., & Yukich, G. (2020). Religion in the age of social distancing: How COVID-19 presents new directions for research. *Sociology of Religion: A Quarterly Review, 81*(4), 357‑370. https://doi.org/10.1093/socrel/sraa039

Barker, E. (2021). *The Centrality of Religion in Social Life: Essays in Hpnpur of James A. Beckford.* London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315240831

Berezovska-Chmil, O. (2020). Theoretical and Conceptual Foundations of the Study of Religious Doctrines. *Good Parson: Scientific Bulletin of Ivano-Frankivsk Academy of John Chrysostom, Theology, Philosophy, History*, (14), 102‑107. https://doi.org/10.52761/2522-1558.2019.14.9

Berger, J., Hamit Fisek, M., Ridgeway, C. L., & Norman, R. Z. (1998). The Legitimation and Delegitimation of Power and Prestige Orders. *American Sociological Review, 63*(3), 379–405. https://doi.org/10.2307/2657555

Berggren, N., & Bjørnskov, C. (2011). Is the importance of religion in daily life related to social trust? Cross-country and cross-state comparisons. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 80*(3), 459–480. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.05.002

Chiarini, R. (2017). Delegitimation provided by the constitutional pact in the First Republic. *Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 22*(1), 71–86. https://doi.org/10.1080/1354571X.2017.1267983

Chiarini, R. (2019). Delegitimation provided by the constitutional pact in the First Republic. *Political Enemies in Republican Italy*. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203703427-6

Dahlan, M., Bustami, M. R., Makmur, M., & Mas'ulah, S. (2021). The Islamic principle of ḥifẓ al-nafs (protection of life) and COVID-19 in Indonesia: A case study of nurul iman mosque of Bengkulu city. *Heliyon, 7*(7), E007541. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2021.e07541

Dani, J. A., & Mediantara, Y. (2020). Covid-19 dan Perubahan Komunikasi Sosial. *Persepsi: Communication Journal, 3*(1), 94–102. https://doi.org/10.30596/persepsi.v3i1.4510

Diez-Sampedro, A., Gonzalez, A., Delgado, V., Flowers, M., Maltseva, T., & Olenick, M. (2020). COVID-19 and Advanced Practice Registered Nurses: Frontline Update. *Journal for Nurse Practitioners, 16*(8), 551–555. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nurpra.2020.06.014

Febriyani, R., Rahman, M. T., & Wibisono, M. Y. (2021). Kondisi Kegiatan Keagamaan Muslim Perempuan pada Masa Pandemi Covid-19 di Wilayah Suburban. *Jurnal Iman dan Spiritualitas, 1*(3), 263–271. https://doi.org/10.15575/jis.v1i3.13122

Hamdi, S. (2022). Covid-19, social stigma and changing religious practice in Tablighi Jamaat communities in Lombok, Indonesia. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, *76*, 102996. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2022.102996

Hanson, G. H., & Xiang, C. (2013). Exporting Christianity: Governance and doctrine in the globalization of US denominations. *Journal of International Economics, 91*(2), 301–320. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2013.08.002

Harahap, S. R. (2020). Proses Interaksi Sosial di Tengah Pandemi Virus Covid 19. *AL-HIKMAH: Media Dakwah, Komunikasi, Sosial dan Kebudayaan, 11*(1), 45–53. https://doi.org/10.32505/hikmah.v11i1.1837

Haryaningsih, S., & Elyta, E. (2022). Religion and Public Policy: Digital-Based Islamic Political Economy and Human Security on Covid-19 Handling. *Al-Albab, 11*(1), 1–156. https://doi.org/10.24260/alalbab.v11i1.2176

Hayati, S. (2020). Desacralization in Dressing as a Political Identity for World Peace in the Millennial Era. *International Journal Ihya' 'Ulum Al-Din, 22*(1), 53–70. https://doi.org/10.21580/ihya.22.1.5607

Ikenberry, G. J. (1999). The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of the Social Order, by F. Fukuyama [Review]. *Foreign Affairs, 78*(5), 162–162. *https*://doi.org/10.2307/20049458

Jogezai, N. A., Baloch, F. A., Jaffar, M., Shah, T., Khilji, G. K., & Bashir, S. (2021). Teachers' attitudes towards social media (SM) use in online learning amid the COVID-19 pandemic: the effects of SM use by teachers and religious scholars during physical distancing. *Heliyon, 7*(4), E06781. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2021.e06781

Kardis, K., & Kardis, M. (2019). Religion and values related to the identity of Polish and Lithuanian culture. Sociological - Historical analysis based on the teaching of the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński. In *Historia Ecclesiastica*.

Khairunnisa, K. (2020). Penanaman Nilai Tradisi Kepesantrenan dalam Membendung Radikalisme Agama. *Al-Riwayah : Jurnal Kependidikan, 12*(2), 243–264. https://doi.org/10.47945/al-riwayah.v12i2.284

Luqman, L., & Ilhamdi, I. (2023). Religious Solidarity for Coping with Economic Crisis During the Covid-19 Pandemic. *Al-Albab, 11*(2), 161–322. https://doi.org/10.24260/alalbab.v11i2.2488

Miski, M., & Hamdan, A. (2019). Alqur'an dan Hadith dalam Wacana Delegitimasi Nasionalisme di Media Online Islam. *Al-A'raf : Jurnal Pemikiran Islam dan Filsafat, 16*(1), 25–46. https://doi.org/10.22515/ajpif.v16i1.1644

Nizar, N. (2018). Hubungan Etika dan Agama dalam Kehidupan Sosial. *Jurnal Arajang, 1*(1), 27–35. https://doi.org/10.31605/arajang.v1i1.44

Nurita, D. (2021). PPKM Darurat, Satgas Tegaskan Tempat Ibadah Tidak Dibuka Untuk Berjamaah. *Tempo.co*. https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1482908/ppkm-darurat-satgas-tegaskan-tempat-ibadah-tidak-dibuka-untuk-berjamaah

Rakodi, C. (2021). Religion and social life in African cities. In S. Parnell & E. Pieterse (Authors), *Africa's Urban Revolution* (pp. 82–109). London: Bloomsbury Academic. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350218246.ch-005

Rashid, T. (2019). Social Media, Religion and Religiosity in Pakistan in the Era of Disruption. *Hamdard Islamicus, 42*(1&2), 33–56. https://doi.org/10.57144/hi.v42i1-2.5

Regany, F., Benmecheddal, A., Belkhir, M., & Djelassi, S. (2021). Conflicting coexistence of legitimation and delegitimation logics in a revived market: The case of a traditional clothing market. *Journal of Business Research, 123,* 438–449. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2020.09.037

Regus, M. (2022). Regulating religion in a time of COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia: context, dynamics, and implication. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 42*(3/4), 313–331. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJSSP-07-2020-0321

Ridgeway, C. L., Berger, J., Norman, R. Z., & Fisek, M. H. (1998). The Legitimation and Delegitimation of Power and Prestige Orders. *American Sociological Review, 63*(3), 379–405. https://doi.org/10.2307/2657555

Ridla, M. R. (2014). Sosiologi Hukum Islam (Analisis terhadap Pemikiran M. Atho' Mudzhar). *AL-IHKAM: Jurnal Hukum & Pranata Sosia, 7*(2), 294–304. https://doi.org/10.19105/al-lhkam.v7i2.330

Roh, S., Kim, Y., Lee, K. H., Lee, Y. S., Burnette, C. E., & Lawler, M. J. (2015). Religion, Social Support, and Life Satisfaction Among American Indian Older Adults. *Journal of Religion and Spirituality in Social Work: Social Thought, 34*(4), 414–434. https://doi.org/10.1080/15426432.2015.1097094

Sajjadi, S. M. (2008). Religious Education and the Delegitimation of Knowledge. *American Journal of Islam and Society, 25*(2), 83–99. https://doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v25i2.401

Shevsky, D. (2020). What is state failure? An overview of concepts. *Mezhdunarodnye Protsessy*. https://doi.org/10.17994/IT.2020.18.3.62.7

Shofaussamawati, S. (2018). Iman dan Kehidupan Sosial. *Riwayah : Jurnal Studi Hadis, 2*(2), 211–224. https://doi.org/10.21043/riwayah.v2i2.3133

Susanti, S. A. (2019). Islam dan Tantangan Globalisasi. *HUMANISTIKA : Jurnal Keislaman, 5*(2), 163–177. https://doi.org/10.36835/humanistika.v5i2.47

Syamsuddin, S. (2020). Keringanan (Rukhshah) Meniadakan Shalat Jumat dan Shalat Jama'ah serta Kewajiban Menaati Ulul Amri. *Al-'Adl, 13*(2), 165-184. https://doi.org/10.31332/aladl.v13i2.1869

Yanuarita, H. A., & Haryati, S. (2021). Pengaruh COVID-19 Terhadap Kondi-si Sosial Budaya di Kota Malang dan Konsep Strategis dalam Penan-ganannya. *Jurnal Ilmiah Widya Sosiopolitika, 2*(2), 58-71. https://doi.org/10.24843/jiwsp.2020.v02.i02.p01

Zainur, Z. (2020). Konsep Dasar Kebutuhan Manusia Menurut Persfektif Ekonomi Islam. *Jurnal An-Nahl, 5*(9), 32-43. https://doi.org/10.54576/annahl.v7i1.3

Zarkasyi, H. F. (2009). Liberalisasi Pemikiran Islam: Gerakan Bersama Mis-sionaris, Orientalis dan Kolonialis. *TSAQAFAH, 5*(1), 1-28. https://doi.org/10.21111/tsaqafah.v5i1.145