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AL-ALBAB

Volume 10 Number 1 June 2021

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Al-Albab ISSN 0216-6143 (print) and ISSN: 2502-8340 (online) is an interdisciplinary journal published twice a year in print and online (e-journal) by the Pontianak State Institute of Islamic Studies, Pontianak. Our academic publication concern includes the studies of world religions of Islam, Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism, Chinese religions and other religions. Interdisciplinary studies may include the studies of religion in the fields of anthropology, sociology, philosophy, psychology, education, cultural studies and other social sciences.

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Editorial Office:

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Pascasarjana IAIN Pontianak,

Jalan Letjend Suprpto No. 19, Pontianak Selatan

Pontianak 78122, Kalimantan Barat, Indonesia.

Phone: (62-561) 734170 Fax: (62-561) 734170 ;

Handphone/WA: +6281256738348

E-mail: redaksi.bjrs@gmail.com

Website: <http://jurnaliainpontianak.or.id/index.php/alalbab>

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RELIGION, SCIENCE, AND CULTURE AMIDST THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: MUHAMMADIYAH'S WORSHIP GUIDANCE AND MEMBERS' RESPONSES

Ahmad Muttaqin

UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Email: ahmad.muttaqin@uin-suka.ac.id

ABSTRACT

How have religious organizations responded to the COVID-19 pandemic? Why have some religious organizations responded to this outbreak from a scientific perspective, but many others have not? This paper explores the Muhammadiyah's proactive role in responding to the COVID-19 outbreak through an integration-interconnection perspective of religion, science, and culture. Apart from establishing the Muhammadiyah COVID-19 Command Center (MCCC), Muhammadiyah have been actively providing religious guidance amidst the pandemic. Through a review of organizational documents and an auto-nethnography study of the responses of Muhammadiyah members and their community, this paper examines the content and process of disseminating religious guidance, as well as the responses of the organization members and society generally. The dynamics of the response of Muhammadiyah members and sympathizers to religious guidance issued by the Central Board of Muhammadiyah will be read from the perspective of the religious authority in the VUCA (Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, Ambiguity) era. This paper underlines that the Muhammadiyah have shown efforts to integrate religion, science, and culture through MCCC to deal with the outbreak. This confirms that the Muhammadiyah movement is both rational and pro-science and serves as a shred of evidence that religious organizations can be problem solvers, although authorities are potentially challenged in the VUCA era.

Keywords: COVID-19 Pandemic; Integration-Interconnection; Muhammadiyah; Religion; Science; Culture

INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic has been responded to differently by various religious organizations. There are religious groups who underestimate the danger of the pandemic and consider it merely a conspiracy of certain groups to rule the world. Those who believe in these conspiracies note that they are not afraid of COVID-19, and that their faith will be able to prevent the threat of

the virus. Other groups directly undermine the calls of health experts, leaders of religious organizations at the central level, and the government. However, other religious organizations and groups are taking it seriously, and thus taking strategic steps to tackle the spread of the disease. The first two groups only realized the danger of COVID-19 after it was discovered that some of their group members were exposed, became sick, and eventually passed away. Some church and mosque congregations and members of certain religious groups are even known to be “super-spreaders” of COVID-19 due to their disregard and neglect of the threat of this pandemic.

Muhammadiyah, an Islamic organization founded by K.H. Ahmad Dahlan in 1912 and “the most powerful Islamic reformist movement in Southeast Asia, perhaps in the world” (Peacock, 1978: 19), is one of the few faith-based organizations that took strategic, measured, and programmed steps against the COVID-19 pandemic since the very first rise in cases. In these first three months of the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia as recorded by Djelante., et.al., “Muhammadiyah has transformed itself to be one of the most agile promoters of health-based and hospital-based emergency response.” (2020: 6).

The Muhammadiyah group issued announcements, formed a task force team with corresponding programs and actions to tackle COVID-19 nationally, and actively issued religious guidance. Muhammadiyah’s organized and proactive steps were often in conflict with governmental policies which were frequently changing. For example, Muhammadiyah reminded the government not to recklessly implement the Large-Scale Social Restrictions (LSSR) easing policy merely for economic reasons. The Muhammadiyah also disagreed with the term “new normal” used by the government and offered other more appropriate terms, such as “new reality” (CNN Indonesia, 8 June 2020). The Muhammadiyah’s disagreement with government policies they considered reckless was later justified by the government (Kumparan News, 10 July 2020).

The emergency religious guidelines for the pandemic period issued by the Central Board of Muhammadiyah were often ridiculed by groups with different viewpoints. Even some members and lower-level organizational leaders denied and delegitimized these circulars and guidelines. This raises the question of how effective and influential the religious guidance of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah is; and raises concerns about the possibility of the modernist organization’s religious authority being challenged amid the VUCA (Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, Ambiguity) situation.

There are countless studies on the Muhammadiyah. Based on the background of the researchers, the literature and research on Muhammadiyah can be classified into two groups. First is research and literature written by insiders

such as organization leaders, cadres, members, or sympathizers. Among those who actively write and study the Muhammadiyah and its autonomous organization, Syamsiatun from an insider perspective are Haedar Nashir, the current Chairman of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah, Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Amin Abdullah, Abdul Mukti, Achmad Jaenuri, Najib Burhani, Hilman Latief, Ruhaini, and more. Even though they are insiders, they do not lose their objectivity so that their work remains critical, academic, honest, and reflective. Their writings and studies on the Muhammadiyah include aspects of ideology, thought, social, history, philanthropy, education, and interactions with other groups, to religious movements at the global level. The second group of academic research has been carried out by outsiders – neither Muhammadiyah members nor leaders. Among the outsiders who studied the Muhammadiyah are Western academics or non-Indonesian citizens, such as James Peacock, Nakamura, Hyung Jum Kim, and Herman L. Beck. They study Muhammadiyah from a historical, sociological, anthropological, and religious movement perspective.

In terms of themes, studies on Muhammadiyah can be classified into several groups. Studies on Muhammadiyah ideology and thought can be found in the works of Peacock (1978), Jaenuri (1997, 2007), Abdullah (2001, 2002, 2007, 2010, 2019), and Nashir (2007, 2010, 2015a, 2015b, 2018). Whereas Nakamura (2012), Mulkhan (1990, 2000, 2010), Kim (2007), Alfian (1989), and Burhani (2005, 2019), known for their study on the history and dynamics of the Muhammadiyah movement sociologically, anthropologically, and politically. Studies on Muhammadiyah education and relations with other religious communities have been carried out by Mukti and Fajar, (2009), Mukti (2019a, 2019b) and Shihab (1998); on philanthropy of the Muhammadiyah by Latief (2012) and Nashir and Latief (2020); on Sufism and spirituality in Muhammadiyah by Masyitoh (2008), Beck (2014), and Biyanto (2017); and about gender studies and women's lense in Muhammadiyah by Syamsiatun (2007, 2008), Ruhaini (2015), and Ro'fah (2016).

There are continued studies on the Muhammadiyah through BA theses, MA theses, Ph.D. theses, legal proceedings, as well as thousands of articles in scientific journals. As an illustration of how massive the number of studies on Muhammadiyah, when the word "Muhammadiyah" is typed into the Google Scholar database, within 0.09 seconds, 81,400 entries appear. A limitation in the study is that among the existing studies on Muhammadiyah, it has been difficult to find a study on Muhammadiyah from the perspective of integration and interconnection of science in religious praxis, especially related to the COVID-19 pandemic. One of the studies on Muhammadiyah

with the integration-interconnection approach was carried out by Setiawan (2018) entitled *Pembelajaran Al-Islam dan Kemuhammadiyah [AIK] yang Menggembirakan (Dengan Pendekatan Integrasi-Interkoneksi)* [Learning Al-Islam and Kemuhammadiyah [AIK] with Fund (the Integration-Interconnection Approach), focusing on the development of AIK material in an integrative-interconnective manner between religious and general sciences at Aisyiyah University of Yogyakarta.

A study on the role of Muhammadiyah as a religious movement responding to the COVID-19 pandemic was written by Najib Burhani (2020) entitled *Comparing Tabligh Jamaat and Muhammadiyah Responses to COVID-19*. According to Burhani, Muhammadiyah is an example of a religious organization responding positively to the COVID-19 pandemic through *Jihad Kemanusiaan* (Humanitarian Jihad), which does not conflict with government policies through various efforts ranging from healthy living campaigns, religious guidance, to mobilizing all resources for its cadres, autonomous organization, and health and education institutions all actively involved in stopping the spread of the pandemic. The Muhammadiyah's proactive role is the result of an inner-worldly religious orientation. On the other hand, the Tablighi Jamaat's strict voicing against calls for restrictions on worship in mosques and religious activities that gather many people is an example of a passive and fatalistic response in response to disasters. This is one of the consequences of their *otherworldly* religious orientation.

Unlike the above studies, this paper examines the process of integration between religion, science, and culture in religious guidance and practice of the Muhammadiyah during the COVID-19 pandemic, focusing on three main issues. First, how has Muhammadiyah responded to the pandemic? Second, from the perspective of integration and interconnection of science, to what extent are the dialectics of religious reasoning and scientific reasoning used by the Muhammadiyah leadership in providing religious guidance during the pandemic? Finally, why did various responses emerge from members of the organization to the Central Board of Muhammadiyah's religious guidance in the pandemic era, and what are its implications moving forward for the religious authority of the ulama and Muhammadiyah leaders?

Methodologically, this paper combines document studies and auto-nethnography or auto-ethnography on the internet and social media. Data on religious views, programs, and organizational activities related to the pandemic was gathered from a study of official documents of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah and official publications: press releases, books, official web channels, social media of the organizations, and literature on

Muhammadiyah studies. Data on the responses of cadres, members, and sympathizers to the Muhammadiyah policies and programs on COVID-19 pandemic was collected by auto-nethnography method, which allowed me, as an activist and administrators in one of the Council at the Central Board of Muhammadiyah, to discern and reflex the dynamics responses in a digital space spreading across various websites and social media platforms and online chat groups. As noted by Villegas (2018), auto-nethnography allows “the researcher explores their feelings, emotions, and evocations in order to understand a cultural experience in an online community of its own people.”

The collected data was processed and analyzed using three models of integration-interconnection of religious science and culture according to Amin Abdullah’s version: semipermeable, intersubjective testability, and creative imagination (2013, 2014). To discern the dynamics of the relationship between the policies of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah and the response of its members, this study implements the perspective of the challenge of religious authority in the VUCA (Mack et al. 2016). The following sub-chapters will, in sequence, elaborate Muhammadiyah’s religious reasoning, Muhammadiyah’s religious guidance during the pandemic with analyzing integration-interconnection of science in it, the response of Muhammadiyah members, and the challenges of religious authority in the VUCA era.

MUHAMMADIYAH RELIGIOUS REASONING

Outsider-observers on Muhammadiyah tend to be biased in evaluating Muhammadiyah. Due to its puritanical aspects in religious views and practices, Muhammadiyah is categorized as a Salafi movement, though some even call it Wahabi. In fact, referring to the official documents of the organization, Muhammadiyah is a religious movement that combines revelation and mind, both in religious thought and practice. The Principles of Beliefs and Ideals of Life (*Matan Keyakinan dan Cita-Cita Hidup* [MKCH]) of Muhammadiyah point 3, for example, clearly states that Muhammadiyah’s religious understanding is based on the Qur’an and Sunnah maqbulah using the mind, which is in line with the spirit of Islamic teachings. The 3rd item of the MKCH formula is:

“Muhammadiyah in practicing Islam is based on: (a) the Quran: The Book of Allah which was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). (b) The Sunnah of the Prophet: The explanation and implementation of the teachings of the Qur’an given by the Prophet Muhammad using reasoning according to the spirit of Islamic teachings.” (Manhaj Gerakan Muhammadiyah, 2009: 51).

Based on this formula, in the view of Muhammadiyah, being religious is based not only on the arguments of religious texts in a textual and literal manner, but also on concepts of reasoning. In the final part of the MKCH point 3, it is explicitly stated: "... using reasoning according to the spirit of Islamic teachings." This phrase emphasizes that the use of the mind in religion is not solely based on speculative reasoning, but also on the logic that is in accordance with the spirit of Islamic teachings. Because Islam supports the development of science, so the logic and mind used are based on the results of scientific research.

The assertion of Muhammadiyah for appreciating science, technology, and culture in religion can also be found in the document of Muhammadiyah Members' Islamic Life Guidelines (*Pedoman Hidup Islami Warga Muhammadiyah [PHIWM]*). These guidelines provide a model for Muhammadiyah members in various life fields: personal life, family life, society, organizations, managing charity, doing business, developing professions, being part of a nation, preserving the environment, developing science and technology, and living life artistically through arts and culture.

The combination of revelation and mind in Muhammadiyah religious reasoning and practice is strengthened by its *manhaj tarjih* which combines three elements: *burhani* (religious holy text); *bayaani* (science-based empirical facts); and *irfani* (the knowledge acquired through sincerity and inspiration, that lead to pure heart and *ihsan*, as ethical considerations for humans and nature).

In practice and as a religious movement, Muhammadiyah and its various charitable enterprises are the implementers of the faith and good deeds framed in a modern organization. Through this perspective, the existing problems of worldly life are not to be avoided and shunned but should instead be approached and resolved through collective charity action. Fatwas and religious appeals issued are always viewed holistically, not only prioritizing religious reasoning (*bayani*), but also viewed from the perspective of science and technology (*burhani*), as well as *ihsan* and ethical-spiritual considerations for the sake of common benefit (*irfani*). That is why since the One Century Muhammadiyah Congress in Yogyakarta in 2010, the Muhammadiyah movement has carried the idea of *Islam Berkemajuan* (Islam with progress). In the *Pernyataan Pikiran Muhammadiyah Abad Kedua* (The Second Century Muhammadiyah Thought Statement / *azhawahir al-afkar al-muhammadiyah li al-qarni al-tsani*), which was the Decree of the One Century Muhammadiyah Congress (known also as the 46th Muhammadiyah Congress), it was stated: "Islam highly respects charity equal to faith and knowledge, so that Islam

is present in the understanding of balance and at the same time being well-established in life” (PP Muhammadiyah, 2015: 8).

Since its establishment until today, the ethos of Muhammadiyah has been the integration of faith, knowledge, and good deeds in an organization. Kyai Dahlan's initial efforts to shift the praying line of the Grand Mosque of Kauman to be more precise in facing the Qibla by using a map, is a merely one example of the implementation of science in religion at that time. The choice of using organizational instruments as a medium for the actualization of faith based on common sense rooted in science and technology and the implementation of good deeds is respected by many. It is through this modern organization that Muhammadiyah shows its role in the fields of education, health, social services, community empowerment, disaster management, and philanthropy. Muhammadiyah's charitable enterprises in education from kindergarten to higher education, and in health services in hundreds of clinics/hospitals around Indonesia, can be categorized as Muhammadiyah scientific charity institution because they are managed professionally whilst implementing principles of science and technology based on Islamic ethics and teachings.

COVID-19 OUTBREAK RESPONSE AND GUIDANCE FOR WORSHIP DURING THE PANDEMIC

Responding to the COVID-19 outbreak, the Muhammadiyah movement has devoted all its resources to fighting and overcoming the pandemic as a form of “*Jihad Kemanusiaan*” or Humanitarian Jihad (Muis, 2020). Through Notice Letter Number 02/MLM/I.0/H/2020 concerning the 2019 Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the Central Board of Muhammadiyah formed the Muhammadiyah COVID-19 Command Center (MCCC) as a task force to coordinate and implement programs and actions for handling COVID-19. The formation of the MCCC coincided with the time when the Government of Indonesia declared the Coronavirus as a national disaster, March 14, 2020, or 12 days from the first case of a positive patient in Indonesia with COVID-19 on March 2, 2020.

The MCCC is a task force team consisting of representatives from councils, centers, institutions, and autonomous organizations under Muhammadiyah such as the Public Health Advisory Council, Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center (MDMC), 'Aisyiyah, LAZISMU, Council of Higher Education, Research and Development (DIKTILITBANG), Council of Primary and Secondary Education (DIKDASMEN), Majelis Tabligh, Muhammadiyah Students Association (IPM), Muhammadiyah University-Students Association (IMM), Nasyiatul 'Aisyiyah (young women), and

Pemuda Muhammadiyah (youth), Hizbul Wathan (scout), and Tapak Suci Putera Muhammadiyah (martial arts). In addition to being created at the central level, the MCCC was also formed at the regional level which exists in 30 regions around Indonesia. MCCC also collaborates with various institutions, both national and international. The detailed progress of Muhammadiyah's response to the COVID-19 pandemic was documented by the MCCC's Information, Dissemination and Publication Team in the form of an e-book entitled *Optimis Menghadapi Pandemi COVID-19: Catatan Kajian dan Respon Muhammadiyah* [Optimism in Facing the COVID-19 Pandemic: Notes on Muhammadiyah Studies and Responses] (2020).

The MCCC report on December 31, 2020, or about 10 months of providing community services, they had succeeded in carrying out activities such as collecting and distributing items (Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), hand sanitizers, and disinfectants; providing medical equipment and medical PPE); distributing food and groceries for negatively impacted families; promoting healthy life and socializing COVID-19 activities; producing virtual education technology and devices for online learning; hospitalizing infected patients and providing shelter for non-symptoms patients; supporting internet data packages; providing tuition waivers for university student; and more, with a total expenditure approximately IDR 308.4 billion (excluding treatment costs at Muhammadiyah-Aisyiyah Hospitals). More than 28.5 million people were directly assisted because of these efforts. This activity has positioned Muhammadiyah as the most concerned organization in mitigating the COVID-19 in Indonesia.¹

In the context of providing religious guidance during the pandemic, until the end of June 2020, the Central Board of Muhammadiyah issued several edicts, circulars, and religious guidance for specifically Muhammadiyah members in addition to the Indonesian Muslim community in general. These edicts and circulars included guidance on procedures for worship during the COVID-19 pandemic such as for worship at home, Ramadan, and Idul Fitri as well as guidance on Eid al-Adha prayer and Qurban (animal sacrifice) ritual during the pandemic. The following discussion will elaborate upon Muhammadiyah's religious guidance for worship during the emergency period of the pandemic. After detailing this guidance, at the end of the sub-discussion, an analysis of Muhammadiyah religious guidance and practice will be presented from the

¹ This appreciation, for example, was made by the Development Strategy Study Institute (LKSP), a big data-based study institution to formulate development based in Jakarta, which, based on the results of its survey, stated that Muhammadiyah is the mass organization that cared the most about the Covid-19 pandemic. (see <https://lksp.or.id/kajian/survei-lksp-muhammadiyah-dan-pks-dipersepsi-lebih-peduli-saat-pandemi/>).

perspective of integration-interconnection of science.

1. *Praying at home and Ramadhan during the pandemic period*

Guidance for worship at home during the pandemic was first issued by the Central Board of Muhammadiyah through Edict Number 02/MLM/I.0/H/2020 concerning the Coronavirus Disease Pandemic 2019, on 19 Rajab 1441 AH / March 14, 2020 AD. The edict contains 5 points: (1) postponement of activities within the Muhammadiyah organization that involve masses or large numbers of people such as religious courses, seminars, meetings, and social activities; (2) religious worship activities; (3) educational activities should be in line with government policies; (4) the Muhammadiyah and Aisyiyah hospitals should prepare for COVID-19 handling, the Public Health Advisory Council (MPKU) to synergize with other majlis, institutions, autonomous organizations, and other Muhammadiyah charitable enterprises; and an assertion that the Central Board of Muhammadiyah has established the MCCC; and (5) adhere to a healthy lifestyle, and to limit travel to places with high risk of COVID-19 transmission.

The edict specifically mentions worship activities during the pandemic in point number 2, stating:

“Religious activities such as congregational prayers and Friday prayers in mosques are still carried out with the following conditions: (a). Those who are sick are advised to pray at home. (b). If deemed an emergency, Friday prayers can be replaced with dhuhur prayers at home, and congregational prayers can be performed at home.”

Point number 5 concerning the recommendation not to travel to areas that are at risk of COVID-19 transmission is accompanied by a quote from a hadith from Usamah bin Zaid, and a prohibition of residents living in the pandemic areas from leaving the area. It is also stated that the hadith narrated by Bukhari and Muslim from Abu Hurairah is about the Prophet's prohibition not to mix the sick and the healthy; as well as the hadith about the prohibition of doing bad and harmful things, the narration of Ibn Majah and Ahmad bin Hambal from Abdullah bin Abbas. The hadiths quoted in the edict are the *naqli* (from the Qur'an and the prophet) argument for handling infectious disease outbreaks through regional quarantine or recently known as lock-down, *PSBB*, and other related terms.

Considering statistical data about the COVID-19 cases which continue to increase and spread to several regions in Indonesia, on March 20, 2020, the

Muhamadiyah Central Executive Board issued an appeal for Friday prayers to be replaced with *dhuh*r prayers at home, and congregational prayers at home. Circulars and appeals were also followed by various online agreement forums held by the Majlis Tarjih, Tajdis, and the Muhammadiyah charitable enterprises.

On March 24, 2020, the Central Board of Muhammadiyah issued a subsequent Circular number 02/EDR/I.0/E/2020 concerning Worship Guidelines in Emergency Conditions of COVID-19 which is equipped with attachments of worship guidance from Majlis Tarjih and Tajid. This circular is a follow-up to, and refinement of, the *Maklumat* [Declaration] of Central Board of Muhammadiyah Number 02/MLM/I.0/H/2020 concerning the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic and Circular Number 03/I.0/B/2020 concerning the Implementation of congregational obligatory and Friday Prayers during the COVID-19 pandemic. The guidance of religious ritual during the pandemic was the result of a meeting among three main institutions in the Central Board of Muhammadiyah, they are the Tarjih and Tajdid Council, Public Health Advisory Council, and the MCCC.

In detail, the attachment to this circular contains 19 points of guidance starting from the aspect of *aqidah* [faith] in viewing and responding to COVID-19, guidance to continue making a strong effort to prevent and handle COVID-19, guidance to carry out safe religious worship in accordance with health protocols amidst a pandemic, as well as guidance to practice recommended religious rituals during pandemic time as a spiritual effort to strengthen faith and social solidarity.

Prior to discussing the 19 points of worship guidance, it is crucial to provide an explanation of the basic values of faith which are used as guidelines in making decisions about worship guidance during the pandemic period. They include, first, the belief that whatever befalls humans cannot be separated from the will of Allah, the Almighty, the Most Just, the Most Beneficent and the Most Merciful. All disasters are tests from Allah who intends wisdom behind each action. Humans should maintain good and healthy quality of the environment, avoid being destructive towards the environment, and avoid causing disease because the cosmic function of humans is to help nature to prosper.

Second, the consequence of faith in Allah in facing catastrophe humans must be optimistic and believe that with every difficulty, there must be a way out by attempting to find solutions and by continuing to believe in Allah (thus being safe from religious wrath). The third is about the nature of religion that was revealed to humans as the blessings for the universe and bringing benefits in the form of protection for humans, their religious lives, their bodies and souls,

their minds, their family institutions, and their wealth. The implementation of religious teachings during the COVID-19 pandemic must avoid any harm and difficulties in favor of prioritizing convenience and a sense of security.

The nineteen points of guidance of worship during the pandemic can be grouped into three parts. The first five points are related to theological views; aspects of faith and *aqidah* in viewing and responding to the pandemic including: (1) the belief that “the COVID-19 disaster is a test from Allah based on the attributes of the Most Beneficent and the Most Merciful of Allah, so that Muslims must face it with patience, reliance on God alone, and effort.” (2) “ COVID-19 patients who die though trying with full faith to prevent and/or treat the disease will receive rewards like those of martyrs.” (3) “Active efforts to prevent the spread of COVID-19 are a form of worship that has the value of *jihad*, and on the other hand, deliberate actions that carry the risk of transmission are bad / wrongdoing.” (4) “Treatment as a form of effort is mandatory. Therefore, experts including the Government are obliged to make these efforts at the same time providing all the necessities related to it.” (5) “In order to avoid the adverse effects of COVID-19, various guidelines and protocols have been established by authorities, including social distancing (*at-tabāud al-ijtimāi*) and efforts to stay at home or work from home as preventive measures, while maintaining work productivity levels.”

The next seven points are about worship: 1. Explaining the law of required prayer that must be carried out under any circumstance. 2. In the context of implementing social distancing and avoiding the harm of transmission of COVID-19 3. The fardhu prayer should be carried out in respective homes, not in the public prayer room or the mosque 4. The ability to carry out prayers for the medical staff on duty 5. Friday prayers are replaced with midday prayers for four cycles in each house 6. guidance on replacing the call *hayaa ‘ala shalah with shollu fii buyutikum* or *shallu fii rilaterallikum* 7. Finally, guidance for worship in the month of Ramadan was included: guidance on evening prayers (tarawih) in each house, noting fasting is still mandatory except for those who are sick, clarifying that medical personnel with heavy burden of work and duties are not required to fast but are obliged to make replace it at another time, and if COVID has not gotten better before the Holy Month, Eid prayers and their sequential activities (homecoming, takbir parade, *halal bilhaal*, etc.) shall not not held.

The next two points are about *ihsan* behavior and social solidarity which related to guidance to increase care for other people through “increasing zakat, donations and alms and maximizing distribution of items connected to prevention and control of COVID-19 and promoting good behavior (*ihsan*)

and community members helping each other (*taawun*) and especially helping vulnerable groups - distributing masks, hand sanitizers, or meeting the basic needs of directly affected families and not panic buying so essentially supplies are still available.

The next three points contain guidance on the care of the COVID-19 dead bodies, which, emphasizes its management must follow health protocols; if deemed necessary and to avoid virus exposure to the organizing staff, the corpse should not be washed, and the execution of the funeral prayer can be replaced by *ghaib* praying in each house.

The next point is about spirituality and *ihsan* by advocating “lots of *istighfar*, repentance, praying to Allah, reading the Qur’an, doing *dhikr*, sending greetings to the Prophet, and taking vows individually and with conviction and positive thinking about Allah’s provision, may Covid-19 soon be eliminated by Allah swt.”

In each prayer guidance for the COVID-19 emergency period in the attachment to the Muhammadiyah Central Executive Board’s circular detailed above, it is always accompanied by logical arguments that come from the Qur’an and Hadith. This is important, emphasizing that the guidance issued is not only based on health protocol considerations, but also has grounding in authoritative, valid, and *maqbulah* [acceptable] religious arguments.

2. *Eid al-Adha dan Sacrificial Ritual during the Pandemic*

On June 24, 2020, the Central Board of Muhammadiyah issued Circular (*Surat Edaran*) Number 06 / EDR / I.O / E / 2020 concerning Guidelines for Arafah Fasting, Eid Al-Adha, and the Protocols for sacrificial ritual during the COVID-19 pandemic. This guideline was issued for Eid al-Adha in 1441 AH (Friday 31 July 2020) which health experts predicted would be during the COVID-19 pandemic. For this reason, worship activities which usually involve large mass gatherings need guidance to comply specifically with health protocols.

This guidance regulates three main things. First, about the timing of Arafah’s fasting based on the essential reckoning of the form of the hilal of *Majlis Tarjih and Tajid* - which explains that the Arafah Fasting which occurs on 9 Dzulhijah 1414 AH coincides with Thursday, July 30, 2020. The second is about the implementation of Eid al-Adha on 10 Dzulhijah which coincides with Friday, July 30, 2020 so that: (a) Eid al-Adha prayers in the field should not carried out; (2) for those who wish, Eid al-Adha prayers can be carried out in their respective homes; and (3) for those who are in a green or safe zone not

affected by COVID-19, Eid al-Adha prayers can be carried out in small fields or open spaces around homes, while still abiding by health protocols.

The third is about the sacrificial ritual (slaughter of sacrificial animals / *udhiyah*) during the pandemic which is briefly directed as follows: (1) the law of sacrifice is the sunnah of *muakkadah*; (2) during a pandemic it is more important to give alms than to slaughter a sacrificial animal; (3) those who are able to make sacrifices and help with the economic impact of the COVID can do both; (4) sacrifices should be converted in the form of funds and channeled through LazisMu to be distributed to people in need; (5) Those who will carry out sacrifice by slaughtering animals must pay attention to health protocols (Edaran PP Muhammadiyah, No: 06/EDR/I.0/E /2020).

Based on the circular of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah regarding the guidance for Eid al-Adha worship during the pandemic, the MCCC held a press conference on June 24 to inform the public about the circular and to clear up any questions. The press conference explained the technical implementation of Eid al-Adha prayers, as well as the mechanism for slaughtering and distributing sacrificial meat based on health protocols, which emphasized: (1) carrying out Eid al-Adha prayers at home with family; (2) Eid al-Adha prayers outside the home can be carried out in areas that are deemed safe by the government, or the green zone, so small groups are created and not concentrated in one place while still paying attention to health protocols; (3) calls for not holding takbir tours and trips outside the city; (4) the procedures for receiving, slaughtering and distributing sacrificial animals/meat are in accordance with health protocols such as the use of slaughterhouses, use of personal protective equipment for the committee, provision of hand sanitizers, soap, gloves, and application of the physical distancing procedure. (<https://covid19.muhammadiyah.id/tuntunan-sholat-idul-adha-di-tengah-pandemi-covid-19/>).

In the Eid al-Adha guidance and sacrificial ritual guidance above, it is clearly illustrated that the aspects of religious worship are integrated with the view of health science in this pandemic period. The integration and interconnection between religion and science, is on one hand, to ensure that religious worship activities for community members can still be carried out during the pandemic, but its implementation still considers safety and the common good through health science considerations.

Obviously, the combination of religion and science during this pandemic has created a worship practice that is different from normal times. This religious innovation is designed for a temporary period, i.e., the emergency response period, but because it is not clear when the COVID-19 pandemic will end,

gradually this new method will set new norms with potential to become newly created “culture” or a “tradition” in the way people observe religion... particularly if the pandemic continues for longer. The emergence of new innovations, which may be easily understood by leaders at the central and regional levels, often raises doubts or rejection from members and leaders at the branch and sub-branch levels.

This matter has been recognized by policy makers at the central level, so in addition to being followed up by a press statement by the Central Board of Muhammadiyah and the relevant Majlis, MCCC made a presentation material on “Sacrificial Worship Protocol”. The Central Board of Muhammadiyah also held an online public recitation with the theme “Eid al-Adha during the COVID-19 Pandemic”. Interestingly, the sources in the recitation were representatives with authority in their respective fields. The most prominent figures in this event were Prof. Dr. H. Haedar Nashir, M.Sc., Chairman of Muhammadiyah Central Executive Board who gave an iftitah speech and Prof. Dr. Abdul Mukti, M.A., General Secretary of Muhammadiyah Central Executive Board who became a keynote speaker. Another speaker was a representative of the clerical authority in Muhammadiyah, Prof. Dr. H. Syamsul Anwar, M.A., chairman of the General Assembly of *Tarjih and Tajdid* of the Muhammadiyah Central Executive Board, and representatives of health practitioners who are also deputy chairmen of the MCCC, dr. Ahmad Muttaqin Alim, Sp.An.

In order to make religious guidance in line with health protocols, and easily understood by members of the organization and the wider community, the Library and Information Council of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah also made graphic and digital information through flyers and memes of short versions of the Eid al-Adha guidance and sacrificial rituals during the pandemic which were disseminated through the Muhammadiyah official social media channels: the Persyarikatan Muhammadiyah Facebook page, Twitter @muhammadiyah, Instagram @muhammadiyah, and the official website www.muhammadiyah.id

3. *Integration and Interconnection of Religion, Science and Culture in Religious Praxis*

The religious guidance during the pandemic time published by the Central Board of Muhammadiyah is an example of how religious and scientific approaches are used to solve problems at the intersection of religion and

health. Viewed from scientific integration and interconnection perspective, as developed by Amin Abdullah, integration and interconnection between religion, science, and religious praxis culture of Muhammadiyah during the emergency period of the COVID-19 pandemic can be found in three models: semipermeable, intersubjective testability, and imaginative creation.

The semipermeable model has been illustrated in the discussion processes and the birth of religious guidance during the Pandemic. Muhammadiyah is an Islamic organization that has provided organizational and religious guidance from the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Central Board of Muhammadiyah established the MCCC, tasked with coordinating the implementation of the COVID-19 handling program and actions. The members of the MCCC are representatives of Muhammadiyah leaders from various Majlis, both directly related to health, social, and educational matters in addition to religious matters. Religious guidance discussion meetings not only involve Majlis related to religious matters, but also other Majlis that handle the fields of health, education, communication, and information as well as other related assemblies. The MCCC press release on religious guidance during the COVID-19 pandemic was carried out by involving the Health Advisory Council, the Tarjih and Tajid Majlis, and the Tabligh Majlis. If the issues are education-related, the MCCC also involves the Primary and Secondary Education Majlis and the Higher Education Research and Development Majlis. This shows the way the fields of religion and science/health greet each other, complement each other, and have dialog with each other. In turn, this semipermeable process continues to examine each other and even results in intersectional creativity as shown in the following description.

Intersubjective testability appears in the discussion and decision-making process which always considers the dimensions of religion and science. The religious and scientific perspectives are not only discussed to address the pandemic but are also used to examine each other - religious arguments are viewed from scientific considerations and scientific arguments are analyzed with religious considerations. While discussing the Eid al-Fitr Prayer 1441AH during the pandemic, one of the chairmen of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah explained the decision made initially would provide an option to pray in an open field for areas not affected by the pandemic, and the elimination of prayers in the affected areas. But considering that at that time the number of positive cases of COVID-19 in Indonesia continued to increase and there was no guarantee that there were areas or regions in Indonesia that were completely free from the spread of the new Coronavirus, finally the ability for Eid prayer in an open field was withdrawn. This decision signifies

how health science is used as a reference for religious arguments about the recommended Eid prayer in an open field in normal times.

Examples of scientific considerations examined with religious arguments are religious guidance to enter a new reality or New Habit Adaptation. Since the beginning, Muhammadiyah has reminded the government to be careful and responsible in changing the regional status from the *Pembatasan Sosia Bersaka Besar - PSBB* [Large-Scale Social Restriction - LSSR) to be looser with the term “New Normal”. The easing of the LSSR allows people to carry out socio-economic activities while still implementing strict health protocols: wearing masks, washing their hands, maintaining distance, and not creating crowding. During this ongoing pandemic, people have been encouraged to pray at home. However, along with the pressure from the community and the widespread desire of the congregation to carry out congregational and Friday prayers in-person in mosques and prayer rooms, the health-science arguments were examined with religious considerations regarding congregational prayer orders. Finally, religious guidance emerged to introduce a new reality or Adaptation of New Habits from the Central Board of Muhammadiyah which allows public prayer rooms and mosques to hold congregational and Friday prayers while implementing strict health protocols as well.

The *creative imagination* model can be found in the recommendation to convert sacrificial animals' funds to help handle COVID-19 instead, which is channeled through the Muhammadiyah Alms Agency (LazizMu). Creative imagination can also be seen in the congregational prayer guidance with a minimum distance of one meter between congregants and performing prayers wearing masks. It then became permissible to perform Friday prayer in one place into several sessions due to limited space and the large number of congregants. There are also online activities, study and recitation, online family takbir competitions, online preacher competitions, and more digital activities.

Among these progressive online worship activities organized by Muhammadiyah is an online Friday prayer through Zoom. This activity was initiated by a group of Muhammadiyah activists who came together in the Ma'arif Institute as a form of embodiment of the opinion of Ustdaz Wawan Gunawan, Lc., M.Ag., one of the members the Majelis Tarjih and Tajdid of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah, and an Associate Professor at the Sharia and Law Faculty of UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta regarding this online Friday prayer during the pandemic. Ustadz Wawan's opinion regarding the argument for allowing online Friday prayers has been written firstly on his Facebook, and then republished on the IbTimes news channel since April

2020.²

This innovation of religious activities resulting from the process of integration and interconnection between religion and science in religious guidance during the COVID-19 period was originally designed for a temporary emergency. However, along with the repeated implementation, the community and members of the organization began to acclimate to the new method, which gradually has become a new culture and tradition. In the future, the use of digital technology in religion will be even more widespread as cultural shifts begin.

The integration of religious and scientific reasoning into Muhammadiyah religious guidance (as reflected in the edicts and circulars of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah) received appreciation from Mark Woodward, an American Scholar of Indonesia who has done a lot of research on Islam in Indonesia. On his Facebook page, Woodward wrote Religious Holidays in the Plague Year - Lessons from the Indonesian Muhammadiyah Movement which later went viral on multiple social media platforms. According to Woodward, the Muhammadiyah's ability to combine religious and scientific considerations to provide guidance for worship at home as well as positive religious guidance (safe, healthy, and compliant with health protocols) can be a valuable lesson for churches in the United States that have rejected calls by local authorities to temporarily close places of worship and hold mass at home. Woodward's

² Ibetimes.id is a news and opinion channel that carries the idea of moderate Islam which is managed by Muhammadiyah youths. Although Ibetimes.id does not have a structural relationship with Muhammadiyah, its managers are Muhammadiyah activists whose ideas are in line with Muhammadiyah (progressive Islam). Wawan Gunawan has been writing opinions in the Fikih Column about online Friday prayer since April 2020, respectively: "Is it possible to perform Friday prayer in congregation online?" (12 April 2020, <https://ibtimes.id/mouldkah-shalat-jumat-berjamaah-online/>) and "Once again, No Problem with Friday Prayers Online" (4 May 2020, <https://ibtimes.id/once-again-no-problem-online-Friday-prayer/>). According to Wawan Gunawan, the implementation of online Friday prayers is a continuation of the online Eid Al-Fitr prayer, which was held on 1 Shawwal 1441 on May 24, 2020, attended by 3 families, Ustadaz Wawan who lives in Yogyakarta as a preacher and Imam, as well as two other families outside Yogyakarta. At the suggestion of the congregants, some of whom live in Jakarta, the first online Friday prayer was held on May 29, 2020. Initially there were only tens of congregants in attendance but gradually the number grew to hundreds. When I joined the Friday prayer online via Zoom on January 1, 2021, more than 150 Zoom accounts were participating, and some of the Zoom events were followed by family members totaling 2-3 worshippers. On February 16, 2021, suaramuhammadiyah.id announced the Majelis Tarjih Fatwa about online Friday prayer. One of the conclusions on the fatwa states: "As far as searching the various literatures, Majelis Tarjih and Tajdid have not found a strong argument or reason to replace Friday prayers with online Friday prayers. Therefore, without reducing respect for different opinions, Majelis Tarjih and Tajdid have not been able to accept online Friday prayers." Because the Majelis Tarjih does not recommend online Friday prayer, many congregations left WhatsApp groups. However, on Friday, March 5th, about 290 accounts still participated in the online prayer, indicating they did not obey the fatwa.

article was also published on ibtimes.id.³

The positive and active role of Muhammadiyah's Humanitarian Jihad in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic by integrating religion, science and culture shows that religion and religious communities can problem solve ongoing problems when working together. This can reduce the tense voice of the religiophobia group who often accuse religion, particularly Muslims, of being the culprit or the source of civilization's problems. In the conclusion of his study comparing the response to the COVID-19 pandemic between Muhammadiyah and Jamaah Tabligh, Burhani wrote, "The activities of Muhammadiyah during the pandemic challenge those who see religion as the antithesis of science" (Burhani, 2020: 8). Sukidi's opinion in the Kompas daily (02 January 2021) wrote that the proactive work of Muhammadiyah in responding to the pandemic by integrating religion (Islam) and science "is a logical consequence of Muhammadiyah's ideology which adheres to rational and pro-science Islam."

The Muhammadiyah's religious guidance during the pandemic can be said to be a total effort to overcome the COVID-19 outbreak from three perspectives: from religion, from science, and from culture. This effort is different from secular groups that only rely on a scientific perspective, or a conservative religious group that only explores religious and spiritual ways to deal with the pandemic.

RESPONSES OF MUHAMMADIYAH MEMBERS AND THE CHALLENGE OF RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY DURING THE VUCA ERA

1. Types of Responses

In Ramadan of 1441 AH, in several WhatsApp groups that I personally am a part of, there were those who continued to post messages both in writing and in pictures about religious activities in their public praying rooms or mosques during the pandemic. Their message is often accompanied by the statement "fear only Allah, sickness and death have been predetermined by Allah SWT." Those who often posted prideful messages regarding the continued activity of congregational worship in places of worship, also often post news about COVID-19 from a conspiracy theory perspective. They considered appeals and laws to worship at home as a form of certain groups to silence Muslims.

At the end of Ramadan 1441 AH, social media and several WhatsApp groups affiliated to Muhammadiyah also spread memes that read "Covid-19 Loyalty

³ See <https://ibtimes.id/religious-holidays-in-the-plague-year-lessons-from-the-indonesian-muhammadiyah-movement/>.

Test” with a man’s face wearing a red beret typical of KOKAM and wearing a mask. Below the masked face were three hashtag signs that read:

#WE_ARE_WITH_THE CENTRAL BOARD’S EDICT
 #EID_PRAYER_AT_HOME
 #FIGHT_COVID_AND_PREVAIL

Judging from the context of the time and its content, the meme was disseminated in response to the widespread invitation to attend the Eid al-Fitr prayer in an open field in several areas with the Muhammadiyah symbol on the flier ironically. In fact, it is clear the Central Board of Muhammadiyah has issued calls and guidance for worship during the emergency pandemic, one of which calls for Eid prayers to be performed in their respective homes and eliminating Eid prayers in an open field, mosques, and other open places where congregant groups gather.

The response of the members of the organization to the calls and guidance of worship during the pandemic period from the Central Board of Muhammadiyah can be mapped into four categories: First, the group that obeys it: *sami’na wa atha’na* (we hear, and we obey); second, the group that subtly refuses for specific reasons; third, the group that opposes and even delegitimizes the guidance, and the fourth group that adheres to creative activities that do not violate health protocols.

In general, the response of urban members of the organization and in Muhammadiyah’s charities falls into the category of the first group that obeys the Central Board of Muhammadiyah’s appeal to worship at home. Mosques and public praying affiliated to Muhammadiyah, and which are in the environment of Muhammadiyah education and health institutions do not hold congregational worship. This first group explicitly announced to the congregants that the mosques and prayer rooms were temporarily closed and called for worship to be performed at home. In addition to making announcements on social media, they also put up a memorial banner at the gate of the mosque announcing the mosque was temporarily closed to the public. To keep the mosque and prayer room alive, the call to prayer is still recited by replacing “*hayaa ‘ala shalah*” with “*shalluu fii buyuutikum*” or “*shalluu fii rihaalikum*”.

Second is the group that subtly refuses the guidance from the Central Board of Muhammadiyah. They still hold congregational worship at the mosque for various reasons, claiming that the area is still in the green zone, as there are no cases of COVID and is considered safe, for example. Another reason is that

worship still follows health protocols by not using carpets or requiring for congregants to bring their own prayer mats, congregants keeping at least a one-meter distance from each other, required mask wearing, washing hands with soap before entering the mosque, body temperature checks for congregants, no gathering or lingering in the mosque, and prohibition for the elderly and children from participating.

The third group is those who oppose and even delegitimize Muhammadiyah's guidance for worship at home. Ironically, the rejection and even "opposition" to the guidance of the Central Executive Board were sponsored by the leadership at the sub-branch or branch levels. Despite the Central Executive Board's calls for temporarily not holding congregational five-time prayers, Friday prayers, tarawih prayers and breaking the fast together in mosques or public praying rooms, some mosques and prayer rooms still are holding religious activities as usual without paying attention to health protocols. When the call forbidding Eid prayers at the mosque or in an open field, there were conflicting leaflets from Muhammadiyah Branch leaders, complete with the organization's logo, inviting congregants to attend Eid prayers in an open field.

The fourth group is those who respond positively to the Central Board of Muhammadiyah guidance that proactively and creatively creates a "new culture", combining advances in science and technology with religious activities. This group is creative in creating opportunities. When there are calls for social and physical distancing, religious activities that were used to hold offline are transformed online using various platforms such as *pengajian* online, family takbir video competition, online preacher competitions, and online Friday prayer.

The excitement of the members' response to the COVID-19 emergency prayer guidance from Central Board Muhammadiyah sometimes arises not due to inaccurate information management, not the content. This can be seen in the Qurbani worship guidance during the pandemic from the Central Board Muhammadiyah. On June 21, 2020, Online Media Tempo.co published an article entitled "Muhammadiyah: No Need to Slaughter Sacrificial Animals, Funds for Covid-19" (Tempo.Co, 21 June 2020). The news received immediate responses from sympathizers, activists, cadres and Muhammadiyah leaders, not only at the grassroots but also at the middle level. In several online communication platforms, such as WhatsApp, the news, whose title was quite provocative, especially the phrase "No Need to Slaughter Sacrificial Animals" became the theme of discussion for several days. There are those who discuss it from the perspective of fiqh of worship, not a few who discuss it from socio-economic perspectives.

Among the fiqh of worship perspective that responded to the news was the question: has Majlis Tarjih reviewed it comprehensively? Is the value of the donation service for handling COVID-19 commensurate with slaughtering Qurban animals? From a socio-economic perspective, there are concerns that the guidance to eliminate the slaughter of qurban animals will harm local breeders, as Eid al-Qurban is an annual “big harvest” for cattle and goat breeders. It is feared that the guidance will reduce the turnover of the sale of livestock.

There was also a response that by slaughtering the sacrificial animals was also part of the way Muhammadiyah members and Muslims helped reduce the impact of the pandemic, especially in terms of socio-economic and health. So far, many parties have received blessings from the economic chain of qurbani worship, not only breeders, but also professional beauticians, seasonal sacrificial animal traders, and butchers. The distribution of qurbani meat to people in need is also considered as an effort to increase gizzi and protein intake so that they have strong immune systems.

In one WhatsApp Group whose members consist of several cross-Majlis leaders at the central level, a statement emerged from members of the Community Empowerment Council (Majlis Pemberdayaan Masyarakat) which stated that the news in Tempo about slaughtering Quran animals on Eid al-Adha during the pandemic was a form of guidance that did not favor to the fate of breeders in difficult times. One of the board members of the Cadre Education Council (Majlis Pendidikan Kader) said that what was made by the Tarjih Council was not empirical.

One of the members of the Tarjih Majlis who was in the WhatsApp group explained that the news at Tempo.co was invalid, because it did not come from the official decision of PP Muhammadiyah. In the news, it was also explained that the source was a “draft” which had not yet become an official decision. Majlis Tarjih and Tajdid have indeed discussed the guidance for Qurbani worship during the pandemic, but the final ruling has not been officially disseminated because it still must be approved at the Muhammadiyah Central Leadership level. But in essence, this member of Majlsis Tarjih explained the guidance for Qurbani worship during the pandemic refers to the guidance on Disaster Fiqh which has become the official decision of PP Muhammadiyah. The main principle is to prioritize the benefit, the good and the convenience in times of abnormal situations caused by a disaster. The COVID-19 outbreak that has hit the world is currently categorized as a non-natural disaster.

2. *Challenges of Religious Authority in the VUCA World.*

The various responses of community members to Muhammadiyah religious guidance during the pandemic have raised the question of how much is heard and obeyed of Muhammadiyah's fatwas and religious guidance. If the fatwa and its guidance are no longer being heard by its members, will Muhammadiyah experience degradation in terms of religious authority? Why can religious authority fade in the organizational environment known for being reformist and modern? Is such a condition of disruption triggered by VUCA (Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, Ambiguity)? What should Muhammadiyah and similar organizations do to maintain their religious "authority" in this VUCA period?

In the past decade, in organizational and leadership studies, especially in the business sector, it is often stated we are currently in the VUCA period, a term that describes a period marked by volatile turmoil, which results in uncertainty, complex and overlapping relationship, causing ambiguity⁴.

One of the triggers for this VUCA situation is disruption of information, the product of technological advances. In religious life, VUCA has ushered in the emergence of a new Muslim community, which is not bound by the affiliations of schools of thought and religious organizations. Their way of observing religion is fluid, hybrid, and eclectic. They will choose which teachings and *fatwas* are more suited to their moods and situations.

Amid the VUCA situation and the strengthening of this hybrid way of observing religion, people respond by choosing which teachings and guidance are deemed suitable to their specific conditions amid the abundant religious information in the digital space. Unfortunately, the abundance of digital religious information has not been accompanied by the strengthening of digital literacy and adequate religious literacy. As a result, people tend to only draw "conclusions" or practical guidance that suits their mood, without looking in more detail at the quality of such conclusions which should come with strong evidence. In other words, residents pay more attention to the aspects of *fiqh* while are less concerned with the *ushul fiqh*.

⁴ "The term [VUCA] was originally coined by the American military to describe the geo-political situation at that time. However, due to the similarity in meaning, the term VUCA is now being adopted by the business world. ... More specifically, volatility means a very fast dynamic change in various aspects such as social, economic and political. Uncertainty means that it is difficult to predict issues and events that are currently happening. Complexity is the disruption and chaos that surrounds every organization. Ambiguity is defined as the heavy burden of reality and meaning that mingles from various existing conditions or a state of suspension and the clarity is questionable. " <http://binakarir.com/volatility-uncertainty-complexity-ambiguity-vuca/>. (Accessed on June 28, 2020).

This condition occurs because many members of the organization experience lack of modernism. Indications in this direction can be seen from, for example, the fact that despite the Muhammadiyah Central Executive Board's circular calling for its members to pray at home during the COVID-19 pandemic, some disobey and ignore it. The reasons for disobedience to the appeal are varied. There are those who feel their area is safe from the pandemic, there also are those who feel incomplete when praying at home during Ramadan, there still are also those who view the religious arguments used as a reference by the Central Board of Muhammadiyah are less convincing, as well as other reasons that basically show "disobedience" to the organization's leadership.

Reluctance to comply with the Central Leadership's circular in some grassroots circles implies that the religious thoughts of Muhammadiyah members are quite varied. At the grassroots level, there is a trend of religion based on habits that has led to conservatism. This happens because the members of the organization focus on studying primarily studying *Fiqh* while forgetting about *Ushul Fiqih*; Stay too much following *Himpunan Putusan Tarjih* (collection of Tarjih's decision on religious ritual) and stripping off its *Manhaj Tarjih* (the method and paradigm of Tarjih). As a result, some members forget the *Taisir Fiqh* which provides leniency and ease of worship in abnormal situations. In fact, in religious thought, the *Majlis Tarjih and Tajdid* have provided a methodological tool that combines the *Burhani*, *Bayani*, and *Irfani* approaches so that the religiosity of Muhammadiyah members can always be in accordance with the times.

CONCLUSION

Muhammadiyah's tagline *Islam Berkemajuan* (Islam with Progress) has illustrated how they have responded to the COVID-19 pandemic: combining religious reasoning and scientific reasoning. The religious circulars and guidance issued by the Central Board of Muhammadiyah are always based on religious and health science considerations. The ad hoc institution formed to deal with COVID-19 MCCC, is filled with a team of representatives from various backgrounds such as health experts and paramedics, disaster management activists, fundraising agency representatives, public policy experts, as well as competent religious scholars and experts. This shows that scientific integration and interconnection has been practiced in Muhammadiyah religious praxis. This integration and interconnection of religion, science, and culture in the Muhammadiyah's religious guidance and praxes occurs, not only in the level of semipermeable, but also in intersubjective testability and even creative imagination. This fact confirms that Muhammadiyah is a rational and pro-

science religious movement. This finding also illustrates that the activism of religious organizations, if based on proper religious reasoning and managed “professionally” as indicated by the Muhammadiyah, can become the problem solver.

However, the difference in religious reasoning between those at the level of the central board leadership and the organization’s leaders below it and its members at the grassroots has resulted in various responses to the religious guidance during the pandemic. The emergence of voices and messages on social media that doubt the religious guidance from the central board of the organization can be an indication that the religious authority of this progressive Islamic mass organization has begun to fade. This condition occurs, for one thing, because it is triggered by the VUCA (Volatility Uncertainty, Complexity, Ambiguity - rapid change, uncertainty, complex, ambiguity) situation currently facing society. Confronting this dilemma, all religious organizations, not only Muhammadiyah’s, need to get out of the VUCA trap with the new paradigm of VUCA (Vision, Understanding, Clarity, Adaptability/Agility), which is a clear vision for dealing with rapid changes, a comprehensive understanding of various changing situations, clarity of problems and the challenges faced, as well as the ability to be flexible in responding to various challenges.

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RESPONSE OF MILLENNIAL MUSLIMS TO RELIGIOUS MINORITY GROUPS IN INDONESIA

Hasse Jubba

Islamic Politics-Political Science, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta

Email: hasse@umy.ac.id

Ahmad Sunawari Long

Faculty of Islamic Studies, The National University of Malaysia

Email: aslong@ukm.edu.my

Ririt Yuniar

Fakultas Ilmu Komunikasi, Universitas Pancasila, Jakarta.

Email: rirityuniar@univpancasila.ac.id

ABSTRACT

Religious minority groups have historically been positioned as the trigger for religious and social disharmony. This paper aims to explore the millennial Muslims' basis for their positioning towards minority groups in Indonesia. The data collected through questionnaires, interviews, and document studies were analyzed and then converted into narrative form, tables, diagrams, and charts. The findings show that there are two millennial Muslim responses towards religious minority groups. First, some are responding with acceptance of non-Islamic affiliated minority groups. Of the 412 surveyed respondents, 280 or 67, 96% stated their acceptance based on the juridical-constitutional reason that every citizen has the same rights and obligations, including the rights to live and obey the law. Representing the second millennial response, most respondents also rejected Islamic-affiliated minority groups. 383 respondents (93%) stated this rejection noting that they believe in the existence of these groups damaging Islam's image. The different forms of response are based on theological, juridical, and cultural reasons that can be found in religious arguments, legislation, and values of the local wisdom of the Indonesians. This study proposes the need of building better understanding among millennial Muslims regarding social diversity in Indonesia, and finding common ground for these differences that can be applied to avoid religious conflicts in the future.

Keywords: response, millennial Muslim, religious groups, minority

INTRODUCTION

Religious minority groups generate different responses among millennial Muslims in Indonesia, even though they live upon the same ground. On the

one hand, religious minority groups are considered a legitimate part of society, having the same rights and obligations as other citizens. In some cases, inter-religious group relations - particularly between the minority and the majority - show mutual acceptance (Jubba, Pabbajah, H Prasodjo, & Qodir, 2019; Makmur, Kuswarno, Novianti, & Syafirah, 2018; Saprillah, 2016). In this case, other groups are considered fellow citizens with the same attributes. so that their existence must be respected and given freedom (especially with respect to non-Islamic religious groups). A survey conducted from November 2019 to February 2020 with 412 respondents showed that 263 or 63.83% “gave freedom to religious minority groups to fulfill their wishes”; while 71 or 17.23% “made them working partners”; and 40 or 9.70% of the respondents stated “religious minority groups should join the majority group”; and only 38 or 9.22% stated their rejection. On the other hand, there is resistance from millennial Muslims towards minority Muslim groups. One of the reasons for this rejection is the claim that these are heretical groups (Munifah, 2017; Risdianto, 2017; Wahyudi & Wahid, 2015). Of the 412 respondents, only 29 (7.03%) accepted minority Muslim groups, nnamely Shia and Ahmadiyya. This means that 383 (92.96%) rejected these two groups. Responses towards religious minority groups can take two forms, open and hidden (Scott, 1981).

Studies of the response to the existence of different social groups can be analyzed through three trends. First are studies that show an open attitude that provides space for the development of religious minority groups with all their dynamics. (El Yadari, 2012; Suryana, 2011; Supriyanto, 2018; Jubba et.al 2019). In this case, the existence of various social groups is placed as a group that has the same position and opportunity in social life. Second are the studies that place the existence of religious minority groups as sources of threat (Maliki, 2010; Farida, 2014; Khoiron, 2018; Rahmat, 2019), which also shows the rejection of religious minority groups. Third, the studies that view minority groups as a driving force for the formation of a more advanced and harmonious life order (Atabik, 2016; Setiarsa, 2018; Setyabudi, 2019; Alam, 2016). These studies emphasize the function of minority groups as a factor for the creation of a more dynamic and open social life. The three trends of studies have provided a strong discussion basis for debates regarding religious minority groups with several complex problems at hand. However, these studies have not touched on how different responses are represented by social groups, especially millennial Muslims.

This paper aims to complement the existing studies with a focus on the different views of millennial Muslims on the religious minority groups in Indonesia. Namely, how tolerant they are in responding to the groups

outside of themselves. To address this issue are three questions. *First*, what do millennial Muslims think of tolerance? This is closely related to what they understand about tolerance. *Second*, what is their attitude regarding the existing minority groups? This issue is also closely related to the question of how they conceptualize religious minority groups. *Third*, what justifies their different attitude in responding to the existence of religious minority groups? This question concerns differences in attitudes when looking at non-Islamic religious minority groups and Islamic affiliated religious groups.

This paper is based on the assumption that the different views among millennial Muslims regarding the religious minority groups are driven by several factors: ideological, juridical, and cultural. Ideologically, they strongly defend their beliefs as Muslims and view others as heretical (although there is also an affirmation that they also respect differences). The law also guarantees the right to religion (freedom) so that anyone can live and practice their faith, but in practice, there is still resistance to different religious groups. Likewise, the culture of the Indonesian people, which highly values kinship relations, is often “forgotten”, which leads to religious groups being tendentiously positioned. These three factors, in addition to being the driving force for an acceptable response, also trigger rejection from millennial Muslims towards religious minority groups in Indonesia.

RELIGIOUS MINORITY AND TOLERANCE

Khorsand & Parvin (2016) refer to minorities as small groups in a specific place with their own ethnic, linguistic, and religious characteristics. Being a minority is closely related to numbers (Nurhayati, 2013; Rehayati, 2011). Minority groups have had an important role in history, but have not been extensively documented, so they are almost invisible and silent (Emadi, 2016). Minority groups go through a stigma that directly affects discrimination against them (Leak et al., 2015). In reality, state policies have created an environment that justifies the public rejection of religious minority communities (Syed & Ali, 2020). They are deprived of security and comfort. However, according to Sahu et al. (2012), insecurity among minorities can be overcome by increasing inter-community accommodation, strengthening spaces, and shared interests. In this case, social organizations play an important role in demystifying the distrust and stereotypes inherent in minority groups, so they can be accommodated. In this regard, Gada (2017) suggested that society should have an initiative in terms of economic improvement and educational progress in a critical manner, and increase communal awareness as the main steps to reduce the backwardness of religious minority communities.

A study by Zabad (2017) on ten religious groups, namely the Shia in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Lebanon and Egypt; Druze, Alawites, Christians and Kurds in Syria; Copts in Egypt; and Zaydis in Yemen shows that post-Arab Spring in the Middle East, minority communities have been vulnerable to turmoil, including violence and economic damages. Even in Iran, there have been human rights violations against members of the Bahia community, the country's largest non-Muslim religious minority (Moinipour, 2018). This violation has been designed in such a way that it does not attract unwanted attention from the international community. The motive for this effort is to slowly eradicate-not to suddenly eliminate-a particular community. Policies also led to persecution manifested in the form of religious intolerance and Shia supremacy. Khorsand & Parvin (2016) even emphasized the need for special attention on the part of the Iranian government towards religious minority communities by granting privileges in the form of legal independence to protect minority groups. In this case, acts of violence or intolerance require actions that respect the existence of minority groups. Tolerance among important groups is mainstreamed to support the realization of more harmonious lives.

Tolerance is one of the many responses to diversity and difference (Besch & Lee, 2018). Kühler (2019) defines tolerance using an analogy; a person (A), for some reason, objects to the actions or practices of another (B), but has no other reasons for accepting an action. Therefore, he (A) must refrain from interfering with or preventing (B) from acting as he pleases, even though (A) has the power to interfere. In this case, tolerance is characterized by deep ambivalence (Drerup, 2019). Tolerance is essentially an expression of uncertainty by recognizing the existence of social reality; it is the same as acknowledging the uncertainty of social reality to tolerate the existence of other people and then tolerate something contradictory to each other because it is regarded as correct (Gorman, 2019). There are three distinct sources of tolerance: individuals, culture, and institutions (Kaul, 2019). The objection and acceptance component of this tolerance involves at least people's judgments, beliefs, and practices (Lee & Besch, 2020). V. and B. Seiler classify tolerance into three types, namely disjunctive, conjunctive, and synergistic (Lalíková, 2016).

In addition, Lee & Besch (2020) proposes two forms of tolerance, i.e. the expression of respect and recognition. Meanwhile, Said Agil Al Munawar divides tolerance into two types, static tolerance and dynamic tolerance (Yohandi, 2018; Kamarauddin dan Sabannur, 2018). Another researcher, Mafrukha (2018), came up with a form of tolerance based on a fiqh perspective, i.e. internal tolerance, tolerance between schools of thought (*madhhab*)

and external tolerance. Internal tolerance includes tolerance in terms of faith, worship, *muamalah*, and criminal law. Meanwhile, tolerance between schools of thought means tolerance of the four imams of the *madhhab* on which Muslims worldwide, including Indonesia, rely on. Meanwhile, external tolerance concerns more about tolerance between different religions. This last type of tolerance needs to get the attention of Muslims in the world in particular, for the sake of creating a life that is *rahmatan lil 'alamin* (a blessing for all creations). Millennial Muslims currently have an important position in determining the future of the nation-state and role of religion. Therefore, their position and role are needed in the context of today's religious society.

Religion and the younger generation often are linked although they appear within various dynamic perspectives that accompany them. Some existing literature tends to show a shift in understanding religion among the younger generation (the millennial generation). This shift in understanding has introduced a religious paradigm which has resulted in a transformation of millennial's religious expression. In Islam, for example, this shift is known among millennials as *hijrah*, shown with expressive behavior by attending various religious studies; the involvement of millennial actors who promise individuals in Islamic migration towards a better and more targeted life goal (Fajriani, 2019). The millennial generation tends to see religious discourse textually in interpreting holy texts, so a contextual understanding is required (Hartini, 2019). Likewise, they seek more religious references through the media, which shows formality in observing religion. In this case, religious activism has made the internet and online social media a new vehicle for the transformation of religious propaganda authority from traditional to modern for millennial literates. (Ahyyar & Alfitri, 2019). This is shown by the management of the discourse of piety through the activities of the body which are uploaded continuously on social media. The Islamic generation can be formed with various purposes, including gaining popularity which leads to economic gain and popularity. (Anisa, 2018). This reality indicates that the values of religiosity when exposed to technology are adopted as an extension of the space for religious interaction, but there are also those who think that religion in online media is only a means of disseminating information and when one wishes to practice religious values, dedication is needed in the real world. (Pabbajah, Jubba, Widyanti & Iribaram, 2020).


The correlation between religion, the internet, and the millennial generation has become unavoidable. The Millennial generation and the internet, social media in this case, have changed many patterns of communication, including in religion. This is in line with what Zulhasmi and Hastuti reported in their

study that *da'wah* on social media, which notes significant challenges and opportunities, especially when dealing with millennials as the majority users. Social media, despite having a positive contribution to *da'wah*, also has many issues that demand attention, such as prejudice, spread of hatred, and reluctance to access primary sources. (Zulhazmi & Hastuti, 2018). In addition, the religious perspective of the millennial generation is also affected by ideology as a fundamental factor in shaping religious understanding. Therefore, the role of religious literature, especially of Islam, in the seedbed of Islamism, is important among the millennial generation (Iswanto, 2018). The shift in religious understanding of the millennial generation clearly has an impact on religious attitudes, including in seeing differences in religious beliefs and understanding. In responding to the spirit of tolerance shown by the millennial generation, the majority are in the *indifferent* category, which proves that there is doubtful behavior towards the sense of tolerance they want to display (Nugraha & Firmansyah, 2019). It is quite different when a person has received significant religious education since childhood or has had environmental influences to develop his religious potential. After becoming a student or an adult, one tends to live based on the values of the religious teachings they were raised with. Through the literacy process and correct religious teaching, the millennial generation can become agents of change in the *wasatīyya* Islamic proselytization, the tolerant Islam that respects differences and is good for all members of society (Zain, 2019).

MAKING ROOM FOR TOLERANCE TOWARD THE MINORITY

In simple terms, tolerance can be defined as an attitude of accepting and appreciating the existence of other different people or groups. In Arabic, tolerance is called *tasamuh*, which is to be kind and gentle to each other and to forgive each other. With regard to Islamic teachings, *tasamuh* is a commendable moral attitude in daily interaction, where there is mutual respect between fellow humans based on the boundaries set by religious teachings. However, the perception of tolerance among young people varies. When they were asked, "What is tolerance?" They answered with several words, such as respect (238 or 57.76%), acceptance (86 or 20.87%), understanding (41 or 9.9%), and diversity (12 or 2.9%), as well as wisdom (35 or 8.49%). In short, the perception of young people about the meaning of tolerance can be seen in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. Young people's perception of the meaning of tolerance



Source: Processed from the Questionnaire, 2020


Figure 1 shows the various choices of words that represent their perception of tolerance. The word “tolerance” for the majority of millennial Muslims is perceived as “respect”. If you look at the words chosen, basically each word still correlates with one another.

The description above shows that millennials generally see tolerance as a form of making space for groups outside of their own (the majority), especially minority groups. Tolerance is very close to “respect”, which means respecting other groups to express themselves, including practicing the beliefs and teachings they believe in. Granting freedom to minority groups is a form of action that can build a more flexible relationship between religious groups. Religious minority groups such as Towani Tolotang, Aluk Todolo and Kaharingan are accepted based on the argument that they are also like “us”, having the same rights and obligations. However, what is often problematic is its practice in the community. This is because there is still rejection of minority groups, especially those connected with the practice of religious teachings or beliefs. If these minority groups are not religiously affiliated, then millennial Muslims tend to “comply” with existing state policies.

Meanwhile, “minority” is generally understood as something that is related to numbers, namely a small or insignificant number. The data collected through the questionnaire show that respondents generally agree that “minority” is closely related to a small number. However, there are answers other than “numbers” to explain the concept of minority. Some of them perceive that

minority is also related to “position”, “role” and “access”. In summary, some of these answers can be seen in the explanation of Figure 2 below.

Figure 2. Millennial Muslim Perception about Minorities



Source: Processed from the Questionnaire, 2020

In Figure 2, it is clear that the majority of respondents stated that the minority is closely related to numbers (324 or 79%). Meanwhile, there are answers besides number - namely position (29 or 7%), role (43 or 10%), and access (16 or 4%). It can be understood that the minority-majority issue has other implications besides the question of number. Likewise, the variety of answers regarding the minority shows that students' knowledge of minority issues is not narrow.


Minority groups cover many aspects that are not only related to religion, but also include other aspects such as gender, ethnicity, profession, etc. Religious minority groups, in particular, are generally treated poorly. It is common for them to get discriminatory treatment in the form of marginalization of position, limitation of rights, restrictions on roles, and deprivation of access. For example, it is very difficult for adherents/followers of a certain faith to get their civil rights such as carrying out worship freely according to the teachings they believe. Limitation of rights can be seen in the “coercion” to choose one “official” religion. They cannot be autonomous because they have to adhere to the recognized religions in Indonesia. So far, Islam, Hinduism, and Christianity are religions that have been safe havens for them. The Towani Tolotang in Sidenreng Rappang, for example, chose Hinduism; Aluk Todolo in Toraja chose Christianity, Tengger in East Java chose Hinduism, Ammatoa in Kajang chose Islam. More often than not, they are placed as a group of

followers of non-mainstream religions (Pabbajah, Abdullah, Juhansar, & Jubba, 2019) who do not base their religious practices on mainstream religions. This also confirms that the bargaining position of religious minority groups is very weak (Maliki, 2010).

ATTITUDES TOWARDS MINORITY GROUPS

There are three attitudes that millennial Muslims have towards minority groups. This attitude is based on various reasons, which are basically a form of their openness to the facts of the diversity of Indonesian society. This also explains the potential for a closer relationship in the future under the auspices of young Muslim groups. The three attitudes are (1) inviting to join the majority group; (2) giving freedom to minority groups; and (3) building partnership. Of the three attitudes, students generally chose “giving freedom” to minority groups to carry out their activities, especially religious activities as they wish. This means that minority groups are given room to express their teachings or beliefs. In summary, the percentage of these three attitudes can be seen in Figure 3 below based on the higher education institutions the students come from.

Figure 3. Attitudes of Millennial Muslims towards Minority Groups



Source: Processed from the Questionnaire, 2020.

Diagram 1 clearly illustrates that there is an attitude of acceptance among millennial Muslims at three higher education institutions. The majority of them give freedom to religious minority groups to practice their belief (280 respondents). In addition, some respondents want to make these minority

groups their partners (85 respondents), and the rest (47 respondents) state that they invite minority groups to join the majority. This illustrates that, in general, millennial Muslims provide flexibility to minority groups to exist and provide room for them to remain in their state.

The flexibility in question is to provide room for religious minority groups to freely practice their beliefs. One of the reasons is that in Islam, respect for belief is very clear. This can be found in QS. Al-Kafirun 1-6 which essentially leaves matters of belief to the internal (belief) of each adherent. "For you is your religion, for me my religion" is a very firm basic principle for all religious adherents not to interfere with the beliefs of followers of other religions. In the history of Islam, several events show the attitude of the Prophet Muhammad who highly respected other religions. The *Fathu Makkah* incident in which non-Muslims and Muslims prioritized maintaining harmony in Medina is a historical fact that shows respect for each other is highly appreciated. In this case, different beliefs are no longer a barrier to creating harmony, because what is being put forward is peace for all, a humanitarian issue.

Several efforts have attempted to shape the religious character of the millennial generation from various perspectives. One perspective is through an educational process that has relevance between the concept of integration - such as the integration of cultural values with the concept of Islamic education (Husein Ritonga & Bafadhal, 2018; Siswanto, 2019). This is offered as a solution for the achievement of educational goals for the millennial generation in the era of globalization with all its complexities (Sukarman, 2017). In addition, strengthening the millennial character through understanding the traditional values practiced in a society, for example through the commemoration of religious holidays, where the values exemplified by the Prophet can affect the character building of the millennial generation (Musfiah Rifqi, 2018). For example, the *Susuk Wangan* tradition, which contains educational values such as religious, social, moral, and cultural values, must be re-introduced to the younger generation. These values should be instilled to shape good character (Wulan et al., 2018). These efforts can be made to build the character and religious perceptions of the millennial generation. However, it is necessary to build a religious perception among Muslim intellectuals, especially millennials since they still tend to have an attitude of dissatisfaction with the status quo, so that new innovations and innovative ideas and thoughts --sometimes out of the mainstream or out of the box-- are needed (Nata, 2019).

JUSTIFICATION OF DIFFERENT RESPONSES

The acceptance and rejection of religious minority groups is based on three

reasons. *First* are theological reasons. In the Qur'an, there are explicitly several verses which state that differences (including beliefs) are not something new. Differences are part of natural law (*sunnatullah*) which must be acknowledged as revealed in Q.S Al Hujurat and several other verses. The verses about differences contained in the Qur'an are described briefly in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Information / Theological References

Qur'an Surah-Ayat	Translation	Substance
Al An'am; 108	Revile not those unto whom they pray beside Allah lest they wrongfully revile Allah through ignorance...	Prohibition of insulting / abusing the gods of followers of other religions
Hud; 118	And if thy Lord had willed, He verily would have made mankind one nation, yet they cease not differing.	Allah allows for differences
Yusuf; 99	And if thy Lord willed, all who are in the earth would have believed together. Wouldst thou (Muhammad) compel men until they are believers?	Allah allows for differences
Al Kafiruun; 2-6	I worship not that which ye worship; Nor worship ye that which I worship. And I shall not worship that which ye worship. Nor will ye worship that which I worship. Unto you your religion, and unto me my religion.	Prohibition of interfering in the affairs of other religions
Al Hujurat 13	O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you. Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted.	Recommendation to respect diversity

Source: Processed from the verses of the Qur'an.

Islam is a religion of blessing for all creations, not only for Muslims. The root word of Islam is *salama* (safe, peaceful) so Islam is the religion of salvation for all beings. In several hadiths, Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) places great emphasis on every Muslim to spread peace to anyone. This is the real form of Islam as the religion of blessing for all. In the history of the spread of Islam,

Muslims have lived in harmony with minority groups. This is because in Islam, the dignity of a person as the caliph of Allah on earth cannot be insulted, just because he is part of a minority group or a group that has different beliefs from Muslims. *Second*, juridical reasons. The 1945 Constitution also explicitly states that every citizen must provide room for different groups (especially religious groups) to practice their faith. The basis used to accept minority groups is the regulations as can be seen in Table 2 below.

Table 2. Constitutional Basis for Minority Group Rights

Source	Content	Substance
1945 Constitution	Article 28 E (1): Everyone is free to embrace a religion and worship according to their religion, choose education and instruction, choose a job, choose citizenship, choose a place to live in the territory of the country and leave it, and have the right to return.	Every citizen has freedom of choice.
	Article 29 (2): The State guarantees the freedom of every citizen to embrace their own religion and to worship according to their religion and faith.	Every citizen has the right and freedom to choose and embrace a religion.
Law Number 12 / 2005 concerning International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights	Article 18 (2): No one can be forced of his freedom to adhere to or determine their religion or belief according to their choice.	Everyone has the freedom to choose a belief and there should be no coercion over the choice of belief (religion).
	Article 18 (3): Freedom to practice and determine one's religion or belief can only be limited by provisions based on law, and which are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.	Restrictions on citizens from choosing a religion can only be done according to statutory regulations.

Source: Laws and legislation.

Some of the laws and regulations abovementioned (not only those shown in Table 2) affirm that minority groups have the same room as other groups, especially in practicing their religious beliefs. This also confirms that legally there is no difference in the treatment of every citizen and group, especially religious groups in Indonesia. In this case, there is a clear and firm guarantee from the state for the religious minority groups to express their faith through religious practices that they believe without intervention, let alone pressure

from other groups, including the state.

Third is cultural. The culture of the Indonesian people is filled with peculiarities. This can be seen from the dynamics of everyday life that are never devoid of colorful differences, be it ethnicity, language, tradition or religion. The condition of a plural nation makes differences no longer a barrier to mutual respect. The tradition of interaction between Islam and the culture of the Indonesian people has a long history with many ups and downs (Jubba, Rustan, & Juhansar, 2018). A family is often composed of people with different religious beliefs (Suhadi, 2014). Views like this are very common in families of various ethnicities in Indonesia. In Javanese society, religion is understood as *ageman* (clothing). Clothing is body protection and is located on the outside so that differences in clothing do not prevent people from accepting each other because they are very formal, not substantive. In Bugis society, for example, religious differences are often placed under ethnic equality, meaning that whatever religion is embraced, they have the same culture as Bugis people. It is the cultural similarity that takes precedence so conflicts can be avoided. Local wisdom such as *padaidi'* (fellowship) has a meaning that goes far beyond differences in belief because this wisdom is based on the spirit of *sipakatau'*, which humanizes humans (Jubba, 2018). In this regard, respect for human dignity is above all. Of course, this spirit is very relevant to the Islamic teachings, which do not differentiate the status of a person or group.

The three reasons above illustrate that religious minority groups still face various issues. However, if we review the response of millennial Muslims, basically they are very rational in stating their reasons. In summary, the reasons used by millennial Muslims, both those who reject and those who accept these two Islamic religious minority groups, can be seen in Table 3 below.

Table 3. Opinions on Islamic Religious minority Groups

Statement	
Reject	Accept
Disrupting public order	The rights of citizens are guaranteed by law
Contrary to Indonesian culture	Part of diversity
Disrupt the unity	Freedom of religion
Deviant Islamic teachings	Part of Islam

Source: Processed from the questionnaire, 2020.

In Table 3, it can be seen that there are two forms of opinion towards the Shia and Ahmadiyya groups in Indonesia. The existing statement confirms that these two groups receive different treatment in the Muslim community, especially the millennial group. Millennial Muslims have arguments in deciding their choice regarding whether to accept or reject religious minority groups in Indonesia. They actually have sufficient knowledge, especially regarding the legal basis related to the existence of various religious groups in Indonesia, which is very diverse to date.

Apart from all the debates regarding the existence of religious minority groups, the fact that there is acceptance and rejection is also an indisputable reality in the practice of social life in Indonesia today. For example, the Islamic minority group (Shia) still faces unfair treatment, as in the case of the Shia in Sampang, Madura (Nurish, 2015). Likewise, the Ahmadiyya also face verbal discrimination, particularly about being 'deviant' and 'outside of Islam', as well as non-verbal which results in a ban on building places of worship as it happened in Tangerang. (Simamora, Hamid, & Hikmawan, 2020). In addition, the incident occurred in East Lombok Regency, West Nusa Tenggara, houses belonging to Ahmadiyya followers were destroyed by vigilantes and accompanied by expulsion (Simamora et al., 2020; Wahab & Fakhruddin, 2019). Undoubtedly, this is contrary to the notion of pluralism and diversity as divine reality which is inevitable (Vahid, 2018). Such rejection also demonstrates the potential for internal conflict in Islam (Alfandi, 2013). In many cases, there are Islamic groups that have quite wide access, including religious facilities, but there are also groups that are labeled heretical, deviant, and destructive. (Pabbajah et al., 2019; Farida, 2014).

Regarding the rejection of Shia and Ahmadiyya, there are two types of responses. First, the rejection was represented by puritan groups such as DDII, Persis, Al-Irsyad, and FUUI which firmly rejected it in the name of purifying Islamic tradition. This form of rejection is more open (Scott, 1981). Islamic teachings are the final teachings that should not be confused with new teachings, especially regarding beliefs as embodied in the pillars of faith. However, under certain conditions, moderate Islamic groups, especially Nahdhatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah have their own attitudes which give room for tolerant understanding (Muhtarom, 2017). Second, claims regarding the period of arrival of Shia in Indonesia that is considered to have come at a later period (the second period was in the 1980s, the first was claimed in the 8th century at the same time as the arrival of Islam in Aceh). Likewise, Ahmadiyya is considered a "newcomer", having only entered Indonesia in 1924 (Sabara, 2014). The crucial phase of Shia development continued in

the Reform era, and in 2000 an organization was formed to gather the Shia congregation, namely IJABI or the Association of the Indonesian Ahlul Bait Congregation (Hasim, 2012). This results in an unfair perception of religious groups that are considered “newcomers”. The presence of a new group comes with other inherent impacts, such as new values, either directly or indirectly affecting other groups that have existed before.

The description above affirms the rejection and acceptance of religious minority groups, although they have received guaranteed regulations and even legitimacy from religion, their existence continues to be questioned. Religious minority groups occupy a less strategic (weak) position and do not have enough media to fight the domination of other religious groups that have already had wide room and opportunities to thrive. The difference in reasons used by millennial Muslims, both in rejecting and accepting the existence of other groups, indicates that basically the young Islamic group has an independent attitude, meaning that their choice of attitude is also based on various policies and even justification of religion (Islam). In the view of Kuhler (2019), in addition to moral, ethical, and pragmatic reasons, political reasons are also the basis for acceptance and rejection of something.

CONCLUSION

This study reaffirms the different responses of millennial Muslims regarding religious minority groups in Indonesia. There is a response that on the one hand accepts the existence of these groups based on religious texts (ideology), constitutional and cultural reasons. However, these three factors also gave birth to millennial Muslims’ acceptance of religious minority groups. First, millennial Muslims accept religious minority groups by emphasizing a very strict *nash* (Qur’an) justification for respect for religious diversity; there is even no reason to force other religions to become part of one religion. In addition, the constitution also explicitly protects the rights of minorities. Culturally, the diverse conditions of the nation and the long history of the formation of the nation-state are supported by many religious groups, including religions outside the mainstream that we know today. This open acceptance occurs to religious minority groups that are not affiliated with Islam. The presence of non-Islamic religious groups is considered part of a more multicultural and diverse life. These religious groups pose no obstacle or trigger for conflict because each of them carries out religious teachings following the teachings of their religion. This argument indicates people’s awareness in which all social groups, constitutionally, have the same rights as other citizens and are free to practice their faiths.

Second, based on the justification of religious, constitutional, and cultural texts, it also creates rejection of religious minority groups. This rejection occurs to Islamic religious minority groups which have been the targets of various discriminatory actions. Such rejection is because these groups are considered to practice deviant teachings that disrupt Islam due to differences with the majority (mainstream). The doctrine that is believed and practiced generates responses that actually put them into a judgmental position. Differences in Islamic understanding and practice not only have triggered conflict, but have also created differences in religious practices that arise from the interpretations of each group. In many cases, there have even been persecution and acts of violence against religious minority groups. In addition, their acceptance is also based on quite strong reasons. The existing religious minority groups are also a complement to societal life.

Different attitudes related to the existence of religious minority groups in Indonesia show that there are still crucial issues in terms of current social relations. There are inconsistent attitudes, especially in positioning religious minority groups, even though they have justification from religion (argument / holy text), the constitution, and culture. It has an impact on religious minority groups which have always been in a dilemma. On the one hand, religious minority groups provide an increasingly open room for dialogue by involving all groups in a forum to find shared agreements, but on the other hand, diversity can be a trigger as well as a threat to social order when each group maintains their differences. This study only focuses on the analysis of the different responses of millennial Muslims regarding the reality of the multicultural and multireligious Indonesian people. The discussion that has yet to be developed in detail provides a practical framework to instill the value of openness to the Islamic generation. This is because one of the challenges that Indonesia will face in the future is the difficulty and reluctance to accept the existence of other groups with different identities. Therefore, it is necessary to build a bridge, through a non-structural inclusive education model, in order to raise the collective awareness of millennial Muslims on the importance of diversity which must be addressed openly to form a stronger and more open social life structure in the future.

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THE CONCEPT OF MYSTICISM IN ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY

Sahri

Institut Agama Islam Negeri Pontianak

Email: sahri@iainptk.ac.id

ABSTRACT

Judging from its origin, there is an opinion that Sufism originates from Islam. Some say that Sufism is influenced by the practices of other religions, such as the practices of Christian priesthood and of other religions. This article aims to examine the comparison between the concepts of zuhud (asceticism / detachment) and wahdat al-wujud (the unity of existence) in Islam and the concepts of asceticism and hypostatic union in Christianity. In Christianity there is a clerical structure, but Islam does not recognize or implement it. Islamic Sufis did not transform Sufism from Christianity or other religions because Sufism is related to human instincts. Additionally, the human soul is the same despite different societies and nations. The similarities of the practice of asceticism cannot be sufficiently used as the reason that it stems from Christian asceticism. There are in fact similarities between the concept of wahdat al-wujud and hypostatic union in Christianity. The differences between the two lies in the esoteric and exoteric dimensions. However, according to al-Junaid and al-Ghazali, mahabbat and ma'rifat are the limitations of the maqam of Sufism, a level of maqam where man is still in a state of understanding of his own existence. So, between man and God, there is still distance. In this modern era, there is a need for a re-interpretation of Sufism in which Sufism is not only oriented to be purely transient to be in union with God, but it is a form of fulfilling our obligations as God's caliphs who should improve things for fellow humans and other living beings. In other words, Sufism not only contains a theophanic dimension of transience, but also a profane dimension in which there are of fellow human interests worldwide.

Keywords: Sufism; Concept of Mysticism, Islam, Christianity

INTRODUCTION

Dialectics related to Sufism (mysticism) will never be obsolete with the times. In addition to being a natural human need (*thabi'iyah*) for peace of mind, the human need for God is inevitable, even for an atheist. Among the things that promise peace of mind is mysticism. The essence of the materials contained within is centered on self-knowledge of the Almighty. Understanding it will free humans from the shackles of worldly interests, leading them to peace.

Substantially, mysticism is an integration between ethical, aesthetic, and esoteric values, which are a perpetual reality from time to time. The concept of mysticism is not the final product of the process of scientific study, because mysticism is not merely a sensory pleasure; it is a gift from the provider of grace. Mysticism/Sufism is not engineered by al-Baghdadi, al-Ghazali, or al-Basri, nor is it a Christian product. Mysticism is a teaching and practice in order to get closer to God, even to unite oneself with God through the *maqam* and *ahwal* techniques. Today, mysticism is facing obstacles and contradictions. Some are of the opinion that mysticism does not originate from Islam, but was influenced from the teachings of other religions, especially Christianity.

With regard to its origin, mysticism is much debated. Some experts argue that mysticism does originate from Islam, because Sufi teachings are in fact based on the *sunnah* of the Prophet Muhammad. Always drawing closer to Allah alone was the doctrine of the early Muslims, even though at that time it was a rule that was not called Sufism, and then evolved into its own scientific discipline when Islam began to develop and progress. There are also experts who claim that Islamic mysticism was initially influenced by other teachings and religions, such as the priestly practice of Christianity, Hindu-Buddhism, etc.¹ Nicholson argued that mysticism in Islam is not purely derived from Islamic teachings, but stems from other religions, especially Christianity. Nicholson identified the lifestyle of Islamic Sufis with the following characteristics: *zuhud* (asceticism), often staying alone in silence, wearing wool attire, doing *dhikr*, etc. According to Nicholson, the pattern has similarities with Christian teachings. In addition, Islamic mysticism is influenced by neoplatonism, because of the contact between Arabs and Greeks, and the teachings of neoplatonism affected some Islamic mysticism thinkers.²

However, according to Nasution,³ The validity of opinions or theories that reveal Islamic mysticism originating or being influenced by other religions cannot be proven, because many texts of the Qur'an and the Hadith teach about the relationship between humans and Allah, as well as ways to approach Him.⁴ For example, the Hadith Qudsi by Imam Buhkari states: "Whosoever shows enmity to someone devoted to Me, I shall be at war with him. My servant draws not near to Me with anything more loved by Me than the religious duties I have enjoined upon him, and My servant continues to draw near to Me with supererogatory deeds so that I shall love him. When I love him, I am his hearing with which he hears, his seeing with which he sees, his

¹ Abdul Qadir 'Isa, *Haqaiq al-Tasawuf...*, 98

² R.A. Nicholson, *The Mystic of Islam*, (Canada: World Wisdom, 2002), 9

³ Harun Nasution, *Filsafat dan Mistisisme dalam Islam*, (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1973), 58

⁴ Read QS. Al-Baqarah: 186, 115, dan QS. Qaf: 16.

hand with which he strikes and his foot with which he walks. Were he to ask [something] of Me, I would surely give it to him, and were he to ask Me for refuge, I would surely grant him it.”⁵

Previous studies, which analyzed several theological problems between Islam and Christianity, particularly divinity, revealed that according to the Qur'an, the concept of the Trinity in Christianity is a form of polytheism (Surah 4:171, 9:30, 5:73), which is opposed by this doctrine is the designation of the ontological nature of the Trinity.⁶ The trinity here is defined as one substance and three persons, namely believing in one God who reveals Himself in three persons. Believe in God; Father, Son and Holy Spirit.⁷ The doctrine of the Trinity is in fact only found in the New Testament⁸. Confirmation of this can be studied in Matthew 28:19, and Corinthians 12:4-6, 13:13. From a Christian perspective, the Trinity is eternal and the three persons work together in re-creation with different tasks.⁹ A similar study was also conducted by Sri Dahlia, who emphasized the comparison between Islamic and Christian theology, particularly on the Trinity and the attributes of God. She revealed that the teachings and theological doctrines of both Islamic and Christian traditions have similarities, like in the aspect of God's attributes. Several schools of theology in Islam have different interpretations of the existence of God's attributes. There are those who claim to be *qadim*, and those who affirm the Hadith (such as the Mu'tazilah ideology which contrasts with the Asy'ariyah ideology). Similarly, the Christian tradition has teachings that are in line with the Mu'tazilah ideology, particularly regarding the humanness of Jesus.¹⁰ Taftazani emphasizes that Islamic Sufism is not derived from the Christian priesthood system. Even though there are similarities in customs between Islamic Sufis and Christian clergy, it does not mean they are both Islamic. The pattern of life of mysticism is a universal tendency in every religion, as the source of religion is one, although different in formal aspects. So, the similarity between Islamic Sufism and Christian mysticism is logical.¹¹ In this case, I agree with Taftazani's argument.

⁵ See in Dewan Redaksi Ensiklopedi Islam, *Ensiklopedia Islam vol. 5*, (Jakarta, PT. Ichtiar Baru Van Hoeve, 1993), 80

⁶ F. Schuon, *Memahami Islam*, translated by Anas Mahyuddin (Bandung: Pustaka, 1983), 85

⁷ Olaf Schumann, *Pemikiran Keagamaan dalam Tantangan* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1993), 212

⁸ Abujamin Roham, *Pembicaraan Disekitar Bible dan Qur'an dalam Segi Isi dan Riwayat Penulisan*, (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1984), 173

⁹ Waryono, "Beberapa Problem Teologis Antara Islam dan Kristen", *ESENSIA* Vol. XII No. 1 2011, 97-116

¹⁰ Sri Dahlia, "Trinitas dan Sifat Tuhan: Studi Analisis Perbandingan Antara Teologi Kristen dan Teologi Islam" *Jurnal Penelitian*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2017, 299-330

¹¹ Abu al-Wafa al-Ghanimi at-Taftazani, *Tasawuf Islam; Telaah Historis dan Perkembangannya*, (Jakarta: Gaya Media Pratama, 2008), 26

Analyzing the aforementioned studies, it seems that none of them have focused on this theme. Therefore, this study aims to present a new element of this research topic – a comparison between the concepts of *zuhud and wahdat al-wujud* in Islam and the concepts of asceticism and hypostatic union in Christianity. This study uses a descriptive method and a comparative analysis, collecting and analyzing data from various valid sources which were connected. Much data was collected using library research. This study ensures authenticity of the data contained in the works of Islamic and Christian thinkers. Islamic thinkers attributed in this study include Abu al-Wafa al-Ghanimi at-Taftazani, Ibn Khaldun, Imam al-Ghazali, Ibn Arabi, Abu Nasr As-Sarraj ath-Thusi, Abu al-Qasim an-Naisabari al-Qusyairi, Muhammad Ghallab, Harun Nasution, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Said Agil Husain al-Munawar, Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, and Abu Bakar Aceh. Meanwhile, the works of Christian thinkers include those by Nicholson, Gershom G Scholem, Frithjof Schuon, Donald Guthrie, William C. Chittick, Olaf Schumann and Bernard McGinn.

MYSTICISM AS A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT

The terms Sufism is more suitable to be used specifically for Islam, while mysticism is more inclined to non-Muslims, including Christians. Bernard McGinn, Professor of historical theology and Christian history¹² stated that although the main idea and purpose of mysticism may be understood as a special God-human encounter and everything about the process of that encounter in his introduction to the 1991 five-volume work on the history of Christian mysticism, entitled “*The Presence of God*.”¹³ By considering the relationship between goals, processes, and effects caused by mysticism, McGinn states that mystical elements in Christianity are part of faith and practice related to self-awareness and one’s reaction to the direct presence of God.¹⁴ In this broad definition, McGinn also agrees with some followers of Catholic theologian Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984) who specifically proposes using “consciousness” rather than “experience” to describe certain situations such as witnessing (vision) and hearing (locution) to supernatural phenomena and conditions of inner pleasure (raptures) that come from the substance of his encounter with God.¹⁵ In addition, partly inspired by the work of Joseph Marechal (1878-1944), a philosopher and expert in the field of psychology,

¹² To date, four volumes of this series of works appear as: *The Origins of Mysticism* (1991), *The Growth of Mysticism* (1994), *The Flowering of Mysticism* (1998), and *The Harvest of Mysticism in Medieval Germany* (2005).

¹³ Bernard McGinn, *The Presence of God: a History of Western Christian Mysticism*, (New York: Crossroad, Vol. I, 1991), xvi

¹⁴ Ibid., xvii

¹⁵ Ibid., xvii

McGinn declared “presence” is the main requirement and an urgent matter in understanding mysticism rather than “union” which is but a small part of the many metaphors, models, or symbols that mystics have used in their presentations.¹⁶

Etymologically, Syekh Hisyam Kabbani¹⁷ explains that *tasawuf* (Sufism/mysticism) comes from four root words: first, the word *shafa* or *shafwun*, which means clean or holy. In an-Nihayah dictionary, Ibn al-Atsir defines this word as “the best of things, the essence, and the cleanest part”. Second, the word *ahl as-Shuffah* (inhabitants of the veranda), which means those who lived in the veranda of the Prophet’s mosque while he was still alive. Therefore, *tasawuf* is also associated with *ahl shaff* (people in the first row). Third, the word *al-shuff*, which means fleece, because the Sufis living in Kufa used to wear clothes made of fleece. Fourth, the word *Shuffah al-Kaffah* (fine sponge), is associated with the Sufis who are clean with soft hearts. However, al-Qusyairi criticized the idea because some of the meanings did not match the intended meaning regarding Sufis. In his work, he asserted the root of the word Sufi is *al-suf* (wool or cloth with coarse hair), so one is said to be a sufi when it turns out that he is wearing woolly clothing (a robe). There are several views regarding the etymology of sufism, and it is clear that it is not only associated with people wearing woolly clothing. Therefore, some people claim that Sufis are identified with *Ahlusshufah* (friends who like to sleep on the front of the mosque). There are also people who say that the Sufis are people who purify themselves. Many others claim the word Sufi comes from the word *shaf* (line in prayer) which is likened to the hearts of the Sufis who come in the first row in facing God. Some of the definitions that have been stated are not in accordance with what is meant by the word Sufi itself.

Al-Qusyairi’s explanation can or cannot be justified. It can be justified because it is impossible for a person wearing clothes made of rough, wrinkled material to be called a Sufi, because even poor people who cannot afford luxurious clothes are very likely to wear rugged clothes. Likewise, in the case of the *Ahlusshufah* (residents of the veranda of the mosque), it is impossible for each of them to be called Sufis, because perhaps among them are people who are merely lingering around. Second, it could not be because it could be people who wear rugged clothes, or also the *Ahlusshufah*, and people who like to isolate themselves are really Sufis, namely those who give up the worldly pleasures in order to seek better life, namely *ma’ rifah ilallah*. Therefore,

¹⁶ The fact that all mystics never represent their mystical experience as union with God is emphasized by other scholars such as Gershom G. Scholem, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*, (New York: Schocken Books, 1954), 5

¹⁷ Muhammad Hisyam Kabbani, *Tasawuf dan Ihsan; Antivirus Kebatilan dan Kedzaliman* (Jakarta: published by Serambi, 2007), 24

Shaykh Abdul Qadir al-Jailani argued that sufism comes from the word *as-shafa* which means holy. That is, the Sufi who applies sufism seriously seeks to keep and purify his heart only with Allah. Efforts to purify oneself are not just by wearing rugged clothes, letting his face turn yellowish, blackening the forehead, speaking words of wisdom, or moving fingers with *tasbih* and *tahlil*. It is much broader than that, only achievable through sincerity and honesty in worshiping Allah, with true detachment from worldly desires, by purifying oneself for Allah.¹⁸ However, according to Ibn Khaldun, not all the wearers of coarse woolly clothes are Sufis, because it is only part of the attributes attached to the Sufis.¹⁹

So, it can be concluded that the word “Sufi” is a term that describes pious people, who are sincerely standing behind Allah Almighty while facing the realities of life in the world. They always detach themselves from the worldly mortal interests, while the main goal is *maʿrifatullah*. Whether or not one is a Sufi cannot be judged by the attributes one wears, but by the sincerity of one’s heart which is called *ʿafʿal alqulub* (activities of the heart) which can only be judged by Allah. Meanwhile, terminologically, *tasawuf* has many interpretations. Al-Junaid al-Baghdadi revealed that *tasawuf* is “cleansing the heart from animal-like traits, showing holy morals, emphasizing the nature of *basyariyah*, staying away from lust, making room for spirituality, holding on to the knowledge of truth, practicing something more important and immortal, giving advice to the people, and keeping promises to Allah.”²⁰ Imam Junaid al-Baghdadi, quoted by al-Mahdili in his book “al-Madkhal ila Tasawuf”, firmly states that what is meant by sufism is “the truth is what kills you and the truth also brings you to life.”²¹

Abu Qasim Abdul Karim al-Qusyairi has different perspectives than the aforementioned. He argued that “sufism is practicing the guidance of the Qur’an and Sunnah, striving to control lust, avoiding heresy, staying away from worldly desires, and avoiding making worship less important.”²² Abu Yazid al-Bustami maintained that “sufism includes three elements, namely: *kha* (getting rid of despicable character), *ha* (adorning oneself with commendable character), and *jim* (getting closer to Allah).”²³ Abu Bakr al-Kattani quoted by al-Ghazali in *Ihya ʿUlumuddin*, asserts that “sufism is character; whoever equips you with character, he provides you with sufism. As for the worshipers,

¹⁸ Muhammad Sholikhin, *17 Jalan Menggapai Mahkota Sufi, Syaikh Abdul Qadir al-Jailani*, (Jakarta: published by Mutiara Media, 2000), 83

¹⁹ See Ibn Khaldun, *Al-Mukaddimah*, (Beirut: Darul Fikr, tt), 370-371

²⁰ Dewan Redaksi Ensiklopedi Islam, *Ensiklopedia Islam...*, 73

²¹ Al-Mahdili, *al-Madkhal il al-Tasawufi...*, 79

²² Dewan Redaksi Ensiklopedi Islam, *Ensiklopedia Islam...*, 73

²³ Ibid., 73

their souls accept to do good deeds, because they purify themselves with the light of Islam. Meanwhile, those with pure souls accept to do good deeds because they purify themselves with the light of faith.”²⁴ Based on several descriptions of sufism terminology, it can be concluded that sufism is purifying the heart from everything that interferes with the self towards God, attempting to eliminate the influence of human origin, removing the character of weakness as a human being, avoiding all inclination to lust, drawing closer to the sacred nature based on knowledge of nature, using useful goods, giving advice that leads to virtue, and keeping promises to Allah.

In the midst of the different expert interpretations of sufism, Abu al-Wafa al-Ganimi at-Taftazani notes the characteristics of sufism in general. According to him, sufism has five characteristics: moral elevation, absolute essence instead of transience, direct intuitive knowledge, tranquility and happiness, and symbolic expression.²⁵ According to Sahib al-Samahah, sufism in Islam is not derived from any ideology or culture, including the teachings of Hermes and neo-platonism, although objectively, Arab-Islamic civilization has never denied the *al-tathir* (influence of) and *al-taaththur*. (influenced by) other parties. However, when Islamic mysticism is thought to be synonymous with the teachings of Kabbalah (Jews), hesychasm (Orthodox Christianity), and charismatics (Protestantism) or religious syncretism, then this can be regarded as “blasphemy” against the sanctity of Islamic teachings, because the theological basis between religions is very different.²⁶ In the view of Sahib al-Samahah, the existence of sufism began long before the birth of humans. Sahib al-Samahah quoted the verse of the Qur’an which reads: “Verily, Allah has chosen (purified) Adam, Noah, the family of Abraham and the family of ‘Imran over all people (in their respective times).”²⁷ This concept is what Ibn ‘Arab called *wahdah al-adyan*, or unity of religions, (Islam as the center point of all the Abrahamic religions). It is undeniable that all Abrahamic religions were initially *hanîf* religions and could be called Islamic. However, these religions have since merged into the form of Islam brought by the Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h). This notion does not mean that Islam does not recognize and respect other religions. Thus, sufism becomes the essence of Islamic teachings, widely embodied in Islam: faith, and *ihsan*; or *shari’ah*, *tareqat*, and *hakikat*; or *ibadah*, *ubudiyah*, and *ubudah*. The three teachings are holistic and cannot be separated. The incorrect assumption is that Islam is limited to carrying out the five pillars of Islam. Therefore, the practice of

²⁴ Al-Ghazali, *Ihya’ ‘Ulumuddin*, (Semarang: Maktabah Usaha Keluarga, tt), 376

²⁵ at-Taftazani, *Tasawuf Islam...*, 4-5

²⁶ Lihat Husni Hidayat, “Tajalliyât Sufistik: Dialektika Nilai-Nilai Religius-Humanistik”, in *Təsofi: Jurnal Tasawuf dan Pemikiran Islam*, Vol. 2 No. 2 December 2012, 223

²⁷ See QS. Ali Imron: 33

the five pillars of Islam must be refined as a comprehensive religious building through perfecting faith and *ihsan*. On the other hand, although *ihsan* is the highest stage in religion, Islam and faith are inseparable.

THE CONCEPT OF *ZUHUD* (ASCETICISM)

In Christianity, the practice of seclusion from society has been carried out by many monks since the beginning of the birth of Christianity. In Islamic history, sufism begins with *zuhud* (ascetic) life by the companions, *tabi'een*, *tabi'u al-tabi'een*, etc. Ascetic behavior is considered an attempt to isolate oneself from the glittering world. This is thought to have much in common with the behavior of monks, of which Christian teachings advise to abstain from indulgence and isolating oneself in the monasteries. This is compared to the lamps at night (in the Arabian Desert) illuminating the way for passing caravans, their tents being a haven for travelers who are starving. Therefore, the similarity of ascetic behavior²⁸ is thought to be influenced by these Christian monks.²⁹ Scientists who agree with this notion include Goldzhiher. He classified mysticism into two parts. First, asceticism (*zuhud*), according to him, despite being influenced by Christian clergy patterns, is more rooted in Islamic teachings. Second, sufism in a broad sense such as *ma'rifah*, *hal*, *wijdan*, and *dzaug*, is influenced by Hindu teachings and Neoplatonism.³⁰ Other scientists such as Von Kreamer, Asin Pacsios, O'leary noted something similar. Von Kreamer said that ascetic life in Islam has been influenced by Christian teachings that existed before the arrival of Islam in Syria and Sinai. According to him, the ascetic life of Muslims is inspired by the life of Christian priests.³¹

According to At-Taftazani, those who say that sufism originates from Christianity utilize several arguments. First, the Arab community and Christians have interacted since the time of Jahiliya. Second, there are similarities in the life patterns of the Sufis regarding the application of the teachings and practices of *riyadhah* (training the soul) and *khalwat* (seclusion) with the patterns of life of Christian monks, as well as their appearance.³² Meanwhile, according to Abu al-'Ala al-Afifi, there are four factors behind the emergence of *zuhud*

²⁸ Every Sufi is an ascetic, but not all ascetics are Sufis. Some people think that Sufism is only synonymous with *zuhud* (asceticism). Ibn Sina emphasizes the differences between Sufis, *zuhud*, and *abid*, namely: (1) People who stay away from worldly pleasures are called *zahid*, (2) People who engage in *mahdhah* worship are called *'abid*, (3) People who focus themselves and their minds for his Lord and draw closer to Him until the Light of al-Haq rises is called *al-arif* or *al-sufi*. Abdul Halim, *Tasawuf di Dunia Islam*, (Bandung: CV. Pustaka Setia, 2002), 24

²⁹ Harun Nasution, *Falsafat dan Mistisisme dalam Islam*, (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1973), 58

³⁰ Muhammad Ghallab, *At-Tashawwuf al-Muqarin*, (Mesir: Maktabah al-Nahdah, tt), 42

³¹ At-Taftazani, *Tasawuf Islam...*, 28

³² At-Taftazani, *Tasawuf Islam...*, 6

(which is considered the origin of sufism) in Islam, namely: (1) the teachings of Islam itself; (2) Islamic spiritual revolution against the social order and the ruling regime; (3) monasticism in Christianity; and (4) the revolution against the experts Islamic jurisdiction (fiqh) and the kalam.³³ Taftazani refuted the opinion that there is a Christian influence by saying that the similarity of the practice of *zuhud*, for example, is not enough to be a reason that sufism originates from Christianity. Nicholson stated that the sources of sufism could not have come from values outside of Islam. He also thought that even though Christianity influenced Islam, it was not a source for Islam, because the asceticism they were arguing about was none other than Islam itself.³⁴ To conclude the discussion on the origins of sufism, it is interesting to reveal Taftazani's statement by making a reasonable hypothesis that Islamic Sufis have not only transformed sufism from Christianity or other religions. That's all because sufism is related to human instincts.³⁵ The similarity between Islamic mysticism and that of other religions does not necessarily indicate that Islamic mysticism is derived from other religions. What is correct is that Islamic mysticism comes from Islam itself, because Sufis have knowledge in the form of intuition and direct testimony, not from reason or argument.³⁶ The same thing was also expressed by Nicholson, as quoted by Taftazani, who initially argued that sufism is not purely from Islam. Furthermore, he revised his own opinion by saying that every thought claimed to be foreign in Islam and born in foreign cultures outside of Islam, is actually born of asceticism and sufism that emerged in Islam.³⁷

A more detailed explanation was also revealed by Massignon who divided four sources of terms in sufism: (1) the Qur'an and this is the most important; (2) Islamic Arabic sciences, such as Hadith, fiqh, nahwu, etc.; (3) the terms of the early kalam scholars; and (4) the scientific language formed from other languages such as Greek, Persian, etc. that became the language of science and philosophy in the sixth century Eastern civilization.³⁸ These are some of the different views on the existence of sufism. It is interesting to compare the views of scholars who attempted to find positive explanations about the nature of sufism. Ibn al-Jauzi and Ibn Khaldun classify the pattern of spirituality in Islam into two aspects, namely: *tasawuf* (sufism) and *zuhud* (asceticism). Although these two terms did not exist in the era of the Prophet Muhammad and are not explicitly mentioned in the Qur'an, except for *zuhud* which is

³³ Ibid., 69-70

³⁴ At-Taftazani, *Tasawuf Islam...*, 29

³⁵ Ibid., 36

³⁶ Ibid., 36

³⁷ Ibid., 37

³⁸ Ibid., 38

mentioned in Surah Yusuf verse 20.³⁹ Nasution revealed that the pattern of living to isolate oneself and stay away from worldly pursuits is also found in Christian teachings. Many Arabic literatures tell about the lives of the monks who exiled themselves in the desert. Their lamps guide the passing travelers, their camps are a refuge for the lost, and their generosity is food for the hungry.⁴⁰

Among the ascetic teachings originating from Christianity are: (1) self-sufficient attitude, because Prophet Jesus was a self-sufficient person, and the Bible was delivered to the poor as in Matthew's Gospel: "Blessed are you who are poor, for yours is the kingdom of God. Blessed are those who are hunger for they shall be filled."; (2) The attitude of *tawakkal* (reliance on God), because the priests have practiced it in their life history as it is said in the Bible: "Look at the birds of the air, for they neither sow nor reap nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feeds them. Are you not of more value than they?"; (3) The purpose of the Christian priest is similar to that of the *murshid* in the Islamic *tariqat*, except that the priest has the authority to erase sins, while the *murshid* does not; and (4) Refrain from marrying. Marriage is considered a barrier and can even distract from God, because for a Sufi forgetting God for a moment is a sin.⁴¹ This is different from the concept of *zuhud* in Islam which has a broader meaning. *Zuhud* is divided into three levels: first (lowest), abstaining from worldly indulgence in order to avoid punishment in the afterlife; second, staying away from this world by weighing the rewards in the afterlife; the third (highest) isolates the world not out of fear or out of hope, but out of love for Allah.⁴²

When Imam Al-Junaid was asked about *zuhud*, he said, "*Zuhud* is considering the world as small and removing its scars from the heart".⁴³ Abu Sulaiman Ad-Darani said, "*zuhud* means leaving what keeps you busy from Allah".⁴⁴ Ibn al-Qayyim said, "The wise people have agreed that *zuhud* is removing the heart from the world, and bringing it to the hereafter".⁴⁵ According to Ibn al-Qayyim, the Qur'an is filled with suggestions for detachment from the world, the humiliation of the world with all its shortcomings, its end and the immediacy of its destruction; and contains suggestions for longing for the

³⁹ Ibrahim, Muhammad Zaki, *Abjadiyyah al-Tashawwuf al-Islam*, (translation) Abdul Syukur and Rivai Usman, Tasawuf Salafi, (Jakarta: Hikmah, 2002), 29

⁴⁰ Harun Nasution, *Falsafat dan Mistisisme dalam Islam...*, 63

⁴¹ Jamil, M., *Cakrawala Tasawuf*, (Ciputat: Gaung Persada Press, 2004), 89

⁴² See Rosihon Anwar, *Akhlak tasawuf*, (Bandung: Pustaka Setia, 2010), 200

⁴³ Muhammad bin Abi Bakar Ayyub al-Zar'i Abu 'Abdillah, *Madarij al-Salikin*, Jilid 2, (Beirut, Dar al-Kitab al-'Ilmiyyah, 1973), 11

⁴⁴ Ibid., 11

⁴⁵ Ibid., 12

hereafter, news of its glory and eternity.⁴⁶ There are three signs of *zuhud* that must exist in a person's mind, namely: (1) not to be excited with what one possesses and not to be sad with what one has lost; (2) It is the same on the side of the one who criticizes and the one who abuses him. The former is a sign of detachment from wealth while the latter a sign of detachment from position; and (3) He should be with Allah and his heart should be dominated by the grace of obedience. For the heart cannot be completely free from love; love of the world or love of God. These two forms of love in the heart are like water and air in a glass. When you put water in a glass, the air comes out. The two cannot be one. Everyone who is 'familiar' with Allah will surely be busy with Him and will not be busy with anything other than Him.⁴⁷

THE CONCEPT OF WAHDAT AL-WUJUD

Regarding the concept of *wahdat al-wujud* (*the unity of existence*), in the theology of the New Testament, it begins with a belief, namely God exists that He created humans and continues to care for them.⁴⁸ In John 4:24 it is stated that "God is Spirit, and those who worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth". The teachings of Christian theology are indeed very close to the term "union of the spirit of God and the spirit of man." Therefore, for later we know the term Trinity in Christianity. The concept of God's relationship with man in Christianity is that man was created in God's likeness, therefore man is His image and praise. The similarity between man and God is in His holiness and righteousness, even though this is actually spiritual. Knowledge of God appears in the revelation of His word through the holy spirit, then in the reality of belief and obedience. Christian belief is rooted in sanctifying the personal meaning of Jesus who is seen as Christ the savior. Obedience to Christ's call is faith; in faith it is God's justice and His grace that can be known. Faith is the determination of human action through the essence of the church (religion) taught by Jesus Christ through the "*Human God*" approach.⁴⁹

Man's relationship with God's creatureliness is expressed only through the wholeness of Christ's message. With the position of human God as a being in the kingdom of God, and the position of God as king, humans must obey and submit to His commands. Obedience to God is an absolute condition for man's repentance to Him. It can happen only if a servant traverses the path of God and desires to identify himself with God. The relationship between man

⁴⁶ Ibid. See QS. Al-Hadid 57:20-23, Ali 'Imran 3 : 14, Asy-Syuuraa 42: 20, An Nisaa' 4: 77

⁴⁷ Said Hawwa, *Mensucikan Jiwa (Konsep Tazkiyatun Nafs Terpadu: Intisari Ihya 'Ulumuddin al-Ghazali)*, (Jakarta: Robbani Press, 1998), 329

⁴⁸ Donald Guthrie, *Teologi Perjanjian Baru I*, (terj.) Lisda T Gamadhi, (Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 1995), 43

⁴⁹ Ajat Sudrajat, *Tafsir Inklusif Makna Islam*, (Yogyakarta: AK Group Yogya, 2004), 128

and God with the most climax of sacrifice is found in the personality of Jesus. Jesus sacrificed himself for the salvation of many people through atonement for sins. During his life, Jesus founded religion on the principle of love. This principle is used as the basis for reinterpreting the laws of the Law (Mark 12:31; 2:23-28; 7:1-23, Matthew 22:40; 23:23; 5:17-58, and Luke 10:25- 37). The most basic is found in Mark 12:31, namely: "Jesus answered: The chief commandment is; Hear, O Israel, our Lord Allah, the Lord is One. Love the Lord, your God, with all your heart and with all your soul, with all your mind and with all your strength. And the second is; love your neighbor as yourself. There is no other law that is more important than these two laws."⁵⁰ This is the essence of Christian religiosity, monotheistic values, and the pattern of relations between humans and God. It is also between humans themselves which is also similar to Islam. So, the meeting point of these three religions is an understanding of the meaning of al-Islam itself which means submission, obedience and complete surrender to God.⁵¹

In Christianity, there is the concept of Hypostatic union. It is the term used to describe how God the Son, Jesus Christ, took on the form of a human, while a perfect God at the same. Jesus is forever God,⁵² but when incarnated, Jesus took a human body and became human.⁵³ The combination of the human nature with the divine nature becomes Jesus, man-God. This is the hypostatic union, Jesus Christ as one Person-Perfect God and perfect man. The two natures of Jesus, his humanity and divinity, cannot be separated from each other. Jesus is forever man-God; perfect God and perfect human; two distinct natures in one Person. The humanity and divinity of Jesus do not mix, but unite without losing their unique identity. Sometimes Jesus functions with human limitations,⁵⁴ but at other times by the power of his divinity.⁵⁵ This doctrine of hypostatic union is an attempt to explain how Jesus is both God and man at the same time. However, this doctrine is certainly not fully understood by humans. It is impossible for a finite and sinful human being to fully understand the workings of God. In short, hypostatic union teaches that Jesus is both God and a perfect human, that there is no mixing or subtraction of any of these natures. He is a unified Person, forever.

Whereas in Islam there is the concept of *wahdat al-wujud* (unity of existence), starting from the basic assumption which states that the essence of existence is substantially one (*jawhariha*) and is counted in terms of attribution and

⁵⁰ Ibid., 133

⁵¹ See QS. Ali Imran: 83, 85

⁵² See John 8:58; 10:30

⁵³ See John1:14

⁵⁴ See John 4:6; 19:28

⁵⁵ See John11:43; Matthew 14:18-21

identity (*al-sifat wa al-asma*).⁵⁶ In this case, it must be distinguished between *wujud* (existence) as a pure ontological attribute and *maujud* (existent being) as existing or existing objects. *Wujud* is also called “ens”, which is the metaphysical act of existence, which is full of mysterious veils and *mawjud* as “esto”, or something that exists.⁵⁷ The former ‘existence’ is transcendent, while the latter becomes immanent. Therefore, the doctrine of Ibn ‘Arabi is called *wahdat al-wujud*, not *wahdat al-mawjud*. According to this notion, there is only one existence, God, and nothing else. The things that seem to exist are merely manifestations or theophany (*tajally*) of God’s existence. It is at this point that the pantheistic nature of the doctrine of *wahdat al-wujud* is questioned. In this case, pantheism is meant in the sense that God has an immanent cause; does the unity of existence then make God immanent? In fact, this notion is understood in two ways; some are of the view that Ibn ‘Arabi’s *wahdat al-wujud* style is indeed pantheistic and some say otherwise. Nevertheless, the concept of sufism which was later raised by al-Junaid al-Bagdadī and al-Ghazālī is a criticism that challenges the radicalism and liberalism of sufism that had been developed by Ibn ‘Arabi, Abu Yazid al-Bustami, and Husain ibn Mansur al-Hallaj. The radicalism and liberalism of their sufism denied the concrete reality of man himself in the concepts of *maqam* (levels), *fana* (destruction), and *baqa* (eternity),⁵⁸ *ittihad* (unity), dan *hulul* (incarnation).⁵⁹

The process of spiritual awareness maturation, according to these academics, begins with the elimination of human concrete consciousness (*fana*) to reach eternal metaphysical consciousness (*baqa*), and then to a higher level, unity (*ittihad*). There is no longer any existence except the existence of God, because God has already taken the incarnated (*hulul*) place in humans after their human nature disappears. This concept is known as *wahdat al-wujud* and eventually led to the killing of al-Hallaj with the death penalty, and al-Bustami was considered a madman whom people abandoned. Al-Junaid and al-Ghazālī’s criticism of the concept attempted to realign the concept of sufism by remaining grounded in the concrete reality of man himself. They limited the *maqam* of sufism only to *mahabbah* and *marifah*,⁶⁰ a stage of *maqam* that places humans in their own concrete consciousness. According to al-Junaid, the highest consciousness is to accept suffering (*mulim*) or favors (*ladzdzah*). Thus, there is still a distance between man and God.

⁵⁶ Ibn ‘Arabi, *Fusus al-Hikam*, Vol. 1 (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-‘Arabi, t.t.), 24.

⁵⁷ Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Knowledge and The Sacred* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989), 124

⁵⁸ Abu al-Qasim an-Naisabari Al-Qusyairi, *Ar-Risalat al-Qusyairiyah*, (terj.) M. Lukman Hakim, *Risalatul Qusyairiyah: Induk Ilmu Tasawuf*. (Surabaya: Risalah Gusti, 1999), 67

⁵⁹ Abu Nashr As-Sarraj Ath-Thusi. *Al-Luma’*. (Cairo: Dar Kitab Al-Haditsah, 1960), 541

⁶⁰ Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. *Living Sufism*. (London: Paperbacks, 1980), 65

Again, the subject of *wahdat al-wujud* in religions, including Christianity, is interpreted as a doctrine of Ibn Arabi in the unity of being or unity of transcendence which is also known as pantheism.⁶¹ With his concept of *wahdat al-wujud*, Ibn Arabi is considered a figure who believes in religious pluralism, where there is unity of religions. In this view, Ibn Arabi allegedly rejected the external rituals and dogmatic forms of each religion.⁶² This was not much different from the form of the *wahdat al-wujud* approach, but this time it became more specific to the esoteric-exoteric dialectic, because Ibn Arabi seemed to be more inclined to look at the 'deep' and 'universal' esoteric dimensions than rituals or dogmas that are in the exoteric dimensions.⁶³ Ibn Arabi's view was misrepresented by William C. Chittick, because he misinterpreted Ibn Arabi's poetry in *al-Futuh al-Makiyyah* chapter 339, noting Chittick said there is no limit to the universality of the Abrahamic religions that came before Islam. Chittick said that Muslims guaranteed the freedom of other religions based on surah QS. al-Shaff: 6, QS. al-Anbiya: 25, QS. al-Nisa: 171, and QS. Thaha: 123-124.⁶⁴ Thus there should be no self-claim on the universality of the prophethood of Muhammad. Chittick wrote: "*It is true that many Muslims believe that the universality of guidance pertains only to pre Qur'anic times, but others disagree; there is no 'orthodox' interpretation here that Muslims must accept*".⁶⁵ Chittick also wrote, "*Even Ibnu 'Arabi who was not afraid to attack the limitations of the juridical and theological mentalities, often defends a literal reading of the People of the Book, without suggesting that by 'Christian' or 'Jews' the Qur'an means anyone other than the contemporary practitioners of those religions*".⁶⁶

In fact, Chittick was inspired by Ibn Arabi's poems. But did Ibn Arabi approve it? No, in fact, the explanation has been summarized in the book which turns

61 Despite the fact that the parallelization of the concept of pantheism with *wahdat al-wujud* found many contradictions between scholars, including Seyyed Hossein Nasr himself, *wahdat al-Manifest* is believed to be a substantial continuity between God and nature, so that if it is read critically, it will be understood that *Wahdat al-wujud* can be a fundamental difference between the identification of the ontological essence of divinity and the continuity of the substance and identity of God. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Three Muslims Sages*, (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 1999), 105. In Ibn Arabi's own work, the term *wahdat al-wujud* is not even found. Quoting Syamsuddin Arif, the term *wahdat al-wujud* was first introduced, most likely by Sadruddin al-Qunawi, a student and stepson of Ibn Arabi. This concept was then continuously popularized by later writers such as Ibnu Sab'in (w. 646 H/ 1248 M) and Afifudin al-Tilmisani. In conclusion, *wahdat al-wujud* is just a fragment of interpretation that is not objective and actually written in the name of Ibn Arabi. Syamsuddin Arif, *Orientalisme & Diabolisme Pemikiran*, (Depok: Gema Insani Press, 2008), 267

62 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Three Muslims Sages...*, 116

63 Ibid., 117

64 Ibid., 117

65 William C. Chittick, *Imaginal Worlds: Ibnu al-'Arabi and the Problem of the Religious Diversity*, (New York, State University of New York Press: 1994), 124

66 Ibid., 125

out to be used by Sophia Perennis followers.⁶⁷ In that work, Ibn Arabi explained the relationship of other religions with Islam. He stated that the Abrahamic religions that were revealed before the message of Prophet Muhammad must be believed to be true in their respective historical contexts.⁶⁸ Even in volume 3 chapter 36, Ibn Arabi explains if Jesus descended now, he would not lead us, but would follow the sunnah of Prophet Muhammad. So, Ibn Arabi is not a 'pluralist'. It turns out that Ibn Arabi still agrees that Jews and Christians who convert to Islam are not considered as apostates, because their teachings purely oblige to follow the teachings of Prophet Muhammad.⁶⁹ Those are some examples that can still be investigated further regarding the manipulation of Ibn Arabi's thoughts, not only limited to the legitimacy of Perennial Philosophy⁷⁰, but also other concepts of religious pluralism.⁷¹ Thus, it appears that the concept of the Trinity in Christianity means that there are three eternal persons in the essence of the One God: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. These three persons are known as the three personalities of God. In Christianity, this belief should not be called polytheism, but a model of monotheism, because the second and third persons are part of God the Father. In other words, the three are in oneness or oneness in three. Meanwhile, the concept of *wahdat al-wujud* in Islam signifies that Allah used to be in His absolute solitude. Then, He thought of Himself so that His names and attributes appeared, then He created the universe. So, the whole universe contains Allah, so that Allah is the only real existence and the universe is only His shadow. Based on this opinion, a Sufi can get out of the aspect of a creature and can unify with Allah.

CRITICISM AND RE-INTERPRETATION OF SUFISM

In the name of Sufism, many of the scholars, who are generally Sunni, reject the doctrine of *wahdat al-wujud* and the attainment of spiritual experiences that are in line with this doctrine such as *al-ittihad* and *al-hulul* because they do not understand it. The scholars who claim to defend Sufism denounce the sect

⁶⁷ According to al-Taftazani, there are two great works written by Ibn Arabi; *Al-Futuh al-Makiyyah* and *Fusush al-Hikam*, al-Taftazani, *Tasawwuf al-Islami*..., 200. These two works are in fact closely related to the Perennial Philosophy's point of view with Sufism. The first is *Fusush al-Hikam* with the concept of *wahdat al-wujud* and *Al-Futuh al-Makiyyah* with the concept of transcendent unity of religions.

⁶⁸ Muhyiddin ibn Arabi, *Al-Futuh al-Makiyyah*, Jilid 6, (Beirut: Dar Sadir), 301-302

⁶⁹ Ibid., Vol. 7, 149

⁷⁰ One of the famous Perennial Philosophy figures is Frithjof Schuon who gives a view on the unity of religions in the transcendent realm. Perennial philosophy believes in the existence of a universal eternal unity that relies on the esoteric dimensions of religions. This esoteric dimension is conceptually different from the esoteric dimension, where the esoteric dimension is an inner spiritual dimension; the esoteric dimension is the external dimension of religions in the form of rituals, or other secondary branches of religions. For more details, read Frithjof Schuon, *The Transcendent Unity of Religion*, (Illinois: Theosophical Publishing House, 1984)

⁷¹ Syamsuddin Arif, *Orientalisme dan Diabolisme Pemikiran*..., 262

which teaches the teachings of *Wahdat al-wujud* and belieg it deviates from Islam. They divide Sufism into two types: “Sunni Sufism” and “philosophical Sufism.” The first type of Sufism is Sufism considered to adhere to the Qur’an and the Sunnah. This type of Sufism, often called “*akhlaqi* Sufism” or “*amali* Sufism,” fences itself off with the Qur’an and the Sunnah while staying away from deviations that lead to heresy and disbelief. The second type of Sufism is said to not adhere to the Qur’an and the Sunnah. This type of Sufism incorporates into its teachings the philosophical elements from outside Islam, such as: Christianity, Greek, Persina, and expresses its teachings by using philosophical terms and special symbols that are difficult to understand by many people.

Sunni Sufism, as it is usually recognized by many scholars, reached its peak of perfection in al-Ghazali. He is considered a hero who contributed to the building of Sunni Sufism. He is considered successful in reconciling Sufism and orthodoxy, or between Sufism and Shari’a, so that Sufism can be accepted by Shari’a experts. The assessment that al-Ghazali was a supporter of Sunni Sufism and not a supporter of philosophical Sufism is incorrect. Al-Ghazali personally adhered to very radical esoteric and philosophical views as revealed in the *Mishkat al-Anwar*, which was intended for a limited circle of his students.⁷² The Sufism that he personally professes is philosophical Sufism, or specifically called “theosophical Sufism.” It is not surprising that people accuse al-Ghazali of being two-faced while outwardly teaching moderate Sufism which is seen as Sunni Sufism, while personally adhering to philosophical Sufism. The classification of Sufism into these two types, Sunni Sufism and philosophical Sufism, needs to be addressed with a critical note. This classification views Sufism derived from the Quran and the Sunnah is only Sunni Sufism. According to this classification, philosophical Sufism which reached its peak in Ibn Arabi is considered Sufism that deviates from the Qur’an and the Sunnah, brings *bid’ah* and heresy, because it is incompatible with Islam. Obviously, the supporters of philosophical Sufism reject the accusation that their Sufism is deviant. They view philosophical Sufism still being in line with the Qur’an and the Sunnah. The accusation arises because of a misunderstanding or inability to understand this type of Sufism. Even William C. Chittick and Michel Chodkiewicz, honestly argued that all of Ibn Arabi’s works were, in fact, none other than interpretations of the Qur’an. Ibn Arabi mentioned that the highest saints of Allah are *ahl al-qur’an* and *ahl al-haqq*. This classification is at the same time a reflection of the dislike of Sunni scholars for philosophy. This distaste has killed, or at least hindered the development of philosophy in the Islamic world.

⁷² See Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, *Misykat al-Anwar*, (Cairo: al-Dar al-Qawmiyyah, 1964)

Another criticism of Sufism is the tendency to commercialize the implementation of Sufism studies and practices. In the past, Sufism was criticized because it was considered to ignore worldly life and material pleasures. Now Sufism is criticized because it is misused to seek business-economic benefits. In the past, the Sufism that was criticized was ascetic Sufism, while now the Sufism that is being criticized is Business Sufism. In fact, Sufism does not forbid business for Sufis. Even business is a respectable job to earn a living. Many of the Sufis and members of the *tareqat* conduct business activities. It is clear that business Sufism is not the same as the business of Sufis and members of Sufi *tareqat*. The business conducted by Sufis and members of the *tareqat* is an honorable act as long as it is carried out in accordance with the Shari'a and is intended for worship and spiritual improvement. In the perspective of Sufism, the most urgent thing is to restore the sanctity of religious studies and its implications on life.⁷³ For this reason, I assert it is necessary to re-interpret Sufism in which in the modern age Sufism is not only purely transcendence-oriented to unite with God, but also the fulfillment of our responsibilities as God's caliphs who must improve fellow humans and other creatures. In other words, Sufism does not only contain a theophanic dimension of mortality, but also a profane dimension in which there are worldwide interests of fellow human beings.

Efforts to develop spiritual values should not only survive the negative influences of modernization, but also be able to affect and provide direction for the formation of a creative and dynamic religious community life. Therefore, efforts are needed. First, to develop an anticipatory attitude as an implementation of the principle of *al-muhafazah 'ala al-qadim al-shalih wa al-akhzu bi al-jadid al-ashlah* (maintaining the old good and adopting the new which is good). Second, foster a creative attitude in accordance with the principle of *iqamat al-maslahah* (building welfare). Third, combining *amali* Sufism and philosophical Sufism so that there is a balance (*tawazun*) between the practiced values and an understanding of these values. Fourth, combining monotheism, Shari'ah, and Sufism as a unit that cannot be separated so that understanding of religious issues can be fully achieved. Fifth, bringing into practice the meanings contained in the teachings of Sufism and providing precise understanding of terms that can cause misunderstandings such as *zuhud*, *hubb al-dunya* (love of the world), etc., and making new interpretations. Thus, in the future when talking about Sufis, it will no longer imply traditional people, but there are "rich Sufis and Sufis who wear a tie".⁷⁴ Re-interpretation and contextualization of the spiritual values of Sufism will be more significant

⁷³ al-Ghazali, *Ihya' Ulum al-Din*, Juz I..., 9-10

⁷⁴ "Rich Sufis and Sufis wearing a tie" is the term used by Said Agil Husain al-Munawar, *al-Qur'an Membangun Tradisi Kesalehan Hakiki*, (Ciputat pers, Jakarta, 2002), 356

if they are conducted at an applicable level in people's lives. The concept of sincerity and love, for example, will be meaningful if these Sufistic values are practiced in all aspects of social life, in the domains of politics, economy, culture, etc. Corruption, collusion, and nepotism, horizontal conflicts, disputes among the nation's offspring, as well as various other social ills will naturally decrease if this concept is socialized from an early age. How beautiful it is for the *ummah* to start a job with sincerity, and to establish relationships between fellow humans with a sense of love as the Qur'an and the Hadith recommend loving each other. However, it would be more reasonable if the application of Sufistic values in modern life was strengthened with systematic institutionalization and movement.

One thing that should be emphasized here is that Sufism in Islam is not derived from or influenced by other religions, especially Christianity. Even though there are similarities in the practices between Islamic Sufis and Christian monks, it does not mean that Islam adopted them. In the Islamic texts themselves, many implicitly teach about Sufism. The concept of asceticism in Christianity is different from *zuhud* in Islam. Asceticism in Christianity teaches more about self-sufficiency and reliance on God; the purpose of the priest resembles the *murshid* in the Islamic *tareqat*, but the priest has the authority to erase sins, while the *murshid* does not; and Christian monks refrain from marrying. Meanwhile, *zuhud* in Islam has a broader meaning, namely: staying away from worldly pursuit in order to avoid the punishment in the hereafter; stay away from worldly indulgence by considering the rewards of the hereafter; and isolating oneself not because of fear or because of hope, but because of love for Allah. Similarly are the teachings of hypostatic union in Christianity and *wahdat al-wujud* in Islam. In the teachings of Hypostatic Union (Trinity), God's relationship with humans (humans being created in the equality of God) are strongly opposed in Islamic teachings. Jesus is forever man-God as two distinct natures in one Person. The humanity and divinity of Jesus do not mix, but unite without losing their unique identity. However, from a Christian point of view, this belief should not be called polytheism. Meanwhile, *Wahdat al-wujud* in Islam teaches that Allah is one and absolute. Allah is the only real existence and the universe is only His shadow. So a Sufi can even get out of the aspect of creatureliness and can unite with God.

CONCLUSION

Sufism is a conscious activity that aims to create a direct relationship with God, which leads a person to get close or even unite with Him. Sufism is the essence of the Islamic faith, which is often extended to include Islam, faith, and

ihسان; or often referred to as *shari'ah*, *tareqat*, and *hakiqat*; or called '*ibadah*,' *ubudiyah*, and '*ubudah*'. In Islam there is no clerical system as in Christianity. Islamic Sufis did not transform Sufism from Christianity or other religions because Sufism is related to human instincts. In addition, the human soul is one despite different societies and nations. The similarities of the practice of *zuhud* do not serve as the reason that Sufism is rooted in Christianity. The concept of *wahdat al-wujud* or transcendent unity in Christianity also has similarities with Islam. The differences between the two lie in the esoteric and exoteric dimensions. However, al-Junaid and al-Ghazali limited the *maqam* of Sufism to only *mahabbah* and *marifah*, a stage of *maqam* that still places humans in their own concrete consciousness. Thus, there is still a distance between man and God. In this modern era, there is a need for a re-interpretation of Sufism, in which Sufism is not only purely oriented towards transcendence to unite with God, but also the fulfillment of our responsibilities as God's caliphs who must improve fellow humans and other creatures. In other words, Sufism not only contains a theophanic dimension of mortality, but also a profane dimension in which there are worldwide interests of fellow human beings.

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THE ROLES OF PARENTS FOR CHILDREN'S FAITH EDUCATION: A CATECHIZATION REVIEW

Lukas Ahen

STAKat Negeri Pontianak, Indonesia

Email: *ahenlukas66@gmail.com*

Cenderato

STAKat Negeri Pontianak, Indonesia

Email: *Cenderato67@gmail.com*

Arius Arifman Halawa

STAKat Negeri Pontianak, Indonesia

Email: *Arif_hlw@yahoo.co.id*

ABSTRACT

This study aims to determine the extent to which parents at Stasi Santo Andreas Binjai, Parish of Santo Mikael Tanjung Baung, Sintang Diocese have played their role as educators of the faith of their children in the Industrial Revolution Era 4.0. This paper explores the obstacles faced by parents and how to overcome these obstacles to carry out their roles as faith educators for their children. This study uses a qualitative descriptive method that describes all the symptoms or conditions that exist. The data collection was conducted using three techniques: direct observation with observation guidance, direct communication through dialogue, and/or direct communication with participants to collect research data using tools (interview guides and documentary studies with visuals) during the study as evidence that researchers took to the field to conduct research. Based on the results, it is known that parents are not yet fully aware of their duties and responsibilities as the first and foremost faith educators for their children. Instead, the responsibility of fostering children's faith is mostly left to schools and churches as institutions (administrators of Stasi and Parish Churches). Lack of time for parents to be with their children and lack of understanding and awareness of parents about their duties and responsibilities in their children's faith education are inhibiting factors. The question exists, how to overcome the obstacles parents face as faith educators for their children. Many parents try to take advantage of family time (although it is limited) to give advice and practical teachings as a form of practical family catechesis, monitor children's activities, and encourage their children to take part in church activities.

Keywords: Role of Parents, Family Catechesis, Faith Educator

INTRODUCTION

In the era of the fourth generation of Industrial Revolution 4.0, the development of science and technology has changed the way people think and behave. The integration of technology and utilization of the internet has become so sophisticated, that we encounter a new world order. This shifting cultural landscape is characterized by digital technology so that distance and place become smaller, as it alters the characteristics of culture, behavior, and communication between human beings. Parents' roles for their children are very essential, as their kids grow in faith depending on parental influences. Previous research by Jerry Lawrence entitled: "Forming Faith in Families: A Survey of The Parents and Children of Dallas Bible Church" discussed parents' roles generally, before noting their role specifically in religion. In this study, all roles related to children's faith were discussed (Komkat KWI, 2016).

One of the characteristics that characterizes this new culture is digitalization of all media content (Komkat KWI, 2015:24-35). The content is converted into numbers to be easily stored and distributed to various networks. With a simple tap or swipe of the fingers on these tools, people can reach the whole world. This digitization changes people's behavior in packaging and managing information. According to Waliyuddin (2019:176) social media plays a more important role than newspaper and television, and "trendicity" seems particularly valuable for Millennials. Viral, trending topics, and popular viewed photos and phrases prove to show their legitimacy. This phenomenon leaves behind humans who are only able to use it as a device without many features. Messages can be distributed multiplexing, meaning they are forwarded in varying types and in large quantities to all corners of the world. The advancement of the internet in the digital age allows the occurrence of virtual interpersonal communication through computer screens, smartphones, tablets, and more. This communication is virtual because it is still surface level despite presenting a falsified reality.

The digital age with the above characteristics affects families. Permana (2019) notes the family shares in the prophetic mission by proclaiming the word of God so that the family becomes increasingly believing and apostolic, making the gospel a way of life in it. This generation's children develop differently from that of previous generations, with the problem of social interaction that moves from direct interaction to interaction in cyberspace. Such developments cannot be denied, but children as a new generation will face the results of the development of the industrial revolution (Ruat Diana, 2019:27). Therefore, parents need to perform their function as educators for their children to face the challenges of the industrial revolution. Parents are the closest family to

the children, so they should inform their children's faith as early as possible to be in accordance with the expectations of the Church. All Catholic families go to great lengths to make their family a small Church where Catholic life is manifested in the family sphere. The duties and functions of preaching are carried out with faith education for their sons and daughters, sanctification can occur through prayer, worship, and mutual devotion in the family. Likewise, the duty of fellowship and service is manifested in the form of service to each other. Finally, the function of martyrdom can be implemented through the testimony of a joyful life, so that as in the First Church the whole family is liked by everyone. A community of believers as described in Acts 2:41-47 and 4:32-37.

According to researchers, family catechisms are suitable to help people raise awareness of children's faith education in the family. By the family catechesis, it is expected that parents can realize duties and responsibilities as educators to balance their children's lives spiritually and physically, fostering children's faith to grow to maturity. Dewantara (2011) notes that delivering the message of the salvation of Jesus Christ to all men is exercised through catechesis. Thus, researchers intend to conduct research in Stasi Santo Andreas Binjai, Santo Mikael Tanjung Baung Parish, Diocese of Sintang and give thought through family catechization so families are more aware of how important the education of children's faith in the family in this era of Industrial Revolution.

In general, parents educate their children as best they can, both physically by paying attention to their physical health; socially by paying attention to associations and manners; and psychologically by nurturing the development of behavior and mentality to the growth of faith by paying attention to the spiritual facet. However, in the midst of the development of information technology affecting all age groups including children, parents are required to conduct education in a clear family context related to the child's faith, because parents are the first real faith educators. In the family, the faith of the child is realized through the mini Church. Based on such exposure, there are four questions that will be examined in this study: What are the roles of parents for their children's faith education in Stasi Santo Andreas Binjai Parish of Santo Mikael Tanjung Baung, Diocese of Sintang? Has the role of parents been carried out properly in accordance with the Family Catechization in the Era of Industrial Revolution 4.0? What are the obstacles faced by parents in carrying out their role as faith educators of their children in the Era of Industrial Revolution 4.0 in Stasi Santo Andreas Binjai Parish of Santo Mikael Tanjung Baung, Diocese of Sintang? How should parents overcome obstacles to carry out their role as faith educators of their children in the Era of Industrial

Revolution 4.0 in Stasi Santo Andreas Binjai Parish Santo Mikael Tanjung Baung, Diocese of Sintang?

REPOSITIONING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION ERA 4.0 FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN'S FAITH

The Industrial Revolution 4.0 is a change marked by rapid production activities relying on the internet for implementation. Various equipment operates by itself or automatically. This industrial revolution not only affects the industrial or production sector, but also has a holistic impact on human life (Daniel Fajar Panimbing, et al, 2019: 196). The industrial revolution 4.0 is marked by the presence of various technologies that combine the physical, digital, and biological worlds through robots, mobile computer devices, artificial intelligence, digitalization of services are used, and so on. In this era, humans will be able to communicate with each other by utilizing internet technology known as the "internet of things." The development of an era characterized by automation and digitization has a huge impact on children's character. The very large technological development is also called the era of big data, where people are given easy, fast access and information can be enjoyed by everyone. However, this presents a big challenge. It is feared that interpersonal communication will decline in quality, including communication essential for children's education (Daniel Fajar Panimbing, et al, 2019: 196). As a result, a parent's role in educating children has never been more important to be applied by parents.

According to Prasetya (2014: 24-25), children live and grow according to the times that exist and develop as children of the times. The current times dramatically influence and control their lives, so that children tend to be selfish, hedonistic, consumeristic, and controlled by instant culture. Faced with this situation, parents should not just complain, or give up hope in properly educating their children, but instead display responsibility. They must be able to educate their children properly, correctly, and responsibly in all areas of life.

PARENTS AS FAITH EDUCATORS

The duty of parents to educate their children is emphasized in the Apostolic Exhortation of Pope John Paul II, *Familiaris Consortio*: "The rights and obligations of parents to educate are essential because they are related to the distribution of human life. In addition, the rights and obligations of parents are primary and primary to the participation of others in education, because of the privileges of the loving relationship between parents and children." After all, these rights and obligations are irreplaceable and cannot be taken over,

and therefore cannot be fully handed over to others or taken away by them (Maurice, 2001: 157). As educators first and foremost, parents must educate their children themselves. They are truly responsible for their children's education and this should not be given to their grandparents, because the responsibility for children's education cannot be replaced and taken over by other parties.

Parents carry out their responsibilities until the child reaches adulthood and can determine their life path responsibly to have religious life and a family. "Through education, children should be nurtured in such a way so that when they become adults they are able to fully fulfill their calling. It also means that if they later commit themselves to marriage, they will be able to build their own family under favorable moral, social and economic conditions" (GS Art. 52). It is the responsibility of men to lead children to maturity and self-reliance in faith. According to Stefanus Tay and Ingrid Listiati (2011) there are at least eight roles of parents in faith education: first, getting children to pray together and accompanying children to receive the sacraments. Parents should teach their children to pray because prayer is the breath of faith. Under any circumstances, either unfortunate or happy, we need to pray. In a state of joy, we give thanks to God, while in distress we ask for His help. Parents should also take care when their children are accompanied and led to receive the sacraments, particularly when infants receive the Sacrament of Baptism. When their understanding and understanding are adequate (about fourth grade), the child is sent to receive the Eucharist by receiving First Communion. When they reach adulthood, the parents send their child to receive the Sacrament of Confirmation.

Second, parents cultivate an atmosphere of love and togetherness at home. By creating an atmosphere of love and joy, parents encourage their children to become individuals who are social and able to make friends with everyone. Parents are obliged to create an atmosphere of love, because love is the soul of children's education, which is accompanied by kindness, service, impartiality, loyalty, and sacrifice. If we look at the surrounding context, it can be seen there have been too many broken marriages. Many of these individuals are trapped in drugs and free sex, and even have been imprisoned. These people were born into Catholic families, but eventually converted to another church, another religion, or maybe have become atheists. This is the condition experienced by parents today, the root of which is that the parents are not sufficiently carrying out Christian faith education for their children as early as possible. Today, instilling Christian faith in children is even more difficult, because world conditions now often conflict with Christian values.

Third, parents must cultivate Christian virtues such as: forgiving the mistakes of others, learning to apologize when guilty, mutual respect, sharing, helping others, comforting others, caring for the needy (especially the weak, sick, and poor) and willing to sacrifice for the good of people. Fourth, parents are obliged to convey the essential values in human life. These values include justice that respects human dignity, the law of love (self-giving), comprehensive sexuality education (a person with a body, emotion and spirit), education about chastity, and moral education that ensures children act with full responsibility. Fifth, parents must be able to provide faith teaching at every opportunity that is delivered attractively, as the teaching of faith does not have to be in the form of formal education. Daily events can be used as moments of faith education. For example, the experience of falling from a bicycle can be used as a lesson to teach that we too can fall into sins and mistakes at any time. The moral is: even though you fall, you are still excited to get up and continue cycling. Likewise, our lives can still rise again to repent and organize a better life.

Sixth, parents must be responsible for fortifying children against the bad effects of the surrounding environment. Because of the strong negative influence of social media and modern culture, parents must pay attention to not bestow negative influences on their children. Too much playing games, watching TV, using Facebook, and other social media, which contain elements of violence and sadism, for example, can stimulate aggressive attitudes in children. Parents must allow their children to socialize in the real world rather than in cyberspace so they can socialize well with others. Seventh, people must be able to direct their children to offer themselves and the talents they have for them. Eighth, parents must direct their children to find their calling in life to achieve true happiness. The calling of family life and the calling of celibacy to the Kingdom of God (by becoming Priests / Pastors, monks, and nuns) are equally noble and noble. From an early age the children have been given the perspective, guidance and understanding of the nobility of the vocation of a Christian life: family life, like the family that is currently living, or other ways of life, namely giving themselves completely to God, serving God with total surrender to the glory of God.

PARENTS AS CHRIST PRESENTING

The role of parents in instilling faith is crucial. Parents who deeply care about faith education will produce children with faith as well. On the other hand, parents who do not care about faith will produce faithless children. It can thus be concluded that parents have an important role in instilling faith in children. Pope John Paul II in his *Familiaris Consortio* Apostolic Exhortation

emphasized that “Parents educate, rooted in the primary vocation of husband and wife to participate in God’s creative work”. By awakening in and for the love of a new person, who in him carries a call to grow and develop himself, the family is at the same time able to assist them effectively to live a human life to its fullest (FC. 36) This sentence emphasizes that parents have the obligation and right to educate their children and have the duty to support children with love.

The function of the family is to present Christ both among the members of the family itself and to the general public. Why is the family identified with a mini church? Of course, this is motivated by the concrete reality that the main elements which form the foundation of the Church, namely unity (*unio*), communion (*communio*), love, and community are the main dimensions that always exist in family life. It is in the midst of the family that the essence of the life of the Church is shown: fellowship, service, accompaniment (kerygma element), sanctification, and testimony of life. With a family life that is mutually serving, harmonious (*rukun*), fellowshipping in prayer and diligently studying the Word, and radiating happiness among the faithful and the wider community of the Christian family carrying out its duties as a “Mini Church.” The process of creating these people takes place in and through the family (Lumen Gentium Art. 11). It can therefore be said that the first and foremost duty of the family is to form a community. Family is a fellowship between individuals who give, complement each other, and hope in infinite love (Gaudium Et Spes Art. 48). The family consists of several individuals who have intense reciprocal relationships. These relationships include those of husband, wife, and children. The relationship occurs in relation to blood relations (nuclear family), which is based on love as a unity of life. The relationship that occurs between parents and their children is not only human (blood relationship) but also spiritual in nature, namely the relationship of love itself.

PARENTS AS LOVE GIVERS

As a private community, the family needs to continuously build a more authentic community based on love (Maurice, 2001: 28). Without love, family cannot grow, develop, nor perfect oneself as a living private community. Love is the foundation and building block for family relationships. Love between family members gives strength and depth to family life. With a foundation of deep love, each member of the family has the responsibility to construct the family as a community of individuals. Responsibility is built on the awareness that we need other people’s lives so we can live too. Every member of the family

needs each other to live, grow and develop as authentic human persons.

A family that builds its life on the basis of love is a place where every family member is respected and appreciated with dignity and high value as a person who is in the image of God. On the basis of love, a man and a woman build a commitment to live together as husband and wife. They accept each other while uniting their hearts and whole life by complementing each other. They are united personally and intimately in the bond of the Sacrament of Marriage. In its capacity as an interpersonal fellowship, the family needs to give special attention to children by developing a deep respect for their personality. Concern for children lasts before the child is born until the child reaches adulthood. Therefore, education on Christian values and essential human values from an early age is necessary so that children can develop into archetypal Christian human beings. Husbands and wives need to accompany the development of their children in walking through these stages of development. By paying attention to the process of child development, the husband and wife learn to be good and responsible fathers and mothers. This could be a factor in the accelerated development of the child into adulthood.

PARENTS AS PARTNERS

Family catechesis also aims to create a dialogue between parents by portraying them as genuine conversational partners with their children. This emphasis is placed on a concerted effort to deepen and live their own faith to gain a clearer view of their duties and responsibilities as first and foremost educators for their children. Based on Setyawan's studies (2014), parents are the first partner who has the opportunity to introduce the reality of life to children and be the first educator who teaches truth. Consequently, they are also the first who should personally introduce God and guide his children to believe in Him. Everyone who has received the sacraments of baptism and chrism are entitled and obliged to take part in preaching and mission tasks in Church. In this case, parents too have the right and the obligation to take part in the task of preaching and mission in the church, including the proclamation of family.

Parents are the first partner and foremost educators for children from birth to adulthood. In the process of forming morals and religion, character, personality, cultural values, and simple skills, the mother's role as a first educator must be a model for children, meaning that parents should also have moral and religious values that can be shown to children. The data showed that there were several obstacles faced by parents in carrying out their role as a child's faith educator including the family condition. Most argue that a calm, harmonious, religious, and family situation that supports and motivates

the child will greatly help the development of the child's faith so that the child's faith can grow and be resilient against life's challenges. Parents also set an excellent example for their children because children can easily learn or imitate the conditions of the house. Therefore, whenever parents (adults) are having issues, they should be resolved without the children knowing. Even if both parents are angry, both parents cultivate pretend harmony. In fact, there are some families who, because of the lack of harmony between husband and wife, cause the child's faith education to be unprofitable. As a result, these children's spiritual life is not developed.

Parents' business also affects the development of children's faith, as was revealed by several respondents. These groups include parents who are always busy working - especially parents who are entrepreneurs and/or gardeners. These groups do not have much time for children even though children need their assistance. Sometimes children are more entrusted with their grandparents or grandmothers, for their faith education they entrust them to the teachers at school. These parents work to provide for the family. Even though they realize that they are busy, but there is no intention to change, they are still busy. According to the researcher, there is a sense of uncertainty in parents who feel busy, because every time they participate in environmental activities, many remind them that children's faith education is very important but on the other hand they work to find money to meet the needs of life, including the needs of children, so parents hope their children appreciate their hard work.

The economic situation of the people in the Stasi Santo Andreas Binjai consists of the middle class whose economy partly consists of civil servants and private employees. While people who are economically lower-class work as farmers in oil palm and rubber plantations. The results from 25 respondents consisting of 17 fathers and 8 mothers are listed in the following table 1.

Table 1: Respondent Identity

No	Statements	Total (X)	% (X/N x 100)
Parents:			
1.	a. Fathers	17	68 %
	b. Mothers	8	32 %
Age:			
2.	a. 30 - 40 years	9	36 %
	b. 40 - 50 years	6	24 %
	c. 50 - 60 years	7	28 %
	d. 60 - 70 years	3	12 %

It is seen in Table 1 of the number of respondents, 25 people, consisting of

fathers and mothers. The number of respondents was divided into two with the number of 17 respondent fathers and 8 respondent mothers. From the data entered in table 1, the age of respondents is mostly 30-40 years with a percentage of 36%. This is because the families in Stasi Santo Andreas Binjai are the majority of new families, and also that comes at the time of data collection of the majority of new families who have been married for more than 5 years. On the other hand, there are respondents who say that no matter how busy they are, they must always be close to the child, enabling the child to freely convey his/her heart. There are some respondents who say that they should always encourage children to be active in Church assistance, spiritual activities in the environment, Sunday School or PIA, PIR, OMK so that children get good faith assistance so that what is obtained in the environment can be developed later if the children are adults.

CONCLUSION

Based on the results of the research and discussion, researchers draw the following conclusions: the role of parents for the faith education of their children in the Stasi Santo Andreas Binjai Parish of Santo Mikael Tanjung Baung, Diocese of Sintang has not been carried out by parents adequately as it should. Parents only play a small role in teaching their children to pray, encouraging children to go to church, and being invited to environmental activities. Researchers felt that most of the respondents indicated that the development and mentoring of children's faith was less noticed by both parents, because parents were less directly involved in coaching, they only reminded children to pray, be active in Church activities, or the environment. However, they did not monitor intensively, because parents were busy with work, so that the development of their children's faith was less developed. For all, if the parents do not play their roles as well, their children's faiths will not be building well too.

Awareness of assistance to children's faith in accordance with the Family Catechization in the Era of Industrial Revolution 4.0 is not fully owned by parents in Stasi Santo Andreas Binjai. Most parents feel that with the opinion of religious education in school and faith assistance in Sunday school, this is a sufficient provision for their children's faith education. In this case, the parents hand over their children's faith education responsibilities to school institutions and Church institutions. In fact, the responsibility of faith education of the main and first children is in the parents. With the assistance of parents in faith education children can be a solid basis in planting the seeds of good in the family, so that the personality of the child is also well formed and gives the

growth of the child's faith towards the maturity of faith.

There are various obstacles for parents in educating children's faith in Stasi Santo Andreas Binjai. First is the lack of time to gather with family. Busy parents cause communication and relationships between family members to be reduced and the distance between children and parents, children will be more comfortable playing, telling stories with peers than at home or children prefer to play on computers, mobile phones, or television, because parents forget to remind children to pray or learn. Second, there is a difference of opinion between the parents in educating their children. This can be seen from one of the parents who closely supervises their children to use the time to learn and do other useful activities, while others pamper their children by playing games and mobile phones that waste time. Third, technological advances inhibit the role of parents in children's faith education. Children waste time with videos, games, and other spectacles through mobile phones and television screens. Fourth, parents' lack of knowledge, understanding, and insight into the teachings of the Catholic faith as a result of lack of parental education is a factor hampering children's faith education. The lack of understanding of parents will make the elderly less able to bring their children to develop their faith towards the maturity of faith.

The efforts of parents in Stasi Santo Andreas to overcome the obstacles they face in carrying out their role as faith educators of their children in the Era of Industrial Revolution 4.0 are seen from, among others: reminding children constantly not to overuse mobile phones such as limiting the time or hours when they can use mobile phones, controlling children in getting along by prohibiting children from hanging out with children who like to be erratic, and never tiring of advising their children while practicing patience. Parents are also getting closer to God in order to invite children to be close to God, as well as encouraging children to be active in church activities and play an active role in society. Researchers suggest a recollection for families with the theme of parent role in the family so that parents can be more aware and live their duties and responsibilities in providing education and faith assistance for children continuously and sustainably in the family.

Cadreization needs to be held for catechists both in the environment and in the Church with the theme of the duties and responsibilities of parents so that the catechists increasingly have the ability and insight in accompanying married couples. The author hopes that the thoughts that the author contributes can inspire in an effort to improve the quality of child faith assistance. The need to maximize the Family Section in the Parish as well as in the Stasi, in order to create and implement a sustainable exit coaching program. For example, there

are coaching and mentoring programs that are routine for married couples (married couples) for the marriage age group under five years, marriage age 5-10 years, marriage age 11-20 years, and so on. In such development groups are always reminded of their duties and responsibilities in educating their children's faith. The couples are also provided with adequate knowledge, skills, and insights so as to be able to carry out their duties and responsibilities as the first and foremost educators for their children.

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WOMEN IN PUBLIC SPHERE AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ISLAMIC SHARIA IN ACEH

Sri Roviana

Faculty of Islamic Education, Universitas Ahmad Dahlan, Yogyakarta

Email: roviaanamitra@yahoo.com

Wening Udasmoro

Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta

Email: udasmoro@ugm.ac.id

Euis Nurlaelawati

Faculty of Sharia and Law, Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga,

Yogyakarta

Email: euis.nurlaelawati@uin-suka.ac.id

ABSTRACT

This article discusses several activities intended for Acehese women after the implementation of Islamic sharia. Activities aimed at women in public spaces have an impact on the marginalization and narrowing of women's public spaces. This article also explicitly provides an overview and analysis of what actually happened to Acehese women so that it appears that there is a problem of the domination of male power over women based on religious, cultural, and political arguments. The purpose of this article is for the public to understand that the Aceh government has made policies aimed at women in the public sphere with the support of Wilayatul Hisbah, which has an impact on the marginalization of women. It is found that after the implementation of Islamic law in 2001 until now, in Aceh, there have been domestication of women with various regulations (qonuns) as well as text interpretations which are used as legitimacy by the power of conservative ideology on progressive understanding. This article makes Aceh a focus area. This article is based on the literature as a secondary source as well as interviews with experts.

Keywords: Women, Domestication, Public Sphere, Islamic Law

INTRODUCTION

Aceh in 2005 is Aceh which has changed from before the Tsunami. The application of Islamic law from 2001 to 2004 has greatly affected women's daily lives. The headscarf and the way to dress the Acehese people are regulated in the *qanuns* of Islamic law. Conflicts between GAM and the Aceh government and residents often occur (Afrianty 2017). However, after the 2005 Tsunami

hit Aceh, there were significant changes in people's lives. Many Acehnese people no longer question Islamic law and GAM.

The community members are busy reconstructing houses that were hit by the Tsunami waves, work affairs, and declining welfare. Social conflicts have decreased because they are no longer the primary concern of community members, especially between GAM and the government. After the transformation of GAM power from Malik Mahmud in 2005 to Zaini Abdullah, there was a power struggle to unite the GAM forces in Aceh, even though this was difficult to happen (Jones 2015).

However, the condition of women remains disadvantaged politically, economically, and culturally. In the public sphere, women are still unable to occupy an equal position with dominant men, have power and become a reference in decision making. Therefore, what is needed is not only for women to be in the public sphere but also for progressive thinking because of institutionalized conservatism's dominance. However, for women to be involved in decision-making, supportive, progressive, and affirmative political conditions are needed to become the power of civil society. This is because women are part of politics and religious power. Women are not only objects of political decisions of power (Sirry 2010).

In reality, in Aceh, women are an essential part of the "object of control" for implementing Islamic Sharia. Aceh women, in many cases, are marginalized. Sharia Perda policies tend to be characterized by policing from a male perspective. There is a close relationship between the Sharia Perda, which characterizes Aceh's specialty, and Acehnese women's experiences. This can be seen from the vital perspective of men in policing women through sharia qanuns. The forms of restraint are in the form of several mandatory hijab recommendations, prohibition of *khalwat*, prohibition of watching entertainment that displays genitals, separate class rules for men and women, prohibition of riding behind one's back while sitting facing the front, prohibition of wearing tight trousers (stretch) when members of the community. Entering government offices, prohibition of sitting at the same table without a mahram, prohibition of watching cinemas, concerts with mixed seating arrangements for men and women, and prohibition of watching films deemed inconsistent with sharia (Perempuan 2010, 10–13).

Such conditions have been going on since Aceh Province after enacting the Special Autonomy Law (Law Number 22/1999 on Regional Autonomy), which enforces several Regional Regulations of a local nature, for example, Aceh Qanun No. pervert), which indirectly leads to the regulation of the female body. The formal implementation of Islamic Sharia in various regions

is characterized by making women the target of sharia regulations, such as *khalwat* regulation (*qanun khalwat*). Women do experience a robust process of marginalization in many ways in their daily lives. Socializing, sitting, dressing, and traveling are also objects of the Special Autonomy Law.

SHARIATISATION AND DOMESTICATION OF WOMEN IN PUBLIC SPHERE

Shariatization and Domes Regarding women's position in the public sphere, several countries with a majority Muslim population, such as Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Al-Jazeera, have made changes in interpreting sacred texts are considered to restrict or place women in the public sphere. This, of course, affects the reinterpretation of sacred texts and fiqh, which places women in a marginal or domesticated position. Therefore, it is necessary to re-examine the construction of Islamic sharia in Aceh of Women in Public Spaces (Cherif 2010).

Interpretation of sacred texts related to Islamic Law needs to be carried out by scholars because, in many cases, women cannot get full access to engage in public activities. Even for problems related to private matters, many women cannot get their rights to the fullest, such as marriage, dowry, and divorce. In terms of participation, women do not get the same opportunities as men. Likewise, in marriage, for example, the matter of dowry, the dominant role is men. Women only receive what is given from men. The saddest thing is the understanding that dowry is the money a woman buys to become his wife. This is, of course, related to issues of gender justice. The woman is entirely in the control of a man. Even though there have been many changes in understanding several texts, the facts on the ground still prove that marriage's dominant problem is the male party. This will be seen in the issue of inheritance (Shaughness 2009).

Even the problems of women in Indonesia, including in Aceh, are also related to transgender (queer) problems as part of society. Transgender issues in Indonesia, including in Aceh, are not unreal. They are real but often get unequal treatment from actors who enforce Islamic law (Davies 2010). Transgender (queer) is seen as a group of people who are "less perfect," even though they are God's creatures who were both born on earth. They are part of the diversity of society in Islam. The diversity of the people of Aceh should get the attention of government officials. The state is not allowed to treat its citizens in a discriminatory manner. Based on religious reasons, however.

Women become subordinate to men. The rights to file for divorce were also lost. In the matter of polygamy, women also experience a very powerless position. A divorce suit is considered as "belonging to men," not women. The issue of

polygamy is a daily problem in Indonesian Muslim communities, including in Aceh (Nurmila 2009). Nurmila clearly explained that many women were polygamous because of the issue of male sexual desire, not because of fundamental reasons such as the permission of a wife who had pregnancy problems, chronic illness so that she could not conceive, and other religious reasons. Men practice polygamy often without the knowledge of their first and second wives. Women refuse to be polygamous, so they choose divorce (Nurmila 2009, 108–12). Here scholars in Muslim countries have reinterpreted Islamic law as applied in society. This is also done in Aceh because some women's problems have become marginal due to the wrong interpretation of Islamic sharia. After all, men feel authoritative. (Cherif 2010, 114).

The issue of women has become a concern of many Muslim scholars because it is an important issue. If it is not paid attention to, it will foster conflict between Islamists and progressives in understanding sharia. Important issues regarding women can affect the family, society, and the regulations to be established in society. The Muslim community, especially women, become citizens who experience discrimination on religion-based regulations. Even though there was a tug of war about political interests. As happened in Iran, the problem of the headscarf, Tunisia, Al-Geria, is full of political power interests. Something like that can happen in Muslim countries like Indonesia. Therefore, it is necessary to integrate a progressive understanding of Islamic sharia with society's needs (Moghadam 2003).

Changes in the interpretation of Islamic sharia, which are interesting to note, are matters relating to the perspective on Islamic sharia in economics, sociology, history, and political science studies. This is related to women's position in having their rights as women, which are sometimes less accommodated in the public sphere. Many studies and researches reveal that the essence of women's problems is connected to economic problems, the influence of religious understanding by elites and politicians to affect society at large. Women are influenced by their position in public organizations and employment opportunities. Public opinion is awakened that women activists are less obedient to religion and justice regarding their rights as citizens. From all views like this, it is clear that men's perspective (point of view) is affected by gender bias in seeing women. This is detrimental to women's rights in the public sphere (Mesquita dan Downs 2005).

We can pay attention to Islamic sharia's main objectives implemented in Aceh after the political reform in 1998, which took place since 2001, namely when Special Autonomy was implemented until now. The government of Abdurahman Wahid (Gus Dur) gave a "gift of Islamic sharia" to Aceh as a

political gift to dampen the desire for independence and separation from Indonesia (Ichwan 2013; Kloos 2013). Presumably, enforcement of Islamic sharia in Aceh, as a form of resistance against the central government that is considered infidels, not sharia run correctly (Ichwan 2013).

The implementation of Islamic sharia has several objectives; first, Islamic sharia as a solution to the conflict between Aceh and the Jakarta (Central) government. The central government implemented Islamic sharia as an independent policy obtained by Aceh due to economic exploitation, human rights violations, politics, and natural resources. Islamic Sharia is also a concern for the central government in the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) to demand Aceh's independence. Second, the implementation of Islamic sharia in Aceh is expected to reduce the horizontal social conflicts. Conflict due to criminal problems such as rape, prostitution, and drunkenness. Therefore, Islamic sharia is implemented to maintain public morality in Aceh so that there is no deviation of power and deviant behavior from society. Islamic Sharia is applied to create justice and create good relations between the center and the regions (Aceh). Third, Islamic sharia is implemented because it adopts original elements from the Acehnese people with a religion that the people of Aceh believe. This is because, objectively, Aceh is a province with a majority Muslim population (98.2%) of the total population of Aceh (Abubakar 2005, 129).

Regarding the implementation of Islamic law, unfortunately, there are differences between sharia enforcers and ordinary people who are the object of sharia targets. The implementation of Islamic sharia is a concern of many scholars because of frequent deviations between ideal goals and practice. Contradictions over the implementation of Islamic sharia are a particular problem in Aceh (ICG 2006).

In terms of the implementation of Islamic sharia, it is not only happening in Indonesia. It has also occurred in Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Malaysia as a global phenomenon of Islamism since the Iranian Islamic revolution. Since the 2000s, Islamism has grown to Indonesia as a movement of *Islamic Populism*. It is political than many scholars engaging (Hadiz 2016). In Indonesia, a Muslim country in the world, discussion on Islamic Law is very popular.

The discussion on the defense of Islamic sharia by Muslim scholars has been quite intensive. Of the total Muslim population countries in the world in 45 Muslim-majority countries, 30 of them are in the territory of countries where Muslims are a minority, especially in non-Muslim countries. Religion, such as the hijab (veil), is a study that continues to develop until now. The Muslim population is in a very diverse area, and they wear Muslim clothes, carry out

Islamic rituals, and want to be part of public activities such as being active in politics and working to continue to get attention so that Muslim women do not get discriminated against politically, economically and culturally. Therefore, there is a need to place Muslim women visible in public political activities (Offenhauer dan Buchalter 2005).

The placement of women in public spaces equal between men and women when linked to a sociological perspective can be found there is a progressive feminist perspective that provides space for women to be active in the public sphere. Women have the same rights in politics as men. In the study of feminist sociology, women's issues must continue to be a concern, becoming a present and future discipline so that women do not experience political marginalization. This is a kind of migration from women's studies into women's studies (gender studies) to become mainstream (Delamont 2003, 114–17).

The issue of a veil similar to a veil can be categorized as cultural. However, currently, there is an Islamic deculturization movement that is sweeping the Islamic community. Islamic expressions that coincide with culture can be found in the Sasak Muslim community in Lombok, Kutai Muslims in East Kalimantan, Banjar Muslims in Banjarmasin, and Muslims Yogyakarta Java. It is not easy for them to leave traditions passed down from generation to generation because, in society, nothing is against Islamic law. Therefore, when there was a prohibition from Wahhabism to express Islam culture, they could not accept Wahhabism that had developed in the last ten years. Some Javanese, Kalimantan, and Lombok Muslims have to give up their cultural identity in wearing long beards, wearing turbans, robes, and hijabs. There is a struggle between Indonesian Muslims and Wahabism in Indonesia. This includes Aceh, which promotes Islamic sharia in society (Hamdi 2019, 108).

In Wahabi's own body, there is conflict. They do not support each other but go their separate ways. This has led to claims that they are the most correct in preaching Islam. This is also the case for Wahhabism in South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, Yogyakarta and Aceh. Some conflicts between fellow Wahhabists give a sign that Islam is not a single religious sect. Some belief in what is considered to be his missionary mission. Even the majority of Wahabi congregations support the existence of religious purification and purification in the field of fiqh. In the case of the unavailability of Wahabi to accommodate local traditions, it shows that Wahabism does not care about the local context. This locality causes Wahabism to conflict with the people of Aceh, Yogyakarta, and Banjarmasin (Hamdi 2019, 176).

The development of wearing the headscarf with the hijab (covering his face) is one of the impacts of understanding Wahabism developed in Aceh. At

first, Acehese women wore the hijab as Javanese women wore a veil with visible and visible hair. However, in its development, women's headscarf is the headscarf which is often referred to as the *syar'i* hijab. There are various prohibitions against women, such as riding motorized vehicles straddlingly, women getting involved in politics, women going out at night. All of this is the influence of Wahabism that has developed in Aceh because in the view of Wahhabism women are not taught or ordered to be active in the public sphere. Women must cover all their limbs because women's bodies and even women's voices are understood as genitals (Abubakar 2005).

Related to the veil, which has recently become a trend among Indonesian Muslim women by some Islamic groups, exceptionally moderate Islamic groups, such as Muhammadiyah and NU, do not teach Muslim women to wear the veil is a serious debate. The veil is understood by moderate Muslim groups as a culture of Arab society and not sharia because there is no valid basis (authentic) either in the Qur'an or in the hadith that instructs Muslim women to wear the veil instead of women wearing a headscarf or hijab. (Gunawan dan Ilyas 2018).

Several essential notes regarding wearing the headscarf, veil, and various women's accessories in Aceh described in this section can be said to be a model or method of domestication of women in the public sphere with forced religious reasoning arguments. A conservative version of religious reasoning and even Wahabism dominated in Aceh during the implementation of Islamic sharia, so it seems clear that women must be controlled and laid off. Women are not in the public sphere but in the domestic sphere, which is considered their nature. Problems of marriage, child care, divorce all place women in a subordinate condition to male superiority.

WOMEN NOT WORKING IN PUBLIC, BUT DOMESTIC

The Wahhabis in Aceh believe that women are not allowed to be active in the public space. Women do not work as breadwinners. In the view of the Wahhabis, women are housewives and do not leave the household. Women to work in the domestic sphere. Meanwhile, men are in the public domain. Such placement can be said to be a struggle for public space (contested public sphere). Things like that happen in Muslim-majority countries such as Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Indonesia. This kind of battle is a struggle for identity between men and women in the political space (Spiegel 2010).

The position of women in Islam has never been as low as often depicted in public space. Islam came to elevate the dignity of all humankind. Especially

women. The promotion of women in Islam had taken place when Islam was revealed to the ignorant Arab society. They consider women as “half-human” so that they are like merchandise that can be exchanged for plus and rented just like that between fellow men and tribal (ethnic) heads. Islam came to liberate such things with humanity’s teachings, which implements the teachings of monotheism that free human beings from all kinds of shackles born of human beings. Tawhid is a concrete form of Islamic respect for women that is only poorly understood in depth. There is a lot of gender bias in understanding the values of humanity in the teachings of Tawhid. However, most understand that monotheism is a principle of Islamic teachings that is only related to human worship of God alone. There are no other dimensions (Mulia 2008, 112–13).

Considering such matters, it is necessary to reinterpret various principal values in Islam so that this religion is understood textually and for the benefit of certain groups. Here, it is necessary to have *ijtihad* carried out continuously according to the changing conditions of the times. *Ijtihad* must not stop being practiced so that Islam becomes a religion that is genuinely following the context of its era. Most Muslims agree with the need for *ijtihad*, but there are problems when many conditions are treated to carry out *ijtihad* work. Especially if you reach the degree of *ijtihad* as an absolute *mujtahid*, almost nowadays no scholar understands various fields of science according to their context. However, the principle that must be adhered to is that *ijtihad* is highly recommended in Islam. With *ijtihad*, women can be avoided from the marginalization of Sharia (Mulia 2008, 114).

Fitzgerald, specifically gives attention to religious studies that discuss women’s issues related to family problems. As a social institution, the family needs to be rethought because there are very drastic changes when it comes to stating that a family must consist of a father-mother and children. Families also face challenges when partners experience demographic distancing, namely a distance between countries, between islands, between provinces, or between regions. Is the family living in one “common house,” or is the family a moral-ethical bond between those who love each other, care for each other, or communicate is also a family building? This is where family issues get a serious challenge because of the drastic changes (Fitzgerald 2003).

Problems of daily life in communities such as in Aceh are closely related to morality and ethics issues. As part of Indonesia’s Muslim community and the world, those who have references to al-Quran and the sunnah of the Islamic community (Muslim community) are measured by moral standards referred to in the holy book as a necessity. Family arrangements, children, and inheritance are always referred to in the scriptures’ teachings that have

been believed. Therefore, women who get half the share of men in terms of inheritance, women who are sometimes used as second wives, and women who take care of children, not working outside the home, are all referred to in the scriptures' moral standards, which are understood textually. Muslim communities (Muslim communities) taking care of the family are different from other religious groups such as Christianity or Catholicism. Al-Qur'an is the entire norm referred to by Muslims with various versions of their understanding. In such conditions, the moral-ethical standards of taking care of the family undergo sociological changes (Leaman 2013, 110).

Al-Qur'an is used as spirituality in taking care of family, children, education, human relations, and political matters. There is a textual understanding that women are not allowed to become part of political parties. If you have a political party, you must have the permission of her husband. Suppose the husband does not allow his wife to be involved in political parties or practical politics. In that case, women automatically have to give up their intention to get involved in practical politics. Al-Qur'an as a whole becomes a reference to become a strength in family and society. This is the political power of the Qur'an, which is the knowledge of most Muslims (Leaman 2013, 11).

In such a context, Acehnese women receive slightly different treatment from men. Men are leaders for all conditions and all walks of life. Meanwhile, women cannot be leaders for men, even though there have been many female leaders, including female kings and female pre-independence fighters such as Malahayati, Cut Nyak Dien, even though in Aceh's history and Cut Meutia. In the latest development, women's position after the implementation of Islamic sharia has become a kind of complement to men who are considered fighters and leaders of all levels of society. Many Acehnese women have always been active in the public sphere and have no religious problems. However, during the development of the GAM era and post-reformation, women's positions experienced a decline in roles that were degraded by the political interests of the power elite (Dijk 2013).

Sharia is textually understood as the path to God for a Muslim. In its current expanded meaning, sharia is a guide to social, moral, religious life and a direction for life as a whole. Sharia is considered a holy guide taken from the Qur'an and Sunnah, the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, the agreement of the scholars and qiyas, which is an analogy which is a way of deducing the opinions of experts on a problem. Sharia is not a set of legal values that can be interpreted more broadly and flexibly so that humanity can carry out creativity due to the times' changing contexts. Sharia should be interpreted broadly so that Muslims are not confined to it (Drexler 2009, 163–64).

In the al-Qur'an, Amina Wadud said, if it is understood comprehensively, not half-heartedly, and with male bias, it will be found how much Islam respects women. Islam significantly contributes to uplifting the dignity of women. Many verses in the Koran deal with revering women. Women are not placed as "second humans" because of menstruation, pregnancy, and childbirth. Al-Qur'an significantly contributed to transforming religious values into human values based on Tauhid as understood by progressive scholars such as Hasan Hanafi, Rifat Hassan, Fatimah Mernisi Asghar Ali Engineer. Al-Qur'an pays close attention to the Reformation of a conservative understanding(Wadud 2007, 188).

The two streams of understanding of the text of the Qur'an have an impact on the existence of two understandings that continue to develop until now among the Muslim community. Between the two often can not meet to understand a single verse that is the basis of the law establishes a legal issue. Conservative groups understand it as a general and universal proposition, while progressive groups understand the proposition to be often particular and casuistic. Therefore, the law's inference needs to be done so that the established law benefits humanity and Muslims in particular. As Hussein Muhammad said, this is quoting Imam As-Syatibi that the particular text limits the existence of the general text. Therefore, it cannot be a universal text, used as a legal guide as long as there is still a specific text used as a legal basis(Muhammad 2016, 125).

Domestication of women means that women do not have income that can support their families. The impact of this is that many women are financially and economically dependent on their husbands. It becomes a severe problem when the husband does not have sufficient income or income for his family. What is often done by wives is borrowing from neighbors who have excess funding or finances; as Ana said, her husband is not economically sufficient for the family but forbids his wife to work outside the home. It is said that the wife must work in the house, namely taking care of the children, cleaning the house, and following the husband's orders(Nurmila 2009, 133–34).

MOTHERHOOD IS MAIN, NOT WORK (STATE IBUISM)

Being a mother is almost synonymous with taking care of a child, breastfeeding, raising, and looking after it. The mother is not someone who works outside the home but works inside the house (domestic domain). This kind of picture is what develops in society in general, as in Aceh. There are moral standards applied in the context of the family based on religious, cultural, and social reasons or values applied to families in Southeast Asia, including in Indonesia.

These values are part of reducing a woman's relationship with outsiders, especially in matters of public affairs, such as for work. (Platt, Davies, dan Bennett 2018).

One of the most basic forms of the ideology of ibuism built by a political regime power is accepting the condition if a wife or mother is polygamous by her husband. A good wife's position is if she is willing to accept it happily because that is what is considered a mother who is willing to understand her husband's condition. This has developed especially among conservative ulama and Wahabism-Salafism developed in Indonesia and the Middle East (Chin 2018).

In many cases, in Indonesia, including in various novels that scholars have written, *Supiyah* was written by Nia Dinata, YB Mangunwijaya's *Burung-Manyar* Kuntowijoyo's *Kutbah Di Atas Bukit* are novels that describe the roles of women in the arena. The public, however, is considered less following Indonesian tradition. In our tradition (Indonesia), many people state that the woman is the mother of children. The woman is the backbone of child care and safeguards the family assets that her husbands have sought. There is strong criticism of such a perspective, but it remains a hindrance in everyday reality. The woman is still a wife, not an activist in the public field (Chin 2018, 13).

Nia Dinata, then wrote a manuscript for a post-1998 feature film, *Dia, Aku, Supiyah, and Share of Husband*, giving an illustration of how Indonesian women, in the post-reform era, had to be willing if their love for their husbands had to be given up because her husband married another woman of his choice. This theme is controversial because it contains very sharp criticism of social reality. After all, many men take more wives, but their economic situation does not meet the requirements of an economically capable family, so they have to go into debt. Husbands who practice polygamy are more likely to be encouraged because of their sexual desire, not for anything else, even though they sometimes look for religious reasons as justification. (Chin 2018, 55). Living in polygamy for some men is again happiness because that is the idea of domesticating women.

Meanwhile, even polygamous women are not happy to show happiness in public. In short, women must have the ability to have two faces: in front of their husbands and in front of the public as a happy partner, even though they have mentally rebelled. Because of this, many traditional, patriarchal and conservative societies say that a woman must make her husband happy with all the conditions she faces every day in her household. (Chin 2018, 56).

Such an understanding is called an understanding that Islam heavily influences

the Middle East. Such understanding developed since the middle ages of Islam, until recently in Indonesia. Therefore, it is necessary to get attention and then reinterpret several Islamic laws (fiqh), which are used as guidelines for breaking the relationship between husband and wife or the relationship between men and women in Indonesia. This is because many things in Saudi Arabia did not happen in Indonesia as a pluralistic country with different Islam from Saudi Arabia. If there is no reinterpretation based on Islamic law, it is feared that Islamic law itself will conflict with social reality (Hefner 2008).

Many women in countries with large Muslim populations, such as Kosovo, Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Pakistan, experience political marginalization because political regimes do not provide adequate space for women. Many women who want to get involved in politics experience “blockages” or are demoted in the middle of the road because of the general perspective that exists in the country, and these women are not as heads of state or heads of public affairs. In contrast to men, who are considered the head of public affairs and the public world belongs to men (Rolland 2015).

Control over women becomes an ideology of marginalizing women by a political regime. Regimes that lack attention to gender justice are based on a framework of sexuality. Political or public participation by women, such as in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Indonesia, indirectly criticizes the understanding that women cannot participate in the public sphere. Since the Reformation took place in Indonesia, women’s involvement in politics has been pushed to reach 30%. This implies that many women are involved in practical political activities both in political parties (legislative) and in the executive (Rolland 2015, 13).

Many women involved in socio-religious organizations such as Nasyiatul Aisyiyah (NA), Fatayat, and Muslimat engage in practical political activities because they think that women themselves must take women’s political roles. This is done because many things related to women are understood and experienced by women, so that women have a lot to take part in it. Women can no longer be restrained from participating in practical political activities even though they have been heavily involved in socio-religious organizations (Syamsiyatun 2007).

The view of NA activists, why they are actively involved in political activities, is practical because there is authentically no ban on women not being active in political parties. Authentically it is even said that men and women have the same role and position in terms of political transactions (matters related to politics). Neither the Qur’an nor the hadith of the Prophet has any prohibition on women being active in political parties or public activities. If anyone

forbids women from being active in political parties or public activities, it is because they understand the Qur'an and hadith following the common interests (Syamsiyatun 2007, 4).

Few groups of scholars or Muslims think that if women are active in political parties or public activities, it will damage society. However, this view is a view that has no solid foundation because, in the holy book and the hadith of the Prophet, men and women are given the potential to become leaders. The issue of *ijtihad* in interpreting the text states that men and women leaders need to get the attention of many parties so that gender injustice can be gradually eliminated. From there, there was no longer any discrimination against women in public affairs. The idea of a reinterpretation of the scriptural text, which is considered unfair to women, is carried out by progressive scholars in almost all Muslim countries. However, some conservative scholars still maintain a textual understanding of the text's sound as a part that does not need to get interpretations or *take* progressive scholars. (Syamsiyatun 2007, 8)

With such a view, it is necessary to carry out activities that give space to women. Apart from the political approach, the cultural approach in Islam needs to be given attention because, so far, the cultural approach has not been given attention (Noor 2015). In the case of Indonesian Islam, it is as stated by Farish. A. Noor, the Indonesian Muslim middle class's presence has changed the Indonesian Muslim community's social demographics. The approach to religion, which was primarily textual and conservative, has turned into contextual and more progressive, especially among the urban middle class. There is indeed a controversy over the discourse on Islam. One party wants Islamism in the private domain, but on the other hand, there is a transformative spirit in the public sphere. This is the bright spot for the rise of moderate Islam and Indonesian cultural Islam after the Reformation took place in 1998 (Noor 2015). The idea of "laying off women" as mothers while men are public humans indirectly explains Indonesian Islamic reviewers. Indonesian Islam is currently having a contest (contestation) between textual Islam which wants the Islamization of the public space by laying off women. As well as the de-Islamization of public space as a free space for anyone, including women. The struggle for public space in Aceh is carried out by reducing women's public roles and providing the most comprehensive possible space for men. After implementing Islamic sharia, it is evident that this kind of condition is taking place in Aceh. It has received a severe response from Acehnese women activists from both socio-religious organizations and Muslim scholars (Ansor 2016).

Politically changing conditions in Aceh cannot be separated from Islamism's power, which leads to the desire to formalize Islam in the public sphere.

Islamism itself is a political force that can distill substantial Islam itself. Islamism is a political movement, not Islam itself (Tibi 2012). Islamism is a movement that is closer to a political movement than a cultural movement. It is just that post Islamism, in fighting for its ideas, often uses cultural methods such as organizing educational activities, community assistance, and other religious activities such as recitation, *istighotsah*, and *tabligh Akbar*. All of what is done is a movement to make framing in the community that formalization matters are more critical than essential things because the people are more easily directed to things that are formal than substantial. (Tibi 2012, 8).

CONTROL FEMALE SEXUALITY, FREEING MEN

As Amina Wadud said, women are menstruating, pregnant, giving birth, and breastfeeding. Therefore, women have limitations and are physically weak, so they need to get special treatment, namely being sent home. Meanwhile, the man does not experience all of that, so that he has the freedom that women do not have. Women become creatures that seem less human. It is known that men and women are only clothed in terms of women getting menstruation, getting pregnant, and giving birth. Meanwhile, what men can do, women can do too. The dimensions of sexuality are often equated with gender issues to be understood interchangeably (Husein 1994; Moghissi 2005).

Women in Southeast Asia are more “laid off” because this is what is considered the most following the traditions and values that have been constructed to society. The applied moral standards have received support from the political regime and religious authorities, thus directing women to always “maintain morals” - moral force, namely by not leaving the house much because leaving the house will bring harm to the women themselves. Women at home have automatically been seen as contributing to the development of public morality (Platt, Davies, dan Bennett 2018, 3).

With such conditions, it is making women's sexuality truly controlled by society and the state. The freedom for women to choose a partner and marry, get a decent job, support community development, and support the family's economy is challenged by the community's moral standards. There is a contradiction between the desire to encourage women to take part in the economic arena and the moral will that leads to the “moral panics” of society if women are active outside the home as one of the family's economic pillars strength. This is the contradiction of sexuality perpetuated to this day in patriarchal societies (Platt, Davies, dan Bennett 2018, 11).

Women are under strict moral control because they are in a position to be

monitored by social mechanics laws (a social mechanism), maintaining the completeness of the rituals applied and social transformation due to the demands of change. If women are active in public activities, then the family experiences morality-ethical problems, women will be considered the cause. However, if the family economy experiences problems due to the husband (spouse) being unable to meet their needs, it is also considered the cause of the household's breakdown. This causes the conflict between the operational needs of the public and domestic Indonesian women to continue to be a problem. Between public morals and the growth of gender justice are two things that are mutually confronted and strongly differentiated (Brenner 2011).

In fact, from the New Order government to the Reform Order until now, many women activists were very active in social activities, active in non-governmental organizations (NGO's), and socio-religious institutions. Since 2004, many women have been involved in political parties because they meet the 30% quota for women. They continue to move people from villages to villages and within the migrant community. However, social control as part of control over women continues even though it is clandestine, reducing women's activity hours by telling women to reduce their curfew. (Brenner 2011, 14).

The presence of women in the public sphere should be seen as part of what is said to be the democratization of the private space so that women are given the freedom to express their will either in the public space or in the private space. If many women want to get involved in politics, it is practically not deterred. Women are involved in making a living, become construction workers. Manual laborers still get their rights. Even if there are women who will not be involved in the public sphere, but in the domestic sphere, everything must be seen as part of a democratic choice between men and women. Such objective conditions for women are essential to obtain. Because so far, women who will be active in the public arena must get approval (permission) from their husbands.

Even though she is excellent, independent, intelligent, thoughtful, and so on, that woman is considered her nature to be a companion to her husband. The woman is not a leader. The women in the household are the wives and the caretakers of the household. Meanwhile, the man as her husband is the leader. The existence of men and women who are different in domestic roles and public roles is considered natural, even *sunatullah*. Such is the view of some of the Muslim community's views on women so that gender justice for women is still a struggle that has not become an actual reality in the Muslim community (Blackwood 2007).

The issue of control over women's sexuality continues to be perpetuated as

a government regime's political policy. In Indonesia since the Soeharto era, the ideology of Ibuism has become very popular. What is called good and great women are women who are only successful in managing the household, including children and husbands, safeguarding family assets, not those who are active in public activities? This is an ideology that has continued to develop until recently, so that when you see that women are active in the public world, but their families have a little problem, it is a mother (a woman) who will be the culprit, even though her husband is also active outside the home as well as her children. (Blackwood 2007, 4–5).

Domination over women using an unfair ideology of gender equality, being a woman sexually is in a very marginal position. The growing public opinion reinforces women's marginalization from the public sphere due to sexuality that women have been married by men because they are good women. She is considered successful and significant by the wider community not because of her prowess as a public official, a reliable breadwinner, a manager, or a political party leader. Women are married in a tradition that develops because they can appear as pious, simple, obedient women and are considered to maintain the integrity of their families (Blackwood 2007, 15).

From there, it is clear that the position of men is more dominant than women in sexuality. Men have much broader freedom than women, even though there are many "great" women in society. Women's lack of freedom can even be seen in marriage, which must be obedient to the family, especially men. The choice of whose spouse in many societies is still the authority of the male family. Women are directed according to the choice of the male family. Even if women can choose their partner, if later there are family problems, then women will be accused of being the cause because they do not obey the family-controlled by men, either husband or male siblings.

In the scriptural text, men and women have an equal position. Women can be leaders over men. On the other hand, men can become female leaders with various criteria such as having a leadership spirit, being fair, honest, responsible, and role models. This is referred to in Islamic activists and contemporary Muslim scholars such as Ali Bin Abdul Razik, Hasan Hanafi, Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Mohammed Arkoun. However, in practice, women's position in public leadership is still questionable for reasons that are theological and ideological in nature, such as fears of moral damage and national decline, which are said to be due to (Elius 2010).

We can see how many women are active in the public arena. In the Islamic world we can see Aisyah, Zainab, Umm Salamah, Umm Kulsum, Khadijah very active in the public world. They become narrators of hadith, become

military fighters, become businessmen, all of which are in the public sphere. Meanwhile, in Indonesia, it can also be said that women who were active in military warfare, such as Tjut Nyak Dien, Cut Meutiah, RA. Kartini and Rahmawati, the wife of Soekarno, are active in the political-public stage, which do not get a hitch. Meanwhile, lately, there have been obstacles for women to be active in the public world because men have far more rights than women to be active in the public sphere. Women are domestic spaces (Elius 2010, 5).

Men get freedom sexually. Meanwhile, women are held hostage because of their sexuality. Many women's organizations with religious affiliations such as Aisyiyah, Muslimat, Nasyiatul Aisyiyah, Fatayat, Perempuan Sarikat Islam (Islamic Women) cannot change the overall image that the issue of sexuality does not necessarily mean that women must be controlled. Women do not have to be laid off while men are free to carry out social and public activities. Women's leadership can also be seen in several prosperous areas, such as in Kebumen, Karanganyar, Klaten, Banten, Tangerang, and Bone, led by the Governor and the Mayor / Regent of Women. However, women still cannot be considered free in public politics in contrast to men.

It can also be seen the success of active women in public spaces, such as volleyball, basketball, badminton, marathon running, swimming, and beautiful jumping. The women managed to become champions and bring fragrance to this nation and country. However, it is said that women's success in the world of sports is not considered to be their principal obligation. The principal obligation of women remains in the household. The success of women in sports is considered "the sacrifice of men for women." Meanwhile, if men succeed in achieving achievements, it will be considered as something they should be. This is a gender-biased ideology that is perpetuated by societal culture and politics (Hoodfar 2015).

The presence of women in various sports contested does not necessarily mean that the position of women is elevated in rank. Especially in conservatives' view, that sport is a colonial activity. It does not reflect part of Islamic culture except swimming, archery, and horse riding, which the Prophet said was taught for Muslims' health. Even though women are getting the attention of conservative clerics, such a thing is not following Islamic principles. Women are involved there, but because the various sports that are contested are considered not following Islamic law or Islamic traditions. This is a challenge among Indonesian Muslims and Southeast Asian Muslims (Hoodfar 2015, 55–56).

CONCLUSION

All of the explanations presented above show serious challenges related to gender equality in a democratic political regime. The relationship between gender justice, which positions women as equal to men in terms of work, both public and domestic, and family management is the aspiration of women activists in Aceh and women in Indonesia in general. This is a concern because for a long time, since the new order took place until now, the gender justice that women activists expect has not been going well. There are theological, cultural, and political difficulties when women are positioned equally with men, even though religious arguments give women a noble place.

From the explanation that has been stated, the position of women is in a discriminatory space. Because the interpretation of Islamic sharia does not provide expansive space for women. Many interpretations of religious holy texts related to Islamic law shut down women from being active in the public sphere. Various regulations such as the forced wearing of the hijab, the obligation to wear Islamist clothes, the prohibition of wearing trousers, the prohibition of riding motorbikes, the prohibition of leaving the house with men who are not mahram and working in the public domain are models of control over women carried out by the Sharia Police. However, what is interesting is that women still do whatever is prohibited by Wilayatul Hisbah. Everything that women do can be a form of “women’s resistance” against Islamic sharia in Aceh.

With the condition of women in the public sphere being discriminated against due to the existence of the implementation of sharia politics, which received support from the political regime as well as religious leaders, religious leaders, and conservative religious groups, finally, Aceh women’s movement activists then fought over public space as a resistance to the policies of the political regime.

The involvement of women in public activities is a common thing. Even when many women are active in the public sphere, become breadwinners in offices, become teachers, lecturers, work in factories and become politicians, this is the most crucial challenge in looking back at the division of roles between men’s roles and women. Men are no longer dominant in taking public roles. Meanwhile, women are only placed in domestic roles. It is necessary to involve men in domestic roles because women have been involved in domestic and public roles. Women’s role in the end row between domestic roles and public roles is very burdensome for women.

It is time to deconstruct the differentiation of roles between men and women. Today, women are asked to take domestic roles, even though the family economy is messy, lacking and wallowing in debt to sustain the family. It is

time for men to be brave enough to allow women to be actively involved in public roles so that the possibility of social conflicts and conflicts caused by economic shortages does not cause many family breakdowns. It is necessary to look back on traditional values that have been embraced as a kind of absolute value so that it places women who are more asked to take on domestic roles.

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AHLUS SUNNAH VIEWS OF COVID-19 IN SOCIAL MEDIA: THE ISLAMIC PREACHING BY GUS BAHA AND ABDUS SOMAD

Saifuddin Zuhri Qudsy

UIN Sunan Kalijaga – Yogyakarta

Email: saifuddinzuhr@yahoo.com

Achmad Fawaid

Universitas Nurul Jadid, Probolinggo

Email: fawaidachmad@gmail.com

Althaf Husein Muzakky

Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga

Email: althofhusein@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

The Covid-19 pandemic, which occurred in line with the massive transformation of digital media, was a significant moment that enabled diverse Islamic preachers to use media to advance their own interests. However, little has been discussed regarding the religious responses to the COVID-19 performed by Ahlus Sunnah community members or those who are not inclined to participate in radical activities. By analyzing two important Ahlus Sunnah figures, Gus Baha and Abdus Somad, this article focuses on the group's COVID-19 views on social media, which represents their motives, perspectives, strategies, and theological views to encourage Muslims to have certain mindsets on the virus. Given that Abdul Somad Official account around \$1400- 21,700 per month with 950 thousand subscribers and Gus Baha Official account around \$5-75 with 500 thousand subscribers, this article investigates their religious/ theological perspectives on COVID-19 and the extent to which they represent religious moderate viewpoints as the solution of the COVID-19. It argues that their YouTube or Facebook channels have enabled the birth of religious moderate arguments on COVID-19 rooted in the Ahlus Sunnah movement. Unlike well-established scientific perspectives on Covid-19 that spread out through official government channels or television, Gus Baha and Abdus Somad's viewpoints have been relatively independent from medical networks, but highly dependent on Ahlus Sunnah movements. With a high number of offline and online followers, it demonstrates the potential of their status as religious influencers on COVID-19 based on Ahlus Sunnah viewpoints in Indonesia.

Keywords: Covid-19, Religious Influencer, Gus Baha, Ustadz Abdus Somad

INTRODUCTION

The internet has allowed people to better access all information, including religious information. Religion that was once studied through interface strategy, requiring a significant time to learn has now become more accessible. Even though it faces various online religious options ranging from a different level of online belief and participation system and even diverse ideologies (Christopher 2002), the internet has put religion (especially Islam) as something that is easily presented. Bunt calls this the 'Cyber Islamic Environment'. It is a virtual space where people can interact and discuss Islamic matters. This evidence has encouraged and stimulated the emergence of preachers to deliver their religious lectures online, especially after the proliferation of social media like Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, and others that were increasingly quick to socialize religious messages.

Gus Bahaudin (Gus Baha) and Ustadz Abdus Somad (UAS) are among the speakers on digital media. Their ideas have begun to influence many people. In the case of social media, 'influence' is possible to measure by considering performance indicators, such as follower counts and web traffic (financial gains directly result from the number of the followers). Experts on word processing and his profound knowledge in various disciplines have already put them among the young lecturers. Departing from a profound knowledge of the main sources of Muslims, Gus Baha's expertise in *Tafsir al-Qur'an* and Abdus Somad's expertise in *Hadith*, have made them some of the most popular digital preachers. Gus Baha or Kiai Ahmad Bahaudin Nursalim is Nahdlatul Ulama figure, son of KH. Arwani al-Hafidz Kudus and KH. Abdullah Salam al-Hafidz Kajen Pati with its genealogy to the Islamic saints of Java, has memorized Sahih Muslim (one of the greatest *turats* in hadith) in Java, also composed *Hafidzuna li Hadza al-Mushaf li Bahahuddin bin Nursalim* (a *tafsir* book based on 'Amr Usman bin Sa'id ad-Dani's work, *Al-Muqni*' on characteristics of Quranic stylistic writing in *mushaf rasm usmani*). Abdus Somad has studied *ilm al-hadith* in the Magister Program of Dar El Hadith El Hassania, Morocco, in 2006, studied the similar study in Doctoral Program of Universitas Islam Omdurman, Sudan, in 2019; also, a lecturer of *tafsir hadith* in UIN Sultan Syarif Kasim Riau. One of the lectures that had a broad response is their lecture on COVID-19 which has reaped the *pros* and *cons* of the masses themselves.

Many studies on these two figures exist, especially UAS whose appearance and popularity are better known than Gus Baha (Uswatun, Usman. 2020; Qarni, Waizul., Syahnna, Mhd., Harahap 2019; Ridho 2019; Zahidi, Salman., Ikmal 2019; Yanuar 2020; Sholihah, Nur., Isti'anah, Zahro'ul., Hakamah 2019). The

emphasis of both studies highly relies on the rhetoric of *da'wah* and the use of social media in the dissemination of religious lectures. www.socialblade.com has estimated monthly income from youtube.com for Abdul Somad Official account around \$ 1400-21,700 per month with 950 thousand subscribers. Unfortunately, Gus Baha Official account is still around \$ 5-75. It indicates that his account is not properly managed, but it remains a channel with nearly 500 thousand subscribers with an estimated monthly income of \$500-8000. Meanwhile, a study that sets both figures in a discussion themed 'COVID-19 has not been conducted by any researcher. This paper complements some previous studies. Both figures have expressed their public opinion about COVID-19. Additionally, their opinions have been received by the public (at least) in the cyber world through a column "comment" on YouTube and the use of hashtags that include their names. In line with this reality, this study has three focuses, namely: (1) the perspective of both speakers on the COVID-19 pandemic; (2) motives (rationale) of their perspectives; and (3) their strategies that have affected the audience about the COVID-19 pandemic.

Both figures have great popularity on social media. There are approximately three arguments that can be proposed. *First*, through social media, their arguments can be rapidly consumed and influence the audiences' mindset against the virus. *Second*, their arguments are resulting from the theological viewpoint of Ahlus Sunnah that-- without having to judge other viewpoints—strives for well-behaved, moderate, and relatively tends to prioritize religious solutions than scientific solutions. *Third*, their arguments are delivered and spread through social media, and have been well known as influencers in religious terminology (Abidin 2016b; 2016a; 2015). In this study, the data were obtained from various online sources. The primary sources were their second lectures on COVID-19 that have been spread on social media. The data were collected and analyzed through interpretive analysis techniques that positioned their statements in one form of discourse to be demonstrated in the literature review section.

SOCIAL MEDIA, THE THEOLOGY OF *AHLUS SUNNAH* AND RELIGIOUS INFLUENCER

This study has involved three underlying courses as stepping-stones to conduct a review and analysis on the three focuses, namely social media, the theology of *Ahlu Sunnah*, and religious influencers (ranging from definition, variation, and some case studies). For that reason, it is important to first present an overview of social media and its users as the mission of *da'wah*. The theology of *Ahlu Sunnah* is a truth (paradigm) between *Jabariyah* and

Qadariyah, and that the religious influencer has now given the latest nuance in religious discourse.

○ **Social Media for Religious Missions (*da'wah*)**

Social media is a site or application that allows a person to create anything to fill and share in many social networks, including false information and/or propaganda. Initially, social media is a communication media that has been discovered since the end of the twentieth century (the beginning of the twenty-first century) and invented by Andreas Kaplan and Michael Henlein. Yet, for the millennial community, the role of social media has shifted to media propaganda (Watie 2016). There are at least three maps of previous studies that have discussed social media as a place for preaching (*da'wah*). *First*, a study that describes the causes of social media that are widely used for propaganda. *Second*, a study on the forms of social media facilities that are widely used for *da'wah*. *Third*, a study on the view of *ulama'* and lecturers in responding and finding a solution to any existing problem in social media as a missionary mission.

Three studies focus on the cause of social media widely used for media propaganda. *First*, the ease of social media in packaging preaching in the millennial era by merely accessing data through the internet. For Omar et al., this evidence can open horizons of insight into the millennial community (Omar, Hassan, Sallehuddin 2015), so that they can learn global issues through a study by Fakhruroji (Fakhruroji 2010). *Second*, the level of effectiveness on the use of social media as a means of *da'wah* (Marlina 2016). *Third*, social media has a faster distribution of information compared to other media forms (Fitriani 2017). In ancient times, preaching (*da'wah*) was done orally and delivered directly in the science assembly. After large-scale propaganda articles have penetrated the media of writing, it is no wonder that in the middle age, the scholars conducted preaching through the classical book, while other preachers currently use social media as a medium for *da'wah* to give direction to the people in the present time.

Various forms of social media facilities that are widely used in *da'wah* are also diverse. It indicates that the enthusiasm of Muslims who are starting to learn science and technology, various features and applications are starting to be celebrated with Islamic *da'wah*. *First*, preaching is also performed through Facebook. It is similar to a study by Choliq that focuses a lot on Islamic figures, such as Habib Muhammad Lutfi bin Yahya, K.H. Abdullah Gymnastiar, CakNun.com, Gus Mus, Yusuf Mansur (the Official), Ustadz M.

Nur Maulana, Ustadz Felix Siauw, Pearl of Wisdom Ustadz Zaki (an Islamic speaker at TPI), Ustadz Ahmad Al-Ethiopia, Buya Yahya, Ustadz Wijayanto, Ustadz Felix Siauw, Ustaz Nasir Bachtiar, Ustadzah Mamah Dedeh, Ustadz Muhammad Riza, and Ary Gina Agustian (Choliq 2018). *Second*, a *da'wah* that is performed on Instagram has turned out to have a great influence in shaping the character of the millennial community with their viral view (Nurdin., Ridwan, Muhammad. 2020). It signifies that Instagram is an easy means for *da'wah* (Zahra, Sarbini, Shodiqin 2016). *Third*, YouTube is also another kind of media for performing *da'wah*. It is also a new commodification that is presently on hold (Arifin 2019).

In addition to the above description, the views of *ulama'* and preachers answering problems through social media as a religious mission have not been perfectly maximized, although this study can be classified on its quantity of data and sufficient exploration on the meaning of the *Qur'an*, the *Hadith* and the classic book, particularly some national scholars who have traditional Islamic scholarship, such as K.H. Bahauddin Nur Salim (Gus Baha). Gus Baha has also studied the greatness of the logic of the *Qur'an* in terms of stylistic components (Sholihah, Isti'annah, Hakamah 2019). Besides, some scholars have a competency in rhetoric and hypnotize the audiences with the charm of religious *da'wah*, namely Ustadz Abdus Somad (Uswatun, Usman. 2020).

○ **The Theology of *Ahlus Sunnah* as a Mediation for *Jabariyah* and *Qadariyah***

There is no group more followed than the *Ahlus Sunnah* (Nasution 1986). This theology greatly influences the mindset and behavior of Indonesians. If someone commits a passive action by surrendering to Allah the Almighty on things that have befallen oneself, it is called *Jabariyyah*. On the other hand, a person who behaves as if he has the power to change his fate and is called *Qadariyah*. This phenomenon has stimulated the emergence of *Ahlus Sunnah* theology that frames and mediates *Jabariyah* and *Qadariyah* ideology with a concept of *Ikhtiyār* and *tawakkal*. It is certain that the position of this theology is *baina al-'aqidah al-Jabariyah wa Qadariyah*, so that Islamic scholars and scientists are required to discuss and elaborate on these ideologies in the present.

The theology of *Ahlus Sunnah* has a variety of parts. Alike the flow of theology and religious point of view, there are certainly many variations, including the theology of *Ahlus Sunnah*. Yet, in a broad outline, the understanding of *Ahlus Sunnah* in Indonesia is divided into three definitions (Bustamam, Ahmad.

2002). *First* is a tendency which adheres to Abu Hasan al-'Asy'ari ('Asy'ariyah). This group is more likely to be traditionalist. *Second* is the theology adheres to Abu Manur al-Maturidi (al-Maturidiyah). *Third*, it also adheres to *Salafi Wahabi* group as oriented to Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab (Wahabiyah), and this group tends to be puritanical.

In addition, the study of *Ahlus Sunnah* at least can be mapped into three categories. *First* is seen from the perspective of Islamic scholars (*Kyai*) (Rofiq 2017). *Second*, the study on *Ahlus Sunnah* theology in discussing social, political, and economic conception in a region or a state, has been largely moderate (Putra 2013). *Third*, the study on *Ahlus Sunnah* is seen as an effort to answer the problem in the struggle between *Jabariyah* and *Qadariyah*, and it has not been discovered. Thus, this study criticized *Ahlus Sunnah's theological* view between *Jabariyah* and *Qadariyah* through the study of perspectives of the *ulama*'.

○ Religious Influencer

Digital technology and new media have shifted, extended, and altered religious practice (Campbell 2012). New media, specifically digital media, challenge the conventional configuration of religious and state authorities, facilitating the emergence of transnational Muslim publics and making central the issue of identity politics (Anderson, Eickelman 2003; El-Nawawy. 2009). For the Muslim community, social media creates a sense of new public spaces (Pennington 2018) which helps them navigate their presence in urban settings (Waltorp 2013). In different parts of the world, social media enables people to negotiate their religious platform and reconstruct their identities (Kavacki, Kraepelin 2017). These social media platforms allow Muslims to enact identity performance (Baulch, Pramianti 2018) and play around with the limits of religious interpretations in increasingly conservative societies (Beta 2014; Williams, Kamaludeen 2017). Adding to those studies, we propose the concept 'religious influencer' to understand how Gus Baha and Ustadz Abdus Somad creatively fuse commercial, religious, and political participation about COVID-19 through their own YouTube channels. We define a religious influencer as a person or a group who can combine their interests in religious growth, financial gain, and socio-political change as attractive and attainable by their followers (mostly young and female), online and offline.

Such a combination, I argue, works effectively as it focuses on encouraging their followers to undergo self-transformation to understand the ethical idea of COVID-19. A religious influencer usually deploys the notion of *dakwah*

(proselytization) as an umbrella term that includes their commercial, religious, and political interests. The followers (and lurkers) are given a sense of ‘choice’ to attain the idealized self (Lewis 2015). In other words, Muslim viewers who follow a religious influencer can opt to learn to make themselves worthy of God’s love in responding COVID-19. However, when they have established a way to cultivate their pious subjectivity in dealing with COVID-19, they understand that they are obliged to follow the religious injunctions closely, aiming for the ‘religious platforms’ set by the influencer.

The notion of religious influence here builds upon Crystal Abidin’s works on influencers in Singapore (Abidin 2016b; 2016a; 2015). In her work, Abidin defines an influencer as

one form of microcelebrity ... who accumulate a following on blogs and social media through the textual and visual narration of their personal, everyday lives, upon which paid advertorials – advertisement written in the form of editorial opinions – for products and services are premised.

Influencers make use of selfies for financial gains as well as for self-actualization. Adding to her work, we propose that we consider how the representations of dealing with COVID-19 are used by the religious influencers to garner a following and to mobilize their followers not just for commercial reasons through social media channels, but also encouraging their followers to ‘better’ themselves in religious terms. The case of Gus Baha and Ustadz Abdus Somad is significant because both are popular *ulama* who voluntarily participate in both online and offline activities to present their religious platform on COVID-19. The Gus Baha and Abud Shomad channels have attracted more than a million followers online each with hundreds of loyal followers attending their regular meetings. They are popular especially among urban, middle-class, young Muslims, and use a range of online platforms: WhatsApp, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and visual-based Instagram.

A POINT OF VIEW OF TWO FIGURES AGAINST THE COVID-19 OUTBREAK

The development of increasingly sophisticated times has made social media a trend in media propaganda. Social media is used as a tool of communication and has now started to modify and transform its function as a media of *da’wah*, religious teaching, and even Islamic learning media in the millennial era. As evident during the COVID-19 pandemic, there are at least two views of prominent Islamic figures presented in real life and the cyber world, namely Gus Baha and Ustadz Abdus Shomad. COVID-19 is a potentially deadly

disease, but Gus Baha and Ustadz Abdus Shomad have their significantly different opinions. For Gus Baha, the COVID-19 is one of God's greetings to His servant that death is a certainty. He advises meaningful thought to address a proper and appropriate behavior against the outbreak:

“You should still strive for it, like you buy a mask. It is absolutely sought after, but do not need to believe in it. As if you can see *lauḥ al-mahfūz*, you probably laugh. If you were in *lauḥ al-mahfūz* written down with a death caused by a crash, then you do not know, but you wear a mask because you are afraid of the virus, the Izrail should probably laugh at you. Moreover, you die caused of a bad nutrition, and along your life, you wear a mask continuously, whereas in *lauḥ al-mahfūz*, you die because of a bad nutrition. There is no correlation with this virus. Please imagine, “I am afraid of being sick. If I were sick, I would have hindered everyone, and needed to slow down my prayer and recitation”. It indicates that your fear is against your worship, and it should be the truth.”

In the view of Ustadz Abdus Somad, the virus is a military of God that has been sent to destroy China after the nation's poor treatment of Muslims in Uighur. Besides, he also encourages Muslims to anticipate the coronavirus because the whole world has been affected. For him, the best way is to be introspective (*muhāsabah*) and be consciously well-prepared to deal with the threat of the virus by consistently reading *istighfar*, conducting repentance prayer, improving prayers, increasing charity, and enacting kindness. He also appeals to people to wear masks and maintain cleanliness by always performing ablution, handwashing, and nail cutting (a legacy from the Prophet). He also suggests executing a 'lockdown'. On the other hand, Gus Baha suggests everyone not to be afraid of the virus, but to be more concerned with behavior in daily life – not creating trouble, distressing other people, and abandoning worship as well as other religious activities. In this context, Gus Baha provides a way to address the virus from an Islamic perspective. The endeavor of humans is to strive for as much as possible, and anything remains in the control and will of God.

In the case of COVID-19, Gus Baha and Ustadz Abdus Somad do not only share their opinions, but also adhere to the *Qur'an* and the *Hadith*. Both figures have provide their arguments on the virus to their respective basse. As *salafi*, Gus Baha argues that the virus is a disaster that descends on the imbalance between righteous people who are ashamed to worship, while people perform anything instead of enthusiasm. The difference is that if a righteous person faces a disaster, he will remember Allah the Almighty. Yet, people with sinful

acts will curse as it has been stated in al-Baqarah [2]: 114. It is said that people who have not been regretful immediately for their behavior will receive humility in the world and hereafter. In his review, Gus Baha also confirms and convinces people not to get an untrue perception. It means that Allah the Almighty who has power over the disaster has dropped down a disaster in order that His servants will always remember Him. By performing possibly best actions, most people probably have neglected the purpose of life; that it is not to accumulate property. When the president has declared and regulated a 'lockdown' for fourteen days, everyone must be indifferent to the economy, education, and anything related to the impact of the virus, because Allah the Almighty has invited humans to not only focus on their world, but also the hereafter as it has been clearly stated in al-Takāsur [102]: 1-8. Furthermore, Gus Baha quotes a statement (*maqālah*) of Ibn 'Umar in Ibn al-Arabi's popular interpretation of *aḥkām al-Qur'an*, so that humans are always enthusiastic to worship for the sake of their world and hereafter as a sentence says "*Imal li dunyaka kaanaka ta'isyu abadan, wa'mal liakhiratika kaannka tamūtu abadan*" (Ibn al-Arabi, 2008)

Apart from the above description, Ustadz Abdus Somad also has his own basis for diversity regarding the outbreak. Like Gus Baha, Ustadz Abdus Somad explains that everyone should overview QS. Muhammad: 7. He also advises that if someone helps the religion of Allah, He (Allah the Almighty) will also help by immediately removing the existing pandemic as it has been well reminded in Ali Imran [3]: 54. Besides, Ustadz Abdus Somad also appeals to everyone to obey orders and always be patient with government policies. Perhaps, this outbreak is not caused by the human act itself, but rather a trial from Allah the Almighty to see the quality of the faith of a servant. Therefore, Ustadz Abdus Somad quotes a *Hadith* by al-Ṭabrāni in his *Mu'jam al-Kubra* namely as follows (Al-Ṭabrāni, n.d.): "To those who are not willing for My resolve (fate) and not to be patient for My temptation on himself, he must have others than Me".

As a role model, Ustadz Abdus Somad presents a view that Muslims should be slightly affected by the virus due to the daily habits that they are always in a holy condition. However, watchfulness must continue to be improved by always maintaining ablution anytime, worship at homes, nail-cutting, and continuously reading *istighfar*. For him, a disaster is caused by humans themselves, so that they need to beg forgiveness from Allah the Almighty. In his response to this condition, he refers to a *Hadith* quoted by Sunan al-Baihaqi as follows (Al-Baihaqi 1994): "For those who read *istighfar*, Allah the Almighty will create his sorrow to be felicity, and from his rigor is a

way out, and given livelihood from an unexpected way.” In strengthening the religious argument against the virus, both figures have a different framing. Gus Baha responds to the virus with a Sufism approach. Once, he told that when Sayyidina ‘Ali was under threat of murder, the attitude of ‘Ali’s friend has remained calm, and said *‘hiṣnī ajalī’* (the fortification of my life is my death ration). This statement was then used as an argument to remain calm amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Meanwhile, Ustadz Abdus Somad was more passive by saying that *i’tibār al-kibār ‘ala ulamā’ al-Azhar* (considering the great opinion of ‘ulama’ in the city of Azhar, Egypt). Thus, it is evident that Ustadz Abdus Somad has a tendency against the opinion of the Azhar’s religious decision.

THE RATIONALE ON THE EMERGENCE OF THEIR ARGUMENTS

There are at least three things that make their thoughts about COVID-19 have the same view as the above description, namely: (1) ideological factor; and (2) literacy factors (reception of the *Qur’an* and *Hadith*). The ideological factors that influence both scholars are from *Ahlus Sunnah*. As an ideology, *Ahlus Sunnah* positions rationality and revelation in a moderate position, so that *ikhtiyār* and *tawakkal* have equal portions although both scholars have differences in accomplishing *Ahlus Sunnah*. As a graduate of *Pesantren*, Gus Baha factually refers to the conventional way of thinking which prioritizes *tawakkal*. However, he does not neglect any prevention, and that Ustadz Abdus Somad prefers to choose and prioritize *ikhtiyār* than *tawakkal*. This fact indicates that their reference and preference are different.

As literacy (source of reference), the religious insight and source of reference of Gus Baha and Ustadz Abdus Somad have different axes. Gus Baha tends to refer to classical *turaś* (yellow book), because it has a load of historical and philosophical values that is still contextually beneficial for present time. On the other hand, Ustadz Abdus Somad has a strong insight into history, but he has more tendency on Tafsir and *Hadith* which also has a historical aspect in the form of *asbābul nuzūl* and *asbāb wurūd*.

The flexibility of Gus Baha in dealing with the COVID-19 outbreak is signified using classic *turaś* (yellow book), particularly *‘ulumuddin’* as a work of Imam al-Ghazali. He also gives an interesting quote, such as *kafāni ‘izzan an takuna rabban, wa kafāni fakhran an akuna laka ‘abdan*. It means that whatever human’s life condition is a form of worship, although when it is performed during the ‘lockdown’ period. On the other hand, Ustadz Abdus Somad who prioritizes *asbābul nuzūl* and *asbāb wurūd* explains that in the Prophet’s period (after the agreement of Ḥudaibiyyah), there was a person who wanted to shake-hand with the Prophet, but the Prophet refused him because the

person was affected by *Ṭaun*. This evidence is then referred to as a policy for the government to execute 'lockdown' to avoid danger.

Furthermore, in the reception of the text of the *Qur'an* and *Hadith*, both figures portray a uniqueness in their reception of the text of the *Qur'an* and *Hadith*. The view of Gus Baha tends to refer to classical literature interpretation (*Sufism*), such as al-Ihya' and al-Hikam. His assumption is that the virus is a thing that will come and go immediately; there is no sense of panic, but trust in Allah the Almighty as clearly illustrated in al-Baqara [2]: 114. This verse addresses that the world is despicable, so that Muslims are summoned to behave as ordinary to the virus; not to be anxious. Yet, Ustadz Abdus Somad who adheres Ali Imrān [3]: 54 as instructed to be aware (alert). It is similar to the opinion of the Azhar scholars.

THE INFLUENCE OF THEIR ARGUMENTS ON COVID-19 TOWARDS MUSLIMS IN INDONESIA

It seems that the ideas of both figures have influenced the Indonesian on a perception against the virus. In this context, the audience is at least categorized into two patterns, namely *pros* audience and *cons* audience. For detail, the following illustration is presented to describe the audiences' comments on social media that indicate *pros* and *cons*.

Table 1. The Positive Comments of the Audiences in Social Media

No.	Account Name	Positive Comment for Gus Baha
1.	Konco Suwung	Life and death are the power of Allah the Almighty. The important matter is to continue to live with a healthy lifestyle and keep our environment clean. Do not leave five-times prayer as our obligations as Muslims, because many benefits we can produce from these prayers for our world and hereafter. Ablution is a way to maintain personal hygiene and it can ward off viruses.
2.	Mr. Zank	I agree, and we must continue our efforts to prevent all diseases.
3.	RSY_Bolo	For Gus Baha, the virus has become a joke. The Corona will be defeated by faith. Stay healthy, Gus. <i>Shollu ala sayyidina nabi muhammad</i> .
4.	Nouvan Hidayat	Gus Baha always connects every single phenomena with <i>Tauhid</i> , so that it remains calm and sincere with anything happens.
5.	Larva el	Caused of his speech, I strongly believe to keep working. Thank you. I wish I could visit you.

No.	Account Name	Positive Comment for Ustadz Abdus Somad
1.	Veri Indarto	Dear Allah, there is nothing any boredom on myself when I am listening to the speech of UAS. Although I have not chance to smooch his hand at Cutnyakdien Mosque, it is a happiness to look at his face. Moreover, it will be a happiest moment as if I meet and look at the Prophet Muhammad PBUH.
2.	Tunas Paiche Adhin Selamat	He is an intellectual scholar; a modesty lecturer, humble, and earnest for his struggle reaching for <i>da'wah</i> in the rural area. He has a higher academic title; Prof. Dr. KH. Assyeikh AbdulShomad Lc Ma, Datuk Sri Ulama Setian Negara, Kayi Jaga Mangkudilaga, Figure of Transformation 2017, The Indonesian Lecturer, and <i>Rahmatallilalamin</i> . He is the key humorist orator and an author of a monumental book. <i>MasyaAllah</i>
3.	Muhammad Satria	Thank you for the advice, Ustadz. I can be calm to face the virus. Two things I can do: having an ablution anytime (be purified) and reading <i>istighfar</i> .
4.	Nani Yani Maryani	The spread of corona virus has made people anxious, but we can still be calm by listening at UAS's speech in 8 a.m. everyday. Thank God, it can remain a comfort and knowledge for me. I note it as learning.
5.	Eva Sari	Thank God. He (UAS) finally deals and agrees with the decree of MUI to stay at home, worship at home, not to handshake, physically distanced when communicating, and not to present in a crowd. The Saudi Arabia that becomes the destination of all Muslims in the world has also implemented 'lockdown' to break the chain of the Covid-19 spread.

Table 2. Negative Comments of the Audiences in Social Media

No	Account Name	Negative Comments for Gus Baha
1.	Eko Hadi	Please prioritize any effort!!!
2.	Min J2	It is kindly the same that we suicide.
3.	Saiful Hasan	Anyone will finally be disappointed. What he delivers does not connect to the case of the corona virus. Everyone may not be afraid of the virus, but he should remain obedient to the existing regulation. It is untrue that he has resisted the regulation. If the government commands the public, they should remain obedient for the sake of others. Moreover, he often gets flu, stomachache, keep away from everyone's fart, fall asleep, and snoring. It means that he is the same as everyone else. He can say that way, because he has not been infected with the virus, whereas when he gets flu, he must look for any aspirin. It signifies that it is a lie when he says that he is not afraid of the corona virus. It can be easily proven when he or anyone approaches everyone affected with the virus, he will visit the hospital to get a medical aid.
No.	Account Name	Negative Comments for Ustadz Abdus Somad

1.	NutCracker Cracker	It indicates that rationality is not well applied/performed.
2.	Zonker Zoker	Try to chase away the virus. Do not too much to say a harm.
3.	Eeah eea	I believe that many people have been disappointed with his argument. Moreover, he mentions that his perspective is the same as some popular scholars who say that the virus is God's military. He always feels that he is the right. For me, when he proposes his argument, because the virus firstly appears in Wuhan, China as well as there is an oppression against Muslims in Uighur. Yet, his argument has made people judge that he does not have an empathy against people in Wuhan whom are affected by the outbreak by unconsciously connecting an oppression in Uighur with the corona virus.
4.	Hendri Wijaya	Please be accustomed to think before start to propose an argument. Be aware of the rationality in order that religion will be more beneficial.

From the mentioned comments, both figures have tried to provide peace for people, especially Muslims. It can be identified through a comment of an account Konco Suwung and Muhammad Satria. The influence of both figures is very visible in the context of religious social policy. In governmental policy, some advice is suggested as follows: execute a 'lockdown', do a physical distancing, stay at home, implement worship at home (including Friday prayer and congregation). Yet, this advice can still be applied in some cities. Nouvan Hidayat, as one of the operators at PT. Djarum has claimed that he still went to work, because it was impossible to work from home. Besides, he also posted on his Facebook about an unsettling phenomenon of those who piled up masks and hand sanitizer: "For those who sell a mask, Personal Protection Facility, and hand sanitizer, do not pile it up and sell it with a high price. Be kind, not to oppress people. Our prayer is against the coronavirus. Beg for forgiveness and stay working with all the potencies we have". PT. Djarum Kudus has continued to operate during the pandemic, but the company has regulated all employees and staff to keep cleanliness and health by supplying masks, gloves, and disinfectant fluids. As if the company has stopped operating, the economy of the indigenous people will certainly turn off. Therefore, the influence of both figures on religious social policymaking in small cities is clearly portrayed. There are several places that still operate a working-time, but it remains possible, such as Menara Kudus, factory, and many others.

JUSTIFYING THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA TO AFFECT THE MINDSET OF AUDIENCES AGAINST THE CORONAVIRUS IN INDONESIA

Gus Baha and Ustadz Abdus Somad are the representatives of Islamic figures

that have become more visible by the media. Their advice is well socialized due to the existence of social media platforms, such as YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, and more. The use of social media for preaching is unavoidable during an era of industrial revolution. The speed of audiences' access and a wider reach has positioned both figures as popular figures. In this urgency, Gus Baha suggests the public to behave and act normally against COVID-19, because this pandemic may be regarded as God's warning that death is a certainty. His suggestion has been well absorbed by his audiences. The involvement of arguments in the *Qur'an* and classical literature have strengthened their trust in his speech. Ustadz Abdus Somad also reminds us to be watchful and careful against the pandemic. For him, *ikhtiyar* and *tawakkal* have become two matters that can be performed by audiences during the pandemic.

The clear method of delivery and literature (classical literature) as main sources, as well as jokes, have made the public interested in them. Although he was unintentionally involved in politics during the general election in 2019 (Tenorio, Jubba, Qodir, Hidayati 2019), his inner imagery did not fade among his audiences. The popularity of the internet as a medium to communicate has been a new section (Fakhruroji, Muhaemin 2017) that greatly eases any access, so that any existing boundary between center and periphery (minority and majority) in the cyber world has become vague. Research on www.apjii.or.id notes that in 2018, Indonesian users of the internet reached approximately 170 people and 19% had used the internet to operate social media. This fact is then exploited by both figures as a media to liver religious advice. Besides, the internet has become a 'Bunt' (*cyber-Islamic environment*) to socialize and communicate with other Muslims (Bunt 2000).

THE THEOLOGY OF *AHLUS SUNNAH* AS A MODERATE RELIGIOUS SOLUTION

The villagers and traditional people cannot be separated from cultural and social traditions. The theology of *Ahlus Sunnah* greatly influences the moderate attitude, tending to always prioritize religious solutions rather than scientific solutions. They also cannot leave any tradition, such as prayer for funerals and *selametan*. Besides, a sufficiently medium economy has made the villagers required to go to the field, so their economy can progress and survive. They are not the same as everyone working in the city with a certain income and tends to allow 'work from home'. Thus, both figures are in moderate position, and not to behave excessively though COVID-19 is a pandemic that has struck down many countries in the world in terms of social, religious, economic, and environmental sectors. This moderate position is called *tawassuth*. Both

figures finally attempt to mediate the social development trends.

The tendency to prioritize religious solutions rather than scientific solutions is because these figures are religious preachers, not medical experts. The emphasis on health perspective and the use of religious narratives that support health regulation will be certainly more dominant. There is a need for the existing religious lecturer with his moderate religious behavior and literacy on various issues in public health, environmental science, and other sciences, so that his perspective is not mono discipline. The need for religious lecturers to read and study health and pandemic literature from a Turkish perspective is also important, such as a work of Ibn Sina, or other multi-talented religious figure, like Ibnu Hajar al-Asqalany with his work *Bazlul Maun* that discusses a history of a plague in the Islamic world since the Prophetic period up to 900s H (Al-Asqalany 1991). Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of the pandemic is not only seen from a religious perspective, but also from history, health, and environmental science.

Because both of their thoughts are conveyed through social media, and they have been widely known as influencers in the religious field. Their ideas are absorbed by their audiences so that they tend not to heed any suggestion and solution from the perspective of science and medicine. *Pros* and *cons* resulting from the wide circulation of lectures have indicated that the position of both figures as religious influencers have processed very well despite different responses from audiences. As viewed from medical science, the minimum of knowledge on COVID-19 pandemic, both figures are frequently highlighted. The openness to see and re-analyze classic *turats* on health and disease as combined with a religious point of view, is a combination that increasingly confirms the position of both figures that mostly affect Muslims in Indonesia (Qudsy 2019).

Similar to the Singaporean case that Abidin analyses, most of the religious influencers in Indonesia are young Muslim *ulamas* aged between 18 and 40 years. It refers to the called names of ‘Gus’ Baha and ‘Ustadz’ Abdus Somad, in which *Gus* is usually a person descendant of Kiai (an elder of pesantren) who young-middle-aged until 40, and *Ustadz* is usually a young religious teacher in an Islamic institution. They deploy techniques of visual labor, through their official social media channels, that engage their followers. The most popular influencers in Indonesia started off as young *da’i*, with a significant rise in popularity of those identifying as one-million-views-*da’i* (*da’i sejuta views for Ustadz Abdus Somad*) and walking-Qur’an-kiai (*kiai Al-Quran berjalan*). Although influencers also have a significant number of followers in Indonesia, they formed ‘komunitas’ or ‘fans’ (interest groups), such as Pecinta Gus Baha,

in Indonesia. Ustadz Abdus Somad, for instance, has a popular YouTube channel, Ustadz Abdus Somad Official and has since gained popularity in the mainstream media as a ‘fans’ for Muslims interested in learning better about Islam.

The notion of religious influencers and the example previously provided on how Gus Baha and Ustadz Abdus Somad merged their religious platforms on COVID-19 frame how we should think about both as ‘theological actors’ and their movement. Although my examples above do not seem to have direct links to certain theological roots (except for *Ahlus Sunnah* theology to some extent), they *condition* the Muslim community’s religious platforms and reconfigure their (religious) subjectivity. Further, by positioning them as ‘theological actors’, we can see the preacher (*dai*) influence over the way the Muslim community in Indonesia reconstruct their opinions on COVID-19 how they should and how they will respond to the virus in the recent periods. Gus Baha and Ustadz Abdus Somad’s emphasis on religious approach, rather than a scientific and medical one, to COVID-19, their idealization of COVID-19 as catastrophe taken by God to human beings and the way they (re) make the issue of COVID-19 in public should be seen as a shift in the current imaginary of common people, and particularly the Muslim community, as citizen-subjects.

Although the positioning of Gus Baha and Ustadz Abdus Somad as religious influences can be seen as influencing religious opinions on COVID-19, we suggest that we look at both as part of an emerging ‘movement of young preacher instead of a form of a religious movement. This perspective allows us to recognize their religious potentials as well as to ‘to glimpse the movement’s possibilities—without forgetting its limits’. This movement of young preacher, instead of promoting scientific approach to COVID-19, enforces certain modes of subjection. The notion of ‘scientific’ commonly used in the approach to COVID-19 pushes them to move into other spaces that require specific religious platforms. In other words, in Indonesia, the common religious opinions among the Muslim community can be captured by the figure of ‘social-media religious influencers’, who actively and creatively sets out how the Muslim community should look, behave, and set their opinions on COVID-19. The religious influencer’s presence and influence are mediated by the prevalence of social media platforms. The religious influencer’s presence and influence are mediated by the prevalence of social media platforms and shaped by the contested religious dynamics to COVID-19.

CONCLUSION

The young preacher's religious approach to COVID-19 has undergone a significant impact on the way the Muslim community has expressed thoughts on the virus. Through social media, their arguments can be rapidly consumed and influence the audiences' mindset. Their arguments also result from the theological viewpoint of Ahlus Sunnah that strives for well-behaved, moderate, and tends to prioritize religious solutions than scientific solutions. Since their arguments are delivered and spread through social media, they have been well known as religious influencers. The 'religious influencers' become a part of religious transformation and condition the Muslim community's expressions on the COVID-19 issues. As seen in the case of Gus Baha and Ustadz Abdus Somad, when they took part in expressing their religious platforms on COVID-19 in their official YouTube channel, which required them to be visible on the social media, they had to give the 'stage' to the religious counterpart instead of scientific or medical approach. The increasing presence of the religious influencers, circulating through social media and garnering significant following both online and offline, reveals the shifting imaginary of ideal religious expressions on COVID-19. However, it also indicates, unfortunately, the limits of this study which positions them in the dominating and lasting patriarchal gender in Indonesia's religious preaching even on the public health realms.

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FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS: THE CULTURAL IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION OF *CELE* AND *BATIK* WITHIN MOLUCCAN SCHOLARS IN AMBON

Elka Anakotta

The Christian State Institute of Ambon

Email: anakottaelka@gmail.com

Flavius Floris Andries

The Christian State Institute of Ambon

Email: qumran_2007@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

Identity is a social construction. The Moluccan people are evident of this structure, especially regarding the policy of the obligation to wear cele (Moluccan traditional garment). This has become a process of identity construction involving culture and ethnicity for Moluccans. This paper discusses how Moluccan scholars who studied in Java understand their position wearing cele in the local context in Maluku. In addition, this paper also discusses the scholars' views on how the process of identity negotiation between localism and nationalism is represented through cele and batik. Information for this study was gathered using a qualitative method with a cultural studies approach. The data were collected using several techniques including interviews, observation, and literature studies to answer research questions and problems. This paper shows that in response to the Moluccan government policy which requires the people to wear cele once a week, most scholars prefer to wear batik instead. One justification is related to cultural and religious aspects, noting cele is more familiar and originates from within the Christian community, while the Islamic community does not recognize cele in their culture. They consider that such policy leads to the construction of cultural identity based on false consciousness.

Keywords: false consciousness, cele, batik, cultural identity construction, Moluccan scholars

INTRODUCTION

The development of modern society has resulted in local knowledge, generally referred to as culture. Culture is the result of knowledge, where humans learn and claim that culture should be revisited in a certain context and locus either locally or nationally. Culture grows and develops in society in line with the conditions and characteristics, so that cultural diversity appears to reflect its

own uniqueness. At this point, one can find cultural similarities and differences at the local, national, and global levels. Identity is a human need in general but at the same time it is also fundamental (Shils 1975; Berger and Luckman, 1991). Biologically, humans are not born in a complete state, but are in the process of building themselves. Humans can basically function depending on how each social actor has achieved self-development and is manifested in existential life experiences. The identity of an individual has several layers, where its significance is determined by the extent of individual experience in a culture that forms it. Thus, various aspects of a person's multi-layered identity are exposed to the environment through conversation, interaction with various other cultures, and even biologically potential (Greenfeld & Eastwood, 2009).

In a famous work by Jacques Derrida, he notes identities are never quite identical, because they always contain elements that cannot be reduced from various changes (Derrida, 1992, p. 9). The content of identity thus is never singular, having several aspects, differences, and similarities, both internally and externally for any identity (individual or collective). Therefore, 'diversity' or multiple identities overlaps and hangs on one of the characteristics of identity politics (Tully, 2003b). Identity politics consists of three ongoing negotiation processes that interact in complex ways: (1) between members of a group fighting for recognition (2) between themselves and the groups to whom they demand recognition and (3) between the latter group members, whose identity is formed because of the struggle, whether they like it or not (Tully, 2003b). Identity politics is disruptive when norms of mutual recognition are questioned and become the focus of struggles and negotiations for justice and freedom (Tully, 2003b).

Social Identity theory proposes that all interactions with others lie in sustainable interpersonal relations (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). It means that if the related group behavior is personally motivated, it will not be motivated by personal prominence, and vice versa. Self-categorization theory (Swann, 2012) extends this idea by hypothesizing the hydraulic relationship between social environment and individual. Therefore, the social identity approach suggests that the motivational burden for pro-group behavior rests entirely on the shoulders of relevant social identities (Swann et al., 2012). Conversely, when a social identity stands out and group members assert themselves in terms of their social identity, they will "be harmful", seeing themselves and other group members as a social category. This means that group members will see other group members through the lens of their membership in the group, rather than in terms of the personal relationships that they have established with one

another (Swann et al., 2012).

Meanwhile, to understand national identity, one must begin with a preliminary investigation into such questions regarding identity. At the individual level, identity can be understood as part of a person's cognitive map that concerns the configuration and structure of a person regarding a social domain. Cognitive maps are images of social order carried out by social actors and classified into various sub-supporting aspects as a picture of a broader social order, awareness of expectations, behavior, norms, conceptions of morality and justice, etc. Identity is an aspect of the cognitive map because of the inevitable relationship as a component of the cognitive map itself. A person's identity is inseparable from the image of the world, one's ethical appearance, etc. (Greenfeld & Eastwood, 2009).

Identity politics has not only become popular and appropriate at the national and local levels, but also on an individual level through lifestyle. These politics penetrate the center of the economy through the ideology of capitalism. 'Identity politics' emerged into modern discourse in the late twentieth century to describe political struggles occurring with increasing frequency. These came to represent some of the most pressing political issues of our time. Various political activities refer to struggles for legal, political, and constitutional recognition and identity accommodation of individuals, refugees, women, gays, lesbians, languages, ethnic groups, cultural minorities, immigrants, and often, religions that exclude Western culture (Tully, 2003a).

Applying this research framework, Moluccan scholars studying in Java tended to change their appearance and fashion by wearing "*batik*" clothing. This trend not only follows the context of their place of study, but also continues when they return to their place of origin. These scholars prefer to wear *batik* instead of "*cele*" (Moluccan garment) even though the local government has designated "*cele*" as a uniform in public buildings (schools and offices) as a way of increasing local identity consciousness (pursuant to Ambon Mayoral Regulation No. 46 of 2017 concerning Wearing Ambon clothing). However, there is debate among Moluccan scholars about *cele* for several reasons. Among other arguments, is a principle one arguing that *cele* is not rooted in the ideology nor does it contain philosophical values. Additionally, *cele* is not culturally rooted in Islamic regions in Central Maluku. This means that cultural space in Maluku is not all rooted in the *cele* tradition which makes *cele* a Moluccan cultural icon, where wearing it in public space as a feature of identity is still debatable. In fact, people wear *cele* only because there is pressure from authorities, not as a form of consciousness. It also is different than fashion interests such as the *batik* people wear daily. *Cele* is a stranger to

some Moluccan people, on the other hand *batik* has become familiar to the Moluccan society.

This paper aims to discuss the contestation between localism and nationalism among the Moluccan people using their attitude towards *cele* and *batik* as a mechanism for understand. Do Moluccan scholars forgo their identity by wearing *batik*? How much does their identity depend on the symbol of the clothes worn, if at all? Couldn't it be argued that identity is strongly attached to the symbol? These pressing questions makes this topic fascinating to study because the issues of identity and ethnicity are two unified and important things that must be discussed from the perspective of modernity. *Batik* has become a trend for Indonesian society, especially when the government established *batik* as a national garment (Presidential Regulation No. 33 of 2009 informally known as National *Batik* Day, resulting from UNESCO designating *batik* as an Intangible Cultural Heritage item on October 2, 2009). Moreover, various *batik* modification pushes have been driven by designers to present a style that is still suitable for wearing *batik*. *Batik* has become a cultural symbol of Indonesian identity. Since its designation by UNESCO, *batik* has received world recognition and there has been growing reinvention and remodeling of *batik* (Moersid, 2013). *Batik* is not only a mass product, but its existence has become intertwined with Indonesian cultural identity (Trixie, 2020).

CELE IN THE CULTURAL CONTEXT OF MALUKU

Cele is the garment worn by women who live in Christian villages in Central Maluku and not worn by women who live in Islamic parts of the region. In addition, this traditional garment is not part of a fashion tradition in other areas in Maluku such as in Southeast Maluku and other areas. Rather than a trend, *cele* has become a uniform outfit in Maluku. The discourse about *cele* in the context of Moluccan culture is fascinating because the idea of *cele* as a Moluccan cultural jargon has penetrated the political space. *Cele*, through the Gubernatorial instruction and the Mayoral Decree, has been decreed as the must-wear outfit in schools, campus offices, etc. However, when *cele* is placed in the Moluccan cultural context, it has become an interesting debate. An informant, Y, had the following to say: "The identity consciousness through symbols is lost so that a movement is needed even though it is political in nature to revive the culture, including *cele*. People, including myself, like to follow suit and are always encouraged to wear *cele* but do not know the meaning of the big and small squares, because of the cultural value education process that does not work. This is different from *batik*. In the past, I did not know the meaning and significance of the symbols in *batik* so I did not consider the

moment. However, after having encountered other people (Javanese people) while studying in Yogya, I understood the symbols in *batik*.¹

The informant's statement shows that *cele* does not have strong ideological roots, but combination of customs and religion have led to it being a collective dress code in Maluku. Hall (Hall, 2021) argues the definition of culture is "the lived practices or practical ideologies which enable a society, group or class to experiences define, interpret, and make sense of its condition of existence". In other words, culture is the implication of people's knowledge of the world through specific actions within a particular context in a specific locality. Thus, centering *cele* as a uniform in the Moluccan local context needs to bring up the philosophical and ideological values that underlie the cultural values of *cele* itself, so that it can be worn as an expression of local identity in the public space. This is because it does not have a philosophy and ideology as the implications of local knowledge that can be expressed through fashion. It does not appear to be ideological and philosophical in the context of *cele* culture. Informant A² reported the following: "The ideological process related to *cele* through cultural education does not work, so the significant philosophy of *cele* through the motifs of the big and small squares is unknown, so it seems that *cele* is not rooted in a strong tradition." The informant's statement emphasized that *cele* is not culturally strong as reported by another informant under the initial G that big and small squares are made in industry, therefore the cultural and philosophical dimension of *cele* is a phenomenon.³

The rejection of *cele* has strong cultural ground as reported by an informant under the initial F as follows;⁴ "Placing *cele* as an icon in the Moluccan cultural arena is not yet final, because they are still looking for a form. In addition, *cele* has yet to be accepted by all Moluccan people who have an Islamic background, and in traditional rituals as well. Emphasis is on the context of customary rituals because that is where localism originates and through these media, we can find cultural traces. *Cele* which is forced to be accepted in the context of localism is a durable process of position and disposition, not yet final and continues to look for a form so that it can be accepted by all levels of society." The informant's account demonstrates in the context of indigenous places in Maluku, *cele* is something that belongs to "the other", not to traditional Islamic regions. Therefore, *cele* is not the identity of traditional Muslim areas. The informant's statement implies two things, namely the existence of an identity debate in which there is a process of coercing other elements to accept *cele* as a

¹ Interview with Y, 20 January 2017

² Interview with A, 7 June 2017

³ Interview with an informant under the initial G, 3 June 2017

⁴ Interview with an informant under the initial F, 6 June 2017

shared culture. This contradicts the idea proposed by Hall, which asserted that identity is inherent and relational. This identity is built vis-à-vis between races, ethnic groups, and religions, so that no identity is built without a dialogical relationship with the others.

CELE POLICY: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

Cele as a shared uniform or as a culture of uniformity through government instructions and the Ambon Mayoral Decree, in addition to being viewed as a form of symbolic violence, the *cele* policy discriminates against the Moluccan Muslim community and live in Islamic regions. This can be seen from the statement of informant F who reported the following: “Talking about the *cele* culture, multiple parts of this culture are not at a place where all Moluccan people can accept it, especially in regions with Muslim population. In traditional and religious rites in Islamic communities, people do not wear a *cele*, but a white *kebaya* for women and a white shirt for men. This indicates that culturally, *cele* is not accepted among the Moluccan Muslim indigenous community. Because of that, discussing *cele* as a Moluccan cultural icon in terms of customs, religious traditions, and fashion has not penetrated the official regional culture, because *cele* is not rooted in cultural identity.”⁵ Informant F’s statement emphasizes that in customary and religious traditions in Islamic communities, *cele* is something foreign or belonging to “the other”. In addition, this statement shows a rejection of the *cele* policy which does not respect certain customary traditions and religion (Islamic communities) in Maluku. Therefore, making *cele* a collective outfit is detrimental to communities living in customary Muslim communities. As a result, this policy can be seen as a form of discrimination against customs and Islamic traditions in Maluku.

However, the reality is that *cele* has been used as a shared cultural icon and has penetrated the public sphere in Maluku, especially in provincial and city government agencies, schools, and private agencies. From Bourdieu’s perspective, the Gubernatorial and Mayoral decrees embody the symbolic power that is present to suppress the public. Bourdieu (2010, 652-653; 1993: 164) argues symbolic power is invisible power that can only be exercised with the involvement of people who do not realize that they are the target, or exercised themselves. Therefore, the language aspect presented verbally through the Gubernatorial Instruction and the written language are representations of power. The Gubernatorial Instruction and the Mayoral Decree as a representation of symbolic power, have unsuspectingly become a form of symbolic violence or cultural domination of society especially for

⁵ Interview with F, 6 June 2017

Islamic communities in Ambon City, as well as other Christian and Muslim communities in other areas in Maluku. Bourdieu (1993: 168) maintains that symbolic violence is a model of structural and social domination that takes place unconsciously in community life, including acts of discrimination against certain groups, races, ethnicities, and genders.

This phenomenon is a form of denial of the multicultural reality of Maluku, which in fact consists of various ethnic and religious identities which are full of various traditions. Farrelly (2004: 43) argues that “multiculturalism is not about difference and identity, but about those that are embedded in and sustained by culture, that is a body of beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of people understand themselves and the world and organize their individual and collective lives.” Farrelly emphasizes that in a multicultural society, differences in identity are not an issue and/or something that must be debated. However, the concept of multiculturalism appears to provide an understanding that each different identity can understand and interpret cultural differences to live in a common space. In other words, multiculturalism emerges as a response to the fact of diversity in a society (Heywood, 2002: 119). The *cele* policy of the government is a denial of multicultural facts, or an act of unrecognition of the existence of religious identity (Islam) through the symbol of clothing. This is not realized by policy makers in Maluku. Therefore, the informants’ statements above also tend to be a form of rejection of government policies that do not consider aspects of the religious traditions of all religions which are also identities.

SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE PRACTICE THROUGH THE *CELE* POLICY

Politically and through the means of power, *cele* penetrates public space and eventually *cele* is forced to be accepted as a culture of uniformity as their culture. This context is what Homi K. Bhaba in the Location of Culture (1994) calls hybridity, with the view that there are efforts to transform culture and identity carried out by the dominant culture represented by “*cele*” over other subordinate cultures. The impact of hybridity can be seen from *cele* penetrating the education arena, the offices of both public and government schools, as well as government and private offices. The government has made wearing *cele* obligatory, but the informants clearly state that they did not understand the philosophical values and the meaning of the *cele* motif. It seems that *cele* is forced to become a regional icon as demonstrated in an interview with a different respondent.⁶ The *cele* movement in Maluku emerged as a response to instructions from the local government which I think is part of an effort to

⁶ Interview with Y, 6 February 2017

elevate *cele* from a minority position to become synonymous with *batik*. *Cele* is a “forgotten minority identity” and needs to be promoted. It is a representation of an ethnic group that continues to fight for position and recognition and so they can compete with other ethnic groups.

The earlier statement indicates that the informants see the discourse of *cele* as an identity that is now in a neglected minority position and thus the government instruction to wear *cele* is an attempt to elevate local culture in the representation of identity consciousness. From the poststructuralism approach, there are problems with representation through *cele*. The informant stated that the local government policy is an attempt to elevate *cele* from the minority to the majority by claiming *cele* to be typical of Moluccan culture. However, Maluku consists of many local areas each with own characteristics, which are not unilaterally represented by *cele*. Even as the informant said that *cele* is absurd when it comes to identity and symbols. The big and small squares in the *Cele* motif cannot be explained philosophically.

The informant’s statement about the *cele* policy, if viewed from the concept of nationalism, is an approach to building nationalism against the idea of localism or global versus local, the West versus the East, or national versus local. *Batik* has been a representation of the majority and thus a part of nationalism, while *cele* is a representation of a minority, based on localism. However, in the context of *cele* localism as a minority representation, it eventually has become a representation of Moluccan culture, and therefore the dominant narrative. This kind of practice was criticized by Robert Young (2001) in *Postcolonialism* for the use of Western ideas by contemporary thinkers such as Parterejee. Although they tried to develop a reverse culture through an independent concept of life (like of *swadesi*), they were still influenced by the Western socialist utopian thinker and the economic theory of John Ruskin. The term ‘minority’ attached to *cele* is a form of resistance to the dominant culture of *batik*. However, eventually it is trapped in the modern tradition or know in social theory as structuralism (Wacquant & Akçaoğlu, 2017).

The ‘*cele*’ policy cannot be accepted by other informants. Many interviewed claimed that forcing *cele* as Moluccan culture is a process of cultural domination.⁷ This is the so-called representation resulting from the practice of symbolic literacy, the invisible power that engages people who do not want to know that they are the target, or that they themselves exercise power (Wacquant & Akçaoğlu, 2017). Most Moluccans do not realize that policies contain representational values or cultural domination that leads to hegemony or as Bourdieu said it is called a form of symbolic violence. The government

⁷ Interview with F, 6 June 2017

may not realize this either. Some Moluccans see the *cele* policy as legitimate because it is associated with a marginalized culture. Therefore, by using the term as a local cultural minority, the government wants to shift the structure and reality of *cele* to integrate with the habitus. This is what Bourdieu means by 'power' - arbitrarily determine the instruments of knowledge and the unconscious expression of social reality. It also means that symbolic power is the power to change and create a reality that must be legally recognized (Wacquant & Akçaoğlu, 2017). The government's effort to make regulations and policies regarding *cele* as a shared culture in Maluku is a form of cultural domination in the cultural context of Maluku. Culture in the local context is an important point in habitus, but this does not mean that the jargon of Moluccan localism should be represented by *cele*. Cultural position and disposition in social reality still exist, thus providing room for the creation of domination structures. By making *cele* a local culture, several questions then arise among the informants, what exactly is local culture? Which *cele* are we talking about? and what is the philosophy of *cele*?⁸

The philosophy of preservation is closely related to traditional values; therefore, tradition will always contain philosophical values that can be understood and explained by the community associated with that tradition. The problem is that Moluccan people who wear *cele* cannot explain the self-philosophy as reported by the informant by saying, "I don't really understand the philosophy of the small or the big squares of the *cele* motif at all, but because my parents wear it, I also wear it without understanding the meaning behind it."⁹ This statement shows that Moluccan scholars who mostly have critical awareness of hidden cultural instruments do not know or understand the philosophical values of *cele* even though they wear it. This ignorance is the result of an unsuccessful cultural education process. This is explained by the following thought from an interviewee: "The ideological process regarding cultural education does not work, so that the philosophical value and meaning of the *cele* motif are not understood. Therefore, it seems that the Moluccans do not have tradition related to *cele*. Although *batik* still survives because tradition, crafts, and arts are part of the culture, *cele* is still limited to fashion."¹⁰

The earlier mentioned statement also provides legitimacy to the claim that *cele* does not have strong philosophical power, nor does it have cultural roots in the context of the Moluccan people. This was later confirmed by informant G (see above). Informant G also made the strong claim local culture and community are suggested and forced, but the Moluccans are not familiar with it and nor

⁸ Interview with S, 12 June 2017

⁹ Interview with S, 12 June 2017

¹⁰ Interview with A, 7 June 2017

do they understand it.¹¹ Informant F also emphasized that the problem of *cele* in the Moluccan localism is not only for people who wear it in Islamic areas, but also those in Christian areas themselves who do not understand it, so *cele* has yet to be formalized: “The city government’s struggle to place *cele* a Moluccan cultural icon has yet to be final; They are still looking for a form and this is important so that it can be accepted by all people, especially Muslim Moluccans, whether it is worn daily or only for rituals. *Cele* worn in the local context is a process of position and disposition that is durable, unfinished, and continues to seek form so that it can be accepted by all.¹²” The statement shows that *cele* is, in fact, something belonging to “the other”, and not Islam. Thus, *cele* is not the identity of the Islamic regions since the culture of these regions do not have *cele* for their rituals. So, for these people, it is something belonging to “the other”. There are two implications for it: first, there is a debate about identity where there is a process of coercing other elements that are forced to be accepted as common property. This contradicts Hall’s opinion (K. Hall & Nilep, 2015). The other implication of Hall’s statement is that *cele* worn as a Moluccan culture is the result of a mental process involving two communities in Maluku --- Muslims and Christians --- as a form of dialogical meeting. As such, there is a form of acceptance and recognition from both communities of the culture. However, this is not the case in Maluku’s cultural sphere, but in the political or power arena which has become an instrument of legitimacy. Thus, in Bourdieu’s terminology, *cele* policy is an instrument of symbolic representation and violence, where representation has caused discrimination, and symbolic violence has become an entry point to worsen conflict and relations. Representation has become stronger due to local government regulations and policies related to the wearing of *cele*, which unwittingly produces a symbolic form of violence against the Muslim communities in Maluku where *cele* is not accepted but they must wear in all their ritual activities. *Cele* is only accepted in Christian areas in Central Maluku, but other Christian areas in Maluku do not recognize *cele* as part of their culture as in the case of Islamic communities in the Moluccan context in general.

Policies are instruments for strengthening the representation process through the educational institutions and workplaces. Through strategic and coordinated actions, it is very easy for the authorities to suppress. This regulation is reinforced by the claim that ‘*cele*’ as a local culture is considered an absolute truth (what Bourdieu called *doxa*) (Zurmailis & Faruk, 2018). *Doxa* is a truth produced unilaterally supported by the interests of the authorities, and ultimately believed to be the same truth. Therefore, it is the people’s obligation

¹¹ Interview with G, 3 June 2017

¹² Interview with F, 6 June 2017

to protect and defend it, even though culturally not everyone accepts it as part of their culture. Therefore, the policy regarding *cele* can be regarded as a form of symbolic power which arbitrarily determines the instruments of knowledge and the expression of social reality and is not recognized as valid or legitimate. Symbolic power is the power to shape the things that are given, to make people see and believe, and/or to strengthen or change the way they see and act toward the world. This is how domination and violence are forced so that there are parties that benefit from it while others are opposed to it.

The term '*cele*', well known in the Moluccan context, has transcended mental processes in the form of stories and experiences to be easily accepted as part of the habitus. Habitus is a system of disposition that produces a lifestyle and practice that is in line with the experience and internalization of the agent's processes when interacting with other agents or the objective structures of their environment. The new habitus that develops as a way of introducing a local identity such as *cele* is seen as a culture of uniformity, and eventually people accept it as part of their culture. This context is what Homi K. Bhabha, in his book "Cultural Locations" (Studies et al., 2016), called hybridity with the assumption that there is an attempt to change the culture or identity by the dominant culture represented by *cele*. This hybridity process can also penetrate the educational arena (Ghasemi et al., 2017) and that is the case where every level school from elementary to high school requires students to wear *celes* of pre-determined colors at least once a week. Likewise, in government offices, all employees must wear *cele* on certain days of the week. However, in the cultural arena, there seems to be a resistance to this behavior because society is not equipped with knowledge of the philosophical values of *ceel*. In other words, *cele* is not rooted in culture and society cannot explain it, as stated by the informant under the initial A¹³: "Cultural education doesn't work very well. Education influences the process of cultural ideology. There is no local content in schools that provides space and a portion for local cultural issues. As far as I can remember, local content only talks about food, namely *sago*. Therefore, people know *cele* only through oral tradition, but formally in written form it is not available." The informants viewed schools as an arena for cultural battles but failed in making them a social capacity to be used as content in formal cultural education for the Moluccan generation, rendering the community unable to understand what *cele* is and what philosophy it contains. The informants understand the dominance of the *sago* narrative because local content in schools is always related to this traditional food. This is not the case with *cele*, so in the local context, *cele* is a minority narrative.

¹³ Interview with A, 7 June 2017.

BATIK IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF MOLUCCAN SCHOLARS IN JAVA

Batik is a Javanese culture that is full of ideology and philosophy behind every motive and is very easy to understand by other people who are not of Javanese ethnicity. This can be seen from the following interviewee: "I am a Moluccan who studies in Java. At first, I didn't know the meaning behind each *Batik* motif, but as time went on, I could finally understand the meaning behind each *batik* motif so that when I used it, I was able to choose which one fits the context. For example, a *batik* shirt with a flower motif or arrow should be used at what time."¹⁴ This statement shows that *Batik* has succeeded in attracting the attention of non-Javanese people, and the philosophy behind the motif is now well-known. This also shows there is an educational process that has been passed down from generation to generation, so that the identity consciousness through *batik* is realized. This is what Eagleton (2000: 14) meant regarding culture as an implication of knowledge. Based on Berger's theory of the identity construction process, informant Y's statement shows the internalization process in the wearing of *batik*. Berger and Luckman (Dharma, 2018) argue that human internalization of reality changes it from the structure of the objective world into the structure of subjective consciousness. This shows that the statement of the informant in seeing the *batik* is a form of value transformation because of the "dialectification" process that occurs, from externalization and objectification before finally coming to internalization.

Social order begins with the continuous external vanity in humans to the world, both in physical and mental activities. Society as an objective reality implies institutionalization. The process of the correctional institution starts externally, carried out repeatedly so the patterns are seen and understood together, eventually resulting in habituation. The habituation that has taken place eventually led to disposition and tradition (Sulaiman, 2016). The dialectical process through external agents and experienced objectification will eventually enter the internalization process. This then results in an understanding of the meaning of the *batik* in the informant's position, not as part of the society and culture in which *batik* is produced. This dialectical process makes informants understand the values and meanings of various *batik* motifs.

In addition, *batik* also has advantages in terms of fashion because it is very easy to adjust to the context.¹⁵ This informant's statement emphasized that *batik* is one of the items which has a high selling value in the market due to fashion. From the two statements above, it is emphasized that *batik* has dominance

¹⁴Interview with Y, 20 January 2017.

¹⁵Interview with F. 6 June 2017

through social and economic capacity, and it eventually strengthens *batik* culturally. This is what the *cele* culture lacks in the local Moluccan context. People wear it routinely once a week, not for cultural reasons, but due to the Gubernatorial instruction and the Mayoral Decree as a means of legitimacy.

CELE AND BATIK AS MEANS OF NEGOTIATION FOR LOCAL IDENTITIES TO BECOME NATIONAL

A society that is formed into a nation state is always attached to its name, an identity which is no longer particular but collective in nature. This collective identity bond is formed from various localities, unified and are bonded by a term that is often called nationalism. Both localism and nationalism are important for an individual as well as a collective bond, because they are related to identity as illustrated by the following interview result: “Nationalism for me is the border or fence of Indonesian territory, which is the result of construction, so there are similarities. Therefore, for myself *batik* has become part of my national identity, so I am free to wear it in any context and space and time at any time.”¹⁶ The result of the interview above illustrates that even though nationalism is a constructed process, the result is a pillar of guarding a common identity as a national community. It is clear from the above statement that the informant shows the symbol of nationalism through *Batik* in which acceptance is made through a mutual consensus. There is a dimension of flexibility the informants show as an expression of dual identity between localism and nationalism, where awareness as part of the Moluccan localism remains visible, but nationalism as an Indonesian is also manifested. Therefore, the wearing of *batik* has become part of the informant’s identity in the context of Indonesian nationalism.

The same thing was also explained by informant R who stated: “*Batik* and *Cele* have the same portion that describes identity. However, *cele* has only become a local identity, on the other hand, local *batik* has become a national identity. So that *batik* does not have to be claimed as a Javanese identity but a national identity which means there is a shared belonging.”¹⁷ The statement above shows consciousness of the informant as a Moluccan offspring who on one hand understands the position of *batik* and *cele* as a representation of identity, while acknowledging they both have different portions. In Bourdieu’s perspective, it is called the limitation of the arena. Applying this framework, using the cultural arena lens to see *cele* illustrates that it is weak. The battle arena for *cele* culture is only limited to the Moluccan localism. On the other hand, *batik* is

¹⁶ Interview with F, 6 June 2017.

¹⁷ Interview with R, 15 May 2017

more widespread because of the cultural struggle on the national/Indonesian scale. In other words, the informant realizes that *cele* has a weak position in negotiations to become a national identity, as illustrated by the following arguments: “However, I must be honest that *batik* has greatly benefited from a policy perspective in addition to being populist because it is a joint movement that is also claimed by the state. Here there are political interests at play due to *batik* being deliberately claimed by other countries. Therefore, the *batik* policy is an attempt to claim the Indonesian *batik*.”¹⁸ The informant firmly emphasized politics is a powerful means of negotiation which, in the end, gives an advantage to the position of *batik* as a representation and national cultural jargon. This was also confirmed by informant F who noted the national political process through the government policy that established *Batik* as a national culture in addition to the award from UNESCO placing “*Batik*” as a national identity is stronger than *cele*. The weakness of *cele* in the process of negotiating a local identity to become national results from by several crucial things. One of the weaknesses of *cele* is the inability of the people who wear *cele* to explain the dimensions of the cultural philosophy contained the clothing, and not all the regions where *cele* originates can accept it. Therefore, in the Moluccan localism itself, *cele* is an ongoing debate because not all Moluccan indigenous peoples accept *cele* both in the context of customary practices such as traditional ceremonies, and in fact as a daily habit of the Moluccans, *cele* is not familiar.¹⁹

In other words, the position of *cele* in the context of negotiation at the local level is weak from a cultural perspective even though it is politically strong, especially when placing “*cele*” in the context of national negotiation. The interview illustrates despite the construction process, nationalism may be a pillar of guarding same identities as the nation’s community. The informants clearly show a symbol of nationalism through *batik*, whose acceptance is through consensus. There is a dimension of flexibility the informants show as an expression of multiple identities, between localism and nationalism. Consciousness of being part of Maluku is still present, but nationalism as an Indonesian also exists. *Batik* represents the informant’s identity in the Indonesian context. The same was stated by informant R as follows: “*Batik* and *cele* represent identity. *Cele* is a local identity while local *batik* has become a national identity. *Batik* cannot be claimed as a Javanese identity but a state identity. This is a shared property.”²⁰ The statement shows the informant’s consciousness as a Moluccan who understands the position of *batik* and *cele*

¹⁸ Interview with Y, 20 January 2017

¹⁹ Interview with F, 6 June 2017

²⁰ Interview with Y, 20 January 2017

as part of his identity, but also that they are different. According to Bourdieu, there is a boundary to the arena.

The battle arena for the *cele* culture is limited to the Moluccan context, while *batik* has a wider scope. In other words, *cele* is in a comparatively weaker position to negotiate to become a national identity, as stated by the informant in the following: “Frankly speaking, *batik* has a better position due to national policies. It is a joint movement supported by the government and the state. There are political interests since *batik* is claimed by other countries, so the policy related to *batik* is an attempt to reclaim *batik* as the original property of Indonesia.”²¹ The informant stated that politics is a powerful way of negotiating which ultimately gives *batik* an advantage in its position as a national representation and cultural jargon. Informants A and S also stated that the national political process through government policies declared *batik* as the national culture. Moreover, recognition from UNESCO has further placed *batik* as a national identity over *cele*.

THE POSITION OF *BATIK* AND *CELE* IN THE CONTEXT OF INDONESIANNESS

Every society has an identity, both particular and collective, as well as local and national. Every identity, both local and national, appears with its own jargon in various styles and forms. Indonesia is defined by the socio-cultural context of society consisting of various ethnic groups, tribes, and sub-tribes, making the condition of Indonesian localism unique. This uniqueness is closely related to various cultures with jargon, which on the one hand displays wealth as a marker of the identity of each group. But on the other hand, the question stands, will each local identity continue to live and develop when faced with the universal culture of a nation (Indonesia), or will it sink into the rhythm and superiority of universal culture that exceeds the national jargon? This issue is related to the culture of *cele* and *batik*, both of which are claimed to be rooted in local identities (*batik* = Javanese and *cele* = Moluccan). But can both survive in a broader context? Or can they be used as a jargon for national identity? The discussion of *Batik* and *cele* as national and local representations is important here.

Presenting *Batik* and *Cele* in the stage of Indonesian national culture or presenting both as a national cultural jargon from the perspective of Moluccan scholars who have studied in Java and Ambon at the graduate and post-graduate levels has introduced various arguments. One of the arguments

²¹ Interview with A, 7 June 2017

stated:²² “For the informants it can be affirmed that placing *cele* and *batik* in the context of Indonesian nationalism, both have the same and balanced position in the sense that speaking of identity, as a Moluccan offspring, I would *cele*, in Java I would wear *batik*. It is also my appreciation of diversity. Expressing identity requires strategy and negotiation, for example, when I know the context, when to wear *cele*, and when to wear *batik*. By wearing *batik* or *cele*, both of them define who I am.” From this argument, the way the informant understands the issue of identity represented through *batik* and *cele* is very flexible. *Cele* remains part of a national cultural jargon, though the arena is for Maluku. Similarly, a national cultural jargon *batik*’s arena is Java. On the other hand, the *batik* from the perspective of the informant shows the value of cultural recognition in which there is respect for other cultures as an expression of multicultural reality. (Svetelj, 2013). However, to the informant, wearing *cele* represents a consciousness of identity that is directly related to the state of being a Moluccan. The consciousness of collective identity appears through the symbols of *cele* and *batik*, which for the informant are both means of representing a national identity. The informant’s statement shows a process of identity construction, both ethnic (Moluccan) which is attached to the characteristics of *cele* (personal reasons) and *batik* that is attached to the community as an expression of a sense of community and a sense of belonging. This is somewhat in contrast to the opinion of Liliweri (2007), that explains that ethnic groups are defined by same cultural characteristics, i.e., language, customs, cultural behavior, cultural, and historical characteristics. According to him, ethnicity refers to classification and is based on affiliation. If *batik* and *cele* are placed as culture, both are representations of certain ethnic groups which are rooted in aspects of language, customs, and cultural behavior.

The same thing that is expressed by Giddens in (Itulua-Abumere, 2013) who argued that ethnicity refers to *cultural practice and outlooks that distinguish a given community of people*. Giddens explained that members of an ethnic group see themselves as culturally different from other social groups. In addition, he also said that Many different characteristics may serve to distinguish ethnic groups from one another, but the most usual are language, history, or ancestry (real or imagined) religion, and style of dress or adornment. In line with Giddens’ thought, Zhang (2019) argued that ethnicity refers to cultural practices and views that distinguish a given community from the others. He explained that members of an ethnic group see themselves as culturally different from other groups. Moreover, many different characteristics can serve to differentiate ethnic groups from one another, but the most common are language, history or ancestry, religion, and style of dress/ adornment.

22 Interview with Y, 20 January 2017

Between Maluku and Java or *cele* and *batik*, both have different characteristics, and both are means of representation of their respective groups even though in the end *batik* has become a national cultural representation supported by philosophical power that can be properly explained. However, for certain ethnic groups it is understood as cultural domination and hegemony. Like the effort to construct *cele* as part of the Moluccan localism, what has also emerged is cultural representation and domination due to the penetration of the government through the “*cele*” policy which is coercive for the whole society regardless of the diversity aspects that exist. In other words, *cele* in principle does not represent the entire ethnic groups and religions in Maluku, including history, culture, and tradition.

The results of the discussion related to the research on localism versus nationalism among Moluccan scholars who studied in Java show that they have different cultural knowledge and insights about *cele* and *batik*. Different reasons also emerge which state the choice of *batik* and *cele* as a means of bodily expression. In general, wearing *batik* is an option rather than *cele*, for various reasons. The research findings indicate that one of the fundamental reasons is related to the cultural aspect in which *cele* is phenomenal in the Muslim and Christian communities of Maluku. *Cele* is more familiar with Christian locus, although culturally and philosophically they are unable to explain the presence of *cele* in their cultural context. Benedict Anderson writes about this theory, suggesting that this fact can be called false consciousness due to wearing *cele* without understanding its philosophy.

CONCLUSION

Contestation between local and foreign cultural values can occur in a short period of time between people as interconnectedness has never been prevalent in this area. Dialectics between the *Batik* and the Moluccans, for example, has resulted in new cultural consciousness leading to the *batik* becoming familiar to them. On the other hand, *cele*, which is considered a local culture, has yet to be a habitus for the Moluccans. Therefore, efforts to maintain local tradition of “*cele*” are made through the policy of the “*cele* movement” which has unconsciously perpetuated colonial culture with the tradition of the “*cele*” symbol that represents other cultural entities. Deterministic policies have also influenced the Moluccan people, including Moluccan scholars, regarding *cele* which is worn once a week during their time away from home. They wear *cele* due to instruction not a habitus. Therefore, this movement has resulted in a form of false consciousness. The context of the Moluccan people as a multicultural society, both in terms of religion, culture, language and *adat*

(customary practices), is a necessity. This is an inevitable socio-cultural fact and is not the result of construction. On the other hand, placing *cele* in the context of the Moluccan universality and forcing it to become a shared culture is the result of identity construction born through government intervention and penetration through the use power as a tool. Campus communities, schools, and offices become arenas for identity construction due to penetration and intervention by power. The impact of this policy is that the wearing of *cele* garment is not due to cultural consciousness but pressure from the authorities through policies. Therefore, making *cele* an identity construction tool does not give birth to the consciousness of cultural identity of the Moluccan people whose characteristics are heterogenous.

Particularly in the cultural context, *cele* is not familiar to Muslim communities on the islands of Maluku. The Muslim and Christians Maluccans who come from the Southeast, Buru Island, or outside the Central Moluccan region do not recognize the *cele* culture, regarding it as the identity of “the other”. Therefore, the *cele* movement which in terms of politics and power can penetrate schools and offices is seen as a means of cultural representation, which is at the same time a form of symbolic violence that is domination and hegemony both culturally and religiously. It can be understood that culture is not only limited to performance, but also rooted in ideology and containing philosophy. This is not found in the *cele* tradition in Maluku. People wear it but do not understand its ideological and philosophical values. Therefore, cultural education must be created as a conscious effort in the community for interpreting identity. Learning from the *batik* for the Javanese people, there is a political element to make *batik* a representation of Indonesian nationalism. However, on the other hand, the cultural education process about *batik* is running well, so that the philosophical values of the *batik* can be identified not only by Javanese people where *batik* originates, but also by those from other communities who wear it. Cultural education emphasizes the ideological aspects behind culture so that the philosophical dimensions of that culture can be learned and explained.

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ISLAMIC MANUSCRIPTS OF MERANAW MUSLIMS IN MINDANAO: AN INQUIRY OF THE RICHNESS OF THE INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE¹

Labi Hadji Sarip Riwarung

*Chairman Folklore Division, Mamitua Saber Research Center, Mindanao State
University*

Email: labiriwarung@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

This inquiry on the Islamic manuscripts intends to illuminate the rich artistic and intellectual writing traditions of the Meranaw Muslims in the Philippines. These Meranaw manuscripts play an important role in guiding people's lives as a source of religious knowledge that reflects people's thoughts and aspirations. Moreover, these manuscripts are additionally an important source of knowledge in understanding people's culture, history, and relationships with other nations, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, and more. These manuscripts are handwritten in Arabic script called batang a Arab or in Jawi or kirim. Some of these manuscripts are the handwritten Qur'an, kisas (Islamic stories), prayer scrolls, medicinal manuscripts or mga bolongs, book of kakasi (book of charms), and the ilmo extreme unction and other Islamic manuscripts of importance to the Meranaw. There are also Islamic manuscripts that are written in stencil and printed like the Parokonan, the introductory guide to prayer, Alipalipan (a book for beginners of the Arabic alphabet), Mawlid/ Barsindi (the devotional song about Prophet Muhammad (P.U.H)), Taabir Mimpi (the book of prophecy), qira'a, Sarf, and Tajwid. To the Meranaws, manuscripts are family belongings with great personal value. They are a family treasure handed down from generation to generation and strictly guarded with great care. Families cover the manuscripts with cloth or skin of an animal for protection and lock them in a chest so

¹ This paper is based on the research undertaken by the researcher in the different archival libraries that were mentioned earlier. It is also based on the paper that I presented in the 2019 Majlis Ilmu in Brunei Darussalam. It is supplemented by interviews with Ustadz, Imam, and other individuals knowledgeable in Islam. I would like to express my thanks and gratitude to the following: To the MSU system President Habib W.Macaayong, DPA, Vice-Chancellor for Research, Extension and Development, Dr. Cesar De la Seña, and Director of Research Dr. Fema M. Abamo for allowing me to attend this conference of Seminar Majelis Ilmu in which I got some valuable comments for the paper. To Dr. Eugene Torres, Assistant Dean of the College of Social Sciences, who patiently edited my paper. To Prof. Midori Kawashima, my project collaborator in studying Islamic manuscript. To the custodian of the different archival library. To the Ulama, Ustadj, and Imam whom I interviewed, especially to my uncle, Aleem Abdullah Abubacar, for explaining to me the meaning of some of the kitabs. To the conference organizers and convener for inviting me to present a paper, thanks to all of you. Allah bless us all. To the three professors of the Mindanao State University: Prof. Adam Acmad, Prof. Tirmizy Abdullah. and Prof. Shaha Dianalan Mustapha thank you for the peer review of this paper.

that they will be accessed only by their family. This research paper presents the Islamic Manuscript of the Meranaw, describes its characteristics and contents to explain the tremendous value to the Meranaw Society, hence the richness of the archival libraries mentioned.

Keywords: Islamic manuscript; Meranaw; Mindanao; intellectual heritage.

INTRODUCTION

Meranaw refers to the people inhabiting the Lake Lanao area, in the island of Mindanao in the southern part of the Philippines. Meranaw, as the people are called, is also the name of the language that they speak. They are one of the largest among the thirteen Muslim ethno-linguistic groups in the country, with an estimated population of 1,142,000 (1.2% of the Philippine population). Historically, the Meranaw were the last major Philippine group to embrace Islam in the late 14th century, and the most successful in resisting the Spaniards. They are Sunni Muslims, with evidence of minor Shiite and Sufi influence. There are also a considerable number of Shia in the Province of Lanao del sur and part of Lanao del Norte (Mackaughan, 1996).

The Meranaw have an important writing tradition indicated by the existence of numerous prized handwritten manuscripts found within the community. As other handwritten manuscript found in the history of human life, the Meranaw manuscripts are very unique. It is also understood that almost every manuscript carries a different sense of heritage within (Sintang et.al., 2020). The Meranaw manuscripts are also different from the manuscripts of other ethnic groups in the Philippines. These manuscripts refer to those materials written by hand in the Arabic, Malay, and Meranaw languages using Arabic-based script such as *batang a Arab* (Arabic Alphabet), *Jawi*, and *kirim* (system of writing of the Meranaw using the Arabic Alphabet because there are classical Meranaw that cannot be translated to Arabic). Lack of studies have been published on these collections of the manuscript. This paper intends to provide a close look into the collections of the manuscript in which intellectual heritage of Muslim Meranaw is being the focus of the analysis.

This article is based on a research project that describes the contents and characteristics of the Islamic Manuscripts of the Meranaw found in the archival materials of Guro Sa Masiu in Taraka, Lanao del Sur, the collection of Sheik Muhammad Said bin Imam sa Bayang at the Al-Imam As-Sadiq (A.S.) Library Barangay Biaba, Marawi City, the collection of Kamilol Islam Society,

Mapandi, Marawi City, and the Maisie Van Vactor Collection of Maranao Materials in the Arabic Script at the Gowing Memorial Research Center at Dansalan College in Marawi City. Hence, these archival materials enhance our understanding of Islamic civilization, reaffirming its richness.

MERANAW ISLAMIC MANUSCRIPTS

The study of Islamic manuscripts is very important in the history of the people and society, including its relationship with neighboring countries (Mahrus et.al., 2020; Rahmi et.al., 2020). Meranaw manuscripts are precious gems and important cultural heritage of Mindanao people to be preserved for future generations. These manuscripts are an important source of knowledge in understanding their culture, history and their relationship with other countries such as Malay, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, and other Islamic countries. Manuscripts also guide the development of their lives as well as their communities both for the present and incoming generations. They are a treasure of the family that cannot be bought by money because they are works of their forefathers, which are irreplaceable.

Some of the most important Islamic manuscripts of the Meranaw which are covered in this study include the handwritten of the Quran, prayer scroll, *Ilmo* (manuscripts for extreme unction), *Bolong* (Medicinal Manuscript), book of *Kakasi* (the Book of Charms), *Mawlid (Barsindi)*, and *Taabir Mimpi* (Book of Prophecy). Those manuscripts carry religious and cultural insights of the people of the Meranaw Muslims in Mindanao. This study tries to explore intellectual heritage covered by those collections of Islamic manuscripts and each's detailed content where readers can understand the text and context of the collections in relation to the basis of community in which they are produced. This article also provides the detail of each manuscript to better understand the root of the intellectual claims contained within.

ISLAMIC MANUSCRIPTS AS THE SOURCE OF INTELECTUAL HERITAGE

To understand the intellectual properties of a manuscript, looking closely to the formal objects being discussed within the thorough detail of the manuscript is the required first step (Patmawati & Wahida, 2018). And Manuscripts also carry important materials that become human heritages as they are originated from human cultures (Amin, 2014; Syarif, 2020). In the following session I intend to provide explanations for eight important manuscripts from the Meranaw Muslim collection in Mindanao.

1. Handwritten Qur'an.

The Qur'an is very much respected by the Meranaw because they believe that it is the word of Allah and believe in the *Barakah* of the Qur'an. According to Hadji Amer Guro sa Masiu², large copies of printed Qur'an were brought to the people of Lanao in the past. There used to be four handwritten Qur'an in Lanao, one in each pengampong (Riwarung, 2012).³ They are *Mokadam* for the Unayan Pengampong; *Maradika* for the Masiu Pengampong; *Dibolodan* for the Bayabao Pengampong; and *Kiraat* for the Baloi Pengampong.

One of these handwritten Qur'ans is owned by Guro sa Masiu in the municipality of Taraka, Lanao del Sur. This Qur'an was written by Maayod (Riwarung, 2012a)⁴, the second Guro sa Masiu. Maayod copied the text of the Qur'an from another Qur'an manuscript, written by *Abdul Carim Tuan Si sa Balabagan*. The scriptorium in copying the Qur'an was in *Wato-Lombayao*, because he was married to a lady from *Lombayao* while writing the manuscript. This handwritten manuscript is part of the cultural heritage of the descendants of Guro sa Masiu. Whoever gets enthroned with the title of *Guro sa Masiu*, will be entrusted as the new custodian of the manuscript set. The manuscript is estimated to be more than one hundred years old, based according to estimates from Muhammad Amer Guro sa Masiu, the Fifth Guro sa Masiu.

The Qur'an is 28.8 cm long and 18.7 cm wide. The number of pages is approximately 870 with 13 lines per page. Two types of paper are used - the first 710 pages are made from *karatas a probinsiya* (provincial paper) and the remainder is made from locally produced paper. The paper used has no watermarks. The Qur'an is bound by thread though some papers have fallen apart. There are illuminated pages that use black and red ink. Another handwritten Qur'an manuscript is the Qur'an of Bacong, Marantao, named *Dibolodan*. According to Tirmizy Abdullah (2012),⁵ *Dibolodan* was the name given to the Qur'an by the community, which implies that it is recognized by the people in the area. Before the Marawi siege, the Qur'an is kept under the custody of the former *Bai a Labi sa Bacong, Faridah Tanggo Abdullah*. In the

² Guro sa Masiu, The fifth Guro sa Masiu, the custodian of Guro sa Masiu archival materials. He is 74 years old and an Arabic teacher in Taraka, Lanao del Sur.

³ *Pengampong* is the social unit in the traditional ruling system in Lanao, consisting of four geographical areas, each of which is governed by four dynastic family. See Labi Riwarung (2012: 29).

⁴ Maayod, the second Guro sa Masiu who scribed the Qur'an of Guro sa Masiu. See Labi Riwarung (2012a: 29).

⁵ Tirmizy E. Abdullah. "*Dibolodan: The Qur'an of Bacong, Marantao*," in Midori Kawashima(ed). "*The Qur'an and Islamic Manuscripts of Mindanao*, Monograph Series No.10 (Tokyo: Institute of Asian Cultures, Sophia University, 2012), PP.27-28.

olden times, the Qur'an *Dibolodan* was used to settle disputes over land, both in *Bacong* and in other communities. Whichever of the conflicting parties swore in the Qur'an that their claim is true then, they assume the ownership of the land. However, if that person is lying, and he swore in the *Dibolodan* Qur'an, it is expected that person will receive the curse of the Qur'an. People believed in the *barakah* that the Qur'an possesses (Institute of Asian, African and Middle Eastern Studies, 2019).

The third handwritten Qur'an is the *Maradika*, the *Qur'an of Bayang*. The term *Maradika* is a Meranaw word meaning freedom. Midori Kawashima (2012)⁶ undertakes research on this Qur'an. Based on her research, the Qur'an is written by Sayyidna, an Islamic Ulama in Lanao who studied in Mecca for seven years. Sayyidna was popularly known as *Haji sa Binidayan*, a municipality in the province of Lanao del Sur. The Qur'an does not indicate the date it was written, but according to Alim Usman Imam (Kawashima, 2011a)⁷, it is between the 18th century and the 19th century. It is also said to have been copied by Haji Muhammad Sayyid, or Sayyidna, during his sojourn at Palembang on his journey home. The paper used in the Qur'an is European and in relatively good condition, though some parts are brittle. Kawashima (2012a) also mentioned that most of the pages are intact. The watermarks found on most of the pages, include fleur-de-lis, the inscription PRO PATRIA, and the words C & I HONIG ZOONEN (Riwarung, 2012).⁸ The cover is made of same type of paper that is used for the main text. The illuminated pages use black and red ink. Gold powder is also used in some of the illuminations. The *Maradika* Qur'an was confiscated as a triumph trophy of the victory of the soldiers during the battle of Bayang, occurring May second and third 1902, when the people of Bayang and other Meranaw datus in the nearby municipalities in the Lanao del Sur province joined and fought the invading American forces headed by Col. Frank D. Baldwin. However, this Qur'an was returned to the Philippines and its photocopy is now preserved at the National Museum of the Philippines. Please refer to figure 3 for the picture of the Qur'an of Bayang.

Aside from the aforementioned handwritten Qur'an there are also other Qur'an that have not been researched yet. Guro sa Masiu made mention of the

⁶ Midori Kawashima, "*Maradika: The Qur'an of Bayang*," in Midori Kawashima (ed). "*The Qur'an and Islamic Manuscripts of Mindanao*, Monograph Series No.10 (Tokyo: Institute of Asian Cultures, Sophia University, 2012), PP.5-17.

⁷ Alim Usman Imam. The informant in the Qur'an of Bayang. He is a direct descendant of Sayyidna. See kawashima p. 6

⁸ Labi Hadji Sarip Riwarung. "*The Qur'an and Prayer Scroll of Guro sa Masiu*," in Kawashima (ed). "*The Qur'an and Islamic Manuscripts of Mindanao*, Monograph Series No.10 (Tokyo: Institute of Asian Cultures, Sophia University, 2012), PP.29-31.

Qur'an named *Istanbul* which is under the custody of the family of Makalawan. The *Dunam*, *Stanbul*, *Makasiran*, and *Lokusamama*. Kawashima (2011) made mention of a printed Qur'an named "Ganassi" which Sayyidna presented to his wife *Bai sa Ganassi*. Aside from those aforementioned Qur'ans, there is also the Qur'an of Sheik Ahmad Basher, a famous *ulama* in the province of Lanao del Sur. He is a graduate of Madrasa Saulatiya in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. He led an Islamic reformist movement and founded the *Madrasah majlis al-shura* Islamic School, run by the council of the Agama Society. The school uses Arabic as the medium of instruction. It also uses the same curriculum and textbooks of Islamic schools in the Middle East. Manuscripts of Sheik Ahmad Basher are housed at the school named Jamiatu Muslim Mindanao, founded by Sheik Ahmed Basher.

2. Prayer Scroll.

This Islamic manuscript is in the archival materials of Guro sa Masiu Hadji Muhammad Amer in the Municipality of Taraka, Lanao del Sur. The scroll contains an elaborate illustration of a building, flagpole, parasol bird and seven layers of umbrella pole with a bird atop. It depicts the different layers of the places in paradise. The other side depicts the mythical serpent dragon (*monkar*), a creature associated with the Day of Judgment. This is rolled and placed in a bamboo tube, so that it is well preserved. Please, refer to figure 4.

3. Kissa or the Islamic Stories.

These Islamic stories are important to the Meranaws because the manuscripts can be an important source of knowledge in understanding their culture, Islamic history, and their relationship with the other parts of the World such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunie Darussalam and the Middle East (Fathurahman at.al., 2019). One very popular *kissa* among the Meranaws is the Baraperangan (Kawashima, 2012).⁹ This is an Arabic story about the martyrdom of Amir Husain, the son of Fatima (peace be upon her), the daughter of Prophet Muhammad SAW, and Ali (R.A.). This Islamic story was translated into Meranaw by Ustadaj Abdulhalim Pengginagina Amboloto and Guro Alim sa Bayang. This is a printed manuscript, but I included it because the two *ulamas* copied them from the original context. *Baraperangan* means fighting in the path of Allah. This Manuscript enhances our understanding of Islamic thoughts, teaching the value of struggle in the path of Allah. It also teaches

⁹ Kawashima, M. (2012). "*Baraperangan*: A Commentary with Excerpts, in Midori Kawashima(ed)A Catalogue of the Maisie van Vactor Collection of Maranao Materials in the Arabic Script at the Gowing Memorial research Center, Monograph Series No. 6. pp. 65-85.

the concept of social order. This refers to the rewards given to those who fight in the path of Allah. This motivates them to propagate the importance of defending the Muslim community against outside aggression.

Another popular *Kissa* of the Meranaw is *Ama I Sumpa* (Riwarung, 2012)¹⁰, or the father of beard (Abu Lihiya). This became popular among the Meranaw, the Maguindanaon, and the Tausug in the 1970s. The story was translated by Sheik Guro a Alam. He purchased the story from Mecca when he was assigned by the Philippines Pilgrimage Authority as a member of an advance party in order to make arrangement for the accommodation of Philippine pilgrims. While waiting for the Philippine pilgrims, he usually bought some stories in a store near *Masjid al-haram*, including this one. On their way home to the Philippines on a boat named Lydia, Guro a Alam narrated the *kissa* in three different language: Maguindanao, Meranaw and Tausog. Hence, the *kissa* become popular. The Kamilol Islam Society or the Ma'ahad Kamilul Islam, were publishing a series of *kissa* in Meranaw at that time. Their objective in publishing Islamic stories is to provide the Muslim masses with books that were easy to understand and entertaining. It also aims to instill Islamic values and in their readers' minds. Moreover, reading and listening to the *kissa* of *Ama I Sumpa* develops a good moral character in people, that would serve as model from which the Maranaw could learn. Another popular Islamic story is the *Samer*, popularized by Aleem Kunug Pumbaya. He translated the Islamic story of Joha to the Meranaw version called Samer.

There were around 33 titles and 220 volumes of these Islamic stories at the Gowing Memorial Research Center in Marawi City but many were destroyed during the Marawi siege. There are also other collections of *Kissa* owned by private individuals. All these Islamic stories teach moral lessons both to the leaders and the people. These also teach the value of education and patience.

4. *Ilmo* or manuscripts for extreme unction.

In the olden times, there were only few ulama or educated persons in Islamic Teachings. Thus, people were very eager to pay a visit when they heard the arrival of an ulama in a certain place. It is because Meranaw are very much concerned about life after death. This manuscript about dying is extremely private, and the owner takes extra care to ensure it is studied appropriately

¹⁰ Riwarung, L.H.S. (2012) "Ama I Sumpa: The background and Synopsis, in Midori Kawashima(ed). A Catalogue of the Maisie van Vactor Collection of Maranao Materials in the Arabic Script at the Gowing Memorial research Center, Monograph Series No. 6. pp. 53-64.

by those who interact with it. This is the one they would search for when an *ulama* or learned person in Islam has arrived from Mecca. The *ilmo* contains the text of the words they want to utter at the last breath of a person. When the *ulama* is asked to impart this *ilmo* to a certain individual, they must look for most auspicious day. This is usually done at night, when people, dogs, and cats alike are asleep. They will pull down mosquito net so that there will be no distraction. The *guro* can properly impart the knowledge to the learner.

5. *Bolong* or Medicinal Manuscript. According to the Meranaw, there are people who are possessed by an evil spirit and cannot be cured with medicines only. There are manuscripts that need to be recited to drive away evil spirits. An example is the manuscript that drive away rats so that rice fields will not be infected with rats. The practice as indicated by the manuscript is commonly found with the Meranaw.

6. Book of *Kakasi* or the Book of Charms

This refers to a manuscript of becoming charming and lovable to the people.

7. *Mawlid* or *Barsindi*.

There is handwritten *mawlid* manuscript copy and there are also some printed copy. This refers to the manuscript that guided the chanter of *dikir* during the birthdate of Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W). This is a literary form of the *kitab mawlid* or homage.

8. *Taabir Mimpi* or Book of Prophecy

This is a collection of knowledge regarding the interpretation of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, lunar eclipses, good days, bad days for travelling, good colors for certain occasions, names of animals assigned to the days of the week and each month in the traditional Meranaw calendar, names to be given to the newly born babies, prophecy on the meaning of dream, and others. The Meranaw use this manuscript when somebody is going to be married, building a house and enthronement ceremony. *Taabir Mimpi* is consulted for the best and lucky day. They always aim for the best, by the grace of Allah. This is owned by Hadji Muhammad Sarip. He reproduced it by stencil and printed it in mimeographing machine owned by Sheik Abdulgani, one of the Guro in Kamilol Islam Society. All the other manuscripts such as the *alipalipan*, *parokonan*, *Qira'a*, *sarf*, and *tajwid* are intended for the education

of the Meranaw.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MANUSCRIPT

Scholars agreed to the notion that manuscripts have their own characteristics including character of writing, pattern, model, tendency and art (Asna, 2019; Amin, 2014). In the olden times, Meranaw had no system of writing, and why the Meranaw epic called *Darangen* has not been transcribed. When Islam was introduced in Mindanao in the first quarter of the 16th century, the Meranaw learned the Arabic script (Riwarung, 2017; Churchill and Borrinaga, 2017; Kawashima, 2011). The Meranaw have a style of writing called *kirim*, patterned after the Arabic alphabet or the *batang a arab*. They use the *Kirim* in writing Meranaw stories and cultural manuscripts. For the Islamic manuscript the system of writing is the *batang a arab*. The common characteristics of Islamic manuscripts are written in *Jawi* or *batang a arab*. The Meranaw manuscripts use the Meranaw language and the Islamic manuscripts use Arabic and Malay languages but translated into Meranaw language.

Important manuscripts are covered with yellow cloth (sometimes in layers or the skin of an animal), and kept in a *kaban* (chest) and locked. They cannot be accessed without the permission of the owner or his authorized person. To assure the owner that the contents of the manuscripts are kept confidential, the pages of the manuscripts are purposely disarranged to confuse the reader. Furthermore, the owner uses also a non-grammatical language which they call as *balig*. Thus, it cannot be understood without the guidance of the owner.

Some of the manuscripts, especially the Islamic stories originated from Saudi Arabia or in other Malay countries, are translated to Meranaw language so that it will be easily understood by the masses. This implies that Muslim countries are related to each other in terms of religion specially on Islamic Manuscripts. Every person wants to documents in good condition, enjoying a good life in this universe with a long life. That is why Islamic manuscripts are kept in excellent care by the owner (Riwarung, 2019).

CONCLUSION

Based on the data presented, the Meranaw in Mindanao in the southern part of the Philippines have rich cultural and Islamic history that is reflected in their written Manuscripts. They are original manuscript, though some of them have not been translated yet (many of which were from Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries). They are primary sources of information that reveal the history of a certain society. Hence, they are handed down from

generation to generation.

Islamic manuscripts mirror the past, and are important sources for the history of Mindanao and its relation to the other Islamic countries. The owner guarded them jealousy because they are the work of their ancestors which are irreplaceable. They value it very much because it marks the Islamic civilization of the people in Mindanao. This is shown in the archival materials of the mentioned libraries in the province of Lanao del sur and Marawi City. Islamic manuscripts of the Meranaw are rich because they cover all aspects of life from childhood up to the day of their last breath. I recommend that further studies on Islamic manuscripts should be undertaken.

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
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ATTACHMENTS OF PICTURES:

Picture 1 showing the Qurán of Guro sa Masiu of Taraka, Lanao del Sur and the other side is the Surah Al-Fatiha of the Qurán of Guro sa Masiu.



Picture 2 showing the Qurán Dibolodan. Picture was taken from the article of Dr. Tirmizy Abdullah.



Picture 3: The Qurán of Bayang. The collection of the author taken at the National Museum of the Philippines during her trip to Manila, November 20, 2019.



Picture 4: Prayer scroll of Guro sa Masiu, copied from my article in Sophia Journal



Picture 5: Some other manuscript of Guro sa Masiu with the Bamboo tube were the manuscript were kept for them to preserved.